Conflict Prevention

In the midst of breaking news stories about the Syrian war, the voices of Syrian women remain absent, despite their contributions to advancing peace in local communities across the country. Rula Asad and Mariam Jalabi give a first-hand account of life in Syria today. They reflect on organizing for human rights and justice in the midst of Syria’s protracted war, and the opportunities they see for the future, both within Syria and for displaced populations in Lebanon and Turkey. This meeting is part of a high-level series in collaboration with the Compton Foundation, to explore new strategies for security. Transcript BIGIO: Good afternoon. Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. We’re so glad that you all could join us for this session today with Rula and Mariam. My name is Jamille Bigio. I’m a senior fellow with the Council’s Women and Foreign Policy program. Our program has worked with leading scholars for 15 years now to analyze how elevating the status of women and girls advances U.S. foreign policy objectives, including prosperity and stability. I want to take a moment before we begin to thank our advisory council members who are here with us today, as well as the Compton Foundation for its generous support for today’s discussion. I also want to remind everyone that the presentation as well as the discussion and the question and answer period will be on the record. Before we begin the discussion, let’s recall that the Syrian conflict is entering its eighth year, with over 400,000 people killed, and 11 million people displaced from their homes to date. Reports are that close to 1,300 people have been killed since the latest UN ceasefire resolution was adopted just a few weeks ago. In fact, there is an escalation in violence as Russia and the Syrian government pursue offensive operations in the suburbs of Damascus. This uptick in violence underscores the dire need for diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the conflict, and yet we’ve seen negotiations falter. The latest round of both UN-led and Russian-led talks were unsuccessful. And the voices of Syrian women remain absent, despite all that they have done and that they are doing today to advance peace and security across the country. Today we’re thrilled to be joined by two Syrian women who are working on some of the most pressing issues in Syria today. We have Rula Asad, who is the founder and executive director of the Syrian Female Journalists’ Network. And we have Mariam Jalabi, who wears two hats. She is a founding member of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement and is also the representative of the Syrian Opposition Coalition to the United Nations, so here in New York. Rula, let’s start with you first. In the midst of breaking news stories about the war, there are few journalists reporting on the particular experiences of Syrian women and girls, of what their lived realities are today. And so can you share, what do you see from your own work, from your journalist networks, of what the situation is for Syrian women and girls on the ground now? ASAD: Sure. Thank you for having me today. Actually, through our work as journalists, we thought all the time we can—even we are a citizen of a certain country, we have a better eye to report about issues. But since the media has changed, and especially in a zone where there is a conflict, media become a part of the civil society. And because of this division in Syria, I mean, no journalist outsider can enter. The journalists have been targeted from the regime and other armed groups since the beginning. So now the citizen who is really reporting about very detailed issue from inside Syria. So because of our work in the place, in the middle between women movement in Syria but also as a media. So we are trying to develop the media to bring more women voices and women’s story to the media. We find out, like, even us, as journalists from the same country, we can’t see the same issues. A lot of citizen journalists we trained during the last five years, because we established in 2013, they report issue, for example, now the problem of documentation. So, like, maybe they’re poor and then they don’t have any access to institution to register their babies. And then there is no access to health care. There is no access to education. And then you can imagine for—I mean, what kind of life is waiting people without documentation, and what kind of suffer, like, the mother, the woman, is facing during this journey to get a paper for a born baby. So that’s one of the issues, but it’s not the only one. I mean, again, people who are displaced from area to the other area, also they don’t have their space or a place to go to send their children to education. And education is very important because now we have a thousand of children without schooling. And that’s, I mean, inside Syria, outside Syria, in the refugee camp. Issues like child marriage, for example. It’s one of the issue reported from different areas within the country. And how the legal—I mean, supporting such a decision, I mean, the judge even in the courts within the government-controlled area, they are—still they are saying child marriage is acceptable according to sharia. And the citizen journalists trying to bring more and more stories to say we have to start from here, I mean, for the basic rights. Freedom of movement from a neighborhood to the other neighborhood, it’s much more harder for women alone than for a man—a young man alone or old man alone. All this is stories. I mean, and the long—I mean, with all basic needs for girls and women have been reported from other citizen because they have the skills how to report about the issue, to write a blog. And many of these blogs and stories within the Syrian media outlet, I mean, the alternative media established after 2011, as react of the governmental media who controlled any news coming from the country. They start to report about every single details about, for example, how people together living in a certain area, whether this place, whether they are Arabs or Kurds. Such, I mean, stories, we didn’t read it before in Arabic, first, or in the Syrian outlet. So through all this, I mean, work—great work from citizen journalists—and even they are sacrificing their lives, for example, giving us such a story because they are challenging all the authority in their area. Sometimes if a young female journalist with a cellphone going outside to take a photo of—a photo of (gravity ?), for example, she is in trouble. The armed group, they will take her phone for two days. And then she has to pay money to release her phone. And she has to come with a man to guarantee, like, she is not going to do such a thing again. So from our work, it’s not only the story we are offering, but also the situation and the safety of female journalists doing such work, it’s something we realize—even I am journalist myself. I travel to—I mean, I report from Syria, from Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. But still, when I learned from other colleague what kind of challenge they have, I mean, I feel like what a great people we have inside country. They have us that much hope to continue working as civil activists, as civil—as a society to bring more stories. Because so far, it has been said, the conflict in Syria have been documented—the most documented conflict in the world because of people using all technology, even the technology turned out to be against them sometimes—like, having been tracked very easy, being arrested, et cetera. BIGIO: So what is your hope with all the risks that are being taken, as you said, to share these stories, to share these experiences, to get this out there. What is your hope of what’s then done with it, of how can it be better lifted up or better—you know, more attention paid to the experiences that people are risking their lives to share? ASAD: Right. Actually, so far the citizen of the world get very exhausted from Syrian conflict. We know that. It’s a lot of information we are sending out to the world. And many people, they start to be very, very tired of following any kind of a news from Syria. All these stories deserve to be continue—to be continued published, but also the people to continue to be supported. So if we don’t save the life of those people and give them all the capacity to continue their work, to make sure they are safe on the ground, to make sure this media outlet, they are able to continue their work, they have a freedom of movement in exile, especially in the neighboring country in Syria, well, this story would be part of one of other conflict, you know. We will look back to read it in—after 20 years. But it’s not anymore, I mean, acceptable for any journalist, any citizen in the world care about other people, because now we are connected. It’s not like something that’s happened in Syria, oh, that’s very far away from here. It’s nothing. It’s affecting everyone’s life, I mean, in the world. And with all this, I mean, connection and technology, people inside Syria, they know they can use it. And they believe people on the other side, they are in solidarity with them. They believe their story even there were a lot, for example, regime tried, and Russians said, like, White Helmet, they are a terrorist organization. This is fake news, et cetera. But, I mean, eight years of revolution—for people, it is revolution. Probably now we see only fighting, but if we look to the—what a change in the society the gender role to change to the positive, or election for women for example, and they hope it will continue after this conflict end. I mean, it’s not a fake—it’s not fake anymore. So what is needed, this story to be held and to continue, I mean, the support—to believe in the power of the citizen who are trying to sacrifice their lives, only to give you another perspective of what’s happening in Syria. It’s conflict. We know that. It’s complicated. Already we know it. Still, there are people who are trying to find their way in all this, as you said, like bloody, I mean, conflict. BIGIO: And against the backdrop of what Rula just shared are the negotiations and what’s happening at the political level. There’s at times a connection and at times a disconnect from the realities that Rula is talking about—these kind of daily tradeoffs that people are making. Mariam, before we get into the work you’ve done through the Syrian Women’s Political Movement, could you say a few words about what’s happening right now at the negotiation level between the governments and the opposition? JALABI: Thank you. And thank you for having me here. Before I go into that, I do want to remember today three people. Today marks the 7th year of the Syrian revolution. We’re entering into the eighth year. And I want to mention, just to make it a little bit more human and a little bit more real, I want to mention three people. The first one is Hamza Khateeb. Hamza Khateeb was 13-year-old when he was captured—when he was arrested by the Syrian regime in 2013, when the revolution was still peaceful. He was returned back to his family with torture signs on him, dead and a body. I don’t know how to say better English. He was given back dead to his family, and torture signs on him. He was only 13 years old. This is Hamza Khateeb. He came out in demonstration. God knows what he said—I don’t know, freedom, democracy. And he was arrested for that, and tortured, and killed for that. The other person that I want to mention is Yahya Sharbaji. Yahya Sharbaji was one of the first people who came out in peaceful demonstrations. He’s a devoted nonviolent activist who had been arrested before by the regime in 2003 because he actually had a group of people with him who cleaned the streets and who had a campaign against smoking in his neighborhood. And he was a devoted nonviolent activist when the revolution started. And it was peaceful at the beginning, nonviolent. He was on the streets telling people to give roses and flowers to the soldiers that are coming to arrest them and kill them. And one of his friends was Ghayath Mattar, who maybe you have heard of if you’re familiar with the beginnings of Syrian revolution, who was also tortured and killed in his—in prison cells in Syria. His body was given to his family three days later. Yahya Sharbaji, who I’m mentioning today, is still in prison. We don’t know what happened to him. We have no way of knowing what’s happening to him, which gives you a little bit of a detail of what’s happening in the Syrian prisons, to remember the detainees who are there, and we have no idea of what—where they are, no account for them, they are disappeared. And this is—Yahya Sharbaji is one of 250,000 people who we don’t know what happened to. About 170,000 people of them maybe we have the names of. There is another 150,000 of them that we don’t know the names of where they sent. Forcefully disappeared. The third person that I want to mention is Razan Zeitoune. Razan Zeitoune was abducted in late 2013 by an unknown group from eastern Ghouta. Razan Zeitoune was the head of the violation documentation center where we get our numbers from, the 1,300 that have been killed since the adoption of Resolution 2401, to stop—for the cession of hostilities in Ghouta. That’s the organization that she had started. She was abducted with three people, her husband, a friend, and another friend—Samira, and Nazem, and Wa’el. And we still don’t know what happened to them. These people, we don’t know who they were abducted by, because there are different groups on the ground that are behaving in illegal, unlawful ways, that could be—that is creating complicated situation on the ground. But this is all the creation of a regime that’s not able to protect its citizens. Now I go to Geneva. And today marks the 7th anniversary of Syrian revolution. Geneva, we’ve done nine rounds of talks. We have come to every talk as the Syrian opposition with willingness to sit and negotiate and engage seriously with whoever is sitting on the other side who’s willing to create a solution for Syria—to stop the killing, to stop the bombardment, to stop the refugee influx from Syria. The regime has not come to any of these rounds, especially not the last two, in any serious way, to negotiate. They come. They’re present. They skirt out the issues. They marginalize this issue and that issue. They say, oh, we have an issue with ISIS, with—not ISIS—with the terrorist groups on the ground. And they never give any official engagement or paper to discuss. While we have seriously given all of the different baskets that the special envoy, de Mistura, has proposed to us, the baskets on anti-terrorism, elections, constitution and transitional government. We have given papers. We have given our ideas. And we have fully engaged. But nothing has come out of it. So we are there right now. And what’s happening on the ground is that the regime comes, sits at Geneva, and talk and whatever they do. Meanwhile, on the ground, they’re intensifying their bombardment and their arrests and their military actions on the ground. Every time a negotiation happens people in Syria, inside, fear of what’s going to happen to them, because it has become a trend every time people sit at the table there is actually intensified bombardment by the regime and its allies. So it seems the last two rounds have demonstrated most clearly in the negotiations is that they have advanced further and further on the ground with the support of their allies, with the lack of the international community’s interest in combatting that or working against it. And they have been taking one area after the other on the ground and making military gains on the ground. So when you have a regime that feels that they have the upper hand on the ground, it becomes very difficult to bring them to a negotiation table and tell them, hey, we need to sit and negotiate with you on what could be done for the constitution, elections, and most definitely they’re not going to then discuss transition. So unless there is something that happens on the ground that changes the scenario, that changes the balance, there is no way this regime is going to come and negotiate with us. Therefore, we are at a crossroads now where if the international community is really serious about bringing a political solution, like we all want, like, for Syria to happen—like, all of you, all of the international community wants to stop this atrocities, wants to stop for a lot of different reasons, for a lot of different interests of different governments in the world, and especially the regional powers. If you want to stop this, there has to be something done on the ground to stop the regime from feeling that they have the power. I do have to mention a story here. And I take it from one of our fierce negotiators, Hadi al-Bahra, I heard him say it the other day. And I looked into it, and it’s like it’s Bouthaina Shaaban. She’s the political advisor to the Assad regime. She was in Moscow with a—in a meeting, in a conference where Lavrov, the foreign minister of Russia, and Zarif was there. Zarif is the foreign minister of Iran. And they’re sitting there and discussing issues. And they asked—they asked her something about, you know, negotiations or the political process in Syria. She didn’t mention anything about Geneva, about the political process. No reference to it whatsoever. So Bogdanov, who is the advisor to the U.N. and who is part of the Russian regime and who has been trying to work, you know, on the negotiations on the side as an advisor, asked her, like, you’re not mentioning anything about the political process about what’s happening in Geneva. So she said, why would I want to talk about a political process if we’re winning on the ground, if we have the military upper hand? Like, why would we want to do that? Like, outwardly like that—(laughs)—like it’s out in the record, you know? It’s in the conference that she was at. Bogdanov couldn’t tolerate, himself. He actually got up and he said: Well, you would not be able to make those gains on the ground if it wasn’t for our help. And I learned later also that they were not allowed—she was not given a meeting with Lavrov. I talked a lot, so I’ll stop here. I’ll let you ask further questions on the negotiations. BIGIO: It’s helpful to have that background. As you’ve said, there’s the balance between what’s happening militarily on the ground and what’s happening at the table in the negotiations—will there be a political solution or not. Against that backdrop you formed the Syrian Women’s Political Movement. What was the goal in forming that movement? How do you hope it will influence the process? JALABI: Yes. Being a woman and part of the opposition, one of the main reasons why we formed this Syrian Women’s Political Movement was the feeling that there is so much that’s happening in talk about Syria that does not include 50 percent of society. And I’m not talking just about, you know, a few people here and there. I’m talking about a majority—the majority, over 50 percent of society that are directly influenced by the crisis, by what’s happening, by every decision that’s being taken at the table. And we’re not present there. And this—I do want to mention also that it’s not just a Syrian phenomenon. This is not just because we Syrian people are incapable of including women. This is a global phenomenon when there world of politics is run by men, and it’s dominated by men. And there aren’t enough women at the table anywhere or in any decision making or policy making where they are actually sitting there to make policies that influence the wellbeing and the rights of women. So we felt that unless we’ve created a movement that’s politically oriented, we will not be able to bring those voices to the table or create any policy. And this is where I related to what Rula has said, is that there is also a little bit of a gap that we felt between what’s happening on the ground, what the civil society is doing on the ground, and the voices that are on the ground, and the suffering they have, or the messages that they have, that does not always reach to the opposition or to the people who are sitting at the table in the way that it should, and in the capacity, and in the—in the speed that it should, that we felt as women we are responsible for making that connection between the ground and what’s happening at the table, so that the decisions, the messages that are coming from women on the ground, from civil society, could be translated to a political message and put at the table to create policies that actually benefit all. BIGIO: One of the things that we’ve seen the talks shift to as well is looking at reconstruction questions. What happens after the war is on the table, even as the violence continues. There are questions about the constitution, about investments to rebuild Syria. What do you both see as the priorities, given the experiences of women and girls on the ground. Rula, do you want to start there? ASAD: Yeah. I mean, people in Syria, they are aware that the international community and U.N. are not coming to save them, because it’s already have been a lot of events and many of red line the regime has crossed. And it looks like an old story for them now. Like, there is now a chemical weapon have been thrown to Hamoria, near to—one of the eastern Ghouta village. But people who are not really—who are not directly under shelling, they are thinking about rebuilding the country already. And for I don’t know what reason, women, they are much more aware of their role for future than, I mean, the other men in the same community. So inside Syria already, people, they don’t really think about building as a building, as an investor, they are thinking about. But they know that they have to leave something to the next generation to learn from. So women, for example, even in a city like Idlib, where the regime force, for example, now there is 2,000 people has to leave—has to leave eastern Ghouta, they have to move to Idlib. The same happened in Aleppo and in Homs previously. People in that small village, crowded with people, they are aware that they have to live together first. They have to find a way to future. They are—women, they are aware that they have to fight for their voice in the local councils. Some women, they know that they have to join the police in the city. So many initiatives to peacebuilding and to reduce any tension recruiting children. So this is kind of thinking for future and how they contribute to building the country. They know—I mean, the other decision—it’s taken out of their, I mean, interest, but they still know that they are the one who’s living on that ground. And they are trying to do their own way how to leave some—I mean, already a very important heritage of Syria have been destroyed. But the people, they are still there. So this is what they are trying to contribute to rebuilding the country by what lesson learned from this. Of course, it’s not like all in the whole country is very beautiful, people they are loving each other and hugging each other. No, it’s not. But there is a lot of initiative at the same time from women and young men and women to reduce all this depression from no one is saving us to what we can contribute to the future, how we keep our voices as civilians, and to get our messages to the people—to the world is up to date. It’s not like if there is no attacks or we are silent. No, even in what’s called for them a peacetime, they also send messages like this is what we are doing and we continue doing this, even you are hesitating or you are doubting. There is civilians still living in Syria and trying to do such a way to the future. BIGIO: You talked about the idea of women taking on the mantle, serving as police officers or serving in politics in local councils. You also mentioned the idea that there has seen some opening around gender norms in society, that Syrian women are stepping into roles that they may not have had before the war started. So how can those roles be cemented, those opportunities be ensured so that women do continue to serve in these leadership roles that they’ve taken on over the course of the conflict? ASAD: Well, it’s not secret. During the conflict there is a lot of positive opportunity, but also there is a lot of negative. It’s very strange to look to this conflict from my perspective as a woman, as a journalist. It’s open to a very positive opportunity. Even that experience of being refugee in a camp in Lebanon, for example, forced women somehow to go out and to learn some skills. So this is the question now. It’s for the future. I don’t have any answer. I don’t think anyone working in my field has the answers. Is it because the conflict now the gender role is changed? And then women, when they are back for what they called previously a normal life, they will give up, say, like, we are not anymore in expected situation. Or they will fight for that? I mean, this is a question—it’s the answer held with the international organization, international—I mean, governments going to save this, it’s a change for good. So if we are not continuing, starting from my organization, not continuing working with citizen journalist, with the citizen who want to become, I mean, blogger, even when we are at this, let’s say, in a post-conflict era. So we are stupid not to do this, because it’s not—I mean, the solution, it’s not like we get rid of Assad. We know that. We are aware about that. So I think it’s very critical to think in the future, even within the international organization working in development, to think also in the future with the Syrian beneficiaries who are providing them with all this developing and empowering projects because now it’s a critical moment. So it’s really held what’s happened after. It depends on how the narrative will change. Who will lead the country? How the political solution will come to the table, et cetera, et cetera. But for sure, if there is enough solidarity, enough support, well-planned projects, I think women they will not take—will not give away what they have gained as the skills and freedom during this very tough experience being displaced or refugee or detainee or in exile, et cetera. BIGIO: Mariam, what do you think? What more can the United Nations, the U.S. government, others do to invest in a better future for Syria? JALABI: I want to comment a little bit on the reconciliation part, is that on the—I want to go back a little bit in the history of Syria. Syria is 23 million people. There were about 700 civil society groups only that were there. And just so that you can get the comparison, Egypt is 18 million but 300,000 civil society groups. And these are two communities that were under a dictatorship of a sort. But all of the civil society groups that were inside Syria, the 700, were actually under the auspices of the regime. They were controlled by the regime. And Asma Akhras, the first lady of Syria, has taken her own initiative in starting a lot of women, you know, civil society organizations and working with different groups, trying to modernize the country. So she had her hand in a lot of these organizations. So when the revolution started, what sprung up and what happened in Syria is that—with the freedoms—is the same thing that Rula was talking about, is that there is a new vision and a new space for people who did not have the space before to act, who sprung into action. And that came into this sphere of civil society groups who have started building in every level—educational level, health level, women empowerment level, on so many different organizational levels that now we have over 300—3,000 civil society groups alone that are functioning in and around Syria. So when we’re talking reconstruction, I—knowing what’s happening on the ground. We know if you’re giving it to the, like, any kind of even just early recovery—I know the EU and a lot of the Western countries keep promising that we will not give any reconstruction money to the government unless, you know, there is a transition, and there’s a lot of the stock that’s happening. But there is money that’s going inside Syria. I know, like, for sure, like, that Japan has actually made big deals with—inside Syria for electricity and power for power plants, for gas, for—like, there is so much that they have done on the ground that’s actually going through the government, that’s all done by the government. When you’re doing it through the government, you’re giving it legitimacy, you’re giving it power to oppress its people more. However, when you have this very well-established now, for the last eight years, for the last seven years, civil society, there is so much that they can give and they can add to the needs of the—the real needs of the Syrian people on the ground, the real needs of women, the real needs of children, education and health, because they are the ones who are involved in trying to rebuild on daily basis in basements, in shelters, doing education, helping people field clinics, doing everything they can from their houses, from the broken, destroyed areas that they’re living in. So those are the people who are going to rebuilt. Like, it cannot be coming through—not even international organizations because international INGOs sometimes don’t realize what’s happening on the ground. And there’s so much that goes through them that does not trickle down to the local groups that are on the ground. So anything that could happen that could help Syrians right now has to be done through that. And then, of course, like, when the transition takes place or there’s a real credible change that happens on the political scene that creates somewhat of a legitimate representation on the ground, then of course the conversation would be very different, the reconstruction would be—the conversation on reconstruction. BIGIO: It’s helpful to note—as many wonder who can they support, what can they do to help—there is a network of civil society actors who are delivering support and services and making an impact already. It’s important to know that they’re there. JALABI: Yes. BIGIO: You’re talking about the role of the U.N., and the U.S. government, and the EU, and Japan. You’ve talked about them in the context of reconstruction. What role do you see for them in the context of the negotiation and the political process? JALABI: Right now Ghouta is under severe bombardment. As you mentioned earlier, only since the adoption of Resolution 2401 there has been over 1,300 people that have been killed, over 120 children that have been killed, over 100 women that have been killed. And all of these are civilians. And this goes back to the organization Razan—to the one that was started by Razan Zeitoune, the VDC, the violation documentation center. I encourage you to go back and see the numbers that they give on daily basis and the reports that they come out with. This is a reality right now that’s happening on the ground. The regime is taking back—(inaudible). They just entered—like Rula said, they entered into Hamoria. Today there has been 3,000 people that have been displaced from their homes that have been taken somewhere into a camp. And we don’t know what’s going to happen to them. And this was done under the auspices of Russia and the regime. There was no international community presence there. There was no U.N. presence there. So when you take a Resolution like 2401 and you feel that it was such a great accomplishment at the Security Council that it’s going to do some kind of a difference on the ground, 2401 was a resolution that was to implement a 30-day immediate ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities on the ground in eastern Ghouta, which is a suburb of Damascus. BIGIO: And this was passed in February? JALABI: And this was passed February 24th. And this resolution—since its adoption, the escalation of violence on the ground has escalated. It’s not—it has increased. As I mentioned, 1,300 people have been killed. Why is this? Because there is a loophole in the resolution that said: You can keep the bombardment and the attacks and the getting rid of all of the terrorist groups on the ground. As far as the regime is concerned, everybody is a terrorist on the ground. Anybody who is inside Ghouta. And if I may just explain a little bit the situation in Ghouta. The fighters that are Ghouta are actually the fathers and the educators and the engineers and the previous, you know, shop owners from Ghouta, who have taken up arms and became part of these rebel groups. So when the regime—when the regime says, oh, everybody is terrorist who are fighting, like, with the rebel groups, so these people are from Ghouta. And they go back to their families in the evenings. Like, it’s an intermingled—it’s not just a place where you have, like, a front line where at the outskirts of Ghouta you have fighting groups that are sitting there and they’re combatting with the regime. It’s not like that. These people are trying to protect their families. They’re trying to protect their neighborhoods. There are some brigades that are sitting on the outskirts that are not necessarily from Ghouta, but what the regime is targeting is those people from inside Ghouta—meaning that anybody who is trying to protect their neighborhood or their families is a terrorist. So this loophole was used in the resolution to bombard and to kill everybody, like, to just take it as a—as a way of giving them the permission. The resolution has given them permission to continue the bombardment on the ground. And it has not made any effect. So what do you do at the Security Council if you come up with a resolution thinking that this resolution is actually going to decrease the casualties on the ground, and it increases it? You need a resolution that completely and totally stops any kind of bombardment on the ground, and that has consequences. If any resolution is adopted at the Security Council without having any kind of a consequences connected to it, any kind of a mechanisms for compliance connected to it—and I mention specifically Chapter Seven. If it’s not in that realm, then it’s not going to be effective on the ground, knowing the history of what the regime and the Russians are capable of doing on the ground. The Russians have the air power from the air. And the regime has it on the ground with the support of the Iranian militias in the checkpoints in—like in eastern Ghouta. So what you need is that for the international community to take action, a resolution at the Security Council with Chapter Seven that has consequences that will bring the regime and the Russians seriously a message saying that if you do this, this is the consequence you’re going to get. If that doesn’t happen, I believe that there has to be states such as the U.S., the U.K., France—people who are capable of doing it—to take unilateral action in what’s happening in Syria. This has been used before in Kosovo. This has been used—(off mic). (Laughter.) This has been used before in Kobane. This has been used also with the coalition of the willing when they attacked ISIS, and they—without even the invitation of the regime they considered this is a threat to the international security. And they came into Syria without having to have any kind of Security Council resolution specifically, per se, and create this coalition to fight ISIS. There are ways in which the international community can take some kind of a limited military action against the regime that gives it a less that if you behave in a certain way—or the Russians—if you behave in a certain way that there will be consequences to it. This is the only way, I believe, and we believe in the opposition, is that it’s going to bring a credible threat to the regime, to its existential—to its existence, that they will be willing to come and negotiate in good faith. If they keep believing that they’re winning on the ground and they’re going to take Ghouta now, next there’s going to take Daraa. After that, they’re going to go to Idlib. And this happened in Halab last year in 2016—not last year, no—a year and a half when they took Halab, it was the same—Aleppo—it was the same thing. They came in and took it over. And this will keep repeating until they have full control back over the country and there will be no political solution. BIGIO: So on that uplifting note—(laughter)—I would like to open to questions now. If you could please speak directly into the microphone so that everyone can hear you, and state your name and affiliation. If you want to raise your placard, I can call on any questions that we have. First up here. Yeah, so please, if you press the— Q: All right. Thank you very much. Thanks very much for the presentation. Really, you began by talking about— JALABI: Who are you? Q: I’m Ron Tiersky from Amherst College, which is in Massachusetts. Really, you began talking about the fact that for Americans, Syria is far away, it’s complicated, it’s difficult for Americans to understand what’s going on. Then listening to the discussion, I think in general that the question of who the opposition is has not been answered. And, you know, I hate to even mention our president’s name so I won’t, but one of—one of the things he said in the debate that was—that was striking was he said people want the United States to support the opposition, but we don’t know who they are. Who are these guys? So, and my question is kind of an information question, is it possible perhaps for Mariam to talk about the opposition? Who is involved? Who they are? And with respect even to this particular point, for Americans or any group to understand the conflict, there needs to be a face on it. There needs to be a leader or a leadership. And one of—one of the difficulties I think a lot of us have in America is to know who the opposition is, who are the leaders, how can we recognize it? So could you talk a little bit about who the opposition is? JALABI: I am the opposition. (Laughter.) The opposition was formed right away when the Syrian revolution started. And I understand the confusion that happens because we do not have one face. Syria is a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-religious, multilingual space where all have been oppressed in one degree or another. So when the opposition first started, it had to have representation from within all of the different groups. In 2011—in June 2011 the first serious opposition group was formed in Antalya. And that grew into about 450 people that were representatives of all different sectors and different groups from society from the ground in Syria. As the—as the revolution grew and as the conflict became a little bit different and a lot of regional powers got involved, the opposition shaped—started to shape a little bit differently, depending on who’s supporting us and who’s helping us, who’s really siding by us. And most lately there was a group that was—I don’t know if you might have heard, just to, like, take away the confusion—is that there was a group that was called the Cairo Group that was formed. And then there was another group that was called the Moscow Group that was formed. And in existence was a continuation of the first initial opposition group, which was called the Syrian National Council, the Syrian National Coalition was created, which is still in function, which I am representing to the U.N. now. And it’s a big group also of a lot of different groups that have come together under this coalition. In 2017, November, under the international community’s support and request that all of the opposition unite under one umbrella and all work together, there has been—the Moscow Group and the Cairo Group were brought together with the other opposition groups—the Syrian National Coalition and the Syrian National Council and a few other groups that are from the ground—into one group that’s called the Syrian Negotiations Commission right now, which its main task is to go to Geneva and negotiate. This group includes everyone who consider themselves opposition. It could be there are some of them that are actually—with all of the differences in what they see in how the transition can happen, they all agree that there has to be a transition happening. And this includes also an agreement with the rebels on the ground, a lot of different rebel groups on the ground that represented within the Syrian National—Syrian Negotiations Commission, which is formed out of 36 members, and expanded to have 50 members. And they have affiliations with a lot of different groups on the ground. As you can imagine, no country can be built by having—like, bringing 20 people together and just putting them as an opposition, and creating that space where it’s going to be a true democratic transition. Therefore, there are a lot of different groups. There are a lot of different minds that exist in Syria—politically, ethnically, religiously—that needed to be under an umbrella of some sort. And this is the umbrella. The Syrian Negotiations Commission right now is the highest and most united opposition group that has existed. And it has been evolving and it has become this. So when somebody says, oh, who’s going to replace Assad? Anybody who replaces Assad—(laughs)—out of these groups, I’m hoping, is not going to be doing the atrocities that they’re creating in Syria. Any kind of a new government that could be formed according to the Geneva—I need to go back to the Geneva Communique from 2011 that was agreed to and became a communique with the existence of Russia and Iran and all of the Western countries in presence. They agreed that there will be a transitional governing body that will take over all the executive powers and be formed by mutual consent on both parties, meaning the opposition and the regime. And this is what we’ve have been calling on. Who’s going to take after the Assad goes? There will be a transitional governing body that will be created by consent on both sides. And this is—I believe is a—is something that has been used before, that has been effective in trying to create peace in peace negotiations where you bring both parties together to the table. But they need to engage in full faith. And this is what we have not yet had yet from the regime. I hope that answers the question. It’s very prolonged. Q: (Off mic.) JALABI: I’m a representative in New York. We have a representative in Berlin. We have a representative in Qatar. We have a representative in Cairo. We have a representative in Istanbul. We have a representative in D.C. We have representative in London, in Brussels. We have—we have—and if you go, there is—I mean, just this is—you can go to the Syrian—a Syrian negotiations commission. You have all of the members. Like, there’s a website. You see all of the names. ASAD: I mean, we did our homework, sir. We already did. Since 2011, as Mariam explained—I mean, before 2011 we didn’t have opposition in the country, neither civil society. But the question we don’t know the opposition to support, but you know, the one who is destroying the country to stop. So I do understand that people, they need to know who is the right people to support. But, I mean, the other side is very obvious to stop or to prevent this regime to continue doing the same, I mean, to the people. And I do understand, like, you don’t—I mean, people generally—or governments, they don’t trust even the civil society. They don’t trust the media. They don’t—I mean, but this is like—(inaudible)—already the regime and/or Russian work on it previously, I mean, during the last seven years. And just very small example, the Russian, anyone in the TV—I mean, at least the Arabic-speaking TV, they say, oh, and this White Helmet, they are a terrorist. I mean, whatever. It’s the context. Whatever is the question, they try to say all the time the news coming from Syria is fake, it has been—(inaudible)—in Qatar, and the White Helmet does not exist and they are terrorists. I mean, this is—I do understand the hesitation but, for me, I mean, it’s a little bit depressing when I receive—I mean, not from you directly—but when I receive such hesitation who to support, who to believe, I mean, after eight—already eight years. BIGIO: We’ve got a number of questions remaining. We’ll try to get to as many as we can. So please— Q: Hi. I’m Rachel Robbins. So, Mariam, you’ve mentioned that 50 percent of the population has been excluded from the process and the Syrian regime has not come to Geneva in good faith willing to negotiate. Can you talk about whether there have been efforts by the women in the opposition to reach over to the women who are, you know, supporting the regime to try to have influence—you know, as you have Liberia example. Have there been efforts from the women who want to see their children go to school and grow up and have a normal life to try to bring pressure on the regime? JALABI: There has been a lot of efforts by women to call for saving—like, creating a solution for Syria on a democratic, pluralistic, human rights, and international law-based. And anyone who agreed to these principles were invited and welcomed to come in to the groups that were created. Some women did not because they could not come to—they did not agree to the democratic and the need for creating a pluralistic government that will call for elections and, you know, change the regime that’s in power for the last 50 years, gone from father to son. There is—that core has not joined. But anybody else, the call has been is that for us—all of us to come together and try to create a solution for what’s happening in Syria. So anybody who’s agreed to that is very welcome and has come. And there’s so many women organizations that have been formed. There’s the Syrian Women’s Network who Rula and I have been part of, and which has been formed since 2012. There is the Syrian Feminist Lobby. There is the initiative that was built by the U.N., and with—(inaudible)—like, in collaboration with women group organizations that, they’ve come together and created this, and brought in a lot of women from all different sorts to create a group to see, like, if there is a solution to be had. However, I do want to mention and say is that when we’re talking about women, we cannot assume that women do not have the same political affiliations and the same political views as men do. Women are not essentially—and by nature, yes, maybe we don’t carry arms in the same way, but we have as many diverse political opinions and ideas. And bringing everyone to the table is—does not happen. Does not happen for women. And when you bring them, it becomes stalled because there is no way for us to move forward for somebody who wants to support the regime and somebody who wants to change the regime, if that answers your question. Q: I’m Judith Bruce. About a year ago we had Dr. Rima Mortada here from the AUB team, who was working with the—looking at the conditions of the Syrian refugees, special influence on the young women—emphasis on the young women and adolescents and all. And I’ve been following this quite closely. And I’ve got two questions. One is, just it is difficult to get news that is believable. I believe you. (Laughs.) Who should we watch? What should we watch? I obviously have a lot of friends in the region. The other is just an observation looking ahead from experience, for instance, in Bangladesh and other places, where in that case civil society, as we were discussing, began getting mobilized in some ways that actually were revolutionary for the world at the end of the day. And we tracked at one point the difference between Egypt and Bangladesh and the numbers of civil society organizations and the scope they were getting. And after their war of independence—some different features because they didn’t have anything like the diaspora you’re dealing with—but nonetheless they had formed sort of execution cells, not even just point of view cells, but groups that delivered services—health services, education services—as governance units, because that’s what sort of governance is. So within the opposition now, if one wanted to support the development of units that not only in whatever setting—external settlements inside the country—are delivering core services that later then are transformed into an active city society, where could you make that investment? How could we invest effectively right now short term for resilience and long term for recovering with, you know, equality and delivery of services? BIGIO: Who do we listen to and where do we invest? ASAD: Well, from my perspective now acting—speaking as activist, for sure all civil society organization because they already have been a focus on the work. And then also they have, like, short term vision and long-term. And investing with the civil society means—I mean, the political groups already—they can reach to—I mean, to sources. But civil society, they have been surrounded and have been isolated in Syria and then in the neighboring country, and now slowly moving to Europe with a very hard condition to work and send—I mean, for example, sending money to Syria or even to Turkey now it’s, like, cost me, as a director of Syrian female journalist network, one day because there is a lot of paper. And I don’t dare to do it through with the bank, because the bank they will come behind me. Anyway, I mean, just a slightly kind of difficulties I’m going through, even I’m living in Netherlands. I think investing in civil society means for the future at least we will not face the same moment in 2011 when we had a space open to go to street, to organize ourselves, but we don’t know—we don’t have any experience. Like, we started to gather 10 people, and then 100, and then 1,000. But it was very easy for the regime me—we didn’t have any tools, any techniques to, as in Egypt has happened, to protect ourselves and to protect our message. So from my perspective I think—and, of course, media, it’s part of the civil society in Syria. And investing in this field, I mean, it will—it will feed back to the country in the future. JALABI: If I may just also add one comment. There is so much of the support that happens—to civil society—that happens through the big INGOs. Like, it happens through the U.N. And so much of the overhead that goes to the big corporations, the big conglomerates of, like, the INGOs, I think one little advice I can give when helping civil society on the ground is to go for have—to have the funds go directly to them. That way, less money will have a lot more impact on what could be done on the ground. BIGIO: Question? If you press the button in the middle. Q: All right. Roy Licklider from Rutgers and Columbia. Look, the key—you said it, something has to change on the ground. That’s going to mean force. And Chapter Seven means us, realistically, OK? The United States has tried—recently tried this twice in Afghanistan and Iraq. In one case we intervened in a civil war, in the other one we caused one. The results were not happy for us or, I think, for them. It’s not clear to me why—well, A, I think it’s politically impossible, candidly. But it’s not clear to me why intervention in Syria would lead to a different outcome. (Laughter.) JALABI: Every case is different. And we see what happened in Kosovo. It brought people to sit and negotiate. And what happened—I want to remember Shayrat. Shayrat was—the airport of Shayrat when Trump took office. And maybe it’s the only thing good that he’s done so far. (Laughs.) That when he—when he bombed that airport, it actually stopped the regime from using chemical weapons and extensive weapons for almost three months. And then it started escalating again, slowly, because what the regime and the Russians do is that they see the will of what the international community or what the U.S. can do, and they test it little by bit, bit by bit, to see how far they can go with it. And then it hits a point where they feel, OK, like, you know, it’s actually now that it’s OK. And we can keep going further. And they do that. And when I call for intervention, or action, I want you to remember also 2013, when President Obama said—put the red line on the use of chemical weapons. And when the regime used the chemical weapons, and there was the threat of bombing, the regime and the Russians, like up in arms. They did everything they could to come to an agreement to remove all of the chemical piles in Syria. They came, like, right away to negotiate and to agree to not have to be bombed. So sometimes it’s not even the actual action itself. Sometimes even the credible threat—that, in itself, is a weapon. When you put a red line itself is a weapon. And a limited move—like it happened in Shayrat—a limited move, a limited enforced action on the ground will—I am not saying you go—like, I don’t like to see what happened in Raqqa happen in any other parts of the world. I mean, we haven’t maybe heard what happened in Raqqa, but Raqqa was destroyed completely by the coalition forces. And there has been, like, over I don’t know how many thousands of people that were killed—casualties, the collateral damaged that happened by the international community. So the U.S. has already been involved. The U.S. was involved in Kobane. The U.S. got together, like, in Sinjar, to save the Yazidis, to save the Kurds. So any kind of credible threat or action—limited action—from any U.S.—from the U.S. or their partners will force the regime to at least come to faithful negotiations to the table. And that’s all we’re asking. We believe in a political solution. But that political solution will not happen when you have the balance so shifted on the ground. So is there anything that could be done on the ground that will push the Russians to truly—and I believe the Russians do want to—(laughs)—get out of this quagmire that they got in. So they do want to—they do want to see the willingness, the leadership of some other country to take force and to negotiate. And if we’re talking politics, Russia’s interest in Syria is connected to a lot of other interests in the region, and other geopolitical issues they have with other powers in the world. So what’s going to happen is that if they can bring this regime to negotiate in faith at the table, we can come up to some resolution—a political resolution that will get Syria out of the deep—the deep hole that it’s in right now. BIGIO: I think we have time for a quick question and a quick answer if we want to take one last. Q: OK. Howard Stoffer, U.N. I served in the Security Council. And you know, with the Russians having—being a permanent member, they’ll veto anything that’s not in their interests. But my question, in the interests of time, you started touching on some of the issues I wanted to raise. Even if you could reach an agreement with Assad and negotiate something, you’ve still got the Russian interests there seeking a military presence. And of course, you’ve got Iran. Iran’s not going to agree to anything. So at the end of the day, you’re going to have a regime run by Assad, there’ll be no opposition, it’ll be whatever the Iranians want to see. And unfortunately—I say this with great, you know, great unfortunateness—that that as a result there might be an Iranian buildup in Syria, and then you might have a regional war, if the Israelis feel threatened. So I really—I don’t see what the opposition—I think the opposition needs to be reaching out on a much broader front and talking to the Iranians. and talking to Hezbollah, and talking to the Russians and the Europeans, the Americans, and Japanese, and see what’s possible. And of course, that’s not a fair question at the end, so if you don’t answer it, I just leave you with those thoughts. (Laughter.) JALABI: I do want to mention something about Iran. Iran just is extending its second credit to Syria. They had given $22 billion to Syria, and now they’re extending the second one. And one of their conditions is actually to move a lot of the infrastructure and the work and the industries that are in Syria into Iran, and also to have monopoly over a lot of the biggest industries that are happening in Syria. And that’s their—kind of the payback that they want. However, when we’re talking Iran and Russian interests in Syria, what I want to stress by back is let’s think about Ghouta and the people that are getting bombed right now, the people that are getting displaced from their homes, the women and children that are sitting in shelters. I know this is coming across as, like, normally I’m asking you to behave, like, working with your emotional maybe part, but really in the end if we don’t respect human rights, if we don’t respect every citizen in the world equally, we are not going to arrive to a political solution that might benefit the interests. Like, we Syrians don’t have any issue with working with any government, with any people around us, or the regional powers, if it is in the benefit of Syria—if it’s a win-win situation for all. And that could be negotiated. Once we have some kind of a deterrent that a government cannot have the impunity—which, giving example, by the way, to a lot of other nations in the world. And as we see—I mean, I’m not going to go into the whole other issues, like, how nationalism and isolationism, and, you know, the right-wings have, like, tendencies, philosophies have been winning lately. But there is a chance for us, through Syria, to teach or give an example to bring back the issue to human rights and international law. And that a rogue government, such as the Assad regime, cannot just—with impunity just do whatever they will, with the support of allies in the world, without having consequences, without having a world order. BIGIO: Please join me in thanking Rula and Mariam. (Applause.) Thank you all for joining us today. (END)

Panelists discuss the potential and ongoing crises that may erupt or escalate in 2018, as well as their global political implications.

Despite the growing evidence that women’s participation in peace and security processes improves stability, the inclusion of women in these processes has lagged since the passage of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. The speakers on this panel review lessons from conflict situations and provide recommendations on addressing state fragility by advancing women’s roles in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The Women in Foreign Policy symposium, held on December 5, 2017, features three panels of leading experts in discussion on global women’s issues. Panelists analyze the status of women worldwide and evaluate their contributions to governance, economic growth, and conflict prevention and resolution. The symposium commemorates the fifteenth anniversary of the Women and Foreign Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Video and transcript from this event can be viewed below.  This symposium is made possible through the generous support of the Women and Foreign Policy Program Advisory Council.

Paul Stares discusses his new book, Preventive Engagement: How America Can Avoid War, Stay Strong, and Keep the Peace. Stares proposes a comprehensive new strategy for how the United States can manage an increasingly turbulent world and reduce the risk of costly military commitments.

Jeffrey Feltman discusses his five years as undersecretary-general for political affairs at the United Nations (UN), the role of the UN in mediating and preventing conflict, and the relationship between the United States and the UN.

Tensions are rising in the Balkans and the risk of renewed violence is growing, but the United States can help preserve peace and stability in the region. As part of the Center for Preventive Action’s Flashpoints Roundtable Meeting Series, speakers Daniel P. Serwer, academic director of conflict management at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Hoyt Brian Yee, deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, discussed the risk of violence and political instability in the Balkans and what U.S. policymakers can do to prevent it.  For further reading, please see the Contingency Planning Memorandum, "The Unraveling of the Balkans Peace Agreements," by Daniel P. Serwer.  STARES: OK, I think we can get started. Good day, everybody. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations and this Flashpoint roundtable meeting focusing on preventing the unraveling of the Balkan peace agreements. Some of you know me. For those who don’t, I’m Paul Stares, I’m a senior fellow here at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Center for Preventive Action, under whose auspices this series is held. I should just give you a background of what we try to do with these series of roundtables which we’ve been holding for many years now. Essentially, we try to focus on areas of the world where there is an incipient risk of instability and conflict and to draw greater attention, particularly of policymakers, to those issues and the wider foreign policy community. We’ve been concerned for some time that with all the attention being given to places like North Korea, Syria, Iraq, just to name a few, that the situation in the Balkans could be moving in an undesirable direction, and much of the progress that was accomplished over the last couple of decades could start to move backwards and we could see or be surprised by events there, which are not in the U.S. interests. So today we’re going to focus on the situation there. We have two excellent, well-qualified speakers. We will begin first with my old friend and colleague Daniel Serwer. We served together at the U.S. Institute of Peace several years ago. He is now academic director of conflict management at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, here in the U.S. in Washington. He has had a long, distinguished career in the Foreign Service with a special focus on the Balkans and was, at one point, U.S. special envoy and coordinator for the Bosnian federation, deeply involved in the Dayton Peace Accords. He has written extensively about the Balkans, not to mention other areas of the world and, obviously, someone who is eminently qualified to assess the situation today. We were hoping to have provided you with a paper that he has written for us in part of our Contingency Planning Memorandum series looking at this specific issue. And he will talk from that paper. We are hoping to release it later today, if not by tomorrow, and you will be sure to receive copies of that paper.  We’re also very grateful to have Hoyt Brian Yee here, too. Again, many of you will know him. He is currently deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs at the State Department, also a longtime observer, participant, engager, whatever in issues in the Balkans. He has been deputy chief of mission, among other positions, at the U.S. embassy in Zagreb, a longtime career Foreign Service official serving not just in the Balkans, but in Afghanistan, I believe, with one of the PRTs. Which one was it? YEE: Actually, it was in Kabul. STARES: Oh, it was in Kabul. OK. And so he will provide commentary and response to Daniel’s initial presentation, which should be about ten, fifteen minutes, and then maybe ten minutes to hear from Secretary Yee. I just want to emphasize, if it’s not obvious from the camera present, that the discussion is on the record here, so please be mindful of that. And for that reason, I do ask you to turn off or mute your cell phones so there’s no annoying interference not only in this, but in the recording. Anyway, I think that’s all from me and I will turn it over to Daniel to start things off. Thank you. SERWER: Thank you, Paul. It’s an honor and a privilege. Paul and I were colleagues at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Hoyt and I met more than twenty-five years ago, I think, when he was working with Chuck Redman on the federation and on the early efforts at peacemaking in Bosnia. It’s really a privilege. The United States is responsible for three peace agreements in the Balkans, the way I count them—it’s Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia—leaving behind a web that has prevented war for more than fifteen years. I want to underline what a plus this is. I hear in the Balkans all the time people who say nothing has changed. Things have changed enormously. All the countries of the region have made substantial progress in both political and economic reform. The problem isn’t that there hasn’t been progress. The problem is that the progress has slowed and even stalled since the European recession. The Greek financial crisis, the massive flow of refugees from the Middle East—Middle East and Africa, and Brexit have made it doubtful that the promise of EU membership can be fulfilled anytime soon, and besides which Euroskepticism is highly correlated with the business cycle. Fortunately, the business cycle is turning up in Europe now, and I expect Euroskepticism to dissipate a bit with that turn in the business cycle. But let’s face it, EU charm is not working as well as once it did, despite what I regard as very strong statements from [high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy and vice president of the European Commission Federica] Mogherini. She really has been on target in my way of thinking. This is a problem for the U.S. because we’ve been depending on Europe to carry the burden in the Balkans with U.S. support whenever it’s needed. But if Brussels fails, the peace agreement could, I think, unravel with serious consequences: heightened migration not only through, but from the Balkans, growing radicalization of Balkan Muslims, and increasing troublemaking by the Russians near and inside NATO. Now, let me make clear that I don’t think anything like the wars of the 1990s is likely to recur in the Balkans. No one has the political will. Nobody has the military capacity. And the institutions that have been implanted in the Balkans, as weak as they appear at times, are stronger than the institutions that existed in 1990. What do I think is needed? Well, the format that the Council uses requires that I consider all the reasonable options that are out there, so I have considered three options. One is more or less business as usual, which is to continue to depend on EU leadership, but for the U.S. to intervene—and I think Hoyt has done this with particular skill—to intervene whenever they look like they’re getting into trouble. And we’ve seen that happen in Macedonia, we’ve seen it happen in Bosnia, we’ve seen it happen in Serbia. And Hoyt, I give him enormous credit for making this work well. But I’m concerned that business as usual is not going to be adequate for the future. So what are the other options? One is to renegotiate borders in the Balkans. It’s out there in the literature, and I want to underline the fact that I’ve considered it as analytically necessary and, in policy terms, completely unappealing to me. But people confuse—too often confuse an analysis, willing to analyze something, as indicting approval in some way for it. So I want to warn that that is not the case. I looked in the paper somewhat carefully at the implications of renegotiating borders. They are not good. They involve massive movements of people to prevent atrocities. A humanitarian crisis associated with that would require a massive input of peacekeeping troops. Those troops are not available from anyplace. And there will always be people on the wrong side of the line, no matter what you do. This notion that you can solve the problems of the Balkans by moving borders is, in my view, simply fallacious. That’s the problem, not the solution. The third option I’d consider is for the U.S. to take back leadership on a selective basis without completely displacing the European Union. Now, there’s a spectrum here between what Hoyt has already been doing and what I’m suggesting, and it’s not a spectrum with a bright line between the two options. But we could be doing more. And the question is, what could we be doing more on? One, and this is—I should underline as I start out that all of the things that I’m going to suggest are relatively low cost and nonmilitary in character, fundamentally nonmilitary in character, even though some military cooperation will appear later on. It’s a diplomatic effort that’s required. I think we need recommitment with Brussels to existing Balkan borders and states. There’s just been too much talk about moving borders and changing the state structures. That should include a planned response to any scheduling of the Republika Srpska independence referendum. Now, Hoyt has been very skillful. I don’t know what he did to [president of Republika Srpska] Mr. [Milorad] Dodik recently, but Mr. Dodik has been backing off the date for the Republika Srpska referendum. That’s good. But I think we still need to make clear how we would respond if it is ever scheduled, and that response should include nonrecognition of Republika Srpska and no assistance—IMF, World Bank, bilateral, U.S., or EU—to any—to an independent Republika Srpska or any—or any country that it adheres to. I’m obviously talking about Serbia. I think we should consider some acceleration in the NATO and EU membership processes. One possibility that I mention in the report is some kind of associate membership that involves the Balkan countries in discussions of policy decisions, even if they don’t have a vote in those decisions. Generally, we need better carrots and sticks. We’ve used some sanctions effectively. EU has trouble using sanctions effectively because they’ve been challenged in court because they find it difficult to get agreement of the full membership. But somehow we have to recognize that sanctions undertaken by the U.S. would be vastly multiplied in their impact were they undertaken also by Brussels. I think that the U.S. should consider some trade access for the Balkans. This wouldn’t cost us much. I admit that it’s against the current drift, but I think, you know, the U.S. making it clear that the Balkans will have preferential access to U.S. markets would be a clear signal that has been lacking. I think we need to refocus our assistance on rule of law, particularly anticorruption and countering extremism. Now, I know there’s a good deal of attention to anticorruption and countering extremism in the Balkans, but I—I want to underline that I think a lot of the other assistance that we provide is by now pretty pointless. I’m fond of telling the story of being sold some blackberries in Pristina one day under a tent that said “USAID,” and I paid more for those blackberries in Pristina than I would have paid at my farmers’ market in D.C. That doesn’t make sense to me. I mean, purchasing power is what it is in Kosovo, it is what it is in D.C. I don’t think we should be supporting projects that uneconomically produce blackberries in Kosovo. I think the one military thing I think we need to do is to give increased visibility and maybe some increased resources to the National Guard cooperation with Balkan countries. This program is the best program that the U.S. has in the Balkans. The cooperation between Serbia and the Ohio National Guard—and I’ll get this wrong—Iowa and the Kosovo national guard, as well as Vermont and the—and the Macedonia national guard, these are incredible programs that have spread far beyond the military sphere, because what happens is the governors say, oh, that’s nice, I think I’ll get involved with that, why don’t we involve our universities, why don’t we involve our companies? And our states are much more the dimension that can cooperate easily with Balkan countries than our federal government, so I think we need to recognize that that’s an important program and give it some more visibility and resources. I think we need a region-wide truth and reconciliation effort. Natasa Kandic has been trying to sell us this for a decade. She’s done incredible work. I think—I think we should buy. But here’s the big, heavy lifting in the diplomatic sense. We need to remove the obstacles in the Balkans. And the obstacles to completing the peace process in the Balkans include Bosnia’s constitutional and electoral inadequacies, UN membership for Kosovo, and Macedonia’s name and its impact on NATO membership in particular. If we could solve those three problems, I think we’d be light years ahead of where we are today. I will admit that there have been at least two high-level efforts on the constitutional issue in Bosnia that have failed. Most people think I’m nuts to suggest that Serbia will allow Kosovo into the UN, but I think that’s a negotiable item if we think creatively about it. I can talk about what that means later if somebody wants to challenge me. And I think on Macedonia’s name, the issue really is no longer Macedonia’s name, the issue is NATO membership and that means getting Macedonia in by the name it doesn’t like, but will accept, the FYROM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and doing it, I would say, at the next summit. In addition to these measures, I think we need to counter Russian troublemaking by reducing Balkan dependence on Moscow’s gas, and I know there are efforts in that direction. Sanctioning those who finance Balkan leaders who threaten the peace, that is not just worrying about the Balkan leaders themselves, but worrying about where they get their money from, beefing up our own media capabilities. In recent years, we’ve talked a great deal more about eliminating the Balkan parts of VOA than about beefing them up, but I think it’s time for us to recognize that we face a real challenge from the Russians in the media space and we have to be able to respond. And finally, I think we need to be consulting with the Balkans countries on Russian election meddling. If they did what they did to us—and I do believe they did—you can imagine what they could do in the Balkans if they really tried. These are not expensive things, but I think they’re important ones. And doing them would preserve peace and stability, avoid major costs, limit Russian troublemaking, and give us a lot of secure and prosperous friends. That said, I face the question, well, OK, who’s going to do all of that? And here, I have to admit that I gave in to temptation in the report to support the idea of a special envoy, something that I’ve resisted over the years because I believe that you have to have a policy before you have a special envoy. And I still believe that and have outlined the kind of diplomatic effort that would require a special envoy. But I have to admit also that I have my doubts about this. And I have another proposition for you, Molly Montgomery, and that is formal designation of the vice president as the owner of the Balkans portfolio, including this heavy diplomatic lifting that I’ve outlined. And in some ways, I think I prefer the latter proposition to the former proposition because it makes so clear that there will be attention paid. I’ll stop there, Paul. STARES: Great, thank you so much, Daniel. We now turn the floor to Hoyt. YEE: Thank you very much. Is this on? STARES: Yes, I believe so, everything’s on. YEE: Thank you. I want to start by just saying how honored I am to be here and to recognize—well, I won’t by name, but I just want to recognize all the colleagues and the former bosses and mentors and many people who have been role models over the years since I’ve been working at the State Department. It’s truly a privilege and an honor to be here with you, and I look forward to your questions. I’ll make this easy. I agree largely with what Professor Serwer has said about both the options and also some of the deficiencies in the current state of affairs and what the United States might be able to do to contribute even more to the situation. He was extremely generous in his praise for me, and I think he meant more generally what I and my colleagues at the State Department and wider interagency have been able to do in the past few years with the European Union. I think what I would like to do is maybe start by talking a little bit about not so much the areas of difference, but where I think we can draw some good conclusions, some reasonable conclusions that get to what I think Dan points out as some of the things we can do going forward. First on a positive sense—in a positive sense, I want to highlight some of the successes. And there have been some successes, I would argue, in the past year in the Balkans. And we can’t say that every year. But I think for those of us who care deeply about the region and have been concerned about the trends over the last several years, I think we’ve seen some positive developments. And I’d start with—I’d start with Montenegro’s accession to NATO, which is, of course, something that required American and European leadership. It required also a great deal of hard work, good work by the Montenegrins. And one aspect of that I want to point out to, and we can circle back and then I can tie it together with my conclusions, is that this was by no means the U.S. or Europe imposing on Montenegro standards it had to meet. The NATO door is open. No country is forced to join NATO. No country is even, I would say, pressured to join NATO. But if countries want to join, they need to meet the criteria, and Montenegro did. I think most people will remember that in 2014 it came close to receiving an invitation to join the alliance, but it didn’t quite get it, it had a little more work to do. And it did do the work necessary to receive an invitation the following year. And I’ll come back to that. But secondly, I think another success story has been in Macedonia where the country, as most of you know, has been in a political crisis for the past two-and-a-half years, going back to the wiretapping scandal that uncovered, when it was revealed, all kinds of corrupt activities. And the country was unable to move forward with its political, it was stuck, of course. Its economy also was also stuck and its progress towards the European Union or NATO, regardless of the name of the country and that hurdle. It was in very difficult shape. But through, I would say first, a lot of hard work by both the European Union and the United States in terms of our diplomacy, but also work by the political leadership in the country, some more willing than others, to meet what we in the international community were asking, primarily a commitment to certain reforms, whether it’s media, judiciary, rule of law in general. There were a lot of steps that the parties had to agree to in order to get to the point where we, the international community, would recognize their elections as sufficiently credible. And remember, in 2016 actually there were two dates set for elections in Macedonia that had to be cancelled because everyone agreed, including the international community, that the conditions were not right. So the elections eventually did take place last December, and the results of the elections I think led to what is I think what most people agree is a pro-reform government that’s very dedicated to joining NATO and the EU and adopting European standards. So I think that’s also a success story. Another one maybe not as well known, but I think equally important in some ways is in Albania where the country last year adopted some sweeping judicial reform amendments to its constitution and to its legislation, which require vetting of its judges and prosecutors, including by members of the international community. This will, when implemented, we believe, have a transformative effect on the judiciary, but also for the reasons that Dan mentioned, the importance of rule of law, of an independent judiciary, will have an important impact on the country’s progress towards European Union. So these are certainly not the kind of headline-making, except for perhaps Montenegro joining NATO, the kind of advances that we would all like to celebrate at some point. But I think it’s worth pointing out these three advances for, first of all, some reassurance that the region is not completely off track and there is a possibility for progress. Secondly, that the international community’s approach—and I fully accept many of Dan’s criticisms or suggestions for improvement. But I think it’s worth noting that in all three of those examples I’ve mentioned, there’s very close cooperation between the Europeans and the Americans. And I would say on some of those instances, in some of those examples, Europe played a more prominent leadership role and others, for example in Montenegro’s NATO accession. I think it would be accurate to say the United States, as unofficial leader of the NATO alliance, played at least as much, if not more of a leadership role. The point being that I don’t think it’s necessary for it to be one way or the other in all cases in order to solve these problems. What’s really important is that there is a partnership, a genuine partnership and a sharing of responsibility, sharing of the burden, as we’ve said in the past, but also of the various tasks, not necessarily just because of the costs or because of political costs or financial costs, but because in some cases we are more effective being in the lead from Washington or Americans in the field and sometimes the Europeans are more effective. So I would—I would just argue that we should be flexible. In some cases, it’s going to make more sense for us to play a more prominent role. Sometimes it will make more sense for the Europeans. The other point I want to make about leadership is that while it’s absolutely true, I agree with Dan, as long as the region remains still fundamentally in transition and in many cases unstable and vulnerable to Russian malign influence and violent extremism, it’s important for the region’s international partners, especially the United States and European Union—other cases, there may be other countries also that can contribute—it’s important for us to play that role. But it’s equally important, and I would say increasingly more important for the leaders of the region to step up and play the role that they were elected to play. I don’t mean this to sound—it will sound, I realize, to some of you like a copout to say this is actually their responsibility, they are the ones that need to do this. And I’m not saying that we should somehow abdicate from our responsibility. But increasingly, we need to find ways to motivate, to convince the leaders and civil society and members of the citizenry in these countries they need to play a more active, responsible role in their own future. So, again, looking for some examples, I think I’d start off with Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have tried very hard with Europeans to advance a reform agenda which has been based on, primarily, focused primarily on economic and social reforms, which the Bosnian governments have been more or less effective at pursuing. They’ve adopted a lot of legislation. They’ve put in place a lot of the steps that the European Union, which leads the reform effort, has asked them to do. But in the end, not a lot has changed on the ground. And there are two reasons for that, I think. One is because the reforms do not address the core, the root problems of the country, which I think can be traced back to Dan’s work in the federation agreements and the Dayton Accords. Not to blame him for that, but the problems are fundamentally political, they’re not economic and social. So the fact that you can pass legislation to fix the tax code or the pension system or health care, while important, is not sufficient. The other reason I think—and I have to remember we’re on—we’re on the record here—but I think it won’t surprise anyone to hear that in our assessment there are many leaders, elected leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are not interested in reforming the system. The current system, the current—the status quo suits many of the leadership, many of the leaders in not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would say, in the region very well. So it’s—I think the standard maxim that goes back for years is, you know, the European Union—wait, I’m not going to say that. Let me start over. (Laughter.) We’re on the record. No. The leaders have figured out that they can do just enough to convince us that they are partners and that they are actually implementing a reform plan that they agreed to. In reality, they are not doing what is necessary in order to bring about a stable and functional state. And they’ve been able to walk that fine line for years. They’ve been able to figure out that most American and European bureaucrats at most stay in their position three years and then they move on. So I’m in my fourth year, I’m going to hang on as long as I can. But it’s true, we do tend to turn over whereas many of these people who are in positions of power in the Balkans have stayed for many years, sometimes decades. They outlast us. And they also understand how the European Union works. There are regular meetings, ministerial level, then council-level meetings, and they know they need to meet certain deadlines. They need to provide just enough progress so that they’re not held accountable. And this is the key word, I think, that we need. And this gets, I think, Dan, closer to what you’re talking about, is there needs to be greater accountability. A partnership is a two-way street. So we offer to especially the European Union, but also America, we offer certain incentives, including stronger economic relations—in the case of the European Union, it’s a possibility of accession for many of these countries that are not already members—and closer ties which bring about prosperity and opportunities for the young people. On their side, we expect the leadership, the elected leaders to implement reforms, to keep their word, to keep their promises, not to be corrupt, to be providing their people what their citizens elect them to do. This accountability is really a hard nut to crack because we’re talking about sovereign countries, leaders elected by sovereign countries. So applying sanctions, which we have done on very rare occasion, is one way. But it’s something, as Dan points out, the European Union is rather reluctant to invoke. So I think we need to find this partnership not only between the EU, but also with our partners in these countries. And when they don’t meet their commitments—and this is the part, I think, where we can—we can perhaps have a lively discussion—is about finding the ways that we can hold accountable. It has—it should begin with the citizens, but if the citizens aren’t able to apply that accountability through electoral processes perhaps because the electoral systems are flawed or because of state capture—which I think in several cases you could make the argument that there is a state capture problem in the Balkans—for whatever reason, if not’s possible, then I think the international community, particularly in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina where many of play a guarantor role for the Dayton Peace Accords, I think we should be willing to step in to do the necessary. Maybe just lastly, and I’ll just close on this, I think there are a couple of other elements in addition to the leadership that transcend perhaps whether it’s option one, two, or three. And I’m not going to choose between then, Dan, but I would say all of them, I think, have some very good elements. I think it’s important that we are able amongst ourselves in Washington with our partners in Europe, with our partners in the region itself find a sense of urgency that we’ve lost over the years, for good reason. I mean, we have to—it’s been—it’s over twenty years since Dayton was signed and many years since the accord in Macedonia, the Ohrid Agreement. And we’ve all been distracted or I should say rightly focusing on new crises or even more immediate, perhaps even more urgent for us. But if we’re going to be effective, I think in addition to deciding who’s going to lead or who’s going to follow, I think we need to agree that these are urgent problems. And I agree with Dan, we’re not in danger of having another ’90s style conflict. I don’t believe that’s true. But I think that below the surface in many of these countries there’s a lot of tension. And we and our European colleagues often take for granted that the—the thin veneer of normalcy. If you go to any of the—I mean, if you go to Pristina or Sarajevo or Skopje, I mean, the cities look very modern and European, people are sitting in cafes enjoying themselves. But I believe beyond the capitals, and sometimes even in the capitals, if you scratch below the surface, it would just take a spark, it would just take a spark to set off conflict again. Again, not a war, but there would be enough conflict to really do everyone, including ourselves, some damage. So I hope we can find that urgency. And lastly, just the last point, I think we need to find a way to use all the tools we have at our disposal, not only EU and U.S. There are other international organizations that are very present, very active in these regions. We need to work with them to bring them into the equation to be part of the solution. There’s been a lot of talk about the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, where I think we all share the goal of seeing this extraordinary organization work itself out of a job. But until it does that, it’s important that we use this office and other tools as fully as possible to get the results. And when it comes time, when we really do have that end state that we want, then, of course, we hope that we can all reduce our presence and our assistance and we won’t have to pay so much for the blackberries in Kosovo. STARES: OK, terrific. Thank you both for those two excellent presentations. We have around twenty-five minutes for Q&A. As usual, please put your name table tent on the side so I can hopefully read your name, notwithstanding my poor eyesight. And I’ll try to not do too much violence to the order in which they went up. And I think, Bob, you were first, thank you. If you could just say, again, who you are and— Q: My name is Bob Beecroft. I was the successor to Dan Serwer as special envoy for the federation in the mid-’90s and served between 2001 and 2004 as the ambassador head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I appreciate what both Dan and Hoyt had to say, but there’s one—and, Hoyt, I thank you for mentioning opportunities for young people. Those of you who know my agenda when I was in Bosnia know that it was heavily focused on the successor generation which, of course, has been leaving the region in droves, that doesn’t help. But unless you deal with that problem of what the young people are being taught and what they are learning throughout the region, but particularly in Bosnia, you’re simply going to have a poisoned successor generation that has bought into the same assumptions and distortions that led to the war in the first place. I wonder if there is any thought being given to issues of national education policy based on at least a minimal consensus on history. Not an easy thing to do, but if you don’t do it you’ll be talking about, oh, the civil war in 150 years, just like we do. I would wonder about a regional council of education ministries. Now, I realize that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 14 education ministers, but I’m talking about the one at Sarajevo. This could be done with European Union guidance. Countries like Finland that are bilingual, Swedish/Finnish, France where the Alsacien province in the east still is German speaking, and Belgium which is a binational state. And I’d just like to say in passing that Ambassador Maureen Cormack deserves a lot of credit for the emphasis she has placed on the successor generation and education reform. And I have reason to believe that Bruce Burton is going to be picking up his side of that issue. But I don’t see how you can look at any of these countries in a generation or two from now unless we get the generations right. And you can’t get them right if they’re basically drinking the same Kool-Aid. Thanks. STARES: Do one of you want do— SERWER: It’s more for you than for me. YEE: I was afraid of that. (Laughter.) No. It’s, first, a great point, Bob, about the young people and brain drain. It is—it is sad just how many young people are leaving places like Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think eighty thousand over the last two years in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, and these are educated people that tend to have skills and talents that the countries need. So we are committed to finding ways to stimulate the economy, grow the economy, and create jobs. AID programs in most of these countries are looking for ways on how to do this, creating these economic opportunities. Education is one of the hardest nuts to crack, as you point out. But I agree, it’s also one of the ones that we need to figure out, we need to have a better handle on it. And when I say we, I think in this case OSCE and in many of the countries that have this problem I think is going to have to play a bigger role, is going to have to step up. I think in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as you said, Bruce Burton is committed to working on this, the idea that you can still have divided schools where you have two different schools under one roof, segregation basically. Still, the manner in which many people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are educated is certainly un-European and very counterproductive from the standpoint of getting to reconciliation, to some sort of if not a common understanding of history, at least compatible understandings of history. So we’ll keep working with that and encouraging the OSCE to, if it does one thing, I think, over the next years, to focus on how to improve the educational system to bring it up to some sort of standard that will allow the country to get closer to Europe. SERWER: Maybe, Paul, I could just add that, you know, it’s almost ten years since Charlie Ingrao published the product “The Scholars’ Initiative,” which involved scholars from all over the Balkans as well as Europe and the United States in trying to put forward a common narrative about what happened in the ’90s. The only area in which they failed to find a common narrative and had to have two separate ones was in Kosovo. Even that, I think, would now be possible. What has not been done because of who’s in power in the Balkans is to use that as the basis for preparation of textbooks and educational materials that could go some distance to promoting reconciliation. And I—it’s one of the reasons I point to the truth and reconciliation proposals of Natasa Kandic, which are regionally based and I think would make a big difference in enhancing demand for a common history. What’s been lacking is anybody to counter the politicians’ inclination to tell a history that supports their staying in power. And so I think part of the solution has to be demand driven. STARES: I think, Jovana, you’re next. Q: Yes, thank you. I’m Jovana Djurovic working—a journalist working for Voice of America, Serbian service. I have two brief questions for Mr. Yee regarding his— STARES: One question. Q: OK, I’ll put it one then. (Laughter.) OK, it will be brief. So regarding your recent visit to Belgrade, there has been—well, still talking about your visit in Serbia. (Laughter.) The first thing has to do really—even the Russian ambassador, but I’m not going to mention him this time. So the first thing is you said that Serbia cannot balance and play on both sides, West and Russia. Is there any deadline, you know, a certain point of time in which Serbia has to say, OK, we are joining to the West sincerely to do European Union or to Russia? And the second one, really briefly, because I think this is very important. Mr. [Aleksandar] Vucic [president of Serbia] said that you talked about the Kosovo issue with him. And I’m quoting, he said that you made your messages or you used government messages in a very, quoting, “loud and clear way,” and that you said to him, quoting again, “that he has to respect it or think about the consequences if he doesn’t comply.” So some of the ministers in the Serbia also said that what you delivered as a message to Mr. Vucic was, quoting again, “nondiplomatic pressure.” So my question is, is there any expectation of the U.S. government from Serbia to recognize the Kosovo independence and resolving the Kosovo issue in general? And are there any consequences, as Mr. Vucic said, if it doesn’t comply? Thank you. YEE: Thank you for the question. Let me say for the first part, the conference which I spoke at in Belgrade about a week ago, and which I perhaps unadvisedly used my Serbian to quote a Serbian proverb that you can’t sit on two chairs at the same time, was in the context of advice to Serbia on how to go faster towards the European Union. In other words, it was not an ultimatum, it was not a warning. It was—the discussion was about how Serbia can move faster towards the European Union, towards integration with the EU. And I gave several pieces of advice, including that Serbia, like any other country that wants to join the European Union, should—I think I used the term should be “all in” for EU membership. In other words, it should make clear to its partners in the European Union that it is committed absolutely to joining the EU. The example—and I realize all countries are different, have different political realities—but the example I would cite would be in Montenegro. Montenegro has moved very rapidly towards joining the European Union, has opened twenty-eight or thirty chapters already in the accession process. It’s not lost on EU members that Montenegro joined the European Union in applying sanctions against Russia. This is just one example. But I think when a country like Montenegro—which was not required technically, just as Serbia’s not required technically to impose sanctions against Russia for what Russia’s done in Ukraine—takes that kind of step, it sends a strong signal that the country is all in. So that was my advice to Serbia, to look for ways to show that it is fully committed the way that Croatia was back in the mid-2000s. Croatia decided that it was going to put everything, everything it had towards joining the European Union, including—oh, I’m not going to say that—including everything. (Laughter.) So it was clear to everyone, including the European Union members at the time, that Croatia had no reservations and it’s going all the way. What I would say about Serbia’s case, although Serbia has made a lot of progress and I think Serbia deserves a lot of credit for what it’s been able to do to open so many chapters, to progress towards European Union members, it’s still apparent, I think, to some or it appears to some of the member states of the European Union that it is balancing between East and West. This may be an incorrect perception, but if you’re trying to join an organization and you want to go faster, our advice is do your best to convince the countries that will make a decision over whether you are able to open chapters or not, that you’re fully committed. And the idea that you can’t sit on two chairs at the same time is a matter of not just of physics, but in political terms I think one has to accept that Russia’s vision of the Balkans, for the Balkans is very different from that of the European Union and that of the United States. I don’t believe they’re compatible visions. I believe it’s possible for countries, just like the United States, it’s possible for us to maintain good working relations with Russia. That is our goal, wherever we can we want to work with Russia. But where we’re working in opposite directions, where we don’t see eye to eye, we’ve made very clear, our secretary of state, other leadership, that we will defend our interests and those of our allies very firmly. So that is—that is the message. It was not a threat or ultimatum. It was this is how we believe you can move even faster towards the European Union. SERWER: Well, let me just address this question of Kosovo recognition and say some things that Hoyt may not agree with or may not want to say. Serbia’s strategy has been to put off complete normalization of relations with Kosovo until just before accession to the European Union. That’s a mistake. It’s a mistake because at that moment just before accession, all the leverage is on the side of the EU, not on the side of Serbia. And the EU can demand whatever it wants to demand without a quid pro quo. I hope that in the intra-Serbian dialogue that’s occurring today about Kosovo that people will be reflecting on this and realizing that with, I think, twenty-two countries that recognize Kosovo inside the EU that it just is not good for Serbia to wait to settle this issue with Kosovo, but that UN membership in particular, which does not require bilateral recognition, but UN membership in particular would be a positive step and is something for which Serbia today could get a quid pro quo, but won’t be able to get one just before—just before accession. Q: Thank you. STARES: OK. I’ll go to this side of the room. Metodija—that’s the correct way of pronouncing your name? Q: Metodija—but if I could put this on, but it’s not working. STARES: It’s on, everything’s on. Q: Oh, it’s on. Metodija Koloski, United Macedonian Diaspora. And thank you, Paul, CFR, and Dan for hosting this once again. One, I want to echo the trade relations. And a few years back, there was a U.S.-Balkans business summit in Baltimore and Annapolis that I think it was put on by a Montenegrin group here. And so that might help and maybe doing another series of these summits, which the State Department would be heavily involved in. The other thing, I want to congratulate the Pence visit to Montenegro and meeting with the leaders of Macedonia and Montenegro and really setting the agenda for the future. But one thing I want to note is that there hasn’t been a U.S. president to visit Macedonia since ’99, a secretary of state since 2001, and a defense secretary since 2007, and no VP visit to date. And I think that’s one of the—I think it’s a very bad strategy of the United States, particularly now with the Russian influence in the Balkans. And I think a visit to Macedonia very soon would really set the agenda. But my question is really about the name, the name issue. Greece is—I mean, there’s—next year is probably the first year Greece and Macedonia won’t be in election season. We might have a resolution. However, this morning news came out that Greece is contemplating doing elections next year. And so if we continue using the strategy of Greece and Macedonia having elections every year, where are we going to—what’s the future for Macedonia? Are we going to push our partners to get Macedonia into NATO without the resolution of the name and, what Dan was proposing, under the ridiculous Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia name? STARES: Either of you. YEE: I’m not sure what the question was. Q: What are the efforts— YEE: About the strategy or— Q: Well, what’s the efforts, I guess, to get a high-level delegation visit to Macedonia? And then the other is, what are the efforts that you’re working on to push the Greeks perhaps to allow Macedonia into NATO under the Former Yugoslav Republic? YEE: So I’ll just say first on high-level visits, my colleague Matt Palmer and others around the room, Molly also, know that this is one of the most difficult tasks that we face as government representatives is trying to accommodate the many requests from around the world of deserving leaders and representatives of our partners and allies. There just isn’t enough time in the day, enough days in the year to accommodate all the requests. I think we are committed to seeing that the diplomatic relations between our partners and allies and ourselves is sufficient so that the messages get across that needs are being met. And unfortunately, it will not always be possible to have the high-level meetings that people want. But we do—we are committed to ensuring that the communication that needs to take place, the messages that need to be both made and received are possible, even at sometimes lower levels than would be desired. I do predict that once Macedonia joins NATO that there will be a high-level visit to Skopje. But there’s a lot of work that needs to be done and I would say that it’s on both sides. This is going to be a negotiation, and I am, I think, cautiously optimistic, I would say, that probably the conditions in both countries are as good, if not better than they ever have been for resolving this name issue. So we very much hope that both governments can find a compromise that they both can accept and to convince their publics, to the extent necessary parliaments, that they are good solutions so that this issue can be solved once and for all. And that will open the way for a lot of things, including high-level meetings. STARES: OK. In the interest of time I’m going to move on. I think Jim is next. And if we can pair your question with Borjan—is that correct—and if you’d please keep your questions very concise. Q: I’d like to thank, Dan, first of all, for your continued writings on the Balkans. A number of people have walked away from their issues in the region, and you continue to hang in there and that keeps us all on our toes, at least intellectually, and so thank you, Dan. Now I’ve taken the gloves off, so you know what’s coming. (Laughter.) But also, Hoyt, you said something that actually just leapt off the page, so to speak, for me, which was a reference to the need for urgency. And what I would like to ask the two of you, I think that really is important. Again, not that what the two of you had said prior to that didn’t set my hair on fire, but it seems to me that if—that you have a new situation now in the region. And the new situation in the region is that—is that the government of Serbia is serious and is prepared for some deals. In fact, this is an historic moment. I would assert that. And if that is the case, given the fact that we’re all talking about after-effects of the region when the government of Serbia from twenty years back or thirty years back or whatever it was now when they decided that they wanted a different region and it was going to be the chief disruptor, that’s what we’ve all had to deal with since then. If they decide that they are going to be the chief builder or constructor or positive element—and I think that this an—then I think you have an historical moment. So my question is, if Serbia is prepared for serious agreements on the major issues, including with Kosovo and Bosnia, what would you two suggest be done to work that through, to work that through in a forward way to tap into that possibility, which I think is more than just a possibility? STARES: And your question if you can, again, be concise. Q: Borjan Jovanovski from VOA, Macedonian service. Mr. Yee, there has been a speculation that you are going to be in Macedonia, that you are going to be our next ambassador from the United States in Macedonia. Could you confirm that? (Laughter.) SERWER: I think they want to hear that first. Q: And if yes, what it means to you. YEE: I’ll answer the first question—(laughter)—from Jim. Q: I will wait. YEE: Look, we agree largely that there are opportunities in the Balkans—and Dan mentioned—and they’re the same opportunities, I think, that we believe are out there. One is Macedonia, Greece, name, solving that. Two, Bosnia and Herzegovina reform, at least in the runup to the 2018 elections, they need to reform their electoral system, otherwise the elections will probably not be valid. And the third is between Serbia and Kosovo where Prime Minister and now President Vucic has said that he wants to have an internal dialogue in Serbia about the future of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo, that he wants to first talk about it within Serbia, but then presumably next with Kosovo about how to normalize their relations in a—not in the kind of way that’s been taking place right now, which is very small steps over long periods of time, but in, we hope, a faster, much more dramatic and urgent way in which both countries could reach the normalized state much sooner. So how we help it—I think that’s your question—how we help that, I think, is as we have been with the European Union. And, you know, there’s a lot I will say—and this is sort of easy for me to say and you’ll just have to trust me. Even when you don’t see us playing a leadership role out in front with the flag, you can count on the fact the United States is always present, we’re always playing some role, I like to think it’s usually helpful, with our European partners in helping countries in the region reach compromises, find solutions, providing assistance, whether it’s technical assistance or even sometimes financial assistance to bridge the gap. So we need to create that atmosphere in which both countries can reach a compromise solution on what their normalization is going to look like. I don’t want to prejudice what that will be, but I think there are some good options. And I think with good will on both sides it’s possible to see some real progress. SERWER: What they really want is normalization and a new relationship with the U.S. When they talk Kosovo or they talk Bosnia, what they’re really talking about is a relationship with the West. YEE: And I’ll just say on that, I mean, our—for us, the relationship between Serbia and the United States is already very strong, but we’re open to increasing it. We have many, many military-to-military exercises and other activities with Serbia already. A lot of people don’t know about that because it’s not always publicized by Serbia. But we have—our economic relations are increasing. I think we have a billion dollars’ worth of investment in Serbia and a lot of people don’t know about that, but it’s actually pretty strong. Serbia’s economy is unique, I think, in that it’s the only economy I know of that actually has a budget surplus now because of a long period of fiscal consolidation. And this, I think, goes to some of the hard decisions and hard steps that President Vucic, Prime Minister Brnabic now and their predecessors have had to make in order to get Serbia to the point where it can meet EU conditions. But with this commitment and also the World Bank rank—the ease of doing business rank, as a lot of the countries including Serbia has improved—as they continue making these reforms, and they need to do more, of course, then there will be more opportunities for cooperation with the United States and other partners. STARES: OK. I’m going to pretend I set my wristwatch incorrectly on Saturday night and try to squeeze in two more questions. Inda and David, with apologies to Austin, if you could ask two very quick questions and we can end things. Q: Inda Swanke, Voice of America. Thank you for bringing this discussion back on the table. Questions for both Mr. Serwer and Mr. Yee and on the same subject matter. We both—you both agreed that Bosnian leadership, and I think the rest of the world does as well, need to take more responsibility and there’s got to be an accountability for their behavior. As a linguist, I will tell you we don’t even have a word for “accountability” in Bosnian, so we sort of switch it up with “responsibility.” It’s a hard concept for them to grasp, and they’ve been getting away with a lot. By saying you need to or you or U.S. or EU needs to find a way to moderate them, what exactly do you mean? And what is a carrot and what is a stick, because the carrot from the Russian side or from an Islamic radical side is obviously attractive? And we’ve seen changes in that direction that I could not call positive, but not as much from this side, so either our incentives are not attractive or they’re not sufficient. STARES: OK. And David. Q: Thank you. I shall play really on that question. I don’t share Jim’s view about this being sort of the historic—historical. We were just talking it before this. But a question based on a couple of things each of you said. I agree with you, Mr. Yee, that just under the surface in a lot of parts of the region that a spark could really create some trouble. It’s not going to be like the ’90s, that was the ’90s, it would be different this time. And my personal view, for what it’s worth, is that our structures are quite weak—I don’t share Dan’s view—I think quite weak and that there’s real danger. Dan, you noted that there have been previous efforts at constitutional reform in Bosnia. I slid by that a little bit. I should, by the way, thank you for this invitation since you and I have been disagreeing for so many years. It’s kind of you to invite me. But the question is—the question is, as opposed to, say, the Butmir effort in 2009, which that was a real full-court press, we lectured them this is your last chance, you better show up. And Butmir on October, what is it, twenty-first, whenever it was, last chance, last chance. They ignored us. And of course, we’ve given them plenty of last chances since. If we’re going to get the sort of changes that both of you mention in Bosnia by the elections next year, what is going to make things different this time so that we don’t get snookered again? Remember, we’re the ones who brought Dodik initially. He was going to not be Karadzic, he was going to be the good guy. We did that. We’ve made some mistakes in the past, we haven’t always admitted it. What’s going to be different this time? STARES: OK. Who wants to go first? Dan? Yeah. SERWER: Well, maybe I’ll try to take this on. David, it seems to me that the Butmir effort—and this gets a little bit into the weeds for some people—it was simply ill-fated from the start from a variety of reasons. The circumstances weren’t good. Frankly, I don’t think the proposal was very well thought out. And it was easy enough for the Bosnians to reject it, despite the high-level involvement. I think that the 2006 April package was much more indigenously generated. It had serious support inside Bosnia. It was opposed by Haris Silajdzic because he wanted to be president of Bosnia—what he told me—and I always thought it would come back to the parliament. It was defeated by two votes, it didn’t come back. It’s not like the United States where if you fail one year you bring it back the next year. And it started a period of real deterioration in high-level interethnic relations, political relations inside Bosnia. It seems to me we have to go back to working on something much more indigenously generated. That can be done in a thousand different ways. We tried it in 2006 with U.S. Institute of Peace. It can be done by the Europeans. It can be done many different ways. But the main thing, it seems to me, is to be clear about the direction in which it has to go, which means being clear that reform must go in the direction of EU accession and membership, nothing more than that. And then let the Bosnians figure this out. And I know there’s been a lot of talk about various reforms of this sort, but we’ll just have to wait until they’re—until they’re ready. The previous question was about? Q: Motivation. SERWER: Oh, how to encourage moderation. Q: The motivation. STARES: Motivation, motivation, how to motivate. SERWER: Motivation. Q: Specifically for the politicians. People are motivated, but they have no— SERWER: I mean, you know, politicians are motivated, in my view, by two things: votes and money. And we need to be clear that those have not lined up in the right direction all too often in the past. And so the question is, how do you make those things line up in the right direction, and I think we can do that. STARES: Final word from you, Hoyt. YEE: Very quickly, yeah, just—I agree with Dan. I think, you know, on the question of motivation, it really depends on the country and it depends on the leader. Some of the leaders, I don’t believe, want to join the European Union, so we can’t really use that carrot for them, even though they’re very good at pretending that that’s what they want. I think for them we need to find, and I think we know in many cases, what they are either trying to achieve or what they’re trying to avoid and to use that within the boundaries that we all have to live in, to use it to our advantage. In some cases, just as an example, I think just identifying the culprit in many cases would be helpful. A lot of times we, I’ll say collectively, international community, don’t like to be so direct to just say it is Mr. or Ms. X that is responsible for the failure of this agreement or of the withholding of the latest tranche of the IMF assistance. But if we do that, if we’re able to say very directly the reason why Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, is not getting the next tranche of the IMF package of over a hundred million euros is because of Mr. or Ms. X, I think that can have an impact. But we need to be willing to do that. And also, we need to be willing to say—you know, we’re talking about high-level meetings. Well, I think it’s sometimes disgraceful how high level—how political leaders in the Balkans, despite their bad behavior, are welcomed in many European capitals as if there’s nothing wrong about what they’re doing. There’s a connection. If people in capitals, if citizens in the country involved see their leaders are able to have the meetings with the highest levels in European capitals or in Washington, they draw conclusions. If their leaders are not welcome in certain places, and the reasons for that are made clear, I think that could have a motivating impact. And just lastly to address David’s question and comment, I think first I’d want to say that I hope we won’t draw the conclusion that because we failed with the April package, with Butmir, with the Prud process, more recently with the Sejdic-Finci talks led by Stefan Fule, that it’s impossible. Unfortunately, some people, I think, have concluded that it’s just too hard to do constitutional reform. To say that, though, I think is to abdicate the responsibility that we have to address the root problems, which unfortunately are tied, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the constitution, to the political system, so we have to keep trying. And what I would say what we can do differently—and this is, I think, what your real question is—I think we need to learn from the mistakes that we’ve made in each of those—each of those had different mistakes, and sometimes it was the leaders involved—but add, I think, what we haven’t had in this mix before, this accountability, this holding the leaders accountable for solving the problems and not letting them off the hook when they—when they try to escape their responsibility. STARES: OK. We are out of time. We’re beyond time. Thank you all for coming here today. I do want you to show your appreciation for both speakers, two excellent presentations. (Applause.) (END)