Demonstrations and Protests

Beijing has tightened its grip on Hong Kong in recent years, dimming hopes that the financial center will ever become a full democracy.
Mar 19, 2024
Beijing has tightened its grip on Hong Kong in recent years, dimming hopes that the financial center will ever become a full democracy.
Mar 19, 2024
  • Nigeria
    Dozens Reportedly Killed as Nigerian Military Fires on Shia Protesters
    Jack McCaslin is a research associate for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Between October 27 and 30, protesters from the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shiite religious organization led by the pro-Iranian Sheikh Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, clashed with security services in and around Abuja, Nigeria’s capital. The IMN reported that Nigerian security services had killed at least forty of its members during the marches. The military claimed that only six people were killed and that protesters were carrying petrol bombs and other dangerous weapons. It later arrested around four hundred members of the IMN. Today, as justification for its use of force against IMN protesters, the Nigerian army tweeted a clip of President Donald J. Trump explaining what he told the U.S. military in reference to the migrant caravan travelling north through Mexico to the U.S. border. "They want to throw rocks at our military, our military fights back," he said. "I told them, consider it a rifle." The tweet appears to have since been deleted. Group members were participating in the Arbaeen Symbolic Trek, an annual commemoration practiced by Shias to mark the fortieth day of the murder of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. The march featured prominently calls for the release of el-Zakzaky, who has been in government custody for almost three years. In December 2015, IMN members blocked the path of Army Chief of Staff Tukur Buratai’s convoy in Zaria, Kaduna state. The government accused el-Zakzaky of ordering the assassination of Buratai (though he was not formally charged until April 2018). Security services subsequently raided el-Zakzaky’s compound and injured and arrested him and his wife. During that December crackdown, security services reportedly killed over three hundred Shias across at least three locations in and around Zaria and quickly buried them in a mass grave. In December 2016, the Federal High Court in Abuja ordered the State Security Service to release el-Zakzaky, but it was apparently ignored. More recently in August 2018, the Kaduna State High Court cleared and released eighty IMN members also arrested in 2015 during the crackdown, but dozens of others still remain in custody. El-Zakzaky has vehemently opposed Nigeria’s federal government, the state of Israel, the United States, and secular government more broadly, and his rhetoric has been explicitly anti-Semitic and dehumanizing. In this way, some of his messages are similar to that of Boko Haram. But, el-Zakzaky does not promote violence, and in 2015 the IMN even supported Muhammadu Buhari’s presidential candidacy. The IMN, through el-Zakzaky, is also undeniably linked to Iran; he visited there in 1980 and was said to be inspired by the Islamic Revolution, and he has made frequent reference to it and its leaders. It is unclear how significant those links are for IMN operations.  That religious and political movements in Nigeria criticize or purport to offer an alternative to the massively corrupt federal and state governments should not be surprising. But, the government’s frequent and indiscriminant use of force reduces or eliminates the possible peaceful paths that these groups might take in their criticism. The Zaria episode is reminiscent of the 2009 confrontation in Maiduguri between security services and Boko Haram, during which the Mohammed Yusuf-led group staged an anti-government insurrection. The security services killed Yusuf, who was in their custody at the time, and several hundred of his followers. The movement then went underground, only to emerge two years later as one of the world’s deadliest terrorist organizations.  Afenifere, the influential Yoruba group, issued a stark warning following the violence in Abuja this week: “We must not forget how [the] extra-judicial killing of the founder of Boko Haram turned the group into a massive terror machine [that] we have been unable to contain and we are opening yet another front.” Afenifere’s warning is well-received. Should security service behavior radicalize the IMN, Abuja would face yet another insurgency for which it is ill-prepared. Despite their similarities, Boko Haram is in the Salafist tradition that generally loathes the Shia, and it is therefore highly unlikely that the two groups would join forces.
  • Comoros
    Authoritarianism in Comoros Is Resurgent
    Adam Valavanis is a volunteer intern in the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Earlier this month, protests against Comoran President Azali Assoumani turned violent, as armed protesters squared off against the military in the old town of Mutsamudu. Located on the country’s second-largest island, Anjouan, the city has seen a wave of protests from locals following Assoumani’s victory in a controversial referendum, held earlier this summer in which he claims to have won 97 percent of the vote. It upends the country’s power-sharing arrangement agreed to in 2001. Following the recent skirmishes, the governor of Anjouan, a virulent opponent of Assoumani, was placed under house arrest on dubious charges of fomenting violence. Comoros is no stranger to authoritarian rule, having been plagued by coups and coup attempts since independence from France in 1975. The country transitioned to democratic rule in 2001 with the creation of a new constitution. However, pervasive corruption and a weak rule of law have seriously undermined efforts at consolidation. An important feature of the 2001 constitution was the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement in which the presidency is rotated between the three main islands of Comoros—Grand Comore, Anjouan, and Mohéli—every five years. Assoumani represents the island of Grand Comore, and a candidate from Anjouan was slated to assume the presidency in 2021, after Assoumani’s five-year term ended. But, with Assoumani's referendum victory, the rotating presidency has been terminated and the way is clear for him to extend his rule by two more five-year terms. Hence the unrest on Anjouan, whose protesters feel that they will now be excluded from power. He claims that the power-rotation makes it difficult to adequately plan for the future. Snap elections are scheduled for next year. The Indian Ocean state now follows some other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where sitting presidents have sought to extend their tenure in office. However, the country’s problems are larger than the recent referendum. While the Comoran power-sharing arrangement probably helped the country transition from decades of military rule to democracy, the constitution has serious flaws that Assoumani has been able to exploit. Specifically, the constitution grants disproportionate power to the executive branch relative to the judicial and legislative branches. This has allowed Assoumani and past presidents to ignore court rulings, marginalize lawmakers, and enhance their personal power.
  • Nigeria
    Shia IMN Protesters Clash With Nigerian Military in Abuja
    Sahara Reporters has acquired a video of a confrontation on Saturday, October 27, between the Nigerian military and a parade of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shia political movement. The video clearly shows young men, presumably Shia, throwing stones at the Nigerian military, who then responded with live fire. Traffic was stopped as apparent civilians fled for cover and some continued to throw stones at troops. Much about the incident remains unclear; a recent report put those killed at more than ten, though previous reports have suggested three or five. According to Sahara Reporters, on October 27 the Shia were marching from Suleja to Abuja in preparation for a religious event called Arbaeen Symbolic Trek. The marchers apparently took a route that had not been approved by the security services. When the soldiers and police intervened, marchers responded by throwing rocks. The army and police responded with live ammunition.  In a press release, the military claimed, among other things, that troops “escorting ammunitions and missiles from Abuja to Army Central Ammunition Depot in Kaduna State were attacked by some members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria.” The military spokesman, Major General James Myam, also alleged that members of the IMN procession “attempted to overrun the escorts to cart away the ammunition and missiles the troops were escorting,” and that the marchers “established an illegal roadblock denying motorists free passage.” A spokesman for the IMN rejected the military’s description of events, claiming instead that the IMN protesters were peaceful and were attacked. The IMN’s three-day march began on October 28 in Abuja and included a call for the freeing of Shia leader Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, who has been under house arrest since 2015. Members of the IMN, marching in connection with the religious event, support of el-Zakzaky's release, or both, were reportedly fired on by the army on Monday, and clashes continued on Tuesday. Reports place the number of marchers and protesters in the hundreds, despite IMN claims that one million would attend. Overall, the IMN claims some three million followers in Nigeria, though the country's predominately Sunni Islamic establishment says that the real figure is much less. In 2015, there was a bloody confrontation between an IMN march and the convoy of Tukur Buratai, the army chief of staff. In that confrontation, the army killed several hundred Shia IMN marchers. The military states that the IMN had tried to assassinate Buratai in the alleged attack on the convoy. El-Zakzaky has been under house arrest ever since. Objective observers have not found the official explanation credible. The 2015 event is reminiscent of the 2009 confrontation between the security services and the followers of Boko Haram, then led by Mohammed Yusuf. A difference is that thus far, the IMN has eschewed violence.  The video of the October 27 confrontation, as well as the subsequent reports of action by the security services, is chilling because it clearly shows how poorly trained the security service personnel were, and how willing they were to resort to the use of live ammunition in the midst of marchers and otherwise innocent bystanders. The military explanation, should it be firmly disproven, would become yet another intentionally false claim made by the military to cover up their treatment of civilians.
  • Women and Women's Rights
    Iceland’s Lessons for the #MeToo Era
    What can the #MeToo movement learn from Iceland? The history of successful women’s protests show that mass mobilization is key.
  • Vietnam
    Women This Week: Making History in Vietnam
    Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post was compiled with support from Rebecca Turkington and Ao Yin.
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    Can Climate Activists and the Energy Industry Compromise?
    The reality that many energy companies are getting more serious about investment in low-carbon solutions is getting lost in the political noise of the day.
  • Iran
    Iran’s Restive Middle-Class Poor
    The latest recurrence of domestic protests in Iran stems from the country’s role in regional wars, combined with corruption and economic mismanagement. This discontent is likely to continue to pose a challenge.
  • Democracy
    Why We Must Never Give Up on Democracy
    In Nicaragua and Armenia today, people are rising up against tyranny and demanding human rights and democratic rights. Nicaragua has been suffering under a decade of misrule and deepening tyranny by the Sandinista Party--and by Daniel Ortega as president and his wife as vice president. And all of a sudden there are national protests. From the New York Times today: “Nicaragua changed,” said José Adán Aguerri, president of Cosep, the country’s influential business organization, which is pushing for dialogue with the government. “The Nicaragua of a week ago no longer exists.” The protests started with a relatively narrow issue — a change to the social security system — but they quickly rose to a national boil when students began to die. Human rights organizations say that dozens have been killed, including at the hands of the police.” In Armenia, protests began two weeks ago against the man who had served two five-year terms as president, Serzh Sargsyan—and was then appointed prime minister a week after his term as president ended. As CNN reported, “The move prompted thousands to take to the streets of the capital Yerevan to protest what was seen as an unconstitutional power grab.” In both cases, “people power” suddenly appeared. The streets were filled with demonstrators. We are reminded of the “Arab Spring,” which erupted when a police officer slapped Mohamed Bouazizi and knocked over his wheelbarrow full of produce to sell. His self-immolation led to protests that quickly spread and brought down the dictator Zine el Abedine Ben Ali after 24 years in power. The protests soon spread to Egypt, where they quickly brought down Hosni Mubarak after 30 years in power. There were protests in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain as well. Who predicted these outbursts? No one; experts assumed the real story was “authoritarian longevity” and the stability of the regimes. And no one predicted the protests in Armenia and Nicaragua. But all these uprisings are a reminder that the taste for liberty is present even in many cases where it is nearly invisible. It would have been reasonable to believe, one month before each of these protests began, that the populace in each case was resigned to its fate and uninterested in democracy. Instead, we can see that many citizens were ready to struggle for more freedom. That is important information for the United States as it considers whether to continue, strengthen, or abandon its policy of supporting the expansion of democracy. Realpolitik is often said to counsel dealing with regimes as they are, but these uprisings remind us that regimes are temporary; populations are permanent. Why side with a regime that the people despise, and will eventually remove? Why assume that a dictator speaks for his people, or will speak for them tomorrow? Why treat the dictators in Tehran, for example, as “Iran” when they are not at all the repository of the hopes—nor will they be the permanent rulers—of the people of Iran? All those despotic regimes lack public support and lack legitimacy, which is why they never hold free elections. Experts have rarely in fact predicted the sorts of uprisings noted here, but the point is not to criticize them for lack of omniscience. It is rather to emphasize that as President George W. Bush put it, “No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.” Of course protests movements can fail to bring freedom; the regime may survive or a new regime may be as bad as or worse than the one it replaces. But Armenia and Nicaragua remind us that the desire for freedom, and the resistance to tyranny, are never crushed. They remind us whose side we should be on.
  • Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
    Gaza and Jerusalem
    When President Trump thought about acknowledging Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the arguments against it were familiar—and had persuaded previous presidents. The secretary of state, Rex Tillerson at that time, argued that the negative Arab reaction would be large, swift, and significant.  In the event, there was not much of an Arab reaction. Remember the riots and huge demonstrations from Casablanca to Cairo to Baghdad to Jakarta? No, because there were none. Nor was the reaction from Arab governments very big.  All opposed the decision, but used words like unjust or unfortunate or unhelpful, which are not exactly declarations of war.  This past Friday and the Friday before that, Hamas organized very large demonstrations at the Gaza/Israel border. Last Friday, perhaps 20,000 people turned out. Many more (perhaps twice as many) had shown up on March 30th, and that decline must be a worry to Hamas.  The word “demonstrations” is actually wrong: there were armed men among the crowds, and their purpose was not ultimately to “demonstrate” but to crash the border fence so that thousands of Gazans could enter Israel—where some who were Hamas soldiers would no doubt have committed acts of violence including murder, arson, and kidnapping. The death toll ten days ago was 18 (or up to 23; accounts vary) and last Friday 10 more, according to Hamas. These events have elicited the predictable denunciations, not least from Arab capitals, and cautions and calls for restraint, not least from UN officials. The United States had to block a UN Security Council resolution on Saturday, April 7 (proposed by Kuwait, the Arab representative on the Council) because it did not demand that Hamas stop these dangerous attempts to storm the border and because it called for an international investigation. Israel’s and our experience with such “investigations” is that they are unfair, biased against Israel, and achieve nothing.  But once again, where are the riots and large and spontaneous demonstrations in the Arab world (or anywhere else for that matter)? Absent. Arab governments do not like to encourage very large demonstrations because they always run the risk of getting out of hand and turning violent or turning against the regimes themselves. Moreover, those regimes are simply tired of having Palestinian politics interfere with their own. Still, if there were a huge popular reaction it would need to be respected and channeled into some large public protests. Apparently it is absent as well. (1500 Arab Israelis marched peacefully in Sakhnin, in the lower Galilee, on Saturday.) Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas alleged Israel was “murdering defenseless, peaceful protesters” and called on the world to stop “the barbarism and killing of the occupation army.” But he is an enemy of Hamas and wants to see its new tactic of border clashes defeated; his statements are meant to palliate Palestinian public opinion, not to evoke public protests. His problem is that he appears to be doing nothing while Hamas is making news.  Citizens of Gaza have plenty to protest about, starting with misrule by Hamas and the terrible economic situation in which so many Gazans find themselves. Hamas tends to react by seeking more violence, attacking Israel with rockets or with this kind of dangerous clash at the border. Of course none of that helps Gazans. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have actually made a constructive proposal: in exchange for a decision by Hamas to avoid any more such border violence, the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza would be opened. Egypt has often kept Rafah closed, sometimes to punish Hamas for suspected collusion with terrorists in Sinai, sometimes at the behest of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah (which wants to be in control of the crossing). The Saudi and Egyptian proposal marks out a sensible path forward. Misery in Gaza is not in Israel’s interest. It is as likely to strengthen as to weaken Hamas. The lack of electricity means sewage goes untreated, and when it enters the Mediterranean contaminated waters can spread north to Israel’s ports and beaches. A lack of medical supplies and working hospitals could even some day lead to an epidemic that can cross into Israel, as the Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea has pointed out. The Trump administration understands this point perfectly well, which is why it convened a conference on Gaza in March. Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar were among the attendees, who also included the EU and eight European countries, Canada, and Japan. Notice who’s missing? The Palestinian Authority, which refused to attend. Misery in Gaza is not President Abbas’s real concern.  U.S. Middle East negotiator Jason Greenblatt said at the conference that politics should be put aside in the search for “realistic and practical solutions” that do not “put the security of Israelis and Egyptians at risk” and “do not inadvertently empower Hamas, which bears responsibility for Gaza’s suffering.” That’s the right approach, and one the Saudis and Egyptians understand. Perhaps it will be impossible to make progress, but the effort should be pursued—for practical as well as humanitarian reasons.  As with the Arab protests against President Trump’s Jerusalem decision, protests about Gaza are not large and will probably disappear soon. But the problem that Gaza represents to Israel and Egypt will not, so these efforts to figure out a way to avoid more misery without strengthening Hamas should go forward. The Palestinian Authority does not like them and Hamas presumably has very mixed views of them. But for the rest of the world, this path rather than the standard denunciations of Israel and unbalanced UN resolutions makes far more sense.           
  • Venezuela
    A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis
    In addition to a sharp economic downturn, Venezuela faces a humanitarian crisis. The United States can do little to prevent a downward spiral, but it should take measures to mitigate the political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of a potential mass emigration.
  • Women and Women's Rights
    Women Around the World: This Week
    Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering February 3 to February 13, was compiled with support from Alexandra Bro and Anne Connell.
  • Iran
    Oil and the Iran Protests
    It doesn’t take much these days to remind oil traders that Middle East geopolitical risk can raise oil prices. Unrest in Iranian cities is the latest case in point. News and video records of major protests in Iran pushed Brent prices to $67 a barrel before analysts started pointing out that the risk to oil supply from the protesters themselves was low. That analysis could be too sanguine. The protests in Iran underscore a rising risk across the Persian Gulf: disgruntled populations are willing to sabotage oil facilities to make themselves heard. Iran has been the site of such attacks of late, especially in the oil rich Khuzestan province known for its Arab separatist movement. In a sign that Iran likely takes the potential for sabotage seriously, an Arab separatist leader who was known to advocate for attacks on oil facilities in Iran was gunned down in Europe recently. Late last year, Bahrain accused Iran of being behind a terrorist attack on a pipeline that brings oil from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. Saudi Aramco has also boosted security at its offshore oil facilities on its maritime border with Iran. Those fields, including the Marjan oil field that is shared across the border with Iran, are slated for expansion by Aramco. Iran is also increasing production on its side of the field, called Foroozan. Khuzestan province is also home to fields that are important to Iran’s ability to increase its domestic oil production utilizing Chinese investment. Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of being involved in recent missile attacks from Yemen that targeted Riyadh airport and the royal palace. The accuracy of the thesis that Iranian protests won’t spread to oil workers the way they did in late 1978 will depend in large measure on whether Iranian government repression of discontent can be successful in putting down insurgency, as it was in 2009. It is important to remember that the sequence of events that led to the fall of the Shah of Iran took months to unfold. Protests were unrelenting at the end of 1978 and oil workers were eventually motivated by the chaos to deny the military access to fuel to prevent them from killing even more Iranian citizens. As conflict escalated on the streets, oil workers walked off the job, eventually bringing Iranian oil exports to zero. The Iranian government is well aware of this risk. In 2010, in the aftermath of internal instability in 2009, it increased the presence of the revolutionary guard in the oil sector to prevent a repeat of 1979. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also never seemed to embrace the notion—put forward by reformists—that Iran’s economy would benefit from integration with the global economy. Rather, Khamenei has advocated vociferously that Iran needs to stay the course on an economy of “resistance” where indigenous economic capacities are part of the battlefield and individuals sacrifice personal consumer needs in favor of the commanding heights of the state. That view seems to lend credence to commentary that Iran’s hardliners themselves started the protests initially to weaken reformers by highlighting the failure of the nuclear deal to bring about tangible economic benefits. If reports of protest slogans are correct, the population could be tiring of the hardliner view that it is a higher calling to remain cut off from the global economy to fund the security of Shiite compatriots via wars in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. Rather, like citizens in many places around the world, especially countries with oil, some Iranians are asking why they should make such sacrifices for a government that lacks accountability and is excessively corrupt. Oil markets will be watching carefully to see if the Donald J. Trump administration uses Iran’s repression of its own people as a reason to refuse to issue the waiver to keep the United States from violating the terms of the nuclear deal or if the U.S. president—once again—refuses to recertify Iran’s compliance with the deal, kicking the issue back to a reluctant Congress. Markets will be looking for any signs that U.S. action will make it more difficult for Iran to sell its oil or to raise new oil and gas investments in the Iranian industry. But as tempting as that grandstanding could be, the United States should probably take no hasty actions on this one until it can give the Iranian people a chance to be fully heard. If reports are accurate, Khamenei’s long standing concept that his fellow citizens should continue to sacrifice in a resistance economy to keep the upper hand in regional conflicts could be losing ground. The United States should do nothing to hinder that momentum. Acting out in ways that reconfirm the long standing hardliner story line that the United States will always be an enemy to Iran would be a mistake at this time. Rather, the United States should take a breath and with uncharacteristic patience, do nothing regarding sanctions until it can see if the chips fall in a more favorable place.
  • Iran
    January 4, 2018
    Podcast
    Mass anti-government protests roil Iran, North and South Korea prepare for possible peace talks, and presidential elections take place in the Czech Republic.
  • Iran
    The Islamic Republic of Iran Is Doomed
    But things are likely to get much, much worse before they—eventually—get better.
  • Iran
    The Iran Protests -- and The New York Times
    In the last few days there have been anti-government protests all over Iran. The BBC reports this as of Friday night, in a story entitled “Iranian cities hit by anti-government protests.” Anti-government demonstrations that began in Iran on Thursday have now spread to several major cities. Large numbers reportedly turned out in Rasht, in the north, and Kermanshah, in the west, with smaller protests in Isfahan, Hamadan and elsewhere. The protests began against rising prices but have spiralled into a general outcry against clerical rule and government policies…. What began as a protest against economic conditions and corruption has turned political…. Slogans have been chanted against not just Mr Rouhani but Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and clerical rule in general. Demonstrators were reportedly heard yelling slogans like "The people are begging, the clerics act like God". Protests have even been held in Qom, a holy city home to powerful clerics. There is also anger at Iran's interventions abroad. In Mashhad, some chanted "not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran", a reference to what protesters say is the administration's focus on foreign rather than domestic issues. Other demonstrators chanted "leave Syria, think about us" in videos posted online. Videos posted on social media appear to show clashes between security forces and some demonstrators in Kermanshah. Now compare today’s New York Times coverage. It is entitled “Scattered Protests Erupt in Iran Over Economic Woes.” More remarkably, consider the very first line: Protests over the Iranian government’s handling of the economy spread to several cities on Friday, including Tehran, in what appeared to be a sign of unrest. Ya think? “Appeared” to be a sign of unrest? What else was it, a sign of support for the ayatollahs? And note the Times title again, telling you these protests are all about the economy—a conclusion contradicted by the words being shouted by the protesters, as the BBC tells us. In fact, buried down in the Times story we do find that in Kermanshah “protesters shouted antigovernment slogans like ‘Death or freedom,’ ‘Care for us and leave Palestine’ and ‘Political prisoners must be freed’….” Does that sound like a "protest over economic woes?" The Times story is written by its bureau chief in Tehran, Thomas Erdbrink, one of the very few Western reporters (he is Dutch) accredited to report for U.S. media. Must he pull punches for fear of being expelled from Iran? After all, this is a regime that has invaded embassies (most recently, for example, the British Embassy in 2011) and in 2009 the entire BBC bureau there was shut down and the BBC’s correspondent expelled. In 2014, Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian was arrested and then imprisoned for 18 months. He and his wife are now suing the government of Iran for their maltreatment and torture while in captivity. So perhaps it is wise for reporters in Tehran to watch what they say. But the Times’s report and headline that these are merely economic protests are misleading. Both should be corrected. Meanwhile the U.S. Department of State issued a very strong statement on these protests—which rightly regards them as political: We are following reports of multiple peaceful protests by Iranian citizens in cities across the country. Iran’s leaders have turned a wealthy country with a rich history and culture into an economically depleted rogue state whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos. As President Trump has said, the longest-suffering victims of Iran's leaders are Iran’s own people. The United States strongly condemns the arrest of peaceful protesters. We urge all nations to publicly support the Iranian people and their demands for basic rights and an end to corruption. On June 14, 2017, Secretary Tillerson testified to Congress that he supports “those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of government. Those elements are there, certainly as we know.” The Secretary today repeats his deep support for the Iranian people. The Iranian people rose up against their oppressors in June 2009. Now we are again seeing that this regime rules by brute force, is widely despised, and would be dismissed by the people if ever they got a chance to vote freely.