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    Fortifying Cyber Infrastructure
    Play
    Tarah Wheeler, senior fellow for global cyber policy at CFR, discusses the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and ways to improve state and local government cybersecurity and critical infrastructure systems. TRANSCRIPT FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations State and Local Officials webinar. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. We are delighted to have participants from forty-six states and territories for today’s discussion on “Fortifying Cyber Infrastructure.” Thank you for taking the time to join us. Today’s discussion is on the record. CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, publisher, and educational institutional focusing on U.S. foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. And, as always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Through our State and Local Officials Initiative, CFR serves as a resource on international issues affecting the priorities and agendas of state and local governments by providing analysis on a wide range of policy topics. I’m pleased to be joined today by Tarah Wheeler. Her bio we shared with you in advance, but I will—I will give you a few highlights. Tarah Wheeler is senior fellow for global cyber policy at CFR, and CEO of the information security consultancy Red Queen Dynamics. She’s also had positions as a contributing cybersecurity editor at Brookings Institution, cyber project fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and very much more. She was also a U.S.-U.K. Fulbright scholar in cybersecurity, and she is the author of the bestselling book Women In Tech: Take Your Career to The Next Level With Practical Advice And Inspiring Stories. And I commend that to all of you. But today’s discussion is on cyber infrastructure. Tarah, thank you very much for being with us. Perhaps you can talk about there were some provisions in the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act for strengthening cybersecurity and cyber resilience at the state and local level. It would be great if you could talk a little bit about that, and what officials should be thinking about when they get those funds, how to use them, how to think about cyber policy at the sub-national level, and how important it is in all of these communities across the country. WHEELER: Thank you so much, Irina. It’s just a real pleasure to be here today. As always, the Council on Foreign Relations is doing an incredible job making sure this information gets to the people who need it. And it’s a joy to be here with you all today. Thank you so much for the work that you do in our state and local governments keeping us safe. I am honored and humbled, and I hope I’ll be able to provide some context today and some of the fun esoterica—(laughs)—of the infrastructure act that we’re taking a look at today. I think the top thing that really crosses my mind as I first read it is, first of all, this is a bill sponsored by Rep. DeFazio, from my home state of Oregon. So good things always come from my beautiful home state. And I’m glad to see that this is certainly one of them. I’m glad to see that the Biden administration is focusing on improving our safety and cybersecurity infrastructure. So if you are running a state and local government—if you’re running, essentially, a non-federal government, as I think most of you already know, there are—there’s a grant program that’s coming out from this bill that was approved and passed a month ago. And there’s about a billion dollars that’s available over the next four years for you to apply for, to try to upgrade your cybersecurity posture, your stance. So the question is, do we all go shopping for purses, or do we figure out how to get some of this money allocated in a fashion that lets us really start to drive towards the challenges of local governments in cybersecurity. There’s really a lot of—a lot of questions people have been asking me about over this one. And maybe the number one thing is, should we be thinking about this on, like, a population level? Larger populations should receive a greater priority? Or should we be thinking about this sliced differently, kind of orthogonally, at a sectoral level? For instance, dividing it up amongst health care, power facilities, water facilities. Is there—is there a difference in that grant set and, for instance, tribal grants for cybersecurity and infrastructure? And it certainly does look like we’ve managed to separate this out into a really smart package of grantmaking not only bodies, but slicing it in multiple different, important ways. So if I were you, the first thing I would do is ask myself: Who’s giving me advice about how to spend this money? Because filling out grant applications is a time-consuming process, as I think basically everybody on this call already knows. It takes a lot of energy and effort to set this up, right? So are you applying for the right thing? The very first question I’m going to ask you is this: Have you asked the people inside your organization—whether it’s a municipality, a county government, a state government—have you meaningfully asked everybody in your organization the question: Is your work and home email password different? If you know, the answer to that question and you’re sitting on this call right now and you say to yourself: Yes, we’ve addressed the question of password sharing, of multiple account takeover, of business email compromise. We’ve fundamentally addressed that question, then we have a different conversation to have. I’m not actually sure if we’re able to do something along the lines of a poll in this Zoom or not, but I would sure love to see some feedback on this from you folks. It’s OK if we can’t but think to yourself this question. If you can meaningfully have visibility into whether or not your users have strong, unique passwords for every different account stored in a password manager or not, that’s the break point. If you’re not there yet, that’s where you need to get to. That’s the very first step, ensuring that you’ve got users using strong, independent passwords. That’s your first defense against not only business email compromise, but the growing threat of ransomware. It’s still growing. It’s still getting—the ransomware threats are still doubling every year, year over year, with really no end to that in sight unless we make some very serious changes. One of the key ways that ransomware hits systems is shared passwords. Now, if you’ve gotten to the point where you have meaningfully addressed the question of whether or not your users are using unique passwords stored in a password manager, your next step right after that one is multifactor authentication. Do you have your users using app-based multifactor authentication to have a multiple factor to log into accounts for state and local governments, for all the systems that you’re—that you’re administering? If you do, then what are you doing on this call? It’s happy hour time for you. Get out of here. You’re doing great, comparatively speaking. No, in all seriousness, those are really the two break points I see: Do you have visibility into passwords? Do you have visibility into multifactor authentication? After that, you can start going to topic-based areas in cybersecurity that are based on your threat model. So that’s really the question I’m going to have for you, and I want you to be thinking in those terms. At what level do you find yourself in that sort of hierarchy of cyber—the Maslow’s cyber hierarchy of needs on this one right here? And based on that, we can start with questions about how sort of we slice this budget and this grant up in ways that are most meaningful to you? Does that help us as kind of a starting point, Irina? FASKIANOS: It does indeed. So can you talk a little bit about, you know, state and local governments most notably have been the target of ransomware attacks in recent years. So the risks—what are the risks on not doing this? You know, on not having appropriate cybersecurity protection measures in place? WHEELER: So a couple weeks ago one of the most devastating data breaches, I think, honestly, in history, happened in Australia. In Australia, a couple of weeks ago Medibank was—experienced a massive data breach. And 9.7 million patient records—now, remember, Australia’s got a population of about thirty million people. We’re talking a third of the population. And when we talk about a population-level event, this is one of the most devastating I’ve ever seen. This is the full and complete medical records of essentially every single person in the entire Australian health care system. These records went to things like reproductive health, mental health treatment, substance abuse issues. And the data breach was—the full analysis will come out, but it looks to be a question of inappropriate protections over things like passwords—over unique passwords and over multifactor authentication. When we talk about why this matters, about why we’re trying to prevent ransomware, about why we’re trying to prevent business email compromise, ultimately what we’re talking about is either preventing the theft of or the denial of the use of the kind of data that you use to run your organizations. If you do not have these measures in place, you are looking at the loss of records in your organization in the case of ransomware, or the theft of records, in the case of a data breach. Those two things are very different. Which should you be most concerned about as someone running an organization that likely retains a lot of official data over the people in your—in your area of jurisdiction. Doesn’t matter if it’s a city, if it’s a county, if it’s a tribal government, if it’s a state. If you are somebody who’s running an organization that stores this kind of data, ransomware is intended to deny you the access to the systems that you’re running. Data breaches are intended to steal and then profit off of the use of that data, whether that is literally blackmailing people whose data you now possess, or in the case of ransomware the promise to unlock that data and make it of use again to the organization in exchange for a payment. Typically, in bitcoin, although monero is growing in popularity. It’s a pretty solid choice. Zcash is another really good one to use for anonymity. And if you don’t understand the things that I’m talking about right now, how you pay, stuff like that, I think there’s call to dive a little deeper into the machinery and the economics of how you pay ransoms and pay blackmail for data breaches. But really in this case, the two major things you can do are get to a point of visibility on where you stand in terms of your user data and your—there’s a difference between user data meaning the cliental you serve and your internal users in your organization. Your internal users in your organization need to have that strong, independent password with multifactor authentication in place. But at the point in which you’ve done that, your next question is: How many computers do you have? I’m genuinely—think for yourself. Think about the answer to this question. Do you know how many computers you have, how many endpoints are on your corporate, your organizational, your business, your government network? If you don’t know the answer to that question, that’s the next question after that one. The question of asset inventory is no longer a question that solely belongs to the IT function in your organizations. It’s a major question when it comes to cybersecurity to provide some kind of visibility into whether or not you’ve got rogue devices on your network. The question I think, Irina, I’m going to try to repeat back again a little bit here, like, what is the impact of these kinds of attacks? It’s either to make money or to cause embarrassment, and then to make money. Ultimately, this is—this is about you being farmed, if you are an easy target, for quick cash payments. And it’s being done by people who really, genuinely, don’t care about the people you serve. I do care about the people you serve. I happen to be one of them, for probably a chain of people trailing on up through a couple of states in this country. And I want to see you, believe me, as safe as possible, because that’s my data. It’s everybody’s data in this country. So, yeah, that’s our—that’s our next step. And I’m interested in the technical side of sort of the steps that you’re at, but there are really good and interesting questions about industry-specific and sector-specific protections that can be put into place as well too. So does that help a little on that question? FASKIANOS: It does. And would you say that you would need—that people should invest in a person within the organization, coupled with an outside firm, that would help us—you know, rather than trying to build it from scratch? Somebody—a consultancy, or that kind of thing? Like, how do you—what is—how do you scale this, or make this tangible, and implement this at the state and local level? WHEELER: How do you implement this at the state and local level? So, first of all, it’s a great question, because it’s both complex and a simple one. If you’re—if you’re somebody like me—I want to be cautious here, because this is what I do, also. I’m a—one of the reasons I’m having this conversation with you folks here at Council on Foreign Relations and became a senior fellow here is that this isn’t just what I write about, it’s what I do on an everyday basis. So my company provides this kind of service. I mean, to set that aside for a second—and I’m just going to try to make sure we’ve covered all of the grounds. It is highly unlikely that if you were an organization that has fewer than 500 people in your organization, that you will be able to bring in house even half of the cybersecurity expertise you need in order to keep yourselves safe. It’s expensive to hire cyber—qualified cybersecurity professionals. There’s a reason why there’s a third—why third-party and service providers are there. And that’s because, it has been my experience, that an FTE, a full-time employee, in cybersecurity, as differentiated from just the IT function, doesn’t get hired till about employee number 150 in almost any organization. Now, that’s different in extremely high-tech organizations, but most of who I serve have haystacks, not tech stacks. So it’s unlikely you’re going to be able to bring a lot of the expertise in house. One of the things I’ve loved, I’m going to bring a lesson across the pond for you. One of the things I’d love to see, the NCSC, which is the—essentially the equivalent of CISA in the United Kingdom—CISA’s the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency here in the United States. One of the things I’d love to see the NCSC do is they certify third parties for incidence response and cybersecurity provisioning at consulting. Which it doesn’t mean they recommend them. It just means they’ve passed a series of bars that says this organization is worthy of trust. You can go to them, and we know that they’ve handled incident response issues before. So I would love to start seeing something like that in the United States. I believe that moves are being made in that direction. I’ve heard of the possibility of that happening, of getting a little bit more of a sort of cyber civil defense force a little bit, if I can borrow, you know, kind of Craig Newmark’s phrase that he’s been talking about for a while. But just the idea that there are trusted third parties you can go to who have at least been rated and evaluated to give you—to give you a hand. So, yes, the service providers are out there. There is a wide range of skills and capabilities out there in third parties. If you ask smart people on the internet, they’ll give you good people to go to. And I want to be—I want to just be very cautious in how I phrase it, I’ve seen a lot of very good and very bad service providers. So when you go and evaluate them, make sure and have somebody who is also a trusted IT or cybersecurity provider, who’s not going to be that person, do an evaluation of who you want to engage with. They should have several things that you should find when you look at them. They should have a bunch of people who are qualified, and those qualifications can take a lot of different—a lot of different sort of—they can be manifested in a lot of different ways. I don’t mean college degrees. I mean people who demonstrate through their care, willingness to educate the public, that they are people who can and should be trusted with critical infrastructure. People who have the respect of the industry are a good fit. There’s a lot of wonderful cybersecurity third-party providers out there. And I want to be cautious not to just sort of also name all of my friends on this one too, but if you look for the helpers, like Fred Rogers says, you’re going to do—you’re going to do just fine when you find somebody locally. Now, I can also provide a recommendation if you get stuck and you don’t know what else to do. You can find four people. Look for your local college. And whatever respected college is a hundred miles away from you or less. Look for, you know, a research one university. Look for whatever state or tech university is near you. I went, by the way, to Portland State University. Go to Portland State University. That was where my master’s degree was. Go talk to the chair of the computer science department. Ask the chair of your computer science department to help you evaluate someone. Go look for your local ISC, or ISACA, or ISSA chapters. Those are information security professional associations. And ask someone from one of those chapters, perhaps the chapter president, to help you find a third-party provider. You can also go look for somebody in government. The CIO and CTO of most states have a pretty good feel for who in-state third-party providers are. And they often maintain an ad hoc list of who those people are, and who those trusted providers are. And finally, take a look and find out inside your organization, if you did a brief poll, if anybody knows people in information security and information technology, where they would go to ask for something like this. Those are four sources of good information you can go to, to ask for trusted providers as we wait for some kind of certification process for cybersecurity third-party providers for you. Does that help a bit? FASKIANOS: It does. So I’m going to ask one more question before opening up to the group. And, please, we’d love to hear not only questions, comments, and you can share what you’re doing in your community as well. So this is a really good time. We’ve found that people share across municipalities and it’s been very helpful. So at the top, you mentioned what kind of grant are you writing. So if you know the answers, you know, the passwords and all of that, great. But the second part is, if you do know that, then what is the other thing that you should be looking at? How to focus on cybersecurity at a—you know, at the different issues and sectors. So can you talk a little bit about that second part of what you mentioned? WHEELER: The hardest part of this is not just doing it as a one-off. It’s not just kind of once a year or once every two years in a cycle writing essentially a book-length report on how you find yourself doing, your stats, your sort of point-in-time perspective on how your cybersecurity is doing. Your hardest job at that point is to maintain continuous compliance integration. That continuous process of repeatedly fixing small things and nudging your security posture upward, that’s the next step. For that, even if you can’t hire somebody internally, or you can’t get the, eh, quarter-million dollars it’s going to take to hire a good, qualified person at a state and local level to come from private industry and run that program for you, you can take a tenth of that amount and start to get in the habit of asking a few questions every week or two that let you check on your cybersecurity posture and just do one or two things at a time. Keep that continuous process in mind and find somebody who’s willing to be your security champion internally. If you’re a thirty-person organization, find somebody that you can give a small pay bump to and give them the checklist that lets them figure out what’s going on in an ongoing basis and make that part of a quarterly report to you. Just start to decrease the amount of time that you go between those checkups to find out how you’re doing. And if there is absolutely nothing else that you can figure out how to do, and you have no money to do any part of this, you get denied for every grant, just do one thing for me. Turn on automatic updates on every machine, everybody’s phone. Most of you folks, if you’ve been issued a government phone—it could be an Android, it could be an iPhone. Turn on automatic updating on your phone, and the next thing you do right after that is turn on automatic updating on your Windows or Mac machines. You’re probably on Windows machines, I’m going to guess, many of you. Turn on Windows Defender, and don’t ignore the prompts if it tells you to do something. Yes, I know it takes forever to do the update cycle. That’s the thing that’s going to keep you the safest, automatic updates. If you can’t do anything else, do that. Keep your patches up to date. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. I am going to open it up to the group, and then we can continue talking. But I really don’t want to—I would like to get to the questions. And you can—we would love to hear from you. And do not be shy. And if there are no questions, I will—that means that you’ve been—you’ve been so thorough. (Laughs.) So if you want to ask a question, you can click on the raised hand icon, and accept the unmute prompt when I call on you. And you can also write a question or comment in the Q&A box. And if you do that, please include your affiliation there so we know what state and where you’re coming from. It just really does help give everybody context. OK, so the first question, raised hand, is from Gail Patterson-Gladney. And please unmute yourself and tell us who you are. Q: Yes. Hello. I’m Van Buren County commissioner. I served for six years and just recently got reelected. And before I served as county commissioner, I worked for the city of South Haven. And I was told in a conference in the Michigan Municipal League that we should not use our personal cellphones for our emails. In the county, it seems to be different. We can go ahead and open our phones and use our emails. Which is the safest way to use our personal phone? WHEELER: That is such a great question. Thank you so much. And congratulations on getting reelected, Gail. Nice work. (Laughs.) So this is the—this is the way I would proceed on that one. It’s a hard question, because I understand the lack of budgets that can lead to you not being issued a phone to conduct work business on. And if you’ve been expected to use your phone, your personal phones, to get your work email, one of the most important things you can do is, like I said, make sure that your passwords on your work and home email are different. And I want to make sure that I’m very clear on that one.  The password I’m talking about isn’t the one to get into your phone. It’s that you’ll set up two different email accounts on your phone. Don’t forward your work emails to your home email address. And open only those home emails on your phone. Does that make sense? I want to make sure that I’m clear. And if I’m saying something you know, I’m so sorry. I just want to make sure I’m clear on this. Does that make sense, first? Q: You said don’t forward your county emails to your personal accounts, like Gmail or Yahoo accounts? Like, personal ones? WHEELER: Yeah. Make sure—yeah, don’t forward your work emails to your personal address. So, for instance, like, my email address might be [email protected]. And when I view my [email protected] emails, even if I’m looking at them on my personal device, I’m not inside Council on Foreign Relations forwarding those emails to [email protected], and then only opening up the Gmail app, and reading my tarah@gmail(.com), and seeing the forwarded emails from my work email. Don’t do that. Does that make sense? Q: Yes. WHEELER: OK. The thing that you do is you go into settings, whether you got an Android phone or an iPhone. You’ll go into settings—let me see if I can just find this real quick. So there’s going to be—there’s going to be a setting in here. It’ll be called general—or it’ll be called—you’ll see where there’s probably something in here called “mail.” So, yeah, inside your iPhone there’s going to be—or in Android—there’ll be a setting called “mail.” And what you need to do is you need to go to this thing right here—see if I can just cover this up a little bit—you’ll see “accounts” in here, OK? Make sure you got two different accounts in there. One’s your work and one’s your home. So you want to make sure that when you’re logging not your work emails, that you’re seeing your work emails as a separate account than your personal emails. I hope that makes sense. And, you know, we can also put a blog out there to help people understand that a little bit better. But the thing that we’re trying to do is make sure that you don’t mix all of those emails up together in one big data pool that’s on your personal email, so that if someone breaks into your personal email, they can see all your government business. Does that make sense? Q: Yes, except for I thought because I have two different email—let’s say I have my government Gmail and then I have my personal Gmail. I thought that separated them enough when I bring up Gmail. WHEELER: So, OK, it depends on how you have your phone set up. But the thing that we want to make sure is happening is that you have two different accounts set up on your phone, as opposed to you forwarding all of your work emails to your personal email address. And if that’s not clear, I want to make sure we got enough time to answer everybody’s questions, but, Gail, also if you want to I’ll help walk you through that. Yeah, and what we’re trying to do here is make sure that if you lost access to either one of those accounts, it wouldn’t mean that you lost access to other. So that’s what’s really important. Now, ideally—in an ideal world, you’re being issued a work phone that you just have work stuff on. Let’s be realistic. Most people aren’t busy getting a $1,000 iPhone for their jobs, right? So that’s the ideal, right? And we’re not sitting in Silicon Valley here. So you’re probably being expected to answer work emails on your personal device. And just making sure that when you have your work emails that you don’t have a setting in your work web or email client that’s forwarding those emails to your personal email address. And we can go into that a little bit more later, but your IT person can probably make sure that you have two different accounts set up on your phone. If you have two different accounts, and you’re viewing them separately, you’re as good as you’re going to be in this situation. Q: OK. Thank you very much. I’ll check with my IT person on that too. WHEELER: Wonderful. FASKIANOS: OK, I’m going to take the next question from Danielle Schonbaum, who’s the finance administrator of Shelby County in Tennessee. And Danielle had a raised hand, put it back down, and put it in the chat. But I would love—we’d love to hear from you directly. So if you want to accept the unmute prompt, that would be great. Q: Sure. Hi. Danielle Schonbaum, Shelby County government. I was just curious about any thoughts you had on cyber insurance. GFOA magazine had a pretty extensive article in the last month or so about some of the pitfalls of cyber insurance and, you know, what it really covers. So just— WHEELER: Well, do you want my thoughts, or do you want my opinions? Because my opinions are funnier, but we should probably start with the thoughts. OK, so the first thought I have here is that cyber insurance is incredibly important. And here’s the reason why: Cyber insurance is really the first sort of attempt that the finance and international regulatory community has really made effectively to price the risk associated with doing cybersecurity poorly, or inappropriately. After the creation of fire insurance, home fire insurance, the number of house fires in this country dropped massively because fire insurance companies figured out very quickly that they could incentivize with their pricing homeowners taking certain steps. Like, making sure that their stoves were located away from the house, or fully tiled, or moving to—away from open flames and open gas flames, to contained sources of light and heat. Moving to baseboard heating away from radiators, that kind of thing. So the insurance company figured out what that risk would look like for a homeowner. And they managed to make it expensive to make choices that were more likely to get you burnt down, and cheaper if you made choices that were less likely to get you burnt down. Cyber insurance is the very beginning of that process right now. If you make choices, like having automatic patching turned on, or using multifactor authentication, or certainly in the case of Gail where you have different devices where you separated out work and home email for people who are employees, those choices mean that cyber insurance programs are going to price safer choices cheaper. So there’s a lot of different providers out there, and it’s still kind of a wild west situation with it. But that’s really important, that they’re doing that. And beginning to stick an actual number on the value of making certain kinds of choices in cybersecurity is the real value of the cyber insurance industry. Are they good at it yet? Some people are better than others at it. I’ve walked clients of mine through the cyber insurance application process before. And the checklists are still really, really—they’re very basic still. They’re still asking questions like, “What kind of encryption do you use?” That’s not a meaningful question for a thirty-person accounting firm, right? Because you’re using Office 365, or you’re using Google Apps, or whatever you’re using. And the answer is, I mean, I guess we use some? There’s a green padlock when I look at my computer, right? That’s the answer to that question. And it’s not that the people who are answering these questions are dumb. It’s that they have a different skill set than those of us who are answering these more specialized questions in cybersecurity. And sometimes the people who design these questionnaires in cyber insurance are sort of copying the patterns they used from homeowners’ insurance, and rental insurance, and auto insurance, without realizing this is a really different world. There’s no independence of risk in cyber insurance. And what I mean by that is, if you house burns down that doesn’t mean your neighbor’s house burns down, even if they have the exact same house and the exact same floorplan, right? In cyber insurance, two different clients who have the same, essentially, floorplan, the same network, the same updates, the same vulnerabilities, if one of them gets hacked the other’s probably going to get hacked as well too. Which means that a cyber insurance company has to figure out how to price risk not only for a single entity, but across an entire spectrum of an industry that likely all has the same version of the same kind of software all the way through it. So that’s the problem we’re tackling. And people who are evaluating businesses and organizations for cyber insurance, are still not really good at understanding independence of risk. A good example is, like, hurricane or flood insurance. If you get flooded, your neighbor gets flooded. There’s no independence of risk in that. If you experience a hurricane, so does your neighbor. House fire’s different. So’s flooding based on plumbing issues in a single-family dwelling, right? I think you can understand kind of the concept we’re going for. So cyber insurance is serving a valuable function. They’re starting to get to the price of real risk. But they’re not good yet at calculating independent risk for individual applicants. I hope that’s useful information for you. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. I’m going to go next to Isabelle LaSalle. I don’t know if you want to ask your question that you’ve written, Isabelle. I’ll give you a few seconds to unmute if you’d like. Otherwise, I will read it. And, yeah, and tell us who you are. Tell us who you are. Q: Hi. My name is Isabelle LaSalle. I’m a legislative assistant with the California State Assembly. I was just wondering if you had suggestions for steps that state legislatures can take to improve cybersecurity at the statewide and at the local government level. WHEELER: The CCPA of 2018 did more to make cybersecurity a thing on people’s minds than almost anything else. If you were there getting that being kicked through, thank you for your service. So the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 means that people now have to pay attention to what’s happening with data on California citizens, California businesses, anybody doing business in the state of California, data passing through California. It’s basically GDPR for California. The CCPA and the requirement now that companies put a privacy policy that clearly states how they’ll handle privacy policy and data requests from the general public on their website is the thing that’s backing most of these people up into saying: How do we know somebody’s data is deleted if they ask us to do it? And that right there, that question is doing more for most small businesses and most companies than you can possibly imagine. So you can just take the week off. You’re good. But genuinely, seriously, for those folks who are looking to find a way to spur action in their organizations, realize that if you’re storing information using a California company on a California citizen, doing business, storing anything in California—and, let’s be honest, much of the tech industry is located in California. Which means you should probably just do this right now. That’s the question that’s going to get you action because it needs to be public facing and it needs to be true. If you say that someone can send us a request and within sixty days we’ll respond, and within ninety days we will guarantee your data deletion, you better be sure that you are deleting that data. That gets you into what really matters, which is your data security and retention policy. So what can legislative assistants, what can—what can legislatures do across this country, what can anybody do in this particular case? Ask people if they understand whether or not data is getting deleted when you think it is. That is not a trivial question. It’s a technical, interesting question that backs up into heavy-duty applied physics and engineering in my field, in computer science. It does come down to sort of, like, what’s a practical definition of deletion? And there’s a couple of good working practical definitions out there, which is beyond the scope of this conversation. But there’s good definitions of data deleted, we’re pretty sure we’re good going forward from this point out. If you can get to that point, you have started to abide by really the spirit of the law, as well as the letter of it. And the CCPA of 2018, incredibly valuable bill. Thank you very much to the entire state of California for giving us all that kind of lever we need to have those conversations with people. And it can just start with, hey, we’re supposed to have a—we’ve got three employees in California. We’ve been storing data there in a data center. We know we’re supposed to have a privacy policy out by law, right? Otherwise, we could get into some trouble. So use that as a hammer when you need to. FASKIANOS: What other—can you cite other examples of states or municipalities that are doing cyber well, that you would—you would, you know, cite for other states and governments—local governments to look at? WHEELER: Two things. Colorado’s also passing a data privacy law. And some time back New York passed new regulations at DFS that meant that they were—they’re really closely losing at how data is stored, protected, and deleted. If you know what’s happening with your data, you’ve gone past the question of sort of user passwords, of multifactor authentication, of asset inventory, and you’re into the real, serious question. Which is, what are we doing with all this information we’re collecting? There’s—I mean, there’s not many state and local governments doing this really, really, really well. And nobody’s perfect on this one. California’s law in 2018 is a very useful one. And the truth is, that it makes a great deal of sense wherever you are in the United States to just abide by that, because it’s by far the most stringent one. So just start there, and you’re good pretty much every place else. It’s going to be important to see those laws passed, but the truth is we need to see a federal law. And if the—and if the federal government passed, honestly, a version of that CCPA 2018, we’d be in pretty good shape. Basically, all companies right now are squeezed between GDPR and the CCPA. And if you abide by both of those things, you’re doing pretty OK. Just because you’re a nonprofit or state and local government doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be doing those things. It just means you probably have a little bit more exception, wiggle room. Don’t take the exception. Try to do it right, if you can. And the answer is it’s hard to get this stuff through. There’s a lot of lobbyists that don’t want to be told what their companies can be doing with your data, right? FASKIANOS: And how likely is it that such legislation will be passed at the federal level? Is that—is that in Congress now? I mean, is—and is there bipartisan support to things that you can tell—you can talk about that? WHEELER: So there’s, in general, always a version of that privacy act sort of running around and trying to get—trying to get through. I couldn’t speak to the current state of what that looks like. And that’s mostly because, it’s my understanding—I’m not a congressional specialist in any way, shape, or form. But it’s my understanding that now with a split Senate and House, there’s less possibility of bipartisan legislation being passed in terms of privacy bill. But I will leave that up to the congressional scholars to address. The answer is, yes. Almost all the time there is a pretty good—a pretty good version of the bill, and a pretty terrible version of that bill, always sort of getting duked out in subcommittees. FASKIANOS: What would you say officials should be doing to raise awareness with their constituents of the importance of strong cybersecurity protocols? WHEELER: I’m not sure how much constituents need to have their awareness raised. This is—it’s sort like—it’s sort of like saying you need to raise the awareness of constituents about pollution, right? Like, we know. We pick up our own trash. But, like, what do you expect us to do about a river by ourselves, right? So I’m not sure how much the individual constituent can do about a river. If they have also the same strong different passwords and multifactor authentication, and they know how many computers are connecting to their home network, they’re already kind of doing what they’re supposed to be doing. At this point, it’s on you to start protecting them. So that’s a responsibility we’ve sort of taken up at this point. It’s a hard one, but awareness in this case, the thing I would say to not do is throw scare numbers at people. We already know what data breaches look like. Honestly, a lot of data breaches are—people get notified of them again and again, and it’s creating fatigue in them. Maybe instead of raising awareness, we need to be able to raise the sophistication of the conversation, especially at the state and local government, to raise confidence—not necessarily awareness, but confidence—in constituents that people are at the helm who know what they’re doing in cybersecurity. So set an example more than raise awareness, is a good way to put it. It’s a hard—it’s a hard task. But if you can do that, you’re doing the right thing.  FASKIANOS: And you have written that some of the money from the package will go toward establishing new Office of the National Cyber Director. So if you were advising that office, how would you suggest that they interact with state and local officials? And how would you want state and local officials to be engaging with that new office? And what’s the timeline for that office to be created, by the way? WHEELER: Well, the Office of the Cyber Director, if I’m correct, if we’re talking about Chris Inglis and the OCD is Office of the National Cyber Director, I’ve seen that $21 million allocation in there. They’ve done a wonderful job getting set up to have conversations about capacity building. State, local, tribal governments are all receiving some attention as we start to pay attention to grassroots-level building of cyber capacity. How would I advise them? I wouldn’t presume to. There’s some very smart people who are doing that work—Kemba Walden, Rob Knake, Chris Inglis, Camille Stewart Gloster. These are incredible and smart people who are doing this work. I think Camille is focused on workplace and cybersecurity capacity building. And how would we engage? I think they’re getting ready to start—sort of state taking more intake from the public, but they’re also beginning outreach programs. They’re just getting set up, right? This is—this funding, I think, was only approved as of a month ago. So I will look forward to see how they’ll develop a portal out for you. And I would imagine it’s going to be some way of taking information in and disseminating it as well. So the answer is, I think they’ve got to figure out where the light switches are first. FASKIANOS: And I will just note that Rob Knake used to be a fellow here at CFR. We were sad to lose him, but he—our loss and the government’s gain, for sure. WHEELER: Absolutely. FASKIANOS: I want to give people—yeah, absolutely. (Laughs.) I want to give people a last chance to ask questions. I have one more while we’re waiting for something to queue up. Do you think that the—that enough money has been appropriated to tackle this problem? I mean, is it a realistic amount? Or is it just a drop in the bucket? And you did mention—you said, how are we doing it? Allocating it by population, or needs, or whatever. I mean, what is the best path forward to sort of get these funds allocated in a strategic manner? WHEELER: Mmm hmm. I’d say that’s a great question. Before I start in on that, I want to just tell the folks in the room right at the moment, whatever your IT questions are—I loved Gail’s question earlier about how do I—how do I, you know, answer these questions on my personal device. If you have—like, I’m the IT person for a bunch of folks, right? Like, not just mom and dad. So if you have questions and you want to just take a minute and ask those questions now, can I just promise you right now there is no such thing as a dumb question. The only question here that’s problematic is one that you don’t ask when you could have asked now and gotten a quick answer from somebody. Please ask your questions. It doesn’t matter how—literally, where is the setting on my watch for this? Where do I click on my computer to fix the thing? Ask me. This is what I do for a living, so I am more than willing to help. And there is no dumb questions on any of this. You could also—do absolutely feel free to contact me. I think Irina’s going to have information up. I’m more than happy to just answer questions for you, if you want to. It’s completely fine. This is—this is fun for me. So but the question about whether or not—Irina’s, it’s, like, such a great question. Like, is this enough money? Is it too little? Is it too much? It’s like asking if the EPA has been allocated enough money to fight pollution. The answer is that it’s always going to be both enough—it’s always going to be too little or too much. And the reason why is, either it needs to be optimized someplace else, or it—the amount of money is enough to get started on something, but not follow all the way through with it. So the complexity of government budgeting—what do I know? I’m just a hacker. I couldn’t put together a government budget for you. But I can tell you, the complexities of that are beyond me personally. I would say that a billion dollars for the kinds of grants that need to be allocated at the state and local level, that’s enough money to fix three of your problems each, right? You could fix a couple, two, three, problems at that level. You can get $25,000, half—you know, a quarter-million dollars. You can get enough money to fix, like, -ish a few problems. It’s not enough to fix all of it. And I hope at least part of what comes out of this is not that you are fixing these problems by yourself. What I hope comes out of this grant process is a continuing collaboration with, what’s most important of all, networking with other people who are experiencing the same problems so that you can get an economy of scale in fixing these problems. So that you can collaborate on solutions. So that you’re building capacity not just technically but in your human capital, so that you learn these things and can share them with everybody around you. If this is implemented in that fashion, each one of you solving a few of these problems and sharing that information amongst every one of the people that you’re put in touch with, that does start to become a meaningful solution to the problem. And for that, there’s enough money to do that. There’s not enough money for all of you to fix all of your problems on your own without talking to anybody. You’re muted, Irina. FASKIANOS: Oh, your comment elicited a few questions. So from Patrick Whalen (sp). Patrick, do you want to unmute yourself? Or I can ask it myself? Q: Hello. Yes, thank you. My question, as I typed it out, may be a little confusing. But you mentioned not using scare tactics and statistics and numbers in discussing these subjects with constituents. And I wonder if you’d recommend a similar or different approach internally within offices? You know, I kind of get eye rolls when people see what my passwords are and just, you know, a mash of numbers, letters, and symbols, and that I change them trimonthly or bimonthly, you know. It’s kind of seen as alien. And so bringing up this subject internally—strategies, suggestions you have for that. Thank you. Very informative talk. WHEELER: Absolutely. Thank you so much. I appreciate it, Patrick. So, first of all, what I’m going to recommend is the guidance on changing your password quarterly has been updated at NIST. That’s the National Institute for Standards and Technology. The guidance at NIST has been updated to you don’t need to change your password quarterly. What you need is a super solid, strong, long password, paired with multifactor authentication. Changing passwords continuously is how you get passwords like summer22!, autumn22!, winter22!. Like, that’s how you get those passwords, and why that password process is really commonly associated with a lot of breaches. And it’s because very few people will change their passwords and store them in a password manager if they’ve got to change them that quickly. Or they won’t maintain them well. The guidance is to get people onto password managers at this point. There’s a lot of great passwords managers. LastPass. I personally use 1Password, because I can have a family vault that I share with family members, with my spouse. We can share, like, some financial passwords that are required. And they’re stored along with the ability to get to those devices that give us multifactor authentication, whether that’s a security key or an app-based authenticator. So how do you—how do you get to a place where you’ve advocated for this? Well, first of all, don’t advocate for the password changes. Advocate for password managers, not password changes. How do you get the attention of people internally? We are all in situations where everything’s burning down all the time. Those of you who are dealing with local governments that have municipal hospitals have nothing but problems all day long. And I see you and I feel for you and I sympathize for you. You’ve got devices inside local critical infrastructure that haven’t been patched in twenty years. And they are wildly vulnerable to all kinds of different attacks that—I mean, honestly, that’s the kind of stuff that we teach at the kiddie village at my information security conferences at this point. That’s how we get the kids started on hacking. So this—you’ve got—you’ve got a target-rich environment that you’re trying to protect, and nobody’s really helping you. Until now. I think genuinely there’s been a real sea-change over the last five years. And when you see the work that’s coming out of the National Cyber Director, coming out of CISA. If you need help with your administration to get attention on these issues, go to some of the latest guidance from CISA. It’s getting better over time. They’re doing a great job getting some of these advisories out. They’re still at too high a technical level to be of a great deal of use to your leadership, but hopefully you can translate it a little bit more for them. And if you can’t do that, find somebody who can, and get you to the level of, like, a football analogy or a cooking analogy, and that will help at least a little bit. You’re in—you’re in a tough spot. And there’s not a lot of money to solve these problems. If you can’t do anything else, get your executives to take a look at the most vulnerable members of the constituency that you serve, and ask yourself: If the most vulnerable members of your constituency are served by devices that are also the least updated and the least cared-for in your constituency. If the poorest people in our communities are being served by the most outdated machines at the local library, and the kind of terrible run-down sphygmomanometer, and, you know, the blood pressure thingy, those devices are the least cared for the and most out of date. You can at least tell your leadership that there needs to be an investment in the people in your community that need that help the most. That can be the way that you get a little bit more buy-in, and it give them that kind of air cover that they need. And then go get $25,000, go get $100,000, go get a million dollars to update the devices and the technologies that serve the people in your community that need it most and will likely understand it least. Chances are fairly decent, it’s some of your executives as well. FASKIANOS: (Laughs.) Excellent. Let’s see, there’s a new question from Stephen Courtney (sp): How do you feel about using biometrics or physical security tokens for access? WHEELER: Biometrics or physical security tokens for access. So there’s a thing that we talk about when we talk about authentication. There’s a thing that you know, a thing that you do, a thing that you are. A thing that you know, a thing that you do, and a thing that you are, are three different elements of authentication. A thing that you know could be a password. A thing that you are could be biometrics. And a thing that you do can be a process of a second factor, for instance, like a token for authentication. If you have a thing that you know, a thing that you are, and a thing that you do, and a thing that you are is involved with biometrics, it’s a thing that can’t change. So you want to be very cautious about using biometrics, because it’s a thing that is intended to be unique to a person, but once the information is leaked and can be duplicated, it can never be changed. You can’t go back from losing somebody’s retina scans and DNA. You can’t go back from losing somebody’s thumbprints as image files, if you’ve been storing them. Be incredibly cautious about that. Now, there’s a lot of very good, technical implementations of multifactor authentication that involve app-based authentication, they involved a physical token or security device. Like—hang on for a second here—this little guy right here is my YubiKey. I use this to authenticate myself—I know, it’s kind of teeny, right? You can barely see the little guy. FASKIANOS: How do you keep track of that? Oh my goodness, I would lose that! (Laughs.) WHEELER: It just stays plugged in. It just stays plugged into my machine all the time. FASKIANOS: Oh, OK, good. WHEELER: So there’s a lot of—there’s a lot of options. And, yeah, you can have those—you can have devices like this that can be permanently there. And what that device means is that if somebody asks me for my physical authentication, if I kind of touch that little thing and the string of letters matches what my app is expecting, they know I’m at my laptop. That’s my laptop key. Or, they at least know that I possess this, if I go plug it into a different laptop. Somebody who doesn’t physically have this key on them can’t get into stuff like my financial accounts. So are there problems with it? Sure. But is this a pretty good choice? I mean, this is what I have my parents do. So it should tell you something about what your options are. Don’t use retina scans, and fingerprints, and DNA. Just don’t use them. But use physical tokens as an option. FASKIANOS: Now I’m worried because now global entry is with a fingerprint. And CLEAR is with an eye scan. (Laughs.) So are you saying not to use those? Are those safe? WHEELER: I use CLEAR, yeah. I’m saying that—I’m saying that we have absolutely no choice about those. Don’t implement them if you can possibly help it. I don’t like it. But let’s be honest, the airport is an incredible coercive environment. There’s no—for all intents and purposes, you cannot not consent to anything anyone ells you to do in an airport, or you can, I don’t know, be locked in a tiny cell. Who the hell knows at this point, right? So be cautious about that and implementing stuff like that. Because once that genie is out, it’s out. And yeah, you pretty much need to use facial recognition to get in and out of this country at this point at any checkpoint. Can you opt out of it at gates walking onto an airplane to London? I’ve opted out before because I’m stubborn as hell and I want to see what happens. And the answer is—the answer I get from gate agents, they’re like, I mean, it’s fine. We just took your picture anyway. And they’ll wave me on. No passport. I’ll be like, but I opted out of facial recognition. And they’re like, I mean, what do you want me to do, look at your passport? I know who you are, Ms. Wheeler. So the answer is it’s already there. Don’t be the person who does it again badly and loses it. FASKIANOS: Got it. So if somebody, you know, I have two practical questions. If you—you know, we all know now clicking on links is a terrible thing and it can unleash some very bad things. If somebody within your agency clicks on a link, what should—what should be the next step? And then the second part is, if you have a ransomware attack or you are being ransomed, where should local officials go? What should be the first call that they make if they’re getting—if they have that situation happen? WHEELER: These are such great questions. There are two—there are two complicated questions. So I’m going to—the first question is what do you do, and the second is who do you call, I think. So the first question—clicking on links isn’t terrible. That’s the internet. You literally—that is the internet, Irina. Like, clicking on links is a good thing. It’s wonderful. If someone you don’t know send you a link in an email from an external—by the way, one of the best things you can do is turn on that little external email notice. If you have your local IT person, have them turn on the notice that says: This message is from an external source. If you don’t know what I’m talking about, go find out and fix that thing. That is absolutely a thing you can fix, and it’s a big defense against clicking on links that you’re like, oh, I feel like I know a John Smith from where the hell over in the next office. You know, I’ll check out what he’s sending right here. Somebody sends you a link that’s like final quarter, you know, executive salaries.xls, do not click on that. That’s never the salaries. It’s never the salaries. So if you click on something, do let your IT people know as soon as possible. But here’s the thing, there’s a lot of stuff in the media that shows sort of somebody clicking on a link and then somebody in a hoodie in the background—you know, that’s me, by the way. I’m the one in the hoodie—you know, typing away frantically, trying to break into your computer as you tapped on the thing. And if you just close the link quick enough like, oh, dang, I can step back and you see, like, somebody slams the lid of their laptop shut. Oh, we defeated the hackers. Thanks. That’s not how any of this works. (Laugh.) The second that you click on the link, the payload has been delivered. It’s done. It’s over. There’s no—there’s, no, oh, I should just close this popup really quick, and everything’s fine. It was only open for a couple of seconds. It’s probably fine. No. The payload has either been delivered or it has failed, and it happened the second that you clicked on the link. Or that the mail client that you were in evaluated the link to try to preload it for you clicking on it. So don’t worry about that second thing that I just said, just trust me on this one. If you click on a link, it’s over. It’s done. There’s no—there’s no kind of a little bit there. There’s no quick just shut it down. The second that the link gets clicked, the payload has delivered or it has failed. Doesn’t matter what you do at that moment. You do need to go talk to your IT person right away. If there’s one thing that you can do it is isolate your computer or your device immediately from the network. Turn on airplane mode. Don’t shut the computer down. Turn on airplane mode and remove it from the internet as fast as you can. That is different. That’s about the amount of data that can be transferred off of your computer. No whether or not the compromised happened, but about how much they can get from you. It’s, like, the bank has been broken into. That state has already been achieved. How much money can they get out, right? So this is what you’re doing. You can’t stop—they’ve already broken in, but you can slam the vault door shut. You must speak to somebody as fast as you can and get your computer cut off from the internet. That’s going to vary a little bit from person to person and from organization to organization. But please go ask your IT people what to do in the event, and how to turn on airplane mode or get your computer unhooked from the internet. If you’re not sure what to do, there’s a little Wi-Fi symbol probably at the top or at the bottom of your screen right now. If you click on that, you’re going to be able to see something probably called Wi-Fi settings. Click on that, and you’ll be able to—I’m trying to make sure that I don’t actually go offline right now—but there should be something in there that says airplane mode. Do that, and then if you also have a—it’ll look like a network cable, right? A little ethernet cable. Yank that right away. Then go talk to somebody. Not using your computer but go talk to somebody and find someone who can help you with that. That’s the first thing you do. The second thing is who are you going to call when this happens, if you’re an organization and you’ve experienced a massive attack? There’s a lot of—there’s several different answers to this question. The FBI has field offices that you can report this to. Be aware that the FBI is a law enforcement organization. Their job is not to protect you or keep you safe. Their job is to solve the crime of how this happened. And so they may be more focused on who the offenders are, how this happened, do you have evidence? And they tend to be pursuing this from the perspective of someone who’s trying to figure out if this is in their jurisdiction and if they can figure out who to go after. I would highly encourage you to report immediately to CISA, which is the organization—it’s not a law enforcement organization. This is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. They also have field offices. They can’t necessarily dispatch incident response to you right away, but they can provide guidance about what you can do next, provide references, referrals, and technical guidance for people who can help you get yourselves set back up again. It depends on what you need to do and how quickly you have recovered from this, and if you’ve recovered from it. So the answer is, basically, FBI field office or CISA. It depends if you are a regulated organization. Maybe you’re health care and you need to report to HHS. That’s also very possible. They’re a regulatory body, so they can both help you and possibly penalize you. There’s a lot of weird incentives in our government. We’re working on it. So whoever you talk to, just be aware there’s a spectrum between can advise but can’t prosecute or regulate all the way over to can after the criminals or can regulate you depending upon what the nature of the breach was and what the level of responsibility you have for it was. It's a complicated question. It’s getting a little easier. And there’s starting to be a bit more of a cyber 9-1-1 at .gov. And I would highly recommend, of course, if any of you are not on the .gov system, that will give you a bunch of resources as well. If you are a state or a local government and your website is not on .gov as opposed to .com, .co, .org, whatever, go get on the .gov system. You’ll get a bunch of resources that will help you out with that, and where to go. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you so much, Tarah. This was fantastic. And to all of you for taking part. Again, if you have questions, you have Tarah here who’s willing to answer them. She’s a fantastic resource. We’re so happy that she’s joined CFR. And obviously she’s still very much running her own company. We will send out a link to this webinar and the transcript. You can follow Tarah Wheeler’s work on CFR.org, on Twitter at @tarah. Very easy to remember. And as always, we encourage you to visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for more expertise and analysis. You can also email us, [email protected], to let us know how CFR can support the important work you are doing. So wishing you all happy holidays. We will reconvene in the new year. So enjoy the holidays and happy new year in advance. Thank you again, Tarah. WHEELER: Thank you so much. It was absolutely wonderful. Thanks so much, Irina. It was a real pleasure. (END)
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    Religion and Foreign Policy Webinar: Religious Freedom and U.S. National Security
    Play
    Peter Mandaville, senior advisor for the religion and inclusive societies program at United States Institute of Peace, and Knox Thames, visiting expert at United States Institute of Peace, discuss their recent report, “Maintaining International Religious Freedom as a Central Tenet of US National Security.” Azza Karam, secretary general at Religions for Peace International, moderates. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy Webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. This webinar series convenes religious and faith-based leaders in cross-denominational dialogue on the intersection between religion and international relations. Today’s session is on the record and the audio, video, and transcript will be made available on CFR’s website, CFR.org, and on the iTunes podcast channel Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Azza Karam with us to moderate today’s discussion on religious freedom and U.S. national security. Dr. Azza Karam is secretary general of Religions for Peace International, and professor of religion and development at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, Netherlands. Previously, she served as a senior advisor on culture at the United Nations Population Fund, coordinator and chair of the United Nations Interagency Task Force on Religion and Development, and president of the Committee of Religious NGOs at the United Nations. And before I turn it over to Azza to moderate this conversation, I want to thank her and Peter Mandaville, who is one of our speakers, for serving on CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy Advisory Committee. We appreciate all of their guidance over the past several years to help us with our programming and activities. So with that, Azza, over to you to introduce Peter and Knox. KARAM: Thank you very much, indeed. It is a true privilege for me and a real pleasure to be able to moderate this session with two scholars and practitioners who have done a great deal not only in the space of religious freedom, but actually assessing and looking at the nexus of freedoms, democracy, human rights, and religions writ large—which, as we all know, is a very topical and temporal issue. But we also know that religious freedom is a very critical aspect of—increasingly a critical aspect not only for the United States’ foreign policy, but as it intersects with foreign policy and domestic policies of many countries around the world, and certainly with the engagement of religious organizations and interreligious actors in many places and spaces. So we’re in a good moment, so to speak, to discuss religious freedom. But we’re also in a very appropriate space at the Council on Foreign Relations to be able to assess and understand together from two leading experts in this space on precisely how and why international religious freedom should be a main tenet of U.S. foreign policy. And I am quoting their singular report, which was very recently issued after a great deal of debate and research, within and under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace. I have the privilege to introduce these two giants of this space. Peter Mandaville is a senior advisor for the Religion and Inclusive Societies team at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). He has twenty-five years of academic think tank and government experience, focusing on the intersection of religion, international affairs, and the Muslim-majority world. At USIP, Dr. Mandaville leads an initiative focused on the security and peacebuilding implications of religion in the external relations of great powers. He’s also a professor of international affairs, and director of the AbuSulayman Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University, and a fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. Previously, Dr. Mandaville was a member of the United States State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, where he was involved in shaping the U.S. response to the Arab Spring, and a senior advisor in the Office of the Secretary of State. He is the author of many publications, amongst which Islam and Politics and Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma. Knox Thames is a visiting expert with the Middle East and Religion and Inclusive Societies team at the United States Institute of Peace. He joined USIP after twenty years of government service, including at the U.S. State Department, and two different U.S. government foreign policy commissions. Most recently, Mr. Thames served across two administrations as the special advisor for religious minorities in the Near East and South and Central Asia at the U.S. Department of State. In addition to his work at USIP, he is a senior fellow with the Institute for Global Engagement. Previously, Mr. Thames served on the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom, AmeriCorps, and is an adjunct research professor at the U.S. Army War College. Welcome to both of you. And I would like, before any detailed questions come up, I’d like very much to give the floor to each of you, starting with Peter, to describe a little bit the background to this incredible report, and what prompted it. How did you go about such a report? We understand you, in other conversations, have mentioned the word “bipartisan effort” repeatedly. Tell us a little bit, Peter, about this—the process of this report, and what you actually, in an ideal context, want to see achieved with it and by it? MANDAVILLE: Yes, great. Absolutely. Thank you very much, Azza. And let me just greet everyone who is joining us today, and to thank Irina and CFR for hosting us, and particularly to you, Azza, for moderating and navigating us through this discussion today. We’re honored and privileged to have someone who, as many of our participants will know, is herself as a towering figure, and someone who’s really shaped the way that many of us do this work, think about it, both in scholarship and in practice. So thank you, Azza. The origins of this report date back to a conversation that Knox and I had several—almost four years ago now, I think. He and I have known and worked together for two decades now. And while we have always had certain differences in terms of how each of us thinks about the question of religious freedom and appropriate approaches to it in U.S. foreign policy, I think it’s also fair to say that we’ve always deeply respected each other and the way that we go about the work that we do respectively. And in that conversation, we both registered some concern about the ways in which intense political polarization in U.S. domestic politics appear to be leaking into the way that we think about and work on questions of international religious freedom around the world. And so we agreed that it would be helpful to try and create a process and a space in which we could have and convene conversations about ways of finding common ground in this work, regardless of where one sits on an ideological spectrum. Are there certain aspects of international religious freedom promotion in U.S. foreign policy that we can all agree on? In late 2020, we both found ourselves taking up new affiliations at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and courtesy of an invitation from the former director of the Religion and Inclusive Societies team at USIP, Susie Hayward, and someone who I’m sure is known to many in the audience today. Susie encouraged us to move forward to create an experts working group focused on these questions. And so we were able to bring together about twenty leading figures on questions of international religious freedom. They represented a variety of sectors and professional backgrounds—some former government officials, some civil society practitioners and activists, and with them thought leaders and scholars on international religious freedom. They represented a wide range of political and ideological orientations. And we sat together with them. This was during the height of COVID, so much of the group’s interaction and discussion was virtual. But we convened this working group in a series of small group consultations to talk through a number of sort of essential questions, looking into how people view the politicization and political polarization in international religious freedom, and their ideas about how we might minimize it and find that common ground. We were, I want to add, supported invaluably in this work by USIP Research Assistant Emily Scolaro, who’s currently in the PhD program at UNC Chapel Hill. Her contributions and helping to manage, move this work forward, were incredibly important. We were also able to benefit, I think very importantly, from the participation, the active participation and endorsement of the work, from the two most recent past ambassadors-at-large for international religious freedom, Sam Brownback and David Saperstein. Obviously, individuals who served in two very different administrations, but who I think in their interaction with each other, in the way that they helped to shape the conversation space, modeled the very kind of bipartisanship and the sort of spirit that we were hoping would characterize their conversations, even when at times we began to talk very openly and frankly about partisan differences in terms of how people on different sides of the political aisle perceive the issue of religious freedom abroad, and how they perceive each other in their efforts and commitments to advance this work. The remarkable diversity that I just mentioned that characterized the group might suggest that we would have difficulty reaching consensus on a lot of issues, and certainly on any policy recommendations that we might want to put forward. And indeed, there were a couple of issues that came up where there were simply very respectfully articulated differences of opinion that meant that we were not able to come up with a recommendation that people were able to express comfort with. For example, one of the issues that came up, and one that will be familiar to many who work in this space, is the question of whether promoting religious freedom should be a function that stands on its own within the portfolio of U.S. foreign policy, or whether promoting religious freedom should be approached as a right that is nested within a broader approach to international human rights. And we just had a wide variety of opinions on that issue. That said, we were able to come up with eight or nine quite concrete recommendations that the vast majority of our working group members from—again, from a diverse range of ideological and political perspectives, felt comfortable with and were willing to endorse. And we’re looking forward to having the opportunity to talk through some of those with all of you today. Thanks. KARAM: Thank you very much, Peter. I think you’ve, indeed, painted the picture, and the aspiration, and the actors very, very nicely and succinctly. Knox, did you want to add anything to what Peter described in terms of the process of getting this, and putting this together as a report, and your own sort of aspiration there too? Go ahead. THAMES: I’d just add my thanks to you, Azza, and Irina, and CFR for hosting this. And also thank USIP for supporting the working group. These recommendations are recommendations from Peter and myself based on the input from the working group. They’re not working group recommendations, but they were certainly informed by the process and the vigorous debate that Peter referenced. When we were starting this, our—as any American knows, or any observer of U.S. politics knows, our domestic political space is really supercharged. It’s about how do you find the wedge issue that can rally the base. It’s about disagreement. And we were concerned that this issue of international religious freedom would be a partisan football in the way—or wedge issue—in the way that domestic religious liberty debates have become. We wanted to find, where are the areas that we agree, right left and center, drawing from experts from academia, former government appointees and civil servants, people of all faiths and none. I’m proud of what we were able to put together. And we’re hopeful that the recommendations we outlined will begin a new conversation and try to solidify a safe space where we can continue to think about ways to advance this fundamental human right that doesn’t jeopardize the work for future administrations and advocates. KARAM: One of the things that you’ve both spoken to is the extent to which there seems to be an understanding that is accepted on all sides, in spite of the polarization, that international religious freedom matters, it is important, and it should be an aspect of U.S. foreign policy. So it sounds as if there wasn’t much agreement necessarily on the what, but perhaps more of a different nuancing and perhaps open disagreement on the how this could or should be undertaken. Is that a correct understanding? And if so, what—in addition to the example that Peter raised, were there other issues where you felt there was not necessarily a common understanding on the how too? MANDAVILLE: I think we all went into this discussion with the awareness that promoting international religious freedom is something that the United States would continue to do. It is, after all, a matter of law. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 mandates that the U.S. Department of State undertake this work. So it’s not as if we could make recommendations to, say, a particular secretary of state, that they decide to stand down from advancing U.S. religious freedom abroad. It is a value that the United States Congress has committed the executive branch of the United States to carry forward. And so our question was more, what are the most effective ways of doing this? And how can we do this in ways that generates the broadest swath of support from the widest range of champions and advocates for this work? So certainly, that question of whether promoting religious freedom should be a stand-alone function, with its own specific structures, whether that’s the most effective approach in advancing this cause, or whether it’s most effectively approached as a broader—as one aspect of a broader U.S. commitment to human rights, which has tended to be the approach that many of our international partners, particularly in Europe, have taken. Although, there has been a notable trend in recent years of even our close European partners also creating their own dedicated special envoys and positions focused on freedom of religion or belief. And so that right there I think starts to point towards another area where there’s debate and discussion. Which is the distinctly American framing of religious freedom or religious liberty—something that I think is in part a function of the American story and American history—versus an international commitment, as enshrined in, for example, the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to promoting freedom of religion or belief, FoRB as it’s commonly called. And these are terms that imply different kinds of framings and different understandings of the scope and breadth of what we’re talking about and what we’re championing. So I think that’s another concrete example of some of the terrain that we wandered across. THAMES: I would add, you’d also see in the recommendations we—the question of how does the United States accomplish this goal through foreign policy? And we have two different recommendations that talk about two different approach vectors. One is using the power of the United States to sanction, to penalize through the country of particular concern status, which the State Department and Secretary Blinken just released their designations on Friday. Versus a softer approach that’s looking to work at a community level to build capacity, to build space for, and appreciation for, diversity and tolerance. Sort of a step removed from the pure human rights advocacy approach. I think, unlike the “is it a holistic or an individual approach to the issue,” which the report couldn’t really—didn’t speak to, because we couldn’t really find a common approach to that question. There was a sense that we can do both, which due to the pure human rights advocacy to leverage the power the influence of the United States to be that force for good, to be the voice for the oppressed, while also using our resources to develop space for diversity of thought, appreciation for pluralism, which is a key building block to respect for human rights. KARAM: Just curious, because I’m not sure—I hope that everybody who’s listening in has managed to read the whole report. But for those who may not have had a chance to read it in full, what would you say are some of the key recommendations you want to make sure that everybody listening knows you made, that you feel are very important? What would you highlight or nuance? MANDAVILLE: Yeah, sure. Thanks for asking that, Azza. And I believe that there’s a link—or, will be a link to the report in the chat box, so that those who are joining us today who haven’t had the opportunity to download the report will be able to do so. There’s also a sort of tl;dr, too long; didn’t read, blog post version of it that is a very efficient 750 words, but kind of hits on our greatest hits in terms of the recommendations. So there are a couple that I would want to highlight briefly. One is a recommendation we have that is about expanding the range of partners and advocates within international religious freedom constituencies more broadly. There is certainly already, particularly in Washington, DC, a very well developed infrastructure for—within civil society, within political structures—for advocating for, funding, and supporting international religious freedom work. And I know that, for example, the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom—Knox, of course, has worked at both— relies enormously on this community to support their work. But this is a community that tends to be focused on the idea of religious freedom as a value, as a right, that should be advanced unto itself. And that makes sense. Religious freedom, freedom of religion and belief, is a key constituent element of international human rights commitments. But I think there are also opportunities—and we argue that there are opportunities for expanding the range of partners and champions for international religious freedom, by drawing attention to the ways in which discrimination against certain populations and communities on the basis of religion, the oppression and suppression of those communities, can at times in certain settings be immediate sources of instability and violence. In other words, there is a national security rationale. There’s a relationship between dynamics of stability and instability, and international religious freedom. And we can point to any number of conflicts around the world—in South and Southcentral Asia, in the Middle East, in sub-Saharan Africa, where those kinds of dynamics are at work. And so we are encouraging our colleagues who work in the broader national security community to understand that in addition to being a core human rights issue, advancing religious freedom, advancing and protecting the rights of religious minorities, for example, can be directly related to efforts to generate greater stability and to foster positive peacebuilding, and enduring peacebuilding outcomes, in a number of settings around the world. A second recommendation that we focus on—and I’ll register this as actually a bit of a surprise for me, in terms of where our discussion with the group came out. We at one point in the discussion took up the question of the relationship between promoting international religious freedom as a foreign policy function and engaging with religious actors more broadly as a foreign policy function. Those of you who are familiar with the bureaucratics, the ambient bureaucratics around this question in U.S. foreign policy, will know that in 2013 under former Secretary of State John Kerry, the State Department created a new office called the Office of Religion in Global Affairs, that understood itself to be working on the broader effort to raise awareness among American diplomats of the importance of religion as a force in societies around the world. And to increase the capacity of American diplomats to engage routinely with religious actors as they go about pursuing whatever their diplomatic objectives might be, and to make the point that that kind of work is separate and distinct from promoting religious freedom, which is tied to a particular normative commitment. It’s a values-based effort. And so we wanted to say that these are two complementary, and to some extent related, but also quite separate functions. The Trump administration made the decision to take that Office of Religion in Global Affairs and to put it under the existing Office of International Religious Freedom. And so it became what is today known as the Strategic Religious Engagement Unit within the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom. We found broad support—and this is a point that Knox and I also both agree on—on the idea that it would be better to take the strategic religious engagement function out of the Office of International Religious Freedom, in order to give it more space to forge its own unique working relationships with other relevant offices and bureaus at the State Department. And for these two functions to proceed in parallel, in cooperation, and working together in the many occasions when it would be appropriate to do that, but also to have their own space to pursue their own distinct roles. THAMES: And I would add that there are a few that resonate with me. One is sort of obvious but needs to be said. Organizations and individuals who work to promote international religious freedom should avoid the temptation to politicize it. That they need to just have a rock-solid commitment to advancing this issue, and leaving politics at home, here at home, and not trying to muddy the waters by throwing stones at advocates from a different political party. So just don’t do it. But two other ones I’ll speak a bit more about. One is just recognizing the difference between the debates here at home, which are important, and situations internationally, which are generally life and death. We know that the cases before the Supreme Court stir great passions. They’re very important. But they’re generally about the finer nuances of how to prefect the protection of religious liberty here at home. The issues confronting advocates and religious communities regarding international religious freedom are about violence, they’re about the lack of justice, they’re about persecution, death, even genocide, as we’re seeing in places like China and Myanmar. So we need to keep that perspective. So don’t politicize it. Don’t blur terminology with what we’re doing—what’s happening here at home, with the situation that’s drastically different overseas. And then, lastly, we talk about there is a community of suffering. Different belief groups that are being persecuted for trying to pursue as their conscience leads. They’re converts, members who are of the humanist community, atheists and agnostics. But then also, members of sexual and gender minorities, the LGBT community. They’re often facing many of the same social and legal challenges that can lead to severe persecution. But those communities aren’t in conversation with each other. So we talk about how to address this pandemic of persecution that we see confronting so many parts of the world, building new alliances between unusual or unconventional allies can start to elevate the issue in new ways, and hopefully bring about results. Because if we can improve the conditions for one community, it’ll often have positive reverberations for others. It’s not that we’re asking them to endorse issues that they would disagree with, but rather a common commitment, a common belief in just the dignity of the human person. And on that ground alone, we should be advocating for the fundamental human rights of every individual. And that’s a possibility that I think has yet to be fully explored. KARAM: I’m glad you said that, because not to preempt what I’m sure will be some very pertinent and important questions from the audience, but just to raise a couple of issues for your consideration that perhaps may also help you pull up other recommendations and nuances from your report. The first issue, to me, is you mentioned China. And I’m thinking, OK, working with civil societies, the U.S. to work with civil society, or impose sanctions. And I’m thinking, I don’t see that happening exactly in the context of a country like China, which is oppressing, or at least is on the record for having, oppressing, certain religious minorities. So in cases where it’s beyond arguing about politicizing, it is being politicized. It is a political issue. (Laughs.) It is very much politicized. So how then would you, speaking to your fellow colleagues in the State Department and others, what would your advice be, given that particular country dynamic, and the relationship that exists at the moment between the United States, China, and Russia? What then would your report actually say as a recommendation for promoting international religious freedom in that context? That’s one question. So please just let me know your thoughts. THAMES: We specifically elevate what’s happening in China as evidence of an opportunity to build a broader coalition around a very dire situation. Of course, from the religious freedom advocacy perspective, China is one of the worst countries of the world for the genocide against the Uighurs, the cultural genocide and physical repression of the Tibetan Buddhists, the limitations on Christianity, Falun Gong, the list goes on. But we know, as we’ve seen China start to flex its economic muscles internationally to promote a global system that I think is antithetical to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but also other core strategic interests, it presents an opportunity to build that broader tent. To where it’s not just religious freedom advocates raising concerns about China, but it’s also folks who want a free and fair-trade relationship, organizations that are concerned about Taiwan and its independence. It’s an interesting opportunity to build that broader tent. But also, I would say, just having worked in the State Department advocating for human rights as an American diplomat is hard. You’re constantly confronted with all the different challenges a superpower faces. So of course, we carry our values into these conversations. I’m proud that our country does that. But it’s also we balance them with security, energy, trade, counterterrorism. So it’s hard work as well. And there’s always the risk of hypocrisy. So part of our—and this isn’t so much covered in the report. This would be more my own personal view is challenging our country to make sure that we’re a consistent advocate for our values, and that we’re consistently carrying those into every conversation, and they don’t get shifted down to the third or fourth talking point, and thus never raised. MANDAVILLE: And I’ll add to that, and I’ll also be going beyond the boundaries of our report here, but also touching on some work that I’m doing here at USIP as well as in my academic perches. I think that there is a broader kind of new geopolitics of religion that we are all confronting right now. It has very much to do with the ways in which we see in operation today transnational networks grounded, at least in part, in religion, in which some of the major strategic rivals of the United States—certainly Russia, China less so, but countries like India, certain domestic groups even here in the United States as well—are all looped into this. And a lot of it has to do with a struggle between inclusivists versus exclusivist understandings of religion and religious identities in ways that have fairly intense human rights implications. So it’s not just a set of individual cases and a matter of U.S. bilateral relations. I think there’s a broader transnational geopolitical construct of religion working behind a lot of today’s geopolitics. We’re finding it expressed through multilateral spaces, such as the G20. We’re finding it expressed through, for example, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, that the United States has had some level of, at times, direct representation through a special envoy. But there are countries—there are emerging powers in Asia, such as China, that have identified the OIC, usually a neglected multilateral space in the eyes of the United States, as a useful platform for advancing certain agendas. And so I think it’s important for us to be aware of these dynamics and to engaged with them. And I think that the kind of combined space of religious engagement and international religious freedom are part and parcel of how we do that. KARAM: Thank you. You both answered this very, very well. And in a way, it kind of begs the concern, the question which is also a concern, that it is already a politicized domain. I mean, geopolitics of religion is a reality that we are living in the midst of today. So trying to keep politics out of it may well be much easier said than done. And in that case, I think one of your recommendations that you make becomes particularly important to understand and appreciate, which is keep the international religious freedom space, office, and engagement—separate from engagement with broader religious issues. Because, in a way, you’re also trying to reduce the politicization dynamics that already exist. And you stand a better chance, perhaps, of pushing for international religious freedom if you’re trying to keep it outside of the—of the contentiousness of the political and geopolitical debates. And perhaps—I’m actually begging the questions that you raised, in addition to also, in a sense, asking us to be very understanding of the complexities that are already in action. And I think—I think one of the many advantages of your report is that you’ve looked at it from a myriad of different angles, and you’ve presented something that even though it is fundamentally about positioning international religious freedom as a main tenet of U.S. foreign policy, you’ve also made the case very critically for how the United States foreign policy can continue to support and protect human rights as a whole. And I want to make sure that that gets underlined and understood. Because you could have—it could have been exclusively about international religious freedom. But one of the many advantages, and I think very wise things, that your report does is you show that intersectionality with broad human rights issues. And you underline the commitment of the United States to the defense of human rights, which in and of itself is a strategic move that you have made with the report. So I want to commend you both on that. Very, very quickly, I just want us to—want your opinion, your read, on the aspect of civil society, the role of civil society in the promotion of this. Because we tend, all of us, to presume that civil society is sort of monolithic space. And you know better than anyone else how fraught civil society is, and how sometimes civil society mirrors the challenges within a government structure, or an administration itself. So what were your thoughts on that when you were putting forward one of the soft approaches of engaging civil society? But what if civil society itself is torn about this issue? What then? THAMES: We highlight some emerging networks of civil society activists that I think are very positive, as someone who’s been in this space for a couple of decades now. The movements of international religious freedom, the roundtables, the networks of parliamentarians, and now governments. But the roundtables, bringing together people of all faiths and none, you go to these events, and you see Baptists sitting next to atheists next to Muslims next to Buddhists. These are gatherings that just weren’t happening twenty years ago. And it, I think, adds strength to the issue, to show that it’s not just about one group advocating for their own. It’s about all groups recognizing this issue’s important for everyone. If one group doesn’t have religious freedom in a certain environment, does anyone really have it? So that’s a positive step. And we elevate them as an example of—to be emulated and to be expanded upon. But I think when you’re looking at communities in the broken countries, where there is persecution, there’s often a fracturing that makes it very difficult to know how to engage, how to advocate. You see this in numerable country contexts, that I’m sure we’re both familiar with. Many are coming to mind. And there’s no quick solution to that, unfortunately, because we know that the oppressor—the oppressive governments often play upon those divisions as well to lessen the impact of their voice. MANDAVILLE: And I’ll add just this briefly, if I may, Azza. You’re absolutely right, of course, that civil society organizations that work in this space, many of whom receive funding from governmental sources and therefore have baked into the DNA of their work some of the contradictions and tensions that are present in government policy approaches. Civil society is, of course, also reflective of broader society, which means that some of that polarization, some of those political biases and orientations are present in civil society as well. I think a recognition of that reality is precisely the pretext for this report. I have often joked with Knox when we looked at the recommendations at the end that, wow, this is really boring stuff. (Laughter.) Like there is nothing particularly interesting and intriguing and profound here. This is all pretty commonsensical stuff. But our idea was that we had just come out of a period of particularly intense political polarization as we started the process. I have no reason to believe that we are not likely to go through another round of that in another couple of years. These sorts of differences of opinion politically, and with respect to this work more specifically, have always been part of its story and always will be. So what we wanted to create was a reference point, a safe harbor, if you will, such that when those polarizing winds begin to blow, and blow strongly again, there’s a reference point that we can turn to remind ourselves of certain core things that we do all agree upon, no matter where we sit politically around these issues. KARAM: Beautifully put. And I just want to now make sure to give a chance to our audience, who I’m sure you’ve provoked and enthused enough for questions. But just one small point to that last point, to both of you, to take into consideration perhaps if you were to do a follow up or maybe the other 750 word postscript to this report. Which is to continue to harness the experiences of working multi-religiously to defend religious freedom as a community of diverse religious leaders. And some of those experiences go underground and are not necessarily noted, when in fact I think, Knox, you were also already mentioning you see varied people coming around the table. But when religious leaders from different religious currents are actually sitting together in defense of one another, not of their own respective community, there is a very potent strategic and almost spiritual strength in that, that I think even not having—this doesn’t have to serve as part of the U.S. foreign policy, but U.S. foreign policy needs to be respectful of that particular dynamic, and fully aware and conscious of it. And I think that is an important footnote to what you’re both trying very eloquently and powerfully to articulate. THAMES: That’s more than a footnote. That should be the headline. Yes, that’s an important point. KARAM: Great. So I’m not sure whether it’s—this is a good now time for me to inquire of our colleagues in the CFR, Irina and colleagues, to perhaps let us know what the Q&A situation is like? OPERATOR: Yes. Absolutely. Thank you, Azza. (Gives queuing instructions.) Our first question comes from Sarah Shabbir at the U.S. Department of State. Please accept the “unmute now” prompt. Looks as though we are having technical difficulties. So we will take our next written question from Guthrie Grave-Fitzsimmons from the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, who says: Do you believe Christians face religious freedom threats in the United States? Because this is such a big issue in the news, do you think the idea of Christian persecution in the United States is possibly making progressives conditioned to be wary of international religious freedom, when they should be natural allies of human rights concerns? THAMES: That is a great question, and one that was a context in which all of the discussions took place. And we had an interesting conversation that didn’t make it into the final version of the report between sort of different sides of the issues about framing, about terminology, and how the superheated domestic debate can turn people off from the international work because there’s sort of a lot of assumptions that come along with it when there are people who are not following what’s happening overseas as closely as those of us on this call are. We notice a difference in terminology. A lot of times Republicans or conservatives are very interested in international religious freedom. Democrats or liberals are more interested in religious minorities. Those different approach vectors sort of end at the same point, but the framing matters to folks who are not initiated into the nitty gritty of this work. So, yeah, the domestic context is an issue, a challenge. And how we talk about it is something I’d be very careful with. Again, going back to my—the foundational point is don’t politicize international work. Let’s leave our domestic debates here, have those robust conversations, but remember what’s happening overseas is literally life and death. And it’s just incomparable to what we’re discussing here at home.  OPERATOR: Great. Our next question comes from Shaarik Zafar. ZAFAR: Hi, everybody. Azza, it’s amazing to see you. Knox, really amazing to see you. Peter, I guess it’s OK to see you as well. This is Shaarik Zafar, formerly Peter’s intern at the State Department and now at Meta, where I lead our foreign policy and national security engagement. Congratulations on this amazing report. I think it’s very timely and very important. What do you think the role of the private sector should be, broadly, in supporting religious freedom? Having spent a little bit of time in the private sector now, when we talk about business and human rights it’s often what we traditionally think of as human rights. And religious freedom doesn’t always rise to the same level of importance. Is there a particular role that you’d like to see businesses here in the United States and elsewhere? THAMES: Thanks, Shaarik. And thanks for tuning in today. I feel like a radio show. I think leveraging the power and influence of the private sector outside of the human rights space is a really unexplored and an area of vast potential. Just looking at the company that you’re working for now, and the whole Metaverse and Facebook and the ability to use social media to promote—to share beliefs, to worship collectively through a digital interface, but also social media is—the problematic aspects of it, to promote hate speech, promote violence. And we’ve seen that happen in a lot of contexts where social media is used to actually abet or instigate severe instances of persecution against religious minorities. So bringing the private sector alongside as partners, trying to find ways to encourage them to walk with advocates, not out of you better do it or we’re going to sue you, but more of a commonsense approach that freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, all the different components of religious freedom, if they are fully respected and protected, then that’s going to be a better environment for creative thought, for businesses, for academia, for all the different components of society. And that makes a better business environment. So there could be a sort of a long-term monetary incentive that could hopefully bring these companies and institutions alongside this work. MANDAVILLE: So let me also add, briefly, so, Shaarik, I guess it’s kind of nice to see you too. Shaarik, everyone, you should all know, was the former State Department special representative to Muslim communities. One of the principal political appointees in the Office of Religion and Global Affairs that I had the honor to serve in. And what I really appreciated about the way that Shaarik did his work is that even though his mandate naturally brought him to deal with issues related to Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment around the world, he always engaged that work in ways that really, I think, embodied the spirit of the recommendation that we make in our report, to make sure to do that work as part of a broader effort to champion those who are vulnerable, whether or not they happen to hold the particular religious identity that his position was focused on. And I know that the technology sector where he hangs his hat now professionally has benefitted enormously from his work. I think what I would add is just that I do think that the tech sector is particularly important here, just because social media and technology platforms, the broader phenomenon of digital hate, is really at the heart of how these dynamics play out today. And so obviously debates and questions we’re having today about the content moderation policies of social media platforms that raise enormous dilemmas that I’ve heard you, Shaarik, speak so eloquently about in public forums. But I think, again, it’s not just the naming and shaming in the sense of finding bad material and pulling it down. I know that social media platforms, of which Meta obviously holds quite a few, Twitter, have the capacity to proactively help to push forward messages of inclusivity. And so I think if there is an ethical commitment to those kinds of values on the part of these platforms, then the more of that we can get the better. We know that it’s just a matter of the business model sometimes, that the algorithm privileges messages that generate certain kinds of responses. And controversial messages tend to generate those kinds of responses. And so I think helping to counterbalance that by proactively making space at minimal cost for others kinds of messages, I think is a very valuable tool. KARAM: Can I just quickly interject that I think, to honor a little bit more Shaarik’s question, because I think he mentioned the private sector. And we honed—you zeroed in on the tech space. And the private sector is tech, plus, plus, plus. (Laughs.) So I do believe that it might be valuable to ask for a little bit more of a comparative reflection of how have the private sectors in their diversities in the United States, for instance, contributed to other human rights issues that are part of U.S. foreign policy? And maybe look at that a bit critically, and compare and contrast, before passing any particular judgement on the value-added for international religious freedom. I think it sort of behooves us to maybe want to study that a bit more, and listen to the experiences of people like Shaarik, but also other private sector actors in this space, before we sort of pass a judgement too quickly. OPERATOR: Great. Our next question comes from Razi Hashmi from the U.S. Department of State. HASHMI: Hey, Knox and Peter. It’s good to hear and see you. I am a former bag handler to Knox Thames and chai aficionado with Peter. So in terms of my question, so I work at the Department of State in the Office of International Religious Freedom, where this report is very pertinent. But I’m also a term member, so I care about these issues in multiple reasons. You had talked about—in your recommendations—about exploring common challenges for at-risk communities. And really, like, broadening the pool of people that are confronted with these issues. Now, one of the common threats in terms of things that we see is the rise of religious and ethnic nationalism. And I’d be curious to hear how you would envision approaching those kind of larger issues, that do connect with those other communities that are at risk. And then the second part of my question is engaging the youth and bringing young progressives that may not be as connected to their religious identity as maybe some other communities. So welcome your thoughts on both those. Thank you. THAMES: I would say on the first part, Razi, the work of strategic religious engagement becomes—I think, rises to the forefront when you’re dealing with these broader movements that have great relevance for religious minorities or belief minorities, whether minority communities, but not them alone. How do you understand the religious landscape of society? How do we prepare our diplomats to interpret what’s going on, not just between politicians or the leadership of a country, but the broader society that is also influencing how they make decisions, how they position themselves, the voices that are coming to the top of their inbox, so to speak. And that’s where increasing the religious IQ of our diplomats, our USAID colleagues, our service members, I think is really important. So that we can see the trend lines that are moving a country in a particular direction or not. This gets into religious and ethnic nationalism. Who are the key players? The people of great influence may not be in government. They could be spokespersons or religious leaders. How do we engage them? How do they impact U.S. foreign policy goals for human rights, but also a range of other issues? And this is where I think training becomes really important. How do we institute a training requirement for all our diplomats, aid workers, and service members so they understand this? They don’t have to get a PhD in comparative religion, but they are equipped with sort of the basic tools to understand these dynamics, and also feel comfortable doing it, that it’s not going to be a violation of the First Amendment, that this is actually a smart way to engage civil society holistically. That religious actors are part of civil society, like any other actor, and smart diplomacy would understand all the different drivers that are moving a country in a particular direction or not. MANDAVILLE: And I would just add to that—Razi, also, it’s great to have you with us today. It’s, I think, been a challenge in U.S. government engagement with religious actors to kind of move beyond an understandable focus on religious figures who tend to hold certain kinds of formal titles and roles within certain kinds of institutional hierarchies, just because the U.S. government is an institution. It’s used to dealing with entities like it, which means that we naturally gravitate towards those kinds of institutionalized spaces of religion. And they matter, but there are also—there’s a vast ecosystem of religious voices and experiences that are not captured by that institutionalized practice of religion, whether we’re talking about younger religious leaders, whether we’re talking about women as religious leaders, whether we’re talking about indigenous and traditional religions that sometimes disrupt our very concept of what constitutes religion in the first place. And I think the sort of heart of doing the kind of work that you’re asking about really relates to and exists in those kinds of spaces. And so I think finding the capacity to do that kind of work, it’s what we’ve sought to make the hallmark of the religious engagement paradigm that we’ve developed here at the United States Institute of Peace. What we call inclusive religious engagement is really the answer there, and not least of all because, harking back to that geopolitics of religion that I alluded to earlier, in so many settings those institutionalized manifestations of religions have incredibly complex relationships with state authorities and state structures themselves, which in various ways often make them an extension of that state. And, as we loop back to the point that you raised about religious nationalism, contemporary manifestations of religious nationalism are often not just about seeking to articulate a very specific relationship between a given national identify and a specific religion, but often a particular way of understanding and practicing the religion in question. It seeks to put certain kinds of parameters around what counts as an authentic expression of that specified religion. And for that reason alone, I think this immediately finds itself in the terrain of protecting freedom of religion or belief.  This is why I think these kinds of issues are an integral part of our efforts to address that very real challenge today. OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Lawrence Whitney, who writes: How do you see the dramatically changing religious landscape, especially in Western liberal democracies, toward increasing religious unaffiliation impacting the dynamics around international religious freedom? MANDAVILLE: Yeah. There was the headline about the United Kingdom after some survey work was done or since this work being a Christian-minority country; that more people are identifying as nonreligious, agnostic, or atheist than identify as Christian. And in the context of the work of international religious freedom I thought it’s interesting to compare the situation for nonbelievers in the United Kingdom that survey work was sort of greeted with a general shrug and everyone moved on. No one’s life is impacted by not believing in the Church of England, not being a member of the Church of England. There’s no social or legal ramifications for walking away from faith. But that is not the case for nonbelievers, atheists, and agnostics in many, many other countries. And in some places, they’re even labeled as terrorists for the sin or the crime of walking away from faith. So for me, it just sort of placed in direct contrast where—the space that’s been developed for a diversity of beliefs in some countries and the incredibly constricted space in many others, and the severe penalties that can fall upon people if they decide to step outside of the very narrow permissible lanes of religious activity. If they challenge that, if they do a different direction, they can be in for a world of hurt. OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Adem Carroll from Justice for All, who writes: Though not every religious leader embraces a rights-based framework, how can a focus on justice be fully integrated into the religious freedom and faith community engagement conversations rather than seeing these in the service of social order or business as usual? MANDAVILLE: It’s a great question, and I think that is one that has endlessly plagued those of us who try to keep questions of social justice at the forefront of the work that we do, understanding that rights-based frameworks have a certain cultural provenance and a background and story of their own, which means that they sometimes don’t travel well. There are any number of challenges that this faces. For those who want to find ways of having conversations about the rights of LGBTQI people in settings where there are enormous and deeply-wrenching debates going on within society about those kinds of issues, this is something that one comes up to—one comes up against very quickly. And it’s one where simply walking into that context with a copy of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights that you then treat as a form of scripture unto itself and reading it at people and expecting, quote/unquote, “compliance” just doesn’t even allow you to start the conversation. You need to find other vocabularies. You need to find other framings. And I think that there are present and available to us in all religious traditions, including for lack of a better term the most conservative variants of those religions, there are basic concepts about the dignity and inviolability of the person that provides spaces to begin to have these conversations in ways that opens space. Contested space, difficult space to be sure, but allow you to at least begin a conversation. But we also happen to have with us in this session in the form of Azza literally, I think, one of the world’s foremost experts given her former work at the UN Population Fund, where these kinds of issues and struggles I know were front and center to things you had to deal with, Azza. So I really think you are by far the best-placed among us to answer this question. Please. KARAM: No, I—thank you. Thank you for that, Peter, but I think expertise is something that we all pool into and all benefit from. So thank you for that—for the wisdom that you’ve shared. I would say very, very quickly as an answer—before I hand over to Irina to bring us to summary and closure, I would say that some of the most critical agents of this work who—one of them—one constituency has already been named in an earlier question, which is young people—young people, some of whom are part of the far right of the religious spectrum but many of whom are actually in the counter movement. Especially when they’re willing and ready and able to work together across their different religious communities, they stand as awesome champions for one another’s religious freedom against the far right. But the other agency—actors or agents that we haven’t mentioned at all and that absolutely deserve a mention are women of faith. And we see in this work where so many of the most sensitive issues intersect into political issues—social issues in particular are intersecting this dimension of religious freedom—we see women of faith at the forefront of so much activism in this space, where they stand as champions of one another and of very specific vulnerable communities. It would, honestly, be very critical for us to honor that engagement. And I can tell you not from UNFP but from Religions for Peace’s five decades of engagement around many of these issues that it is women of faith and youth who are leading so much of this work to realize fundamental human rights and the intersectional human rights simultaneously. And ironically the COVID pandemic actually gave those kinds of movements a boost. So whereas we were complaining that we don’t see much multi-religious engagement in response to the COVID crisis, actually, when we looked at some of the incoming proposals to the multi-religious humanitarian fund at Religions for Peace, we found that it was women and faith and youth—interfaith youth groups who were doing the most remarkable work in that space. And so just to acknowledge that effort and to make sure that we don’t forget that activism. Thank you. Irina, back to you. Thank you so much. FASKIANOS: Azza, thank you very much. And Peter and Knox, this was a fantastic hour. We really appreciate you and all of the great questions and comments. I regret that we could not get to all of you, but there will be more opportunities. You know where to find our distinguished speakers and moderator, but you can follow Peter Mandaville’s work on Twitter at @PMandaville, Knox at @KnoxThames, and Azza at @Mansoura1968. We also encourage you to follow CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy program on Twitter at @CFR_religion. And write to us at [email protected] with any questions or suggestions. Again, we will send out the link to the transcript and the video of this discussion, as well as a link to the report that we were discussing. And I just want to say our next Religion and Foreign Policy Webinar on Health-Care Equity and Accessibility Around the World will be on Tuesday, December 20, at 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time. We will send out an invitation for that. So, again, thank you all. Have a great rest of the day.
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