Foreign Aid

Neil Edwards is an Open Source African Media Analyst at Novetta. Media analysis for this piece was enabled by Novetta data. On December 3, John Nkengasong, director of the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) announced a 60 percent vaccination target—one estimate of the level needed to achieve herd immunity from COVID-19—in Africa’s fifty-four countries. Since American and European officials have pre-purchased vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna for domestic use, African governments and the Africa CDC are being forced to find alternative vaccine supplies. The immunization drive is expected to be among the largest in the continent’s history—the first being the campaign to eradicate polio, which required 9 billion oral vaccine doses, over the course of twenty-four years. The World Health Organization’s COVAX program aims to help developing countries secure vaccines. However, the program will only cover the most vulnerable 20 percent of each country’s population. Assuming that each vaccine requires the administration of two doses, Africa, with a population of over 1.3 billion people, will need at least 1.6 billion doses to meet its 60 percent vaccination target. Africa CDC—after accounting for COVAX’s contribution—will need to secure 1.28 billion more doses at an estimated cost of $13.54 billion to close the remaining gap. More vaccines may be needed, however, as some will inevitably spoil during transport—Africa’s heat, rainy seasons, and poor road infrastructure provide logistical barriers to distribution. To make up for COVAX’s limited reach, African governments are considering deals to buy vaccines that are viewed with skepticism in the West. In particular, several governments have expressed interest in China’s leading vaccine, BBIBP-CorV, developed by the China National Pharmaceutical Group (SinoPharm); Novetta’s Rumor Tracking Program revealed that Russia’s leading vaccine, Sputnik V, also remains popular on the continent. The SinoPharm vaccine received approval for distribution on January 4 after reporting a 79 percent efficacy rate in interim late-stage trials. The vaccine is now being lined up to inoculate 50 million people in China before January 15, with second shots to be delivered before February 5—all free of charge to Chinese citizens. However, medical experts have questioned the vaccine’s safety, citing China’s unwillingness to release publicly any of their trial results. Regardless, China could use vaccine access to bolster its economic and political influence in Africa and other regions struggling to secure enough vaccines. In May, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed developing countries’ need for vaccines, offering to provide the Chinese vaccine as a “public good” at an affordable price. On October 16, Liu Jingzhen, chairman of SinoPharm, told fifty African diplomats visiting a SinoPharm vaccine factory that “after the COVID-19 vaccine is developed and put into use, it will take the lead in benefiting African countries.” Those who visited offered messages of reassurance to their citizens regarding the vaccine. James Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Ambassador to China, commented on SinoPharm’s size and experience developing vaccines on polio, yellow fever, and smallpox, stating that the visit was “an eye-opener” that led him to “hope that we get the vaccines anytime soon.” This “vaccine diplomacy” is a continuation of China’s efforts to frame itself as the solution to—rather than the cause of—the pandemic. Since the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak, China’s President Xi Jinping has focused on publicizing Chinese efforts to supply medical aid worldwide. According to state-owned China Global Television Network, an international language broadcasting network, from March to mid-October the Jack Ma Foundation delivered over four hundred tons of medical supplies across Africa, including monthly deliveries of thirty million testing kits, ten thousand ventilators, and eight million surgical masks. In addition, the Chinese government claims that it sent nearly two hundred experts to support medical personnel across the continent. China’s planeloads of COVID-19 donations—including hospital gowns, nasal swabs, and surgical masks—were initially viewed positively, especially in countries like Zimbabwe, where equipment in public hospitals has been systemically looted over the years. However, in August, a corruption scandal emerged over Jack Ma’s medical donations in Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission accused the Kenya Medical Supplies Authority of selling a consignment of medical equipment intended for the Kenyan people to a dozen Tanzanian companies in March. The scandal raised doubts over China’s ability to circumnavigate corrupt institutions and ensure that medical supplies—including vaccines—will arrive and be administered to their intended targets. In another front of China’s public-relations offensive, state-owned news outlets are suggesting the SinoPharm vaccine has technological and logistical advantages over mRNA vaccines, such as those developed by Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech. The Global Times, a Communist Party mouthpiece, emphasized SinoPharm’s use of an “inactivated” vaccine, a decades-old technique used for influenza and polio vaccinations that delivers a killed or weakened virus into the body to prompt an immune response. This was presented in contrast to Western firms using “less-proven technologies” to develop their vaccines. The Global Times further questioned whether African medical staff have the experience to deal with any adverse reactions from mRNA vaccines. Chinese media assert that distribution networks in Africa are well-established due to existing commercial ties. Alibaba, Jack Ma’s e-commerce giant, has a firm footing on the continent; the company recently struck a deal with Ethiopian Airlines to ship vaccines to Africa. Media also highlight that SinoPharm’s inactivated vaccine can be transported in affordable, off-grid refrigeration units—a genuine advantage over mRNA vaccines, which need to be stored between -20 and -70 degrees Celsius. In Africa, tropical heat and a dearth of ultra-cold freezers—the machines can go for over $15,000, more than fifteen times the cost of off-grid units—make it especially challenging to deliver mRNA vaccines to rural communities and remote islands. Yet despite Chinese media’s questioning of mRNA vaccines, one Chinese company, Fosun Pharmaceutical, partnered with Pfizer-BioNTech to develop and commercialize the mRNA vaccine that has been authorized in many Western countries. Furthermore, in December, following a strategic cooperation agreement between Fosun Pharmaceutical and SinoPharm, China agreed to receive 100 million doses of the popular mRNA vaccine—demonstrating an approach to stockpile both domestic and foreign-made vaccines. China’s vaccine diplomacy in Africa serves to be a high-risk, high-reward venture. If SinoPharm’s vaccine restores a sense of normalcy to life across Africa, China will be praised. However, if the vaccine proves ineffective or creates unforeseen health effects, China’s carefully crafted image—one based on ideals of credibility and philanthropy—could be undermined.

The Center for Preventive Action has created this resource for those seeking information and analysis about the effects of COVID-19 on peace and conflict.

Tareian King is an intern with CFR's Africa Program and a student at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. She is also the founder of Nolafrique, an e-commerce platform that enables artisans in African villages to have global exposure and opportunities for scale up. The African diaspora sends more money to Africa than U.S. foreign aid and foreign direct investment. In 2018, sub-Saharan Africa received $25 billion in development assistance. In that same year, immigrants in the United States sent $46 billion in remittances to their home countries in Africa, out of a total of $150 billion sent from the United States globally. In 2017, $85 million in remittances were sent from the United States to Senegal, the seventh-most of any country (France topped the list with almost $650 million). Remittances are the transfer of money, often by a foreign worker, to an individual in their home country. A closer look at a diaspora neighborhood in New York City helps explain that remittances are not only a form of familial aid but also an important investment vehicle that builds wealth. In Petit Senegal, on 116th street between Lenox Avenue and Frederick Douglass, the sound of English is replaced by Wolof and French. “How are you?” is transformed into “Nanga def” and “ca va?” Wolof is the native language of the Wolof people found in the Gambia, Mauritania, and Senegal. French is the language of francophone West African countries, including Senegal, which are former French colonies. American fashion—such as blue jeans and t-shirts—also disappears. Instead, people are dressed in elaborate, traditional West African textiles and fabrics. In the evening, there are Muslim men sitting outside on the sidewalk with foldable chairs drinking attaya tea, a Senegalese drink consumed after meals and with guests. Petit Senegal, located in the heart of Harlem in Manhattan, is not much different from some neighborhoods in Senegal’s capital, Dakar. The cultural link between Petit Senegal and Senegal underpins an economic one.    Petit Senegal is filled with thriving, tax-paying businesses owned and operated by Burkinabe, Gambians, Ivorians, Malians, and Senegalese, though the majority of businesses are owned and operated by the latter. Import-export businesses, supermarkets, seamstress, tailors, phone repair shops, beauty salons, bakeries, Islamic educational programs, and African goods stores fund the remittances to their respective West African countries. Senegalese immigrants have built a substantial amount of wealth for themselves, but to understand their success requires a look back to Senegal. Dakar’s real estate market grew 256 percent between 1994 and 2020, and business owners in Petit Senegal opted out of investing their profits in a house with a white picket fence in America. Instead, they opted to invest in the profitable real estate market in Dakar. Residents return home during holiday breaks to purchase their land in cash instead of sending the money via wire transfers. Once the land is acquired, they return to Petit Senegal and remittances pay for construction. Profits from these properties in Senegal are then invested in local businesses in Petit Senegal, helping them grow, and the investment cycle in Senegal continues. The goal of most residents in Petit Senegal is to build as many properties in Senegal as they can while they are in America. Mr. Jabel Cisse, a seamstress in Harlem for over twenty-five years, has built two villas and an apartment complex since immigrating to America. Mr. Muhammad Fall, the owner of an import-export business, has built two apartment complexes and is now in the process of building a hotel. While these shops are small, their owners are engaged in international business with Senegal. The people in Petit Senegal selling earrings and soaps and repairing phones are the same individuals financing real estate in Senegal. The $85 million from the United States is about 4 percent of the $2.2 billion Senegal receives as remittances, which together account for 10 percent of Senegalese GDP. One of the sources of that capital, diaspora communities like Petit Senegal, are a natural bridge between the U.S. and their home countries. They know the risks and customs of the market, have local contacts, and know how to invest in their countries in profitable ways. As foreign aid budgets are cut or threatened and immigrants find financial success, remittances have grown in importance; so, too, should the diaspora communities that pay for them.

A new report by Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein offers a comprehensive overview of how countries around the world are integrating gender equality as a foreign policy priority, and how the United States can advance security and economic growth by drawing on the benefits of women’s empowerment globally.

Stephanie Hanson is the senior vice president of policy and partnerships at One Acre Fund, an agriculture organization serving one million farmers in Africa. The COVID-19 pandemic poses challenges for African agriculture. Farming is the dominant way people in sub-Saharan Africa earn their living and feed their families. But government restrictions on movement designed to slow the spread of COVID-19 have made the daily activities of African farmers more difficult and may well lead to a reduction in the production and availability of food in markets. For example, purchasing seed and fertilizer is more difficult when many agrodealer shops are closed. Obtaining financing to purchase that seed and fertilizer is harder when microfinance organizations are not making new loans. Selling vegetable crops at market can be impossible when markets are closed or curfews limit transportation options to reach markets. In addition, East African farmers are also dealing with a second plague of locusts, a once-in-a-generation scourge that could decimates crops across the region. Though it is still early, the anecdotal evidence is worrisome. There are signs that local food prices are increasing in some countries and reports from farmers that lockdown measures have reduced their ability to grow and sell their produce. In Nigeria, for example, rice farmers are having trouble getting rice to market because of increased transport prices and unclear security regulations further inhibit the movement of food to urban markets. African governments in many countries, including Rwanda and Kenya, have made encouraging steps to allow the agriculture sector to continue to operate during lockdowns and movement restrictions, including recognizing agriculture as an “essential service.” But even in countries where agriculture has been designated an essential service, farmers and other actors in the agriculture sector find themselves uncertain of what’s allowed and what isn’t. In particular, more clarity is urgently needed for transport linkages that bring farm inputs to the last mile and farm production to consumers. Once African governments clearly define these rules, they need to work effectively with local government and local security officials to make sure those rules are implemented correctly. If national government gives farmers an exemption from a curfew to transport crops to market early in the morning, local police need to understand that exemption and allow farmers to reach those markets. International donors should prioritize support for African farmers because African governments have a limited ability to cushion the economic shock of COVID-19 on them. As a result, donors and governments should work together to keep financing flowing to farmers over the next twelve to eighteen months, a critical period for the next two growing seasons. As the Rural and Agriculture Finance Learning Lab suggests, bridge loans and first-loss guarantees can help incentivize financial institutions that provide credit to farmers to continue doing so through the pandemic. Focusing COVID-19 emergency aid on farmers now will reduce the amount of humanitarian food aid required as the pandemic continues, and help to prevent a health crisis from becoming a food security crisis.

As the coronavirus pandemic increases the need for aid around the world, donors are facing tough choices over whether to continue helping vulnerable populations abroad or focus their attention at home.

This post is part of an interview series on Gender Equality in Foreign Policy, featuring global and U.S. officials leading initiatives to promote gender equality in their areas.

Alexander H. Noyes is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. After thirty-seven years in power, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was toppled via a military coup in November 2017. His successor and former vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, promised a break from Mugabe’s authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement, declaring a “new Zimbabwe” that is “open for business.” After two years in power, to what extent has Mnangagwa delivered on his promises? In short, it’s bleak.   In a RAND study published this week—based on interviews I conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe, with politicians across the political spectrum—I systematically assess Zimbabwe’s political and economic reform efforts that Mnangagwa has been touting over the past two years. I found very little genuine progress, along with an uptick in repression and a rapidly declining economy that is near collapse.   On the political front, reform promises are severely lagging. The report assesses five main reform areas, including elections, legislation, the security sector, judiciary, and repression. The research revealed very few tangible steps toward reconfiguring Zimbabwe’s autocratic system. Repression has increased and the military is ascendant.    Despite some progress in certain areas, Mnangagwa’s economic reform efforts are either incomplete or falling short across a variety of sectors. A new currency regime has been hit by runaway inflation, corruption continues unabated, land reform is incomplete, the mining sector is increasingly militarized, and the privatization of state assets has been fraught with false starts. Rampant political interference and intraparty splits underlie the country’s stunted progress. As an adviser to Mnangagwa put it: “Politics dictates and distorts economics” in Zimbabwe.   Although Mnangagwa has repeatedly deployed flowery reform rhetoric, his administration’s piecemeal actions belie any movement toward genuine political or economic reform. There is a wide gap between the government’s reform rhetoric and the reality on the ground. The government’s well-rehearsed slogans appear to be largely political theater targeted at the international diplomatic community and potential investors. Even where limited progress has been made, such steps appear to be largely cosmetic. A serving member of parliament characterized Mnangagwa’s political reform efforts as putting “mascara on a frog.”   With the old guard and the military still firmly in power—and both benefiting from their perches atop the highly cartelized-and patronage-based economy—genuine reform is unlikely in the next one to three years under present conditions in Zimbabwe. The country is likely to continue down a path of political polarization, protests, political violence at the hands of the state, and economic deterioration.   Zimbabwe has tremendous potential, with rich natural resources and one of the most educated populations in Africa. How can the United States and international actors help arrest this downward spiral and support Zimbabwe’s recovery? Although Zimbabwe does not have much strategic value to the United States, America is the largest bilateral donor to Zimbabwe and holds some leverage.   Politics and economics are inextricably linked in Zimbabwe and the country will be unable to recover unless the two sectors are addressed in tandem. To help the country recover from years of mismanagement, corruption, and state violence, international actors—including the United States—would be wise to push the government in a coordinated fashion to implement genuine political, economic, and security reforms.   Genuine reforms would go a long way toward putting Zimbabwe on a democratic path, lessening high levels of political polarization, and repairing the collapsing economy. A good starting point would be pushing the government to respect its own constitution, allow for peaceful protest, fully repeal repressive laws, and hold security forces accountable for human rights abuses and the killing of unarmed civilians. International democracy and governance assistance should be increased, with a particular focus on professionalizing political parties. A cooling-off period of one to five years before military officials can join politics would also help to disincentivize more coups and security sector involvement in political processes.   The international community should also proceed with extreme caution on economic support for the government, withholding support for debt relief or any new lending until clear and unambiguous progress has been made on reforms and respect for human rights.   Mnangagwa is attempting to have his cake and eat it too, paying lip service to reforms in the hope of securing international support but staunchly refusing to implement any measures that might harm his and his closest supporters’ political and economic interests.