Demonstrations and Protests

Thailand could be headed toward unrest after the disbandment of Future Forward Party, an opposition group popular among young people.

Adam Valavanis is a former intern with the Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. He received a master’s degree in conflict studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science.  On February 22, Togolese will head to the ballot box to vote in a presidential election. It will be the year's first national election in Africa. The incumbent, President Faure Gnassingbe, is seeking to extend his stay in office despite having already served three terms as president.  Gnassingbe will face six other candidates, including longtime rival Jean Pierre Fabre. Fabre, a human rights activist, was nominated as the leader of Togo's main opposition party, National Alliance for Change, late last year. He has come in second place in the previous two elections and now faces the herculean task of uniting the opposition. Thanks in part to the fragmented opposition, Gnassingbe is favored to win. Faure Gnassingbe came to power in 2005 following the death of his father Gnassingbe Eyadema, who had ruled the country since 1967. He subsequently won reelection in 2010 and 2015. Together, the Gnassingbe family has led the country for more than fifty years. The family's long reign has in recent years become a point of contention. In 2017 and 2018, protestors took to the streets demanding that Gnassingbe step down. Unfortunately, these protests have fizzled out, with the opposition, nicknamed the C14, unable to capitalize on them ahead of the election.  Now Gnassingbe finds himself with more power than ever before. His grip on the country has been bolstered by the reinstatement of presidential term limits last year by parliament. Under the new law, presidents can serve up to two five-year terms. Term limits had been scrapped during Gnassingbe Eyadema's near forty-year rule. However, this new law reset Gnassingbe's term limits, permitting him to stay in office until 2030. The opposition had boycotted the 2018 legislative elections, resulting in a near unanimous decision. Such anti-democratic moves are surprising in West Africa, home to some of the continent's most vibrant democracies. Despite its otherwise strong record of defending democracy in the region, ECOWAS has been unable to exert its influence in Togo. In early 2018, the regional body hosted mediation talks between the government and the opposition. Unfortunately, in spite of these efforts, little has changed on the ground and ECOWAS seems unable to reign in Gnassingbe's authoritarian tendencies. In response to the protests in 2017 and 2018, Gnassingbe unleashed security forces on peaceful protestors resulting in arrests, injuries, and deaths. In the run-up to Sunday's contest, opposition towns across the country have been on lockdown. Additionally, the country's national election commission issued a statement earlier this week, stripping the main independent election observer, the National Consultation of Civil Society of Togo, of its accreditation. This follows the commission's refusal to allow the Catholic Church to monitor polling places. Such moves have many worried that the vote will be neither free nor fair and another step away from democracy.

Qassem Suleimani and Tehran have won the battle for Baghdad. U.S. policymakers should understand that—and leave.

The region is accustomed to cycles of protest and political upheaval, so it’s better not to bank on successful revolutions.

Amir Asmar is a Department of Defense analyst and CFR’s national intelligence fellow. Throughout his intelligence career, his primary area of focus has been the Middle East. He held a wide range of analytic, senior analytic, and leadership positions for the Department of the Army, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Intelligence Council. The statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this blog post are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. government. Review of the material does not imply DoD or U.S. government endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion. It is a paradox that at the moment Lebanon is facing its most severe economic and political problems in decades, it may be on the verge of becoming something it has never been: a real nation. Historically, the Lebanese have identified themselves by sect before nationality. Sectarian identity has been the basis of their governmental structure, and sectarian militias fought their sixteen-year civil war. Lebanese protesters now, though, have appeared remarkably united in the demonstrations that began in mid-October, demanding the complete replacement of their political system. They are aspiring to a common, prosperous future with a single national voice. However, their maximalist aims will be difficult to achieve. It is likely the demonstrators will fall short, but it remains to be seen whether the Lebanese can maintain their growing sense of nationhood even if they fail to achieve their full demands. Washington should pay attention because a post-sectarian Lebanon—with a more effective and broadly representative government—is far more likely to be a partner for U.S. regional objectives than the current Lebanese state, which experiences paralysis every time leaders of the three largest sects cannot agree on a way ahead. Notably, one of the three leaders is Hezbollah, which is generally opposed to U.S. regional objectives, receives substantial support from the Iranian government, and, under the current system, can veto any policy. Since it was carved out of greater Syria in 1943 to serve as an eastern Mediterranean beachhead for French colonialism, Lebanon has been a compact among leading sectarian families rather than a nation. Powerful and corrupt sectarian elites monopolize political power and a disproportionate share of the economic pie, using patronage networks to maintain their sectarian followers. Beirut’s consosciational political system apportioned positions and power based on notional sectarian population numbers. The threat of renewed civil war among the sects—like the 1975-91 conflict that took place with eager encouragement from Lebanon’s neighbors—kept the country’s population from coalescing into a single nation. To a degree, Lebanon’s current popular demonstrations have mirrored the youth-dominated protest movements sparked by failed policies in other Arab states. The Lebanese suffer from many of the same afflictions as other Arabs: an insufficient voice in their government, lack of transparency in how the government operates, limited economic opportunities, corruption, and inadequate quality of life. Moreover, Lebanon’s infrastructure is crumbling and the Lebanese experience daily electricity cuts, garbage piling up in the streets, sporadic water cuts, and environmental degradation. However, unlike other Arab countries in which protests tended to focus on one authoritarian ruler, demonstrators in Lebanon have targeted a collection of leaders who have been by turn sectarian elites, combatants, politicians, and kleptocrats. What makes this Lebanese moment remarkable is that the protestors appear to blame sectarianism for their economic plight and are rallying for its end. It is no longer about keeping the peace among a population divided by sectarian identities; it is about realizing the population’s aspirations for its future without deference to sect. As the Lebanese come together—waving their national flags and playing their national anthem—to demand improved governance and quality of life, they face significant challenges. The present-day demonstrators’ maximalist aim of a complete overhaul of political leadership—“All of them means all of them”—is unlikely to be achieved. Although Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri has resigned, other political leaders will likely resist the demonstrators’ call to step down; in typical Lebanese fashion, even al-Hariri remains a candidate for reappointment as prime minister. Already some leaders are alleging a foreign hand in the demonstrations. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah maintains that Lebanon is being “targeted” internationally and has suggested that some among the activists associated with foreign interests are looking to plunge the country into civil war. The political class simply has too much to lose and will seek to make only cosmetic changes. Lebanon’s own 2005 Cedar Revolution could be instructive here. In 2005, popular demonstrations, similar to today’s, were successful in achieving their primary objectives, including the departure of Syrian troops from the country and the election of a new government free from Syrian interference. However, the newly elected political leadership was from the same ruling class and arguably co-opted the Cedar Revolution’s domestic aspirations, protecting elite privilege at the Lebanese people’s expense. Today’s demonstrators are arguing that it was not only the Syrians who constrained Lebanon’s future, but also Lebanon’s sectarian system of governance and the leaders it continues to promote. Even if the current leaders can be convinced to make significant systemic changes, competent leaders from outside the traditional political class—untainted by the country’s history of graft—will need to be found for the new political system to function as the protesters imagine. Irrespective of whether the next government is sectarian or some new yet-to-be designed non-sectarian system, it will need to overcome the effects of decades-long mismanagement, corruption, and resource constraints. Unfortunately, if today’s demonstrators’ demands for meaningful change are frustrated, they may not remain united as Lebanese nationals in search of a voice in Lebanon’s future. Longstanding sectarian divisions could quickly re-emerge as failure begets blame. While the Lebanese are wary of another conflict, and a full-fledged civil war remains unlikely, leaders seeking to retain their privileges could see a benefit in impugning other communities’ leaders; some could see limited conflict as a means of redirecting blame or changing the narrative. Lebanese history is replete with assassinations of sectarian leaders, including in the lead-up to the civil war in 1975. The United States should approach developments in Lebanon with great care. The state has a way of frustrating foreign designs. Neither of the two U.S. interventions in the country—in 1958 and 1982—demonstrated sufficient understanding of Lebanese social and political dynamics; similarly, many Israeli attempts to shape the Lebanese state in Israel’s favor have failed. Moreover, the specter of great power competition over Lebanon is coming into view. Russia’s public warning against foreign intervention in Lebanon is certainly aimed at the United States, and the United States has accused Russia of casting doubt on the authenticity of the demonstrators’ demand to end endemic corruption. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), important to Lebanon’s defense and critical to its aspiration of a post-sectarian future, was an effective U.S. partner in the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Because of its non-sectarian construct and its successes against Sunni jihadists, the LAF is viewed favorably by Lebanese across the sectarian spectrum. Continuing or increasing U.S. military assistance to the LAF could be a way of promoting the demonstrators’ objectives by supporting their most treasured national institution, while steering clear of direct involvement. It would also help to buttress the U.S. relationship with Lebanon’s most important national institution in the face of Russia’s mischaracterization of U.S. policy. Moreover, the demonstrators’ drive for a post-sectarian future should eventually focus on dismantling sectarian militias, including Hezbollah’s Shia militia; if the United States does not continue its support for the LAF, this would be less likely as Hezbollah could be the only effective fighting force in the country. Although unlikely to succeed fully, the demonstrators’ drive to eliminate all sectarian considerations from government and policy is necessary for building a flourishing Lebanese nation. It remains to be seen whether this moment can yield at least partial, positive change without embroiling the Lebanese in another sectarian conflict. The appearance of external hyperlinks do not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for the linked websites, the information, the products, or the services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find in these locations.

The Sultan of Sokoto, Nigeria’s premier Islamic traditional ruler, has banned the #ArewaMeToo campaign in Sokoto state. The movement is a northern Nigeria spinoff of the international #MeToo movement. Following the ban there have been allegations that the police have assaulted two women’s rights activists. Sokoto state is socially conservative and predominantly Muslim. The sultan’s ban of a feminist movement is no surprise; the real news is that #ArewaMeToo was established in the first place, though the number of its supporters is very small, according to the media. The media is also reporting without confirmation that #ArewaMeToo received assistance from the British Council, the European Union, and the U.S. embassy. Such unconfirmed reports are likely to feed northern suspicion of outside, secular forces that are seen as hostile to Islam. Northern Nigerian Islam makes no distinction between religious and secular authority, making the sultan a powerful personage, even if he is unrecognized by Nigeria’s secular constitution. Unlike some other traditional rulers, the sultan serves as a bridge between the modern world and his more conservative and traditional subjects. Before his enthronement, the sultan was a professional military officer, serving as Nigeria’s defense attache in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The sultan has been active in peace and reconciliation work and has excellent relations with Christian leaders, but the scope of his work is limited by the conservative outlook of his subjects. It is hard to imagine that he could tolerate, let alone support, a feminist movement such as #ArewaMeToo.  As elsewhere, sexual abuse in northern Nigeria appears to be widespread. According to USAID’s 2018 National Democratic and Health Survey, 11 percent of boys and 18 percent of girls in northern Nigeria report having been sexually abused, but, as is true elsewhere, sexual abuse survivors rarely speak out. 

After six months of escalating police violence and protester resistance, matters in Hong Kong have come to a head. Now is the time for Washington to ensure that all sides know that the United States stands with those struggling for freedom, democracy, dignity, and the rule of law.

If passed, a new bill would signal U.S. support for the protesters and put pressure on China’s leaders.

Election fraud allegations have prompted President Evo Morales to resign with no clear successor, plunging Bolivia into political uncertainty.

Jennifer Davis, an American anti-apartheid activist, passed away on October 15. Among her many legacies, she mobilized public pressure on the U.S. Congress to overturn President Ronald Reagan’s veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Born in Johannesburg and a graduate of the prestigious University of the Witswatersrand (Wits), she and her husband eventually moved to New York. Soon after, she became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Like other white, highly-educated anti-apartheid activists, she was strongly influenced by the racism of Nazi Germany and the subsequent holocaust.  From 1981 to 2000 she was the director of the American Committee on Africa that coordinated NGO opposition to apartheid and made it a mass movement. She went beyond the Sullivan Principles, which called on American companies doing business in South Africa to treat their South African employees the same as they treated their employees in the United States. She pushed for Americans to boycott South African goods, and for Americans to divest from companies that profited from apartheid.  Within the governing African National Congress, there is frequent criticism that the United States came late and only half-heartedly to the anti-apartheid struggle. Jennifer Davis is a reminder of the important role played by civil society in heightening public awareness in the United States of apartheid—which eventually led to real legislative action—and that the international anti-apartheid movement acquired significant American support.

Political unrest is sweeping Chile, as impatience with inequality grows in what has been one of Latin America’s most prosperous and stable countries.

Iraq’s struggling economy and government corruption sparked the protests, in which hundreds have died. The governing elite appears shaky, and the stability of the country is at stake.