Wars and Conflict

Over the past week, as many have been distracted by the U.S. elections, an extraordinarily dangerous unraveling has picked up speed in Ethiopia.  Months of simmering tensions between the leadership of the Tigray region and the central government in Addis Ababa boiled over into open military conflict, threatening to tip the country into outright civil war. Ethiopia’s crisis jeopardizes not just the security of 110 million people, but the stability of the region and the promise of a more assertive, more capable African influence on global affairs. For decades, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was first among equals in Ethiopia’s ruling coalition. But when Abiy Ahmed of the Oromo Democratic Party became Ethiopia’s prime minister in 2018, it marked a shift in relative power among the coalition’s ethnically-based components. Domestically and internationally, Prime Minister Abiy’s ascension came to be understood as a corrective measure intended to address popular dissatisfaction about political repression, access to resources and opportunity, and the perception that an ethnic minority (Tigrayans constitute roughly 6% of Ethiopia’s population) enjoyed the lion’s share of power and influence in the country’s federal government.  Tigrayans came to feel unfairly targeted by the new government’s personnel and policy choices, declined to join the successor party to the old ruling coalition, and then this fall chose to proceed with their own regional elections in defiance of a federal decision postponing planned elections due in part to the COVID-19 crisis. All of this heightened tension played out against a backdrop of increased contestation for power from different populations and parties throughout Ethiopia, and a broad rethinking of the federal project in the vast, diverse, and strategically important country.  Lighting the tinder in Tigray only increases the chance of sparks spreading elsewhere in the country and reduces the vision of a free and democratic Ethiopia to ashes. The crisis also threatens to draw in Eritrea and Sudan and to undermine ongoing efforts to bring peace to Somalia and Sudan. It presents rich opportunities for extremists and for external actors willing to fan the flames of war in the Horn of Africa to achieve an advantage in unrelated rivalries. Instead of emerging from a difficult period of internal reform as a strong standard-bearer for African institutions and interests internationally, Ethiopia would be, at best, weakened, distracted, and susceptible to manipulation. At worst, outright state collapse in Ethiopia would be a massive humanitarian catastrophe with destabilizing consequences far beyond Ethiopia’s borders.  The world must act urgently to prevent worst-case scenarios. The African Union and the United Nations have called for dialogue, and Tigrayan officials appear open to a role for the AU, but Ethiopia has largely met international concern with unconvincing reassurances.  It is extraordinarily unfortunate that the Trump administration has already staked out an antagonistic position vis-à-vis Ethiopia, limiting U.S. influence at a critical moment, but the United States can still lend meaningful support to those with the credibility to successfully encourage de-escalation. The most urgent task for mediators is to get both parties to cease hostilities, and more challengingly, to free the TPLF and the central government from the trap of having delegitimized each other, so that they may forge a path to productive dialogue.

Amy Austin Holmes is a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. One year ago, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan promised to end the Turkish “Peace Spring” intervention in Syria. The decision came after U.S. President Donald J. Trump ordered the U.S. Department of Treasury to impose sanctions on key Turkish government officials and U.S. Vice President Mike Pence negotiated a Ceasefire Agreement, which was meant to end the hostilities. But new data shows that the Turkish military and Turkish-backed militias in the Syrian National Army (SNA) have been implicated in more than eight hundred violent episodes involving civilians or members of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since the Ceasefire Agreement was signed. This does not include violations that took place in other parts of Turkish-occupied Syria, such as Afrin. Nor does the figure include infighting between the various Turkish-backed factions in the SNA, where looting often erupts into violent clashes. My analysis is based on data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) as well as observations I made on the ground in Syria, where I visited the frontlines of the area occupied by Turkey. The so-called “Peace Spring” intervention began on October 9, 2019, when Turkish soldiers and SNA factions, including the Hamza Division and Sultan Murad Brigade, surged across the border into Syria and occupied a large swath of territory between Tel Abyad in the west and Ras al-Ayn in the east. Five days later, Trump announced the sanctions because the Turkish incursion undermined the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS), endangered civilians, and posed an “extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” But the sanctions were short-lived. On October 23, 2019, just nine days after the sanctions were declared, they were lifted again. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin announced: “As a result of the ceasefire, and at the direction of President Donald J. Trump, Treasury is delisting two Turkish ministries and three of the country’s senior officials.” The White House statement announcing the October 2019 Ceasefire Agreement stated: “The Turkish side expressed its commitment to ensure safety and well-being of residents of all population centers in the safe zone controlled by the Turkish Forces (safe zone) and reiterated that maximum care will be exercised in order not to cause harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.” The Ceasefire Agreement further states that Turkey and the United States are “committed to safeguard religious and ethnic minorities.” However, during my visit to Syria in September, I personally spoke to Yezidis, Kurds, Armenians, Syriac-Assyrian Christians, and Arabs who were all forcibly displaced because of the intervention and are still unable to return to their homes. Many of them still live in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Furthermore, the ACLED data shows that there were one hundred thirty-eight violations in Tel Tamer alone, a Christian region home to thirty-five Assyrian villages. Tel Tamer and the Assyrian villages lie outside the area that Turkey is allowed to occupy. Therefore, any armed clashes that take place there are in clear violation of the Ceasefire Agreement. Tel Tamer, which is the main population center, is now only six miles away from the frontlines of the area occupied by Turkey and SNA factions. Some villages are even closer. The region is protected mainly by Syriac and Assyrian Christians who are organized in the Syriac Military Council and the Khabur Guards, both of which are part of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Prior to the rise of ISIS, some twenty thousand Assyrian Christians lived along the Khabur River. But, in 2015, ISIS overran the area, forcing many to flee. Now a small fraction of that number remain. The Turkish attacks have further contributed to displacement of the region’s indigenous Assyrian community. At least one hundred thirty-seven Christian families were displaced when Turkey invaded during the Peace Spring operation. Even after the October Ceasefire Agreement, Turkish attacks continued—and civilians continued to flee. On October 30, 2019, some four hundred families from the towns of Tal Tamer and Areesheh were forcibly displaced due to fighting in the area. On November 3, 2019, Turkish forces shelled the Tel Tamer region with artillery fire, killing a member of the Free Burma Rangers who was part of their medical team. Then, on November 15, SNA forces attempted to capture Tel Tamer, surrounding it on three sides in an attempt to enter the town and presumably annex it to the already occupied territories. The clashes were accompanied by an exchange of shelling and drone attacks by Turkish forces. As a result of the Turkish offensive, which continued after the Ceasefire Agreement, five members of the Syriac Military Council and Khabur Guards were killed. The total number of civilians and SDF members who have been killed as a result of the Turkish offensive is unknown. Turkish forces or SNA factions have shelled SDF-controlled villages in the countryside of Tel Tamer every single month since the Ceasefire Agreement. In spring 2020, SNA factions repeatedly set fire to crops and agricultural lands in the countryside of Tel Tamer. With a total of more than eight hundred violent episodes since the October 2019 Ceasefire Agreement, this means that Turkey and their SNA militias committed an average of 2.3 cease-fire violations per day. In the Assyrian region of Tel Tamer, Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA are not allowed to operate at all. And yet even there they committed one hundred and thirty-eight violations according to the ACLED data. The bar graph below breaks down the number of cease-fire violations per month in Tel Tamer, since the Ceasefire Agreement in October 2019. According to a new UN report, “civilians residing in the Afrin and Ras al-Ayn regions […] witnessed an onslaught of violations perpetrated by members of the Syrian National Army as well as shelling and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.”  My analysis of the ACLED data provides the first quantitative assessment of the number and type of violations. The vast majority (85.6 percent) of cease-fire violations in Tel Tamer involved armed conflict, including events that are categorized as battles, armed clashes, shelling or artillery fire, drone strikes, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. An estimated 11.5 percent of all cease-fire violations included looting or property destruction, while 2.9 percent of incidents included mass displacement of civilians. As explained above, the displacement of four hundred families is counted as a single incident. It is unclear whether the constant attacks on Tel Tamer are intended to expand the territory that Turkey currently occupies, or to further pressure more civilians to flee. The “Peace Spring” operation has already changed the demography of Ras al-Ayn, which has historically had a diverse population, reflected in the fact that the city is known as Rish Ayno in Aramaic and as Serêkaniyê in Kurdish. The assault on Tel Tamer may be an attempt to change the demography of areas even outside Turkish control. Regardless of whether the attacks on Tel Tamer represent territorial expansion, or ethnic cleansing, they are in clear violation of the Ceasefire Agreement negotiated by Pence. The ACLED data also makes clear that the relentless attacks on Tel Tamer—and the Christian inhabitants of the region—are intentional. On October 8, 2020, Trump announced that his executive order, which makes clear that the United States could impose sanctions on Turkey if it violates the Ceasefire Agreement, would be extended for another year. As the new data shows, this has happened hundreds of times. While Turkey has previously been a valuable ally to the United States in the region, many of Turkey’s actions have become destabilizing in Syria. It would be in the interest of the United States to insist that Turkey uphold the Ceasefire Agreement, be held accountable for violations, and establish a mechanism to closely monitor the Turkish-occupied areas of Syria going forward.

Any sharp drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq grants Iran a golden opportunity to expand its influence there and threatens to inflame sectarian tensions.

An insider’s perspective on why U.S. policymakers repeatedly underestimate the costs and consequences of intervention to both the United States and the people of the Middle East.

Ambassador (Ret.) Carey Cavanaugh is a professor of diplomacy and conflict resolution at the University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. Renewed military action over Nagorno-Karabakh makes clear that the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not a “frozen conflict,” but a persistent threat to stability in the South Caucasus region and beyond. Developments this week call for immediate international attention and renewed diplomatic engagement given the prospect that a wider armed clash could spiral out of control.  At sunrise on Sunday, September 27, 2020, fierce fighting erupted along the line of contact that separates Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan. Who initiated this latest clash is unknown, with each side vehemently blaming the other. Precise details regarding battlefield deployments and the exact number of casualties also remain unclear. What is certain is that military outposts, villages, and the city of Stepanakert were struck by artillery fire and missiles; Azerbaijan drones and a helicopter were shot down; armored vehicles were destroyed; an exchange of some territory occurred; and the number of military and civilian casualties in one day of fighting surpassed one hundred (with at least sixty-eight killed). All sides have declared martial law and Armenia has announced a general mobilization of its armed forces. Major international players are urging a cessation of hostilities and a return to the negotiating table, but it remains to be seen whether this round of fighting will continue and perhaps escalate.  This longstanding ethnic dispute emerged in 1988, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the Nagorno-Karabakh region sought independence from Azerbaijan. In the ensuing years, it resulted in twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand deaths, the displacement of about a million people across Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenians gaining control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven additional adjoining territories of Azerbaijan. Large-scale warfare stopped in 1994 with a Russian-brokered ceasefire which basically held for twenty-two years (despite regular ceasefire violations which occasionally led to isolated deaths of civilians and military personnel).  The long-term absence of significant military conflict, however, did not represent acceptance of the status quo. Political and economic developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the wider region—plus the absence of an agreed political settlement—have altered the military balance, hardened negotiating positions, and created potential domestic political incentives for aggressive action, thereby amplifying prospects for renewed fighting. In the past, all sides repeatedly expressed support for a political solution via negotiations, but when no such settlement was forthcoming, Azerbaijan increasingly insisted that, if necessary, it would restore control over its territory by force. In April 2016, a significant flare up occurred along the line of contact—dubbed the “Four-Day War”—in which Azerbaijan did recapture a small amount of land, but the war cost at least two hundred lives. A week of less intense hostilities took place this past July along the northern section of the Armenian-Azerbaijan state border resulting in at least sixteen deaths. Afterwards, tensions remained high, possibly setting the stage for the current military action. Both Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have made clear their nations are now prepared for war. In a televised address, Aliyev said the goal of his military operation is to regain all the [lost] territories. Pashinyan declared, “we are on the brink of a full-scale war in the South Caucasus which might have unpredictable consequences.” Those unpredictable consequences could include significant refugee flows, military strikes by both sides on civilian and economic infrastructure, and a potential spillover economic and humanitarian crisis in Georgia (which is heavily dependent upon energy imports from Azerbaijan).  The unique roles that Russia and Turkey play in the South Caucasus introduce additional complexity and danger. Russia has a military alliance with Armenia, which does not include the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and operates a major military base in the Armenian city of Gyumri, but Moscow is also the primary source of sophisticated weaponry for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey has maintained an economic blockade on Armenia since 1993 and has been increasingly vocal in vowing its complete support for Azerbaijan. In response to the current fighting, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has tacitly embraced the military action, declaring that international negotiations failed to solve this problem for thirty years, and calling on Armenia to immediately withdraw from Azerbaijani territories. While it is neither in the interest of Russian President Vladimir Putin nor Erdoğan to risk conflict between their two nations, the potential for miscalculation—which could even lead to questions about possible NATO involvement—certainly exists (tensions between Russia and Turkey, even if effectively managed, could lead to complications in Syria and Libya, where the two powers back opposing sides in their respective civil wars). The United States has explicitly discouraged external parties from participating in the escalating violence over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 1992, responsibility for the international mediation of this dispute has rested with the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group which is led by three co-chairs: the United States, France, and Russia. At several points in its long negotiating history, the Minsk Group has helped the conflicting parties move toward an agreement, but to date, apart from the general absence of conflict (a substantial achievement on its own), these negotiations have yielded little lasting progress. Relations between the three co-chair countries have diminished under the Donald J. Trump administration and the lack of stronger engagement and greater movement on the diplomatic front in recent years is clearly an underlying factor behind the renewed hostilities. The current disarray in OSCE leadership has not helped; neither has Washington’s distraction with other priorities.  While Russia has always possessed the stronger hand to push for a ceasefire in the region, it will undoubtedly take a concerted effort and greater U.S. attention to have any chance for progress on the peace front. At this dangerous moment, there could be merit in UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres making use of his “good offices” to appoint a personal representative—not to supplant the Minsk Group, but to more closely follow the conflict and peace efforts on the secretary-general’s behalf, thus immediately increasing diplomatic engagement and highlighting the strong international interest and support for a peaceful solution.

With Washington absent and Berlin indifferent, it has fallen to Paris to deter and defuse the situation.

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post covers September 10 to September 18.

For peace to take hold in Afghanistan, formidable challenges will need to be overcome during the talks.

On September 8, U.S. Senators Jim Risch and Ben Cardin, joined by an impressive bipartisan group of cosponsors, introduced a resolution calling for an end to the violence in Cameroon and for inclusive dialogue to address the underlying political tensions that are at the root of the conflict between the state and anglophone separatists. They are the latest in a large and diverse group of senior U.S. officials who have worked to highlight the crisis in Cameroon. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tibor Nagy has engaged in direct and personal diplomacy aiming to influence the situation. Congresswoman Karen Bass, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, has been resolute in condemning abuses, and has worked on a bipartisan basis to clearly communicate U.S. concerns and support for peace talks to Biya’s government, including in a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives last year. The Trump Administration removed Cameroon from the list of countries eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and has scaled back military assistance to the country. But Cameroon is a case in which concern in Washington does not translate into effective influence. In Cameroon itself, little political progress has been made as various factions grapple for control of the talks and sometimes competing lines of effort stop and start.  Meanwhile, the people of Cameroon continue to suffer despite calls for a ceasefire in light of the COVID-19 crisis. Just this week, the army launched a new campaign in Bamenda, ostensibly to bring law and order to the city. The BBC reported that the operation involved house-to-house searches, seizures of citizens’ property, and even indiscriminate shooting. Residents of the city largely stayed home, caught between the government and separatists who have called for citizens to stay home as a form of protest, in an all-too-familiar impossible situation. This summer the Norwegian Refugee Council named Cameroon the world’s most neglected displacement crisis, noting that half a million people have been forced from their homes. It can be painful to reckon with the limited capacity of the United States, or of any external power, to bring seriousness of purpose to urgently needed political dialogue. But ultimately civil conflicts with political roots cannot be resolved without domestic will and leadership, and Cameroon’s ossified political class has thus far failed to muster either. But the efforts of U.S. officials still matter. Should those vital domestic ingredients emerge, the United States is well-positioned to support a process that prioritizes the urgent needs of civilians and gives all parties in a tremendously diverse country greater opportunity in the future.

Mounting tensions between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean could depend on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.