• Global
    Preventive Priorities Survey for 2015
    Today, we at the Center for Preventive Action released our Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS) for 2015. This is the seventh in our annual effort to harness crowd wisdom and foreign policy expertise in order to identify plausible sources of political instability and violence and to rank them into three tiers based on their impact to U.S. interests and likelihood of happening in the upcoming year. The goal of the PPS is to help officials and policymakers focus on the most important conflict prevention demands. Despite all the early warning analysis done in the U.S. government, there is neither a systematic process that does this, nor a routine system for bringing such information to the attention of senior officials. The PPS represents our best effort to provide this once a year and, given the feedback we receive from officials, the survey is highly coveted and widely read. A word on PPS methodology. First, we harnessed social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs, etc.) to solicit over one thousand suggestions of contingencies—five times last year’s participation rate—in order to bypass media filters. Second, with input from CFR colleagues and outside experts, we distilled over one hundred crowd-sourced results down to thirty contingencies that were deemed most plausible to erupt or escalate in 2015. Third, those thirty contingencies were sent to a broad selection of 2,200 government officials, foreign policy experts, and academics, who rated their likelihood of occurrence and potential impact on U.S. interests. There were several notable changes compared to PPS 2014, but I would like to highlight two. First, six new contingencies appeared, including two ranked as Tier I—the highest level of concern: an intensification of fighting in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed militia forces and Ukrainian security forces with the potential for more overt Russian military intervention, and heightened tensions within Israel and the Palestinian territories. Second, six contingencies from last year were dropped from the 2015 survey, including continuing conflict in Somalia and intensification of al-Shabab’s terrorist attacks on neighboring countries, the destabilization of Mali by militant groups with spillover effects on neighboring areas, and military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan triggered by border and/or resource disputes. Please check out the full PPS 2015 results, which includes the thirty contingencies, as well as the ten most commonly cited outliers added by survey participants. And as always, visit our Global Conflict Tracker, an interactive map that provides continuously updated research and analysis about each contingency throughout the year.
  • Conflict Prevention
    Preventive Priorities Survey: 2015
    View the accompanying online interactive: CPA's Global Conflict Tracker The intensification of the crisis in Iraq due to advances by the militant group the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the top conflict prevention priority for U.S. policymakers in 2015, according to leading experts who took part in the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) seventh annual Preventive Priorities Survey. This fall, CFR's Center for Preventive Action (CPA) solicited suggestions from the general public on potential conflicts that could erupt or escalate next year. CPA narrowed down the nearly one thousand suggestions to the top thirty, and invited more than 2,200 government officials, academics, and foreign policy experts to rank them by their potential effects on U.S. interests and likelihood of occurring in 2015. CPA then categorized the scenarios into three tiers, in order of priority for U.S. leaders. "The Preventive Priorities Survey is unique in providing a forward-looking assessment of the specific crises and conflicts that really worry U.S. foreign policy experts. This is invaluable to focusing U.S. policymakers' attention and resources on the most important conflict prevention challenges," said Paul Stares, General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention and CPA Director. Of ten high-priority contingencies, respondents rated only one—the Iraq crisis—as both highly probable and highly consequential. Participants considered this scenario more important to U.S. interests than they did last year, when it was ranked as a having a moderate impact on U.S. interests. One high-priority contingency—an armed confrontation in the South China Sea—was upgraded in likelihood from low to moderate this year. Two new scenarios on this year's survey were also ranked high-priority: the intensification of the Ukraine-Russia crisis and escalation of Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Both were deemed highly likely to occur, but with moderate effects for the United States. Two conflicts were downgraded from high- to mid-level priority this year—violence and instability in Pakistan and in Jordan. Respondents considered each less likely, though still moderately important for U.S. interests. The Top Ten U.S. Conflict Prevention Priorities in 2015: the intensification of the conflict in Iraq a large-scale attack on the U.S. homeland or ally a cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure a severe North Korean crisis the renewed threat of Israeli military strikes against Iran an armed confrontation in the South China Sea the escalation of the Syrian civil war rising violence and instability in Afghanistan increased fighting in eastern Ukraine heightened Israeli-Palestinian tensions View the full results here [PDF]. Prior surveys and associated events can be found at www.cfr.org/pps. CPA's Global Conflict Tracker also plots the results of the survey, as well as other ongoing conflicts, on an interactive map paired with background information, CFR analysis, and news updates. The Preventive Priorities Survey was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. CFR's Center for Preventive Action seeks to help prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly conflicts around the world and to expand the body of knowledge on conflict prevention. Follow CPA on Twitter at @CFR_CPA.
  • Conflict Prevention
    You Might Have Missed: Drones, Obama on Proxies, and U.S.-China Military Relations
    Remarks by President Obama at G20 Press Conference, White House, November 16, 2014. Obama: But we’re also very firm on the need to uphold core international principles. And one of those principles is that you don’t invade other countries or finance proxies and support them in ways that break up a country that has mechanisms for democratic elections. (3PA: The United States led coercive regime change invasions in three countries in the past thirteen years. Moreover, the international community has been funding and training proxies in the Syrian civil war for almost two years, and on September 19 Obama signed legislation to include the Pentagon in training the proxies. Presumably, these core international principles apply exclusively to other countries.) Steve Coll, “The Unblinking Stare: The drone war in Pakistan,” New Yorker, November 24, 2014. There are many reasons to be skeptical of the C.I.A.’s unpublished, lower estimate. According to former Obama Administration officials, the C.I.A.’s Counterterrorism Center, which oversees the agency’s drone operations, generates an after-action report, which includes an assessment of whether there was collateral damage. The center has a specialized, independent group that conducts post-strike investigations. The investigators grade the performances of their colleagues and bosses—not exactly a recipe for objectivity. But it seems clear that, over time, the Administration’s record improved significantly in avoiding civilian casualties… “The drones create a lot of misery in our area,” one student said. “So do the Arabs.” He meant Al Qaeda. “Why are the Arabs coming to our country? Why are they not fighting in their own countries? But we also say to America: If you say the Taliban are terrorists, yes, we agree. They are. But who created them?”… North Waziristan residents and other Pakistanis I spoke with emphasized how difficult it would be for a drone operator to distinguish between circumstances where a Taliban or Al Qaeda commander had been welcomed into a hujra and where the commander had bullied or forced his way in. If the Taliban “comes to my hujra and asks for shelter, you have no choice,” Saleem Safi, a journalist who has travelled extensively in Waziristan, told me. “Now a potential drone target is living in a guest room or a guesthouse on your compound, one wall away from your own house and family.” “You can’t protect your family from a strike on a hujra,” another resident of North Waziristan said. “Your children will play nearby. They will even go inside to play.” The researcher in Islamabad said, “There is always peer pressure, tribal pressure, to be hospitable.” He went on, “If you say no, you look like a coward and you lose face. Anyway, you can’t say no to them. If a drone strike does take place, you are a criminal in the courts of the Taliban,” because you are suspected of espionage and betrayal. “You are also a criminal to the government, because you let the commander sleep in your hujra.” In such a landscape, the binary categories recognized by international law—combatant or noncombatant—can seem inadequate to describe the culpability of those who died. Women, children, and the elderly feel pressure from all sides. A young man of military age holding a gun outside a hujra might be a motivated Taliban volunteer, a reluctant conscript, or a victim of violent coercion... Cheryl Pellerin, “Fiscal Crisis, Threats Test DoD Strategy, Readiness,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 16, 2014. One such area, particularly because of the ISIL fight in Iraq and Syria, [Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael G. Vickers] said, is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. “There is just not enough of that capacity to go around right now,” he said, adding that primary reconnaissance aircraft in demand include the Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. “We’re making due,” he added, “but we’re taking more risk in some areas. The demand now in Iraq and Syria is very high and we have challenges in Yemen and Libya and elsewhere, so we’re working hard to fix this but it’s not something you can get out of right away.” Without going into specific shortfalls, the intelligence official said, “we’re concluding that we will need more [drones] going forward than we might have thought a year ago if we hadn’t had Iraq-Syria and this situation.Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America Department of Defense and the People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism, U.S. Department of Defense, November 12, 2014. The United States Department of Defense and the People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the “sides”): Reaffirm the commitment to the development of a new model of U.S.-China military-to-military relations, which is an integral part of the bilateral relationship: …The United States Department of Defense and the People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense (hereinafter referred to as the “sides”): Affirm that notifications should aim to reduce misunderstanding, prevent miscalculation, and manage risk and crisis effectively; and Establish a mechanism to inform when both sides would exchange notifications of major military activities on the basis of the principles of constructive cooperation, mutual interest, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and reciprocity, consistent with accepted international norms of behavior… Gen. Wesley K. Clark (ret.), Don’t Wait for the Next War: A Strategy for American Growth and Global Leadership (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2014) p. 39. “Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary [Paul Wolfowitz],” I opened. I paused. It felt a little awkward as he looked up at me. I thought I better put it in context. “Sir, when you visited us out at the NTC in January, you said I should stop by to say hello when I got back to the Pentagon.” I paused. No reaction. I tried again. “Well, I just wanted to stop by and say congratulations for all that was done overseas. You must be very proud of the operations and the troops.” I wasn’t one of those troops, and, sure, that was a little disappointing. I’d been held in position at the National Training Center during the war to continue the training activities for our mobilizing National Guard forces. But I was proud of what our team and the Army had accomplished. Now Wolfowitz was engaged. He looked up at me intently. “Yes,” he said, “of course….But, we didn’t get Saddam Hussein. President Bush says his own people will take him out….Maybe, but I doubt it.” I knew there was a rebellion underway as the Shiites in southern Iraq took advantage of Saddam’s defeat to rise up against his control, and I had read there was some argument as to whether or not President Bush had flinched and called a halt too soon, or should have ordered General Normal Schwarzkopf Jr. to Baghdad. But I wasn’t prepared with an opinion one way or the other on Saddam’s future. “Still, we did learn one thing,” Wolfowitz continued. “We learned that we can intervene militarily in the region with impunity, and the Soviets won’t do a thing to stop us.” (p. 39)
  • Conflict Prevention
    What Leon Panetta’s Memoir Says About Drone Strikes
    Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2014), pp. 388-391. But the singular preoccupation with drones distracts from the larger context of the struggle we are waging. Yes, the United States possesses and uses drones to target senior Al Qaeda leaders who are otherwise beyond our reach to capture. (3PA: Actually, the United States rarely uses drones to target senior al-Qaeda leaders. As I have pointed out, only between 2.2 percent and 5 percent of all victims of U.S. targeted killings were “leaders.” A recent study by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism determined that less than 4 percent of the 2,379 drone victims in Pakistan were members of al-Qaeda. Moreover, most of those killed by drones were not “beyond our reach to capture.”  Again, as has been pointed out, there is no actual preference to capture suspected terrorists over killing them. Since this was first declared a policy preference in September 2011, the Obama administration has conducted over two-hundred targeted killings and only five capture operations.) And yes, I appreciate the fascination with technology. Advances in weapon design often are captivating—witness the crowds at the annual Rose Parade as they gasp when the Stealth bombers pass overhead. But to call our campaign against Al Qaeda a “drone program” is a little like calling World War I a “machine gun program.” Technology has always been as aspect of war: The North developed repeating rifles to use against the South in the Civil War; machine guns and tanks debuted in World War I; the Allies used radar, code-breaking, and nuclear weapons to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during World War II. Those breakthroughs saved American lives and secured historic victories, though sometimes at great cost. (3PA: The myth that drones are merely another weapons platform is one often repeated by U.S. officials, and is a myth that we have dismantled in successive reports. The inherent advantages that armed drones provide have significantly lowered the threshold for when civilian officials will authorize the use of lethal force to kill people. There is a reason that, of the estimated 385 targeted killings in Pakistan, for example, 99 percent of them were conducted by drones and not by manned aircraft, rockets, or special operations forces raids.) Today, as with those historical examples, what is most crucial is not the size of the missile or the ability to deploy it from thousands of miles away; what matters far more are the rules of law and engagement. (3PA: Panetta makes an excellent point, but what matters even more is that the rules of law and engagement are publicly known and comprehensible, and have been demonstrably implemented. If not, then there will never be much public trust or understanding of the targeted killing program and U.S. policies will have no normative influence in shaping how other countries employ their own armed drones.) Again, those rules reflect painstaking consideration across the government; they require presidential authorization, specific policies approved by the National Security Council, intelligence collection, and analysis by a number of agencies, legal opinions, and reviews and congressional oversight. Those legal standards in turn reflect the basic values that guide this work, and those who are involved in debating and constructing those rules work zealously to protect the values—notably the minimization of risk to American lives and those of noncombatants—that they express. (3PA: These statements of process and values are admirable, but are based upon the foundational principle of U.S. targeted killings: “trust us.” Given how often the words of administration officials—including Panetta—have not matched actual drone strike practices, this is a tenuous argument to make. Panetta later writes, “I recognize that the public was not privy to those conversations, but the checks and balances of our government ensures that these operations were subjected to appropriate scrutiny while still keeping details out of the hands of our enemies;” Another assertion without factual support. While properly classified details should, of course, be kept out of enemies’ hands, unclassified details should not be hidden from American citizens, as they have been.) Some of my colleagues in the Obama administration argued that these operations were far too secretive and that they should be conducted with full public explanation of each operation. One official even suggested that we send out press releases with each strike. I certainly agree with President Obama that we need to be far more transparent in the way we explain our drone policy. However, I also believe that certain operational details need to remain secret. The president, as commander in chief, needs a range of tools to defend the nation, and secrecy is one of those tools. (3PA: This is another universal statement that U.S. officials make safely after they retire: “We should have been far more transparent.” What would be more useful is actual transparency and accountability by those same officials when they were serving in government. Moreover, it would be helpful if Panetta suggested even one way that America’s use of drones could be made more transparent. It is easy to aspire to transparency in the abstract, but retired officials are rarely specific.) …And yet, as the president recognized that day and has since publicly acknowledged, this is an area admittedly fraught with complexity: When an American missile snuffs out an avowed enemy of this country, lives are both lost and saved. A terrorist who is committed to blowing up an airplane or destroying a skyscraper is eliminated, and those he would have killed are spared his brutality. At the same time, a young person who loses a father or a brother, who digs out the embers of a relative from the smoking wreckage of a Hellfire missile may be radicalized, may turn his anger against those who killed his loved one. It is a hard business of agonizing choices. In the world of theory, it is easy to be certain. In the world as it is, many brave men and women risk their lives to protect others from danger, and every decision is subject to dispute. (3PA: Note how Panetta characterizes all drone victims as “an avowed enemy of this country” or “a terrorist who is committed to blowing up an airplane or destroying a skyscraper.” This is a scary and vivid characterization, though inconsistent with those individuals who the United States has primarily targeted with drones. Namely, low-level militants who pose a threat to the security forces and populations in the countries where they reside, or, in the case of the Haqqani Network, those who facilitate attacks against U.S. servicemembers deployed in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Panetta mentions “many brave men and women risk their lives to protect others,” but the point of armed drones is that Americans never risk their lives–unless they are those intentionally or unintentionally targeted and killed.) As with enhanced interrogation, the use of drones provokes strong feelings and strenuous debate in our nation. It should. But as with the interrogation discussion, it’s important to recognize that neither side has a monopoly on reason. Relying too heavily for too long on technology that spies down from above and can unleash deadly force from half a world away surely reinforces a worrisome image of malevolent American omniscience. Moreover, this technology is rapidly spreading across the world. Americans would undoubtedly recoil if China, for instance, were to spot a dissident in Mexico and eliminate him with a missile. (3PA: These are all critical dilemmas posed by Panetta and ones that would have benefited from him expressing his own opinion. For a long-time-policymaker purportedly unafraid of “straight talk,” Panetta refuses even in retirement to address these dilemmas head-on. It is also worth mentioning how he hypothesizes a Chinese drone strike on a “dissident,” as opposed to how Beijing would assuredly describe the target, as a “terrorist.” Using such disparaging terms to characterize victims is assuredly one of the many precedents that China will adapt from U.S. precedents regarding drone strikes.)
  • United States
    What Threats or Conflicts Will Emerge or Escalate in 2015?
    In March, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated, “Our military’s first responsibility is to prevent and de-escalate conflict.” However, when it comes to the United States’ ability to anticipate and predict conflict or instability, there is room for improvement.  Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently repeated what many military officials acknowledge, “In the last forty years, our record in predicting where we would use military force next, even six months out, is perfect. We’ve never once gotten it right.” Just a year ago, the United States did not anticipate that it would again be deeply engaged in military action in Iraq, let alone in Syria, against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria before the end of 2014. For the past six years, in an effort to assist policymakers in anticipating and planning for international crises that threaten U.S. national interests, we at CFR’s Center for Preventive Action have conducted the Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS). The PPS evaluates ongoing and potential violence conflicts and sources of political instability based on the impact they could have on U.S. interests and their likelihood of occurring in the coming year. What threats and conflict are you worried will emerge or escalate in 2015? Please tell us your suggestions in this survey. Keep your responses short and to the point, but feel free to explain why the contingency is important. Compelling suggestions will be included in this year’s survey, which will be published in December. Take the survey here: http://svy.mk/1qqbKpk. 
  • United States
    Senator Levin Calls for International Coalition to Oppose ISIS
    Play
    Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) joins Michael Getler of PBS to discuss the ongoing crises in Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq and the U.S. response.
  • United States
    Senator Levin Calls for International Coalition to Oppose ISIS
    Play
    Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) joins Michael Getler of PBS to discuss the ongoing crises in Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq and the U.S. response.
  • Conflict Prevention
    Ebola Reveals Gaps in Global Epidemic Response
    Coauthored with Daniel Chardell, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program.   Jan Eliasson, deputy secretary-general of the United Nations (UN), calls the Ebola outbreak ravaging West Africa a “test of multilateralism.” If so, the world is failing. The epidemic has already infected a reported 4,300 people in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, claiming 2,300 lives. Fragile health-care systems in these countries are collapsing. Poorly equipped treatment centers are overflowing. Riots are erupting as soldiers enforce quarantine zones at gunpoint. Scores of doctors and nurses, who lack proper protective gear, are contracting the virus from infected patients. Others are walking off the job, intensifying the region’s severe shortage of health workers. Meanwhile, border closures are causing food shortages and price spikes, leading the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization to warn of “grave food security concerns.” Unlike prior Ebola outbreaks, which have occurred in remote regions and been quickly contained, new infections are rising “exponentially,” according to the World Health Organization (WHO). Cases are expected to reach at least 20,000 over the next six to nine months. The root cause of this epidemic is the institutional weakness of the affected states, all three of which have experienced civil war in the recent past and struggle to provide basic public services to their populations even under the best of circumstances. Before the outbreak, Liberia had one doctor and thirty nurses per 100,000 inhabitants, according to estimates. These rudimentary health systems have been absolutely overwhelmed by the deadliest Ebola outbreak in history. Low levels of confidence in public institutions—a common feature of post-conflict environments—have made populations wary of cooperating with government officials throughout the crisis. This pervasive distrust has facilitated the spread of the vicious disease and exacerbated existing social tensions. Complicating matters further, Ebola was previously unknown in West Africa, so local health workers were woefully unprepared to recognize the virus, isolate infected individuals, and monitor their contacts. But the severity of the epidemic and the disastrously slow response also reflect glaring gaps in the international system—namely, multilateral institutions that are ill-equipped to respond to global health crises. The WHO, in principle charged with coordinating global responses to international public health emergencies, has drawn heavy criticismfor its belated recognition of the epidemic’s severity and waiting until August 8 to declare the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). WHO director-general Margaret Chan, who had received high marks for her earlier performance as director of health in Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak and subsequent crises, has come under unaccustomed criticism. As the emergency developed, she has appeared testy and defensive at times. In a September 4 interview with the New York Times, Chan resisted the very notion of WHO responsibility to combat the outbreak, asserting: “First and foremost, people need to understand WHO. WHO is the UN specialized agency in health. And we are not the first responder. You know, the government has first priority to take care of their people and provide health care. WHO is a technical agency.” Similarly, David Nabarro, whom UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon appointed to coordinate the UN response to the epidemic, insists that primary responsibility rests with the afflicted West African countries themselves. What they need above all, he said, is money. With thousands dead in West Africa and tens of thousands more likely to become ill in the coming months, the WHO’s insistence that it is primarily a technical agency is both exasperating and inadequate. As our CFR colleague Laurie Garrett has written:   Chan has been at great pains in her media blitz this week to say that the UN and WHO are not in charge—the respective governments are in command of the Ebola crisis. […] Unanswered is the obvious question: What does the world community do if a weak government fails to act, or makes wrong choices? If Ebola spreads to other countries this conundrum will arise again, and the global community will be left with its own question: “Who’s in charge?”   But in another sense, making WHO a scapegoat is deeply unfair, for the failure in West Africa has been a collective one. The agency’s lackluster performance reflects a huge mismatch between the high expectations placed upon it and the narrow mandate and modest resources at its disposal. Hamstrung by years of budget cuts to its outbreak and emergency response units, for instance, the agency learned of the outbreak only in March, nearly four months after the virus claimed its first victim in Guinea. Faced with a lethargic WHO and ineffectual West African governments, the medical humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors without Borders) has attempted to fill the void. MSF has been on the ground treating the ill from the outset, all the while vociferously warning that the global response to the Ebola outbreak was inadequate. “Leaders are failing to come to grips with this transnational threat,” cautioned MSF international president Joanne Liu at a UN briefing earlier this month. “We are in uncharted waters.” MSF should be lauded for its indispensable work in the field. But the world cannot expect NGOs to address transnational health threats on their own. Nor should we rely on hopes that experimental drugs and vaccines will miraculously relieve us of the burden of action. Though far from over, the crisis has demonstrated how ill-equipped the multilateral system is to cope with global public health emergencies, particularly in the world’s weak and failing states. In an increasingly globalized world, it is illusory and hazardous to imagine that fragile states can cope with such emergencies on their own, cordoned off from the rest of the world. If UN member states are serious about confronting global health crises, they must rethink the role of the WHO, empowering it to lead the response to transnational health threats. The world needs a multilateral framework that can provide both rapid responses to emergencies and long-term capacity-building that targets the underlying deficiencies in infrastructure, expertise, and funding in these weak states. Without that, they will remain the weak links in global public health. Two components of that framework are clear. To start, UN member states should establish a contingency fund available to the WHO that is dedicated exclusively to financing outbreak containment measures in countries that are unable to do so. These measures would include mass deployment of health workers, medicines, food and water, and protective equipment. The idea is not new. In a 2011 report [PDF] on strengthening global responses to pandemics and public health emergencies, the WHO itself recommended that member states develop a “Global Health Emergency Workforce” and a $100 million contingency fund to “support surge capacity” in the case of a PHEIC, such as the current Ebola outbreak. However, as Georgetown professor Lawrence Gostin recently wrote [PDF], these recommendations never secured support from wealthy donor nations. Second, in global development initiatives, public and private donors should place greater emphasis on building health care infrastructure in weak states, especially those emerging from conflict. Again, this is not a novel concept—scholars have been writing about the importance of incorporating health into post-conflict reconstruction efforts for years. Such infrastructure could have been critical in staving off the rapid spread of Ebola in Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example. Unfortunately, for the thousands of Ebola victims, it is too late for these measures to help them. But they may help prevent a future outbreak of the same magnitude—or ensure that, if one does occur, the world is better equipped to respond.
  • United States
    Guest Post: A Cold Warrior’s Foreign Policy Advice for Obama
    Harry Oppenheimer is a research associate for national security at the Council on Foreign Relations. The conviction of John Foster Dulles—Secretary of State under Eisenhower in the 1950s, shaper of NATO, and lead architect of Rollback—about the most effective method of maintaining global peace and stability stands in stark contrast to the Obama administration’s foreign policy of remaining flexible and cautious. At the center of Dulles’ strong beliefs, as he remarked in his book War or Peace, was the importance of clear intentions in international affairs. “It is the theory and hope of the proponents of the [NATO] treaty that by thus making clear in advance what we will do in the event of an attack on Western Europe, that attack will not, in fact, occur.” Dulles believed that the main threat to global stability is miscalculation by state actors attributed to broadly-defined interests and weak signals of breaking points—where aggression becomes a cause for full-scale conflict. When interests are broad they become difficult to defend, and ambiguous intentions risk leaving the breaking point open to interpretation. Furthermore, stated policy positions must be matched by action in order to maintain credibility. President Obama’s foreign policy is characterized by reluctance to state and defend strong positions on international issues. U.S. policy in Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq share one characteristic—an ambiguous articulation of American interests. The intent is to allow flexibility and choice, and prevent being pulled into conflicts. Policymakers would be well advised to look back for a significant counterpoint and understand the potential consequences of such a strategy. America doesn’t want its limits to be tested or foreign actors to see how far they can push; this is not only a clear goal of American foreign policy but also of the international community at large. Today, Russia is testing these limits and the costs of the United States’ ambiguous foreign policy are evident. The downing of MH17 by Russian supplied missile systems, buildup of troops along the Russia-Ukraine border, and aid convoy heading for Ukraine have significantly escalated the conflict and tested the willingness of the United States to respond to a threat of instability in Eastern Europe.  The Kremlin assumed that the risk of an international incident was outweighed by the strategic advantage that heavy weapons provided for the rebels and presence of troops along the border; this assumption is now going to be tested. Letting it get to this point is a strategic blunder of U.S. foreign policy. No one knew exactly what the United States’ reaction would be if Russia supplied heavy weapons to the Ukrainian rebels. But in the future, for example, if the Russian military overtly invaded Ukraine, would the United States and NATO take action? What will be the reaction to Russian aid convoys? If the Malaysia Airlines flight was an American Airlines flight, would the United States have already intervened? The risks of guessing the answer to these questions are that eventually the United States will be forced to act beyond where it is comfortable, an outcome no one wants. Already, Bashar al-Assad knows how to test the U.S. and NATO responses, and three years into the Syrian Civil War the international community still cannot define U.S. interests in the conflict. The civil war has been marred by widespread torture and killing of political prisoners opposed to Assad, and use of chemical weapons on an industrial scale against non-combatants. However, at each stage, U.S. strategy has been to avoid direct action even when clear lines have been crossed. By keeping U.S. interests ambiguous the United States feels confident in its ability to stay out of conflict. However, every policy has a breaking point. Now, when U.S. interests are threatened the country saves face by redefining its agenda, but what happens when this becomes impossible? The risk is that, over time, it becomes very easy for other countries to miscalculate exactly where the United States draws the line, forcing it to escalate conflicts beyond where it is comfortable. Subsequently, the potential for even greater and unavoidable conflict increases. It would be easy to dismiss Dulles’ advice as reflective only of the bipolar world order of his day, but this would be a mistake. Greater global stability and lower risk of conflict could be achieved by a more clearly articulated foreign policy that lowers the potential for other countries to miscalculate the United States’ willingness to project force abroad. As Russia evaluates the risks of an invasion of Eastern Ukraine it would be advised to look at the lessons provided by Germany before WWI and WWII. As Dulles remarked, both the Kaiser and later Hitler miscalculated the response of allies to take action when their partners were threatened in Europe. They acted without certainty of the outcome, and history demonstrates how wrong the Kaiser and Hitler were. In the end, the costs for both sides and the world at large were massive. Today, Russian aid convoys race toward the Ukraine border and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen believes that a Russian invasion of Ukraine is “likely.” The United States should make its intentions clear so that the Kremlin doesn’t make the same error as Germany in 1914 or 1941, and opposing sides don’t suffer greater consequences than necessary. This would require a shift in the way President Obama conducts foreign policy, but it is a necessary change. A first step would be a commitment to Ukraine that goes beyond political rhetoric and demonstrates the United States’ resolve in the region. Knowing precisely where the United States stands is one of the best ways to ensure that Russia never has to discover how far it was willing to go.
  • United States
    Guest Post: What’s Next for the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit?
    Amelia M. Wolf is a research associate in the Center for Preventive Action and the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. The focus of this week’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit—economic investment in sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa—has changed the narrative of how the United States perceives of and engages with the continent. However, the summit is missing a vital component to achieving its long-term goal of sustained growth and development. If the Obama administration is serious about the United States being “central” to the economic development of Africa, it should emphasize the important role of human rights behind closed doors after the Summit ends. While ignoring potentially controversial issues in the short-term will make for less contentious discussions, the long-term implications could negatively affect U.S. partnerships with African countries and drastically hinder region-wide progress. Unfortunately, the United States has shown limited interest to destabilizing situations outside of terrorism-related countries—such as Somalia and Djibouti. Although the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) is complex and recurring, if affects the political stability and economies of the surrounding countries—including Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, Republic of Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan. The United States should collaborate with CAR’s neighbors, and other states with influence in the region, such as France, to facilitate a dialogue on how to address the humanitarian situation—first in surrounding countries, and eventually within CAR itself. This simple strategy of diplomatic facilitation, without an overt role of the U.S. military, is applicable in situations other than CAR as well. With its growing investments in Africa, the United States also has the opportunity to increase accountability for human rights violations by supporting the development of institutions for justice and the rule of law in collaboration with African states. Though African leaders now widely-reject the International Criminal Court (ICC), claiming that it is “politicized” or “anti-Africa,” this was not always the case. The DRC, CAR, Mali, and Uganda have all referred situations to the court for investigation. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni referred Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, to the ICC in 2004. However—signifying the continent-wide shift in leaders’ opinions of the court—he praised Kenya in 2013 for rejecting “blackmail” by the ICC when Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta was indicted for his role in the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008. Controversy reached a new high in February 2014 when the African Union (AU) urged its fifty-four members to condemn the ICC indictments of sitting presidents, with Botswana as the only dissenting country. Given the AU’s stark and enduring opposition to the ICC, it is unlikely that the African leaders will be persuaded to once again support a court that has investigated twenty-one cases, all of which are from Africa. However, there is still a strong desire for justice throughout Africa, particularly from civil society. The sole purpose of creating the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (which is expected to merge with the African Court of Justice) in 2004 was to provide AU member states with the ability to prosecute offenders that would otherwise be tried by the ICC. The United States has the opportunity to support and facilitate the development of legal institutions, allowing the region to pursue justice in a manner consistent with the continent’s established processes and values. American support for this venture would not only help to ensure that human rights are promoted  and accountability upheld, but assist with monitoring human rights compliance of foreign investors—such as China. The summit comes at an unprecedented time for Africa, and it is the optimal time for more direct U.S. engagement. Overall security has increased in recent years and the United States is widely trusted throughout the continent. Though there are persistent pockets of Islamic extremism, and armed conflict in the eleven countries, there are fewer and less intense wars than in previous decades. Additionally, despite the growth of Chinese investment, the United States is slightly more trusted throughout Sub-Saharan Africa—with 74 percent of the region viewing the United States positively, compared to 70 percent viewing China positively. This is due in part to the perception of China’s investment as colonial exploitation, and the tendency of Chinese companies in to predominantly employ Chinese workers rather than host-nation workers. U.S. support for preventing human rights abuses in African countries and supporting institutions for justice will help confirm its commitment to the continent’s development as a whole, and potentially diminish China’s influence in the region.
  • Middle East and North Africa
    Town Hall: Middle East Update
    Podcast
    CFR fellows discuss the current situation in the Middle East.
  • Conflict Prevention
    Guest Post: What’s in Store for Kashmir Under Modi?
    Anna Feuer is a research associate in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state and a historical flashpoint for separatist violence, terrorism, and border tensions, has enjoyed relative peace since 2010. However, recent incidents—including a violation of the Indo-Pakistani ceasefire that holds on the Line of Control (LoC) and a controversy surrounding Kashmir’s special constitutional status— point to the many stresses that could spark renewed unrest in the contested territory. External threats from Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based, anti-Indian militant group committed to jihad in Kashmir, and the ongoing risk of military conflict with Pakistan compound Kashmir’s insecurity. India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, should seek to reduce Kashmir’s vulnerability to these pressures by addressing Kashmiris’ longstanding domestic grievances, including militarization of the region, economic stagnation, and the preservation of Kashmir’s legislative autonomy. Modi should start by altering the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir so that it applies only to the LoC. According to Human Rights Watch, AFSPA, which grants special powers to Indian armed forces in “disturbed areas,” protects soldiers from prosecution for abuses and violates international human rights law. The previous prime minister, Manmohan Singh, pledged to repeal the law but failed to overcome the army’s opposition. Recently, however, the Ministry of Defense may have signaled a change in attitude, indicating that the time has come for “a strategic shift from merely invoking control mechanisms to addressing conflicts at various levels.” (Defense Minister Arun Jaitley was more evasive during a trip to Srinagar last weekend.) Repeal, or at least reform, of the law would do much to  reassure Kashmiris concerned with human rights and militarization. As elsewhere in India, Kashmiris are deeply worried about unemployment and economic stagnation. Recognizing that some Kashmiris may understand socioeconomic issues, like they do security issues, in the context of their troubled relationship with New Delhi, the Modi administration should keep economic development at the center of its approach to Kashmir, and avoid communally-driven policies that could divert attention from economic goals. Kashmiri traders are hopeful that the new government will revitalize trade across the LoC , though the Pakistan army’s opposition may make this impossible. Finally, Modi should downplay his party’s commitment to eliminating Article 370, the constitutional provision that grants Kashmir significant autonomy. While the BJP and its ideological affiliate, the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, maintain that Article 370 stokes separatistism and hinders Kashmir’s full integration into India, many Kashmiri Muslims perceive Article 370 as a lifeline that preserves their political voice in a Hindu-majority nation. (Whether the provision provides for substantive autonomy is another issue; presidential orders since 1950 have ensured that most Union laws apply to Kashmir.) Some have suggested that the BJP may attempt to consolidate its support in Hindu-dominated Jammu by hastening the repeal of Article 370. However, as analyst Jonah Blank points out, Modi’s sweeping election victory gives him “the political space to reach out to Indian Muslims” and potentially soften the BJP’s hardline stance on Kashmir’s special status. Modi should not attempt to quietly dilute Kashmir’s special status without officially removing the provision; past efforts to weaken the state’s autonomy have not gone unnoticed by separatist leaders. The Modi administration has already committed itself to the return of Kashmiri Pandits, Hindu Brahmins displaced during the Kashmiri insurgency of the late 1980s and 1990s. But the time is ripe to address the many other enduring issues that could exacerbate communal tensions and secessionist violence in Kashmir; as reporter Myra MacDonald has pointed out, Pakistan’s deteriorating security situation makes it less and less desirable for Kashmiris who are seeking peace, stability, and economic opportunity. By taking steps to reform AFSPA, encourage economic development, and “douse the sparks” produced by the Article 370 controversy, Modi can demonstrate his concern for Kashmiris’ longstanding grievances. However, if Modi pursues the Hindu nationalist positions that characterized his tenure as chief minister in Gujarat and colored his campaign speeches, he risks a return to the insecurity that has plagued Kashmir for much of its recent history.
  • Lebanon
    Renewed Conflict in Lebanon
    Introduction Lebanon is at risk of experiencing renewed civil strife in the coming months, primarily as a result of the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war, now in its fourth year. Although potent memories of Lebanon's fifteen-year civil war and the desire of Lebanese political leaders to avoid a resumption of conflict have so far acted as a brake on violence, growing pressures caused by the influx of Syrian refugees and rising sectarian tensions could undermine Lebanon's fragile stability. The United States has strategic interests in preventing renewed conflict in Lebanon, namely precluding the further spread of regional instability, protecting the security of Israel, and denying jihadists ungoverned territory from which they could threaten the U.S. homeland. Resolving or at least deescalating the conflict in Syria would reduce the growing strains on Lebanon, but the prospects for this are dim in the short-to-medium term. Yet, steps can be taken to lessen the likelihood of renewed conflict in Lebanon. Bolstering the resilience of Lebanon's state institutions and seeking to deescalate growing sectarian tensions will be essential. Although this strategy does not resolve Lebanon's longstanding political and socioeconomic challenges, it aims to insulate Syria's most vulnerable neighbor from the spread of conflict. The Contingency The potential for renewed conflict in Lebanon hinges directly on the trajectory of the civil war in Syria. Over the next twelve to eighteen months, the security situation inside Lebanon could deteriorate due to three interrelated spillover effects stemming from Syria's ongoing civil war: growing sectarian violence, a rising influx of refugees, and the increasing paralysis of state institutions. The Syrian conflict will likely remain a protracted stalemate over this timeframe because neither the regime nor the rebels have the capacity to prevail militarily. Though the Syrian regime is consolidating military gains on the ground, an outright regime victory remains unlikely. However, should the regime emerge victorious, the prospect of widespread renewed conflict in Lebanon could diminish, particularly if Hezbollah withdraws from Syria, removing a major impetus of sectarian violence in Lebanon. Meanwhile, in an even less probable scenario for Syria, if armed rebel groups either overthrow the Assad regime or force its retreat from Damascus, the contingency would not only be more likely, but possibly worse than depicted. Major refugee flows from Damascus would be expected. Rising Sunni power in Syria and, by extension, Lebanon, would check Hezbollah's dominance and necessitate a reformulation of Lebanon's power equation, typically achieved by force of arms. The most likely prognosis for Syria is stalemate. However, stalemate should not be confused with stasis. The conflict in Syria is dynamic, with continuing shifts in the contours of the fighting, mounting outflows of refugees, and a growing influx of foreign fighters, as well as deepening radicalization and sectarianism of its population. This ongoing stalemate would have significant spillover into Lebanon. Three interrelated developments could combine to produce renewed conflict in Lebanon:   Growing sectarian violence. Deepening sectarian divisions and violence inside Syria exacerbates existing tensions among Lebanon's Sunni and Shiite communities. In particular, the Shiite militant organization Hezbollah's unalloyed support for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's brutal regime—including the increased involvement of Hezbollah fighters in Syria—provokes more acute sectarian blowback in Lebanon from an outraged Sunni community.   Two notable factors contribute to Lebanon's sectarian dynamic spinning out of control. First, as sectarian hatred deepens, leaders of Lebanon's multiple religious communities lose control over their respective "streets." Second, sectarian violence feeds itself with repeating cycles of hate-based attacks and reprisals. The violence grows more acute and spreads beyond traditional flashpoints to encompass a broader swath of the country. Tit-for-tat kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings proliferate, with monthly civilian death tolls rising. This contingency features several other developments:   Lebanon's Sunni leadership vacuum is increasingly filled by radical elements that encourage the Sunni population to form militias and take on Hezbollah more frontally. A marked rise in Sunni militancy occurs. Civilian areas, including markets and cafes, are hit increasingly by indiscriminate bombings as Sunni extremists mimic tactics in Iraq. The "shadow war" between Hezbollah and al-Qaeda as well as the Iran-Saudi proxy battle in Lebanon intensify. Syrian jihadist organizations Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) expand their presence in the Lebanese theater. Lebanon's Shiite community, increasingly angered by suicide attacks in Shiite areas, ignores pleas for calm and initiates revenge attacks. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's traditional discipline over the Shiite community frays badly. De facto sectarian zones emerge as Lebanese citizens feel increasingly insecure. Neighborhood patrols and vigilante-style protection rackets begin to appear.   Rising influx of refugees. As violence in Syria deepens, refugee flows into Lebanon continue unabated, punctuated at times by spikes related to particularly acute episodes of violence in Syria. The Syrian refugee population in Lebanon balloons over twelve months from one million to two million, approximating half of Lebanon's population of four million prior to the outbreak of conflict in Syria. The refugee flows overwhelm Lebanon's already fragile infrastructure. Water, electricity, and waste management systems break down. Already in the throes of a historic drought, Lebanon suffers widespread and debilitating water and electricity shortages. The incidence of disease rises with the lack of sufficient sanitation. Public health and education systems collapse.   The effect reverberates through the Lebanese economy. Economic growth plummets, contracting the economy, while the unemployment rate continues to spiral upward from its current nearly 15 percent to more than 35 percent. The sharp economic decline in turn feeds a skyrocketing crime rate.   Massive refugee flows and the resulting socioeconomic distress provoke the Lebanese host population's deepening resentment. Syrian refugees are increasingly targeted in attacks, and Syrian youth grow more disaffected, forming gangs in response. The Syrian refugee population radicalizes and increasingly looks for protection by Syrian fighters flowing in and out of Lebanon. Ties emerge between some armed elements of the Syrian refugee population and radical Islamist factions in the Palestinian refugee camps. Increasingly, these two Sunni-dominated refugee populations find common cause and undertake joint attacks against Lebanese adversaries in an increasingly fractious arena.   Increasing paralysis of state institutions. Political paralysis in Lebanon intensifies as ongoing stalemate in the cabinet—divided along pro- and anti-Syria lines—leads to a political vacuum. Presidential elections are continually delayed as principal political parties fail to reach consensus on a new president. The Lebanese government proves increasingly incapable of responding to the country's proliferating challenges. More significantly, the unity of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) comes under increasing strain. The LAF's reputation as a stalwart national institution erodes. Accusations mount within the Sunni community that the LAF is a partisan force favoring Hezbollah and the Shiite community. LAF attempts to monitor the Syrian border and prevent Sunni fighters from crossing into Syria add to the perception that the army disproportionately targets Sunnis and is doing Hezbollah's and Iran's bidding. Sunni extremists increasingly target LAF checkpoints and other army installations. As LAF checkpoints spread to combat growing instability, their targeting has the perverse effect of contributing to the spread of violence around the country. Radical Sunni clerics intensify their calls for Sunni soldiers to defect from the army. Some young recruits from impoverished Sunni communities begin to heed the call. Though the Lebanese army does not break up, its cohesion is badly shaken.   The cumulative effect of these three cascading spillover scenarios constitutes a critical tipping point for Lebanon. Though each development on its own would cause significant harm, the combination of all three occurring simultaneously could overwhelm Lebanon's existing resilience.   Warning Indicators   The warning indicators of renewed conflict in Lebanon include the following developments:   Sudden massive influx of Syrian refugees. An acute uptick in violence in Syria could precipitate a sudden and significant exodus of refugees to Lebanon. In particular, should Damascus descend into deeper violence—due to either a rebel offensive or external intervention—significant numbers of refugees would flow out of Damascus, with Lebanon their most likely destination. Sunni extremist suicide bombings resume and accelerate in pace and geographic spread.. The bombings move beyond Shiite strongholds such as Beirut's southern suburbs or areas in the northern Bekaa Valley. Instead, a widespread campaign targets heavily populated civilian areas with the intention of sowing greater fear and anger throughout the populace. Sectarian killings increase. Attacks would be perpetrated based on sect and characterized by grisly, execution-style killings, with maimed bodies left in neighborhoods as a warning. Mobilization of sectarian-based militias across communities. As security grows more tenuous, communities mobilize at the grassroots and establish armed protection squads based on sect. Bombings and assassinations target Sunni areas with previously unknown Shiite groups taking credit. As violence deepens, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah increasingly loses control of his community, which seeks revenge for suicide attacks targeting Shiites. Checkpoints proliferate, increasingly dividing cities and other parts of the country into de facto cantons. As sectarian violence worsens, official and unofficial checkpoints sprout up at transition points from one sect-dominated area to another. Evidence grows demonstrating the radicalization of the Syrian refugee population and/or deepening involvement of radicals from Palestinian refugee camps. Syrian refugees increasingly settle in the Palestinian refugee camps as shelter grows scarcer. Palestinian extremists and Syrian refugees cooperate in an ad hoc, tactical manner, possibly forming new joint groups. Syrian refugees organize, forming gangs or armed groups that perpetrate attacks inside Lebanon.   Assassination of a major Lebanese leader or attack on a venerated religious site. In particular, the assassination of Nasrallah or a leading Sunni or Christian za'im (leader) could unleash widespread violence that serves as a tipping point into this contingency. Likewise, the destruction of a critical mosque or shrine, such as the Shiite Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus (a "Samarra mosque moment"), could similarly provoke a sudden and acute descent into violence.   Implications for U.S. Interests   Renewed conflict in Lebanon threatens U.S. interests in three principal ways. First, it would exacerbate regional instability, further undermining the U.S. interests in promoting peaceful, democratic reform and economic development in the region. Lebanon's descent into sectarian strife would deepen Sunni-Shiite tensions across the area, intensifying regional rivalries and potentially destabilizing neighboring countries at a time when the United States intends to "rebalance" its foreign policy priorities.   Second, renewed conflict in Lebanon could threaten the security of Israel, a critical U.S. ally, especially if jihadists gain a significant foothold in Lebanon. In particular, al-Qaeda–linked groups may seek to establish a presence close to Israel's northern border in order to perpetrate attacks on Israel. Moreover, in a number of follow-on scenarios, Israel could be drawn directly into Lebanon, further compounding regional tensions and adversely affecting other U.S. priorities in the region.   Third, renewed conflict in Lebanon would allow for ungoverned territory to be exploited by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups, with potential threats to the U.S. homeland. Should the situation in Lebanon deteriorate, Sunni jihadist groups already infiltrating the Lebanese arena could find more leeway to operate, both in terms of training as well as planning and launching attacks. These groups could use Lebanon to recruit operatives to undertake attacks in Europe or the United States.   Preventive Options   Given the direct linkage between Syrian spillover and Lebanese instability, resolution of the conflict in Syria would be the most effective path for preventing renewed strife in Lebanon. Yet, prospects for resolving Syria are remote at this time. Instead, a strategy that focuses on mitigating the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict while bolstering Lebanon's resilience and diminishing its sectarian tensions offers the best path forward. Specifically, to prevent renewed conflict in Lebanon, the United States has three broad sets of policy options   Mitigate the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict. Efforts to ensure humanitarian access to civilians inside Syria and insulate Syria's neighbors from spillover would help prevent renewed conflict in Lebanon. This option presents numerous challenges given the lack of international consensus on Syria and the entrenched nature of the Syrian conflict. It would also entail a broadening of the dialogue with Iran beyond nuclear-related issues, which has hitherto not been U.S. policy. Specific measures the United States could take to contain spillover from the Syrian conflict include the following:   Work with the United Nations and relevant global and regional actors to vastly improve humanitarian access into Syria, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2139. Faced with roadblocks from the Syrian regime on granting access to humanitarian organizations providing medical and food aid in rebel-controlled areas, the United States should seize on the UN consensus embodied by UNSCR 2139 to launch a full-bore multilateral effort, including the EU, Russia, and Iran, to increase humanitarian access. In particular, the United States should take advantage of Iran's professed willingness to support humanitarian access, encouraging Tehran to leverage its influence with Damascus to provide greater international access for aid. Initiate a dialogue on Syria, under UN auspices, with influential regional actors to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Turkey, and Iraq. This dialogue would highlight potential shared interests that might be leveraged to make progress on containing violence in Syria. Possible areas of overlap might include diminishing the growth of al-Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria or facilitating humanitarian access. Some might argue that the United States should now seek to set terms that will break the ongoing stalemate, including conceivably dropping the precondition that would require President Assad to resign early in the dialogue process.   Reinforce Lebanese resilience. The United States can also consider measures that bolster Lebanon's resilience given the likelihood of continued Syrian spillover. This option is only feasible with a substantial influx of resources. It should therefore be undertaken in concert with European allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, and the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. These measures include the following:   Increase funding for humanitarian and development assistance to both Lebanon's Syrian refugee population and the Lebanese host population. Working through the International Support Group for Lebanon and with the United Nations and the World Bank's Lebanon Trust Fund, the United States should spearhead efforts to double assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon and to Lebanese citizens. The Gulf states, in particular, should be encouraged to increase their contributions, which lag significantly. This option could be difficult to implement given the lackluster global response to the UN appeal: to date, less than 15 percent of the UN's target of $1.89 billion in humanitarian assistance to Lebanon has been funded. Donors should aim to increase funding to at least 30 percent of the UN target given the destabilizing effect of Lebanon's refugee crisis. Work with the LAF and international partners to dramatically enhance Lebanon's border security. The United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, should accelerate ongoing efforts to improve surveillance and controls along Lebanon's northern and eastern frontiers. The United States could initiate discussions with the UN to explore expanding the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) beyond its current area of operations in the south, thereby relieving the LAF of operating in particularly sensitive areas.   Deescalate sectarian tensions. The United States can work directly or indirectly through a variety of channels, including critical European and Gulf allies, to help reduce sectarian tensions inside Lebanon. Though the measures noted below are feasible, the United States should also encourage regional allies with deeper influence in Lebanon, such as Saudi Arabia, to resist the temptation to stoke sectarianism in Lebanon. Options include the following:   Initiate high level meetings with political leaders in Lebanon to encourage consensus building and work toward peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections. The U.S. ambassador in Lebanon can urge the representatives of Lebanon's two primary political groupings, the pro-Western March 14 coalition and the Syrian-aligned March 8 bloc, to break its existing stalemate. Strengthen the National Dialogue process. The dialogue process in Lebanon—which dates back nearly a decade—has had mixed results at best. For example, President Michel Suleiman attempted to use the National Dialogue process to seek agreement among Lebanon's polarized political factions to refrain from involvement in the Syrian conflict, to no avail. Nonetheless, in the absence of other, more effective institutional mechanisms, it can serve as a useful channel for communication among contending parties and reduce the possibility of miscommunication by providing a safe venue for discussion. Reform and strengthen security institutions, namely the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF). Work with the United Kingdom and France to integrate training and reform efforts within the LAF to safeguard against public perceptions that it is becoming a sectarian institution. The United States can ensure that part of its LAF assistance comprises enhanced training and communication skills that bolster the institution's public image. The United States could also work with allies to harmonize other flows of foreign assistance to the LAF (in particular from Saudi Arabia). Similarly, the United States should increase ISF reform and training efforts.   Mitigating Options   If Lebanon descends into violent conflict, the United States will have fewer options at its disposal to mitigate the consequences. Nonetheless, it will be essential to limit the damage that might emanate from Lebanon. These options would include the following:   Send a high-level U.S. envoy to seek a cessation of hostilities. This effort will be critical if the conflict expands beyond Lebanon to include Israel. In that case, the United States will need to leverage its ties to Israel and possibly work through regional actors to get both sides to stand down. Shuttle diplomacy would be undertaken by a U.S. special envoy, in coordination with the UN and European allies. If conflict remains internal, the United States could still seek the mediation of regional actors—perhaps Qatar, given its success in past efforts—to pursue a ceasefire. Establish a crisis management group with important regional allies including Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to limit fallout from Lebanon. Depending on the depth of conflict, the United States could consider establishing a regional contact group on Lebanon that would participate in intelligence sharing. Under U.S. leadership, senior representatives from these regional governments would convene to identify imminent security threats and joint measures—such as enhanced security protocols—that would forestall violent spillover. Mobilize international resources for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction through a Lebanon Emergency Fund. Once conflict breaks out in Lebanon, humanitarian needs will increase exponentially. The United States could spearhead efforts to mobilize as much as $20 billion to $25 billion for the Lebanese and Syrian refugee populations and infrastructure reconstruction. The large Lebanese diaspora community and Gulf states would be critical contributors to this effort..   Explore the possibility of enhanced UN peacekeeping in Lebanon. Depending on the level of violence, the United States could work through UN channels to bolster UNIFIL forces once a ceasefire is achieved or to help protect various communities against sectarian massacres.   Recommendations   Resolving Syria's conflict would dramatically diminish prospects for renewed strife in Lebanon, but the likelihood of a resolution in the near term is slim. Instead, spillover from Syria's protracted civil war threatens to destabilize an already volatile situation in Lebanon. Concerted efforts should be made to lessen its likelihood and mitigate the effects of unrest should it occur. To achieve these goals, the United States should implement the following recommendations.   Deepen U.S. intelligence sharing and information gathering so as to have better insight into Lebanon's internal politics. These measures should be undertaken by the Department of State and the CIA.   – Enhance intelligence exchanges with regional intelligence services, especially in the Gulf, to gain greater insights into the various extremist elements operating inside Lebanon.   – Increase monitoring of extremist elements in Palestinian camps.   – Undertake mapping of evolving sectarian fault lines across Lebanon, as well as important actors/groups, using all sources, including "big data" resources that can make use of open-source intelligence to track sectarian violence.   – Inventory influential online sources of sectarian rhetoric—clerics, websites, online publications—in order to refine strategies to counter sectarianism.   Intensify diplomacy in concert with the United Nations, United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia to tamp down sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation in Lebanon. These measures, undertaken by the Department of State, would focus on both Lebanon and the region.   – Reach out to Lebanese actors across the political spectrum to encourage consensus-building on critical political milestones, including the presidential election and a new electoral law.   – Support and actively promote the resumption and strengthening of Lebanon's National Dialogue process as an important venue for beginning to resolve political tensions among Lebanon's various sects. Its agenda should be broad and include diminishing sectarian tensions by promoting cross-confessional cooperation and enhancing internal security measures.   – Open discussions with both Saudi Arabia and Iran on diminishing sectarian tensions. Consider the establishment of a regional dialogue that includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Iraq and Turkey that aims to deescalate tensions in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.   Enhance Lebanese security, especially along the porous Lebanese-Syrian border, and pursue measures that strengthen security institutions, especially the LAF and the ISF. These measures should be enacted alongside France, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia, all of whom share important equities.   – Bolster U.S. defense and security assistance and cooperation with the LAF and focus new training efforts on Sunni enlisted soldiers. Pursue broader reforms and training that strengthen the institution's reputation as a national, not sectarian, force.   – Encourage the expansion of the Lebanese army's security plan beyond Tripoli and the northern Bekaa region into other restive parts of the country.   – Work with the French and Saudis to ensure that Saudi Arabia's $3 billion grant to the LAF is harmonized with existing plans and structure set for the LAF's long-term development.   – Work with the United Kingdom and others to dramatically increase support for border security/training, focusing specifically on the northern border with Syria.   – Enhance the equipping and training of the ISF by reinvigorating the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) programming in support of the ISF. Funding should be increased from $15 million to previous levels of $20 million or more. This training program should emphasize human rights and the rule of law.   – Explore the possibility of expanding UNIFIL's mandate to assist with enhancing border security elsewhere in Lebanon beyond the Blue Line.   Address Lebanon's mounting socioeconomic ills with greater resources and strong coordination with regional allies, the European Union, and international financial institutions.   – Mobilize significant global support for the World Bank's Lebanon Trust Fund. The United States should use diplomatic channels to encourage Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to provide greater assistance by providing detailed reporting on the negative social and economic impacts of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon and tying this socioeconomic deterioration to prospects for renewed conflict in Lebanon. Funneling aid through this multidonor fund will ensure that it bypasses Hezbollah-controlled government ministries.   – Implement funding conditions to harmonize new development assistance with long term national goals such as unifying the electrical grid and reforming the health care system.   – Accelerate support job creation programming in Lebanon that seeks to harness the country's indigenous entrepreneurialism by encouraging growth of small and medium enterprises. To the extent possible, ensure that assistance aimed at enhancing infrastructure includes job creation elements targeting both Lebanese citizens and the Syrian refugee population.   – Encourage Lebanon's exploitation of its offshore natural gas resources that are in uncontested areas as a longer-term source of energy and revenue by encouraging the Lebanese Petroleum Administration to accelerate efforts to establish the appropriate institutional and legal frameworks for enabling offshore gas exploration.   – Expand economic development assistance programs that target impoverished areas of north Lebanon and the Palestinian camps.   – Encourage Gulf allies to increase the number of visas available for Lebanese workers as well as encourage renewed Gulf private investment in Lebanon.   Bolster support for the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon, with special focus on the needs of children.   – Through example and diplomatic pressure, urge interested states and regional partners to ensure the $6.5 billion UN appeal for humanitarian aid for Syria and refugee-hosting communities in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and other neighboring countries is fulfilled. While public shaming of Gulf countries for their paltry contributions may be tempting, this tactic could easily backfire. The appointment of a new UN Syria envoy possibly could be linked to aid commitments. However, given that the Gulf continues to hold the UN in disdain, as evidenced by Saudi Arabia's rejection of a Security Council seat, the special envoy may not prove a useful leverage point.   – Accelerate efforts to resettle Syrian refugees in the United States and increase quotas.  
  • International Organizations
    Voting Against Accountability for Syria
    Coauthored with Claire Schachter, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. Today the UN Security Council voted on a French draft resolution referring the situation in Syria—where government forces have systematically slaughtered civilians—to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia and China vetoed the resolution. While not surprising, the double veto is enormously frustrating to those demanding a stronger international response to war crimes in Syria. To some observers, the failure of this referral may signal the impossibility of ensuring accountability in a context of geopolitical rivalry. But the Obama administration’s decision to support the resolution, even in the face of near certain defeat, was appropriate and necessary—appropriate in light of its evolving relationship with the ICC and necessary given its limited options for ending the conflict in Syria. Syria—like the United States, as well as Russia and China—is not party to the Rome Statute, the painstakingly negotiated treaty that created the world’s first permanent international criminal tribunal. Accordingly, the situation in Syria can only be investigated by the Office of the Prosecutor pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution. The Obama administration’s decision to endorse the draft resolution was notable, given the tumultuous history between the United States and the ICC. President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute just before leaving office, while advising against U.S. ratification until “fundamental concerns” were addressed. The succeeding Republican administration of George W. Bush signaled its immediate antipathy toward the Court, given the perceived risk that its independent prosecutor might launch politically motivated indictments against U.S. officials or servicemen and women. In May 2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton took the symbolic step of “unsigning” the treaty (an act he later called “my happiest moment at State”). Despite this initial estrangement, the United States’ relationship toward the ICC has evolved steadily since Bolton’s action. During its second term, the Bush administration began quiet, pragmatic cooperation with the Court, including by providing evidentiary and other materials related to cases on its docket. Most dramatically, in 2005 the United States supported the UN Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC and the pursuit of prosecutions of those senior Sudanese officials suspected of war crimes.  This quiet support has expanded under the Obama administration, which voted at UN Security Council in spring 2011 to refer the Libya  situation to the ICC. Unsurprisingly, many international observers now regard the United States as a de facto member of the ICC—albeit one that remains outside its jurisdiction. The vote on referral to the ICC was ridiculously late in coming. More than eight months have passed since the government of Bashar al-Assad provoked global outrage by deploying chemical weapons against civilians in the suburbs of Damascus. It has been five months since Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, announced that an international inquiry into Syrian atrocities “indicates responsibility at the highest level of government, including the head of state.” What explains the Obama administration’s decision to back a vote now? One obvious explanation is that the administration is genuinely committed to the principle of accountability for crimes against humanity. On this reading, supporting an ICC referral was a victory for U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power, one of the most outspoken advocates of this principle and a proponent of an increasingly close relationship between the United States and the ICC. Power—and perhaps likeminded others in the administration—have become increasing frustrated by the United States’ passivity in the face of Syria’s human rights catastrophe. Cynics might argue that the administration, having struggled to develop a coherent and effective policy to end the bloodletting in Syria—and having shied from pursuing more forceful steps in the face of limited support at home and few allies willing and capable of sharing the burden of military intervention—is grasping at symbolic straws. That would be too harsh an indictment. At this stage, the United States has a very poor hand to play, facing divisions among (and extremists within) the Syrian opposition and the political agendas of veto-wielding countries at the UN. The vote was also bound to fail. Although supported by scores of UN member states, Russia’s publicly stated opposition and dogged defense of a rare client state condemned it from the outset. Vladimir Putin no doubt calculated that he has already lost in the court of Western public opinion, whereas he can still earn points at home for standing up to the West—just as he has over Ukraine. More disappointing though hardly surprising was China’s decision to veto (rather than abstain)—the latest in Beijing’s troubling pattern of passivity toward perpetrators of gross human rights abuses. Belated failure is still hard to stomach, especially because it would have been worthwhile to pursue accountability against Assad now. Critics of pursuing justice before peace argue that if the priority is to end the conflict, indictments are misguided because they may encourage tyrants to hold on to power rather than weaken their position or deter them from further abusing their citizens. According to this perspective, the double veto may have preempted an investigation that would have prolonged the conflict, and also preserved whatever little hope there may be for the Geneva Process. This position, however, is based on the flawed assumption that there is a necessary trade-off between peace and justice; that the pursuit of the latter will necessarily compromise the former. As with the earlier indictment of al-Bashir however, there is little in Assad’s history or behavior to suggest that he needs any additional motivation to cling to power and pursue victory. Today’s vote marks yet another setback for the Syrian people and for the pursuit of international accountability for the most heinous crimes. And yet, by forcing Moscow and Beijing to go on the record as defenders of continued impunity for the Assad regime, the Obama administration did the right thing and demonstrated its commitment to working with the ICC. However, the failed vote also sends an invaluable reminder to the United States that a stronger relationship with the Court is no substitute for willingness to take forceful action to prevent or halt atrocities.
  • South China Sea
    South China Sea Tensions
    As the United States pivots to Asia, disputes over territories in the South China Sea have escalated tensions and threatened regional stability.