Conflict Prevention

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. In January 2006, a fledgling group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta People (MEND) kidnapped a group of oil workers, setting in motion a series of high-profile abductions of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities. Nigeria’s oil revenues fell, fomenting instability in the Niger Delta region. Militant groups under the platform of MEND unleashed coordinated attacks on Nigeria’s oil and gas infrastructure from 2006 to 2009. The pace of attacks fell after President Umaru Yar’Adua established an Amnesty Program that ostensibly included disarmament of militants, job training programs for ex-militants, and a system of payoffs that especially benefitted their leaders. When they were active, the Niger Delta militants were often enmeshed deep in the creeks of the region, in makeshift camps cautiously hidden from view to protect against possible aerial bombardment and attacks by the Nigerian military. From those hideouts, militants orchestrated attacks on oil facilities and kidnapped workers. In response, the Nigerian military chased them all over the creeks of the Delta—sometimes inflicting casualties, at others outwitted by a ragtag group with little formal training in warfare. According to a UN Development Program report, the difficult topography in the region “encourages people to gather in small communities—of the estimated 13,329 settlements in the region, 94 percent have populations of less than five thousand,” though the regional population is estimated around thirty million in total. In the Delta’s small settlements, “infrastructure and social services are generally deplorable.” The report highlights the paradox of an oil-rich region mired in poverty: “ordinarily, the Niger Delta should be a gigantic economic reservoir of national and international importance,” due to the scale of its resource wealth. However, “in reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.” This reality animates the various armed groups that have emerged in the region. MEND, the Niger Delta Avengers, and the Niger Delta Green Justice Mandate have all insisted that the federal government address issues of poverty, neglect, and environmental degradation. And because of the failure of successive governments to address these issues, armed militants remain active. These groups evade the military as they traverse the creeks and tributaries of the region to bomb oil facilities or abduct oil workers. In 2016 alone there were more than twenty attacks carried out on oil facilities in the region. Sometimes, these attacks are carried out with the knowledge and tacit support of local people. In October 2020, a group known as the Reformed Niger Delta Avengers issued a warning to the Nigerian government, threatening to resume attacks if their eleven demands are not met by the new year. The relationship between armed groups and the indigenous populations of the region is complex. Militants clearly employ techniques to attract local people and then lock them into a network of incentives. These range from persuasion to coercion, and are designed to control, corral, manipulate, and mobilize populations. Armed militants in the Niger Delta continually seek to legitimize their actions in the eyes of the local population. Residents of the region—particularly in the coastal communities where militant activities are rife—experience neglect, deprivation, and a lack of infrastructure. School buildings and health centers, already decrepit, are often times not operational because teachers and doctors do not want to travel to work. Abject poverty is widespread, with a teeming youth population that is either out of school, unemployed, or both. Delta residents feel a great sense of frustration at the almost total abandonment by successive federal and state governments, which receive huge sums from the oil drilled in the residents’ backyard. Armed groups tap into these frustrations frequently by projecting themselves as freedom fighters, supposedly risking life and limb to agitate the government for a better life in the Delta. People see the agitations of the armed groups as an expression of their internal frustrations and yearnings to hold federal and local governments to account for failing to fulfill their responsibilities. Of course, sometimes militants use fear to keep the people submissive. Yet, armed groups have also taken up the role of philanthropists, providing welfare to a people weighed down continuously by the burden of living in a paradox. Militant leaders have been known to utilize proceeds from oil bunkering activities to provide scholarships to students, build health centers and schools, and resolve disputes in their communities. By doing this, they seek legitimacy from the people, who are then willing to overlook—even excuse—their criminal enterprises. The federal government’s response to the issue of militancy has always been to deploy more soldiers to the region to restore calm. These deployments often result in heightened insecurity in the region. Human rights violations occur frequently; communities have been raided and in some cases bombed. And herein lies the problem: what is usually meant to be an operation to restore order takes the form of an occupation or invasion by a force that the people consider alien to them. Military activities erode further the trust deficit between the state and the people. To address sustainably the issue of militancy in the region, the government should do two things. It should first seek to delegitimize armed groups by building trust with the people. It can do so by asserting its authority—not through military might, but by providing basic services, such as education and proper health facilities. For many Niger Delta communities, the most visible signs of development are infrastructure built by international oil companies or former militant generals, while many of the waterways are dotted with military assets of the Joint Task Force. A running joke in the region goes that while development remains elusive, the ballot box has no problem getting to Delta communities on election days. The federal government should also exercise good faith by committing to its obligations under the Strategic Implementation Work Plan, established in 2017 in response to militant agitations in the region, as well as the Action Plan enacted by the Ministry of the Niger Delta. Prioritizing the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill is another necessary step. When Niger Delta residents see more development and fewer bullets from the military, agitations of armed groups in the region will cease.

The United States and its partners in the Americas have made little progress on ending the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Only with the cooperation of crucial partners in the European Union can the U.S. government hope to reach a resolution in the stricken South American nation.

For peace to take hold in Afghanistan, formidable challenges will need to be overcome during the talks.

The Center for Preventive Action has compiled an accessible overview of the Afghan peace negotiations, including the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the U.S.-Afghan government joint declaration, and the ongoing intra-Afghan process.

The Center for Preventive Action has created this resource for those seeking information and analysis about the effects of COVID-19 on peace and conflict.

Amir Asmar is a Department of Defense analyst and CFR’s national intelligence fellow. Throughout his intelligence career, his primary area of focus has been the Middle East. He held a wide range of analytic, senior analytic, and leadership positions for the Department of the Army, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Intelligence Council. The statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this blog post are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. government. Review of the material does not imply DoD or U.S. government endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion. Gabriela Hasaj is a research associate for CFR's military fellowship program. It is unlikely that the 2017 rift between Qatar and the Gang of Four—Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and including Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—will heal anytime soon. A few months after the rift began, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had to intervene to stop a Saudi Arabia and UAE-led plan to invade Qatar. An effort at a negotiated solution in February faltered, and an April call between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Qatari Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad failed to facilitate a resolution. Although the Saudi-led group criticizes Qatar’s relationship with Iran and its outreach to Islamist groups, the dispute centers on Doha’s unwillingness to follow Riyadh’s lead on regional issues. The United States has maintained security relationships with the two sides, but a variety of U.S. regional objectives—collective security structures, particularly to contain Iran; more effective countering terrorism efforts; stability in Libya; and energy production and distribution—have been or are likely to be affected by the rift. Although the quartet broke diplomatic relations with Qatar after its April 2017 ransom payment to Shia militants to gain the release of twenty-six Qataris abducted in southern Iraq, elements of the conflict between Doha and Riyadh predate the payoff. With the 1995 ascent of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani as emir of Qatar, Doha pursued an independent foreign policy that sought ties to important regional and international players. Al-Jazeera, founded in 1996, is a voice of the Doha government and angers Riyadh with its critical coverage. In 2011, Doha argued that the wave of Arab revolts “could not be ignored or contained and can only be moderated if they were engaged.” It deviated from the Saudi approach, supporting Islamist parties that came to power in Tunisia and Egypt, and anti-Qaddafi forces in Libya. Rather than criticize Iran for stoking Bahrain’s Shia revolt, Doha held high-level meetings with Iranians during the protests to discuss security and economic issues. As one of many conditions for ending the rift, the quartet has demanded that Doha sever all ties with Iran. Washington would probably also prefer that as many of its partners as possible take steps to further isolate and pressure Tehran. Qatar insists, however, that maintaining cordial relations with Iran is a commercial necessity. Since the 2017 break with the quartet, Qatar’s relations with Iran have grown closer. Doha restored full diplomatic relations with Tehran, and Iran provided Qatar with sea shipments of fresh food and allowed Qatari airplanes to use its airspace. Qatar is on the record in support of Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear power. Also, senior Qatari defense officials have called for the restoration of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement—which was opposed by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi—and indicated Qatar would not join any conflict against Iran. Although they ended up on opposite sides of the Syrian civil war, Iran sought Qatar’s influence among opponents of the Damascus regime to avoid conflict with its own militias. Although there is no indication that any party to the rift is reconsidering its security ties to the United States, including U.S. basing on their soil, divisions among Washington’s Gulf partners also make them reluctant to embrace ideas regarding collective security. The U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) naval forces remain in Manama, while the United States’ largest air presence in the region and CENTCOM’s forward headquarters are at Al-Udeid Air Base near Doha. U.S. troops are also based in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar and three members of the quartet were in the top fifteen purchasers of U.S. arms in the world between 2008 and 2018. However, as a result of the rift, the 2017 U.S. proposal of a Middle East Strategic Alliance, a regional NATO encompassing Egypt, Jordan, and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—with an initial focus on containing Iran, never got off the ground. The GCC and its Peninsula Shield Force, typically a non-player in the region’s major conflicts, is unlikely to become more effective or contribute to U.S. regional security priorities. Furthermore, Doha clearly engages with militant groups and may be frustrating Washington’s objectives of stifling funding for some violent extremists. In addition to the 2017 payment of hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom to groups currently designated by the U.S. as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO)—Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanon’s Hezballah, and Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezballah—Doha has explicitly supported jihadists fighting the Syrian regime, including Ahrar al-Sham and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. With Israeli acquiescence, it sends funds to the Palestinian resistance group Hamas, a U.S.-designated FTO descended from the Muslim Brotherhood that has worked for years to undermine U.S. regional peace proposals. Doha also permits the Afghan Taliban to maintain an office in Qatar. Senior U.S. Department of the Treasury officials have criticized Qatar for allowing fundraisers to solicit donations for extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in the country. Moreover, al-Jazeera’s news coverage provides a platform to operatives from many terrorist groups. For its part, Doha has denied enabling terrorist attacks, and it is worth noting that some of its quartet accusers likely have their own links to militants through government and private funding of Islamist proselytization, schooling, and charities and are cynically using this issue in an effort to paint Doha in the worst possible light. In Libya, where the United States has sought stability since Qaddafi’s 2011 downfall, the Gulf rift has created openings for external powers to intervene in violation of a nine-year-old UN arms embargo. Turkey has joined Qatar in providing arms to the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli against UAE- and Egypt-supported strongman Khalifa Haftar. The Muslim Brotherhood-backed Justice and Construction Party retains a strong position within the GNA, which explains Doha’s support and the quartet’s hostility. The nine-year-old civil war has created a security vacuum and made the country a base for terrorist attacks in Europe, North Africa, and the Sahel. Had the GCC maintained the ability to come to coordinated policies, picking a partner in Libya may have reduced the scope of the Libyan conflict to the benefit of Libyans, their neighbors, and the United States’ European partners. The rift between Qatar and the Saudi Arabia-led quartet has also impacted the energy sector. In 2018, the year after the quartet broke relations with Qatar, it left the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to signal its disapproval of Saudi influence in OPEC and to focus on becoming a leader in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Historically, LNG was priced based on the price of oil. Quitting OPEC gave Qatar more freedom to price its LNG with less deference to Riyadh’s oil pricing. Although the UAE has a longstanding LNG agreement with Qatar that remains unaffected by the rift, it expires in 2032, and Abu Dhabi has decided to expand its own natural gas production capacity. A recent discovery of a massive gas field on the border of Dubai and Abu Dhabi could lead to the UAE becoming a net exporter of LNG at Doha’s expense. Riyadh is also seeking to become a player in the LNG field, through a network of GCC countries and relationships with U.S. and Russian LNG producers. Qatar—already the leading LNG exporter to the United States’ largest trading partners in Europe—reached a partnership deal with the Italian company Eni to develop oil fields in Oman, Mexico, and Mozambique, and invested in the Golden Pass LNG project in Texas. In conclusion, the rift has made it more difficult to move closer to a number of U.S. regional objectives, including constructing a regional security architecture, placing greater limits on Tehran, averting more effectively the funding of extremist groups responsible for regional terrorism, and containing the damage from Libya’s civil war. The energy sector may well become the next battlefield of competition between Qatar and its adversaries. To avoid a dynamic similar to the recent destructive Russia-Saudi oil price war, Qatar and Saudi Arabia or the UAE would need to communicate and separate their longstanding differences from the LNG market. Their split will continue to invite involvement in Arab affairs from Iran, Turkey, and other actors. Despite the rift’s obvious negative consequences, Washington has benefitted from Doha’s relationships. It negotiated an agreement with the Taliban in Qatari-hosted talks. Also, Qatar’s ties to Syrian insurgents enabled the 2014 release of Peter Curtis, an American held by Jabhat al-Nusra. Qatar’s increasingly close ties to Tehran could serve a similar role if U.S.-Iranian talks resume. However, until it is resolved, the rift will continue to render achieving many U.S. regional objectives more difficult. The appearance of external hyperlinks do not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for the linked websites, the information, the products, or the services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find in these locations.

This blog post is part of the Women and Foreign Policy program’s interview series on Gender Equality in Foreign Policy, featuring global and U.S. officials leading initiatives to promote gender equality in the defense, development, and diplomatic sectors.

Amir Asmar is a Department of Defense analyst and CFR’s national intelligence fellow. Throughout his intelligence career, his primary area of focus has been the Middle East. He held a wide range of analytic, senior analytic, and leadership positions for the Department of the Army, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Intelligence Council. The statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this blog post are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. government. Review of the material does not imply DoD or U.S. government endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion. Jacob Ware is a research associate for CFR's counterterrorism and studies program. Even as the world grapples with the effects of the novel coronavirus, tensions between the United States and Iran continue to simmer. Prospects of renewed negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and regional behavior have grown increasingly distant. After the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iran began to violate terms of the 2015 nuclear deal last year and appears now to have enriched enough uranium to produce a single nuclear weapon. Despite significant damage to the Iranian economy from U.S. sanctions, there is little evidence of the Iranian regime changing its behavior sufficiently to satisfy U.S. concerns or being willing to make significant concessions in any negotiations. The regime can afford to delay negotiations with the West because it is more resilient than generally assumed. Although some will point to protests as evidence of regime weakness, there are three reasons why the regime in Tehran will remain in power and in control: first, pride of Persian nationhood, which the regime effectively manipulates to promote domestic support for its activities; second, sanctions that are less impactful than presumed and Tehran’s past experience in managing sanctions; and third, Tehran’s use of violence to pursue foreign policy objectives abroad and ensure its survival against internal dissidents. Iran has been under almost uninterrupted U.S. sanctions since the 1979 seizure of the last U.S. Embassy in Tehran by student supporters of the Islamic Revolution. When Tehran began to promote Shia militant movements in the Middle East in the early 1980s, the United States designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. In the last few years, the United States has ramped up a campaign of maximum pressure, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlining U.S. demands in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in May 2018. These twelve demands included an end to processing of nuclear material and missile development, and for Iran to end its support for militia groups in the region. The Iranian regime has been able to resist this pressure in part by drawing on the country’s fierce national pride to promote Iranian nationalism and garner domestic support for the regime’s actions. As journalist Robin Wright explained of the strength of national pride in Iran, “the best way to understand Persians is to think of the most chauvinistic Texan you know and add 5,000 years [of history] and then you begin to understand just how proud they are." Nationalist chauvinism prevails in the Iranian regime’s rhetoric about the United States and its allies. President Hassan Rouhani claimed that “the United States has always sought to sow intrigue against Iran but has never succeeded in the face of Iran’s greatness." Drawing on national pride, Tehran has made the domestic case for not engaging in any negotiations where Iranians are asked to “subject” themselves to the will of a foreign power. This has allowed Iran to more forcefully resist U.S. demands, including starting renewed negotiations. Tehran has also proven resilient and well-versed in blunting the net effect of U.S. sanctions. The sanctions have been, by all objective measures, painful. The rial has lost half its value in just under two years, oil exports are down nearly 90 percent from 2018, and the economy shrank 7.1 percent in 2019. Sanctions have negatively affected public health and living standards across the country, and black market prices of everything from fuel to chemotherapy drugs are steadily rising. The European signatories to the JCPOA, despite their desire to preserve the deal, have failed to attenuate the effect of sanctions. European states set up a mechanism to maintain economic and humanitarian relief offered by the JCPOA, but it has only recently facilitated its first export of humanitarian goods from Europe to Iran, despite the instrument being in place for over a year. One analyst explains how Iran manages this economic adversity: “the Iranians really do have alternative industries to fall back on and a significant domestic capacity, as well as the ability to leverage their relationships with several of their neighboring states." U.S. sanctions primarily focus on a few key sectors—banking, energy, and politics—so Iran has been able to fall back on other parts of its diversifying economy, including a growing manufacturing sector. Iran is also able to receive compensation for its exports through informal payment mechanisms, which allow Iranian trading partners to sidestep U.S. secondary sanctions. Moreover, Tehran is increasing trade with China and Russia, both of which reject U.S. sanctions, and has implemented tough austerity measures to cut domestic spending. The Iranian regime also remains willing to use violence to secure its interests abroad—and at home—despite U.S. sanctions and demands. Iran cannot compete in an all-out conventional military conflict with any Western power, but it still projects strength to assert influence and pursue foreign policy interests throughout the broader Middle East, including by signaling ambiguity regarding its nuclear weapons intentions, supporting subnational armed groups, and developing an increasingly large and sophisticated missile inventory. Tehran continues to encourage proxy attacks against U.S. targets, including a missile attack in Iraq in mid-March that killed one UK and two U.S. citizens, and retains the capacity to attack the United States or allies in the region. At home, too, the regime continues to use force to protect its interests. At times, popular anger—triggered by economic hardships, such as rising fuel prices or cuts in state subsidies—has spilled onto the streets, as it did in the form of widespread demonstrations in November and December of last year. The Iranian regime, however, had no compunction about using violence to repress popular demonstrations and has successfully done so numerous times. Tehran showcased its disregard for public well-being by killing more than one thousand protesters during the demonstrations last year, suggesting it will have little reluctance to continue to crack down on dissent within its borders. The recent demonstrations do not seem to represent a sufficiently widespread popular mobilization to threaten the regime. The global spread of coronavirus has led some to speculate that the effects of the pandemic in Iran present an existential threat to the clerical regime. If reports about the rate of COVID-19 infections and deaths in Iran are accurate—several senior officials have been infected, and the country is experiencing serious shortages in essential medical supplies—the regime may face challenges deflecting blame for a growing human catastrophe. However, even in this context, Iran has shown that it is willing and able to resist U.S. demands, and continues to employ violence via its proxies in the Middle East. The United States might view the additional pressure that COVID-19 has placed on the Iranian regime as an opportunity to take initial steps to reduce tensions and regain a measure of trust from the Iranian public, which polling indicates Washington has lost. It could do this by offering unconditional medical assistance or communicating that other states could do so without being subjected to secondary sanctions. The United States' allies in Europe have begun shipping humanitarian aid to Iran, perhaps opening the door to some U.S. action. Tehran will most likely wait for the results of U.S. presidential elections in November 2020 before deciding on the desired timing and strategy for renewed nuclear negotiations with the United States. Iran’s priority in the face of sanctions has been to maintain its posture and activity, resuming key aspects of its nuclear program, continuing to develop its missile arsenal, and—despite reports that sanctions have forced Tehran to cut some of its support to subnational armed groups—providing financial and military support to regional proxies. The Iranian regime has demonstrated resilience and durability in the face of sanctions on numerous previous occasions, and, rather than position itself for negotiations, continues to pursue domestic and regional policy goals opposed by the West despite economic challenges. The appearance of external hyperlinks do not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for the linked websites, the information, the products, or the services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find in these locations.

Despite recent UN efforts to coordinate talks, peace in Libya remains elusive.

This year, a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure, including electoral systems, was the top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

This year, a mass-casualty terrorist attack on the United States or a treaty ally directed or inspired by a foreign terrorist organization was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.