Defense and Security

Transnational Crime

  • Global
    Regional and Multilateral Responses to Organized Crime
    Play
    Watch experts analyze the greater roles regional and multilateral organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations, can play in controlling organized crime. This session was part of the CFR symposium, Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: An Overlooked Threat?, undertaken in collaboration with the Latin American Program and Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and made possible by the generous support of the Hauser Foundation, Tinker Foundation, and a grant from the Robina Foundation for CFR's International Institutions and Global Governance program.
  • United States
    Local and National Policy Responses
    Play
    This session was part of the CFR symposium, Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: An Overlooked Threat?, undertaken in collaboration with the Latin American Program and Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and made possible by the generous support of the Hauser Foundation, Tinker Foundation,  and a grant from the Robina Foundation for CFR's International Institutions and Global Governance program.
  • United States
    Local and National Policy Responses to Organized Crime
    Play
    Watch the mayor of Nuevo Laredo and the former Colombian foreign minister discuss steps Mexico and Colombia are taking to control organized crime in their countries. This session was part of the CFR symposium, Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: An Overlooked Threat?, undertaken in collaboration with the Latin American Program and Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and made possible by the generous support of the Hauser Foundation, Tinker Foundation, and a grant from the Robina Foundation for CFR's International Institutions and Global Governance program.
  • Global
    Organized Crime and Transnational Threats
    Play
    JIM LINDSAY: I'm Jim Lindsay, director of studies and vice president here at the council. It's my great pleasure and honor to welcome you all here today to the Council on Foreign Relations Symposium on "Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: An Overlooked Threat." We are holding today's symposium in collaboration with the Latin American Program and the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Dr. Andrew Selee, director of Latin American Program is here and I want to just thank you to Andrew and his organization for agreeing to cosponsor the symposium. What I would like to do -- and it's of course always important to note that we can't do the sort of program we do here at the council without the support and generosity of a number of people who I'd like to just mention right here. First is Rita Hauser. Rita Hauser is here in the front row. Rita has been a generous supporter of the council over the years and has given us a gift that makes it possible for us to engage in these sort of annual conferences where we reach out and collaborate with another think tank. And it's been an important contribution to the council. I want to say thank you very much, Rita. Second -- today's event is made possible by the Tinker Foundation, which has supported our work in Latin America. And I believe Nancy Truitt is somewhere in the room, a senior adviser to the Tinker Foundation but perhaps I got it wrong. Last, I want to thank the Robina Foundation which has underwritten the council's brand new initiative on international institutions and global governance, which has been an effort to try to look at international institutions as they exist at the beginning of the 21st century and try to devise more effective avenues for promoting multilateral cooperation. What brings us here today for discussion is based on the observation that the illicit flow of goods, money, information and people is an increasing source of tension in relations between the developed countries and developing countries. Nowhere is this more true than in the Western hemisphere. Latin America is a major source of cocaine and many other illegal substances for the U.S. market, as well as for Europe. And the problems created by the drug trade increasingly coming to dominate U.S.-Hemispheric relations. Within the hemisphere, Mexico has emerged as the newest power center for organized crime. A couple of decades ago Mexico was largely viewed as a transit country for illegal drugs from Colombia. Today, Mexican drug trafficking organizations now are a major player of their own. They are a major presence in source countries such as Bolivia and Colombia. They control supply routes through Central America and they control drug distribution rings here in the United States. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in its "2008 National Drug Threat Assessment" that, and I quote, "Mexican drugs trafficking organizations now represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States." It's also worth pointing out that the rise of Mexican drug trafficking organizations has been a major threat to democracy in Mexico and it's created a wide number of problems south of the border. The reality is that the transnational nature of organized crime means that unilateral policies or policies that simply rely on doing something at the border will not work. Multilateral cooperation is essential. Unfortunately, I think it's fair to say that the governments of the Western hemisphere have yet to develop adequate multilateral responses. We instead see a wealth of different and conflicting policy choice and drug traffickers have been able to exploit the lack of coordinated governmental response. And that brings us to the subject of today's symposium. And the symposium essentially has three main goals: first is to try to assess the state of organized crime situation in the Western hemisphere and discuss its underlying causes. Second, the symposium today is looking to analyze the local, national and regional strategies that have been pursued so far to identify those strategies that are counterproductive as well as those best practices that should be emulated and extended. Third, the purpose of today's symposium is to generate concrete policy ideas for combating organized crime in the Western hemisphere. And we're going to have three panels. The first panel will look at "Organized Crime and Transnational Threats" in the hemisphere, essentially an effort to explain or review the expansion of organized crime networks in the region. Panel two is entitled "Local and National Policy Responses." Here we're going to move to discuss local and national experiences, policy responses, and the lessons learned in Colombia and Mexico. And the third panel "Hemispheric and Multilateral Reponses" is going to review the national and regional policies of the United States toward organized crime. One last thing that's probably the most important thing I have here to do today is to A, tell you that this is on the record -- people are speaking for the record -- and the most important thing actually is to say if you have one of these little devices, a Blackberry or a cell phone, anything that can go beep in the middle of, if you could turn it off or put it on mute, we would greatly appreciate it. Once again, I want to thank you very much for coming here today. And now I'm going to turn it over to Stanley Arkin to introduce the first panel. STANLEY S. ARKIN: Thank you. This is a very distinguished panel in that all of them have extraordinary experience which touches or thinks about organized crime without actually participating in it. And, by the way, there's no -- (inaudible) -- today. DAVID HOLIDAY: Are you sure? ARKIN: I hope not in your case. David Holiday, who has spent a very big piece of his life working on civil rights or decent living in Central America and he is now an officer of the Open Society Institute and in particular in Latin American focus. Lee Wolosky -- I've known for years. He's a very fine lawyer. He works for David Boies. He does international cases. We even worked on one or two together. And he worked at the White House working with transnational risks and has a lot to say about organized crime. This is not because he works for a large law firm, but because he has insights that go beyond that in a scholarly way. And Will Wechsler is a deputy under secretary at of our Department of Defense. We'll ask some interesting issues as to why we have the Department of Defense doing something we always think in this country the Department of Justice does or even worldwide. And let me start by saying that organized crime is a very, very embracive two words. It can mean anything from the people down the street who form a neighborhood gang, Bloods, Crips, can be Hell's Angels and up to what we ordinarily in this country think of as organized crime -- it's always Italian which shows the extraordinary quality of this country and its melting pot qualities changed substantially so that the Italians are now being very much competed with by the Russians and the Vietnamese and the Hmong and virtually every other kind of nationality which forms its own organized crime of one kind or another. We're focusing here, as Jim said, on organized crime in this hemisphere because I think largely the enormous narcotics problem and probably people problem. By that I mean, immigration and perhaps even people which are forced into particular kinds of occupations which we don't like or think are right. Let me start by asking Lee Wolosky, a legal scholar, how you would define this kind of transnational organized crime and give us a bit of your insight as to how it was formed and functions. LEE S. WOLOSKY: Sure. But let me answer not as a legal scholar, if I may, but as a policy person or a former policy person. ARKIN: I agree. WOLOSKY: I think that the primary characteristic of what we're talking about in this forum and what we should be talking about in this forum is whether or not a particular activity impacts national security or impacts the foreign policy objectives of the United States and therefore rises beyond a law enforcement problem to a problem that requires broader components of the U.S. government including the Department of Defense to have a role in resolving it. And that is in fact how this issue sort of came about, international organized crime as a national security issue was first identified by President Clinton, who was fond of talking about initially something called the dark side of globalization. And Clinton would go around in the mid-'90s in the White House talking to its White House staff about all the bad things that attended the end of the Cold War all the bad collateral effects that came from the increased mobility -- ARKIN: Organized crime did precede President Clinton. WOLOSKY: Absolutely. ARKIN: Good. WOLOSKY: But I think the point I would leave this group with -- and I'll stop here -- just to respond to your question is that I think organized crime as a national security problem did not precede President Clinton. President Clinton was the first president to stand up in a speech that he gave at the United Nation, actually the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, and he said, international organized crime is a threat to the national security of the United States and I'm going to do a variety of things including signing a document called a presidential decision directive, PDD 42, which said as much and instructed his federal bureaucracy, not just law enforcement but other parts of the federal government to devise certain responses. Now, it's true and appropriate for this forum that the very first action that was taken under this new presidential directive was a targeted campaign of really warfare against the Cali Cartel in Colombia because the president had identified international narcotics trafficking as being perhaps at that time the prototype or the archetype of international organized crime. But there followed from that a number of other groups and organizations that were targeted under that basic step. ARKIN: But the Cali cartel, renowned as a narcotics cartel with all kinds of stories coming out about their culture, how they live together and recruited and impacts they've had on their country, Colombia, but were they an organized crime group just out to make money breaking some fundamental laws or did they also have a political quality to them? Were they allied with the FARC, say, for example, which made it more of a transnational problem? WOLOSKY: Well, that's something that I think maybe one of our regional experts would want to speak to more than I would. But certainly I think that in Colombia under that basic framework we identified both independent and forces that were acting together that impacted the national security of the United States. So not only did we go to war with the drug cartels under this framework but we proceeded to designate not only the FARC but the ELN and other groups that were destabilizing Colombia as foreign terrorist organizations. And then we, again, under the same framework -- but again on the implementation I'll defer to others -- we launched Plan Colombia in 2000, which has had a very profound effect in stabilizing Colombia. ARKIN: Just so we're complete in terms organized crime in Colombia, South America, in this hemisphere, narcotics may be the major business, but you would agree that money laundering which flows from that and obviously has an impact upon on our financial systems and then people movements, immigrants being extracted or placed in other countries and perhaps even slavery of some kinds is also a part of their business. That's true as well? WOLOSKY: Absolutely. And many of the groups that we came to target were not only drug trafficking organizations but were alien smuggling operations, human trafficking organizations which typically trafficked women into prostitution. Arms trafficking organizations, organizations that we were concerned had the ability and willingness to traffic in radiological or radioactive and other types of materials. So yes, not just drugs but a lot of other bad stuff as well. ARKIN: Now, is there anything perhaps I ought to ask you, David, which makes this kind of organized crime more a part of the at least ostensibly legitimate governments which exist in South America, Central America and Mexico? Is there a greater intertwining of organized crime in those countries than say there is in this country? HOLIDAY: Sure. That's clearly been the case in Colombia and Mexico and increasingly in Central America especially Guatemala where this year we sort of learned about the para-politics scandal in Colombia in which the paramilitaries which are essentially drug trafficking organizations have bought off any number of congresspeople and other including the cousin of the president who's in jail currently. In Mexico, there're sort of large -- there are different estimates about what sort of percentage of the territory is governed in a sense alternatively by drug traffickers from 8 percent to much higher. But, yes, both the economy and the politics are extremely penetrated. In Guatemala there's -- for many years there's been talk of a parallel government, a parallel power that essentially is the sort of power behind the throne so electoral politics starts to mean less and less in these kinds of situations. Can I go back and ask Lee, though, what is it about international organized crime that is a national security threat? Is it -- for example, with the drug traffickers -- is it the introduction of illicit drugs into a country? ARKIN: We were leaving that for Will. HOLIDAY: Okay. That's fine. Whoever. I don't want to -- but I'm left with that sort of what's our definition. ARKIN: That's a great question. HOLIDAY: And is there any international organized crime that is not a national security threat? WOLOSKY: Do you want to answer that? WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Sure. ARKIN: This is not counting Pancho Villa. WECHSLER: Yes. There are certainly lots of crime and organized crime that goes on all around the world that's not a national security threat. We risk overwhelming our national security apparatus by expanding the definition too large. But I'll give you some examples of some things that clearly are national security threats and are recognized as such and have been increasingly recognized as such over the last two decades of fairly linear progression across multiple administrations where we have very clear enemies of the United States, some of which we're fighting right now, that are funded by the proceeds of organized crime, organized crime that's a threat to the national security interests of the United States. Where we have criminal organizations who are threatening the basic governance or are threatening the legitimacy of a state that is an ally or of great interest, particular interest to the United States, that is also a clear national security interest to the United States. It is both of those areas where the work of the U.S. government expands beyond the traditional law enforcement agencies and involves the wider national security community. ARKIN: Is there an aspect of our national justice agencies or Department of Justice, leave out our state prosecutorial agencies, but the FBI, Department of Justice being intrusive in these South American, Central American countries in terms of what we ask of them, in terms of what we expect of them? And I'm not talking just about renditions or extraditions. WECHSLER: Well, there are a lot of lessons learned from the relatively powerful and underappreciated successes that we've had in Colombia over the last decade on the security side. And one of the clear lessons learned is that you need to have clear, strong leadership in the country in question that's willing to cooperate with the United States as the one who lead these efforts -- that's we're going to have the sort of spine of steel that we've seen from Uribe -- and then willing to accept the help from our law enforcement organizations on terms that work for them. When we find ourselves in situations where we don't have an adequate partner, then not only do you run into some of these questions that you just raised, but in the end of the day the work is not that effective. ARKIN: But more to the point, we don't allow Mexican or Guatemalan or Brazilian law enforcement officers to roam around this country while they seek to penetrate our organized crime of which we have some for sure, whereas we have our people doing just that, whether they're flying airplanes that are on the ground. WECHSLER: Everything that we would do in these areas would be with the -- if it's done effectively would be with the cooperation of the local government. The local government has to ask us to be there, has to want this kind of assistance. Typically, they've gotten there but they found that the enemy that they're against has vastly more resources than the state itself, has vastly more capabilities than the state itself. And that's the challenge that they find themselves in and so then they look for resources -- when they choose to combat this threat they find themselves looking for resources outside their state. And when it works very well as it has over the last decade in Colombia, it is a methodical long-term plan of shared responsibility between not only the United States and the countries in question but the wider international community as well. ARKIN: But aside from Colombia, wouldn't it be true that every Northern, South American country and every Central American country, save maybe Honduras today, has some resentment about American law enforcement officers coming in? WECHSLER: Well, it's -- I don't know I would be so sweeping but I would say -- and I defer a lot -- ARKIN: And left out Colombia. WECHSLER: I defer a lot of this to my colleagues in the Justice Department who work more directly. But what I would say is that where this works is where we are working in concert with the government in question. In some places in this hemisphere we're working in great concert. It's not just in Colombia but in others we're not at all. And when we're not, when you don't have that leadership, you end up finding the countries in a very challenging situation. ARKIN: Dave, could you talk about why in the last 20 years -- I think some people said 10, 20 -- 20 years where we've recognized this is a serious problem and not before? HOLIDAY: Well, to the extent that we're talking about drug trafficking I do think there is -- I wouldn't entirely root it in this but the 1988 U.N. Convention on Drugs, which sort of set a framework in which by definition any possession of illicit drugs should be criminalized. And I think that we've seen a lot of changes over the last 20 years. I'm going to speak in very broad strokes here so I hope I don't simplify it. But when I look at the kinds of policies that have emanated from a sort of both a military and a criminal prosecution of the situation, I think you can see a lot of -- that we've often contributed to the problem more than we've helped. In the U.S., the sort of the prison population has grown enormously due to the incarceration of often non-violent drug offenders. Prisons both in the United States and in Latin America have become factories for organized crime. ARKIN: Just a minute. We know that the U.S. has more people per capita in jail than any country in the world. HOLIDAY: That's right. And we often -- I would be interested to know, for example -- we don't know a lot about our counter-narcotics sort of treaties and agreements. They're often secret agreements. But I know that 10 years ago Ecuador -- we conditioned our counter-narcotics assistance on an increase in arrests, again, just blossoming their prison population in the current government, which is not considered an ally but is taking perhaps a different approach to how to deal with this kind of problem. So that's one thing. The other issue is I think that Colombia has become because there was this ideological component, obviously a civil war in Colombia, and it became tied up with the drug war, that sort of came on to our radar. Now, there are scholars who argue that a lot of, again, our policies of trying to attacking the FARC in particular and the ELN in Colombia -- the guerrilla organizations -- was counterproductive -- eradication policies which sort of pushed the local population into the hands of the guerrillas and increased their political capital because we were not prepared to offer alternative livelihoods. And frankly, the problem is with a lot of these strategies, which we're sort of now importing to Mexico, is that the sort of direct confrontation with the drug cartels has not necessarily reduced the flow of drugs. And so it's hard for me to look at Colombia and say that there's a success there because organized crime, one of the -- when you're a clandestine or sort of underground organization it's much easier to adapt and the governments and the other forces are much slower to adapt. And we've seen sort of the emergence of smaller cartels. So it's not just the FARC that's doing drug trafficking but also these other cartels from former paramilitaries. So I think -- I don't see that that has been successful at all. In the case of Mexico one can argue, as some have done -- Vanda Felbab-Brown from the Brookings Institution has written about this -- that sort of pushing to sort of confront the cartels increased the violence and instilled sort of -- the jury is still out as to whether that's going to somehow reduce violence in the long run, reduce the political power of the cartels. Certainly I think the sort of level of influence of cartels both in Colombia and Mexico is still pretty immense. ARKIN: Is there any justice system south of the border -- certainly Canada has a justice system but it's quite small compared to ours -- is there any justice system south from the border including Central America, Mexico, South America which you can speak of respectfully? HOLIDAY: Actually, the Colombian justice system isn't bad. ARKIN: Except for Colombia. HOLIDAY: And Chile I would say. ARKIN: Chile? HOLIDAY: Chile. ARKIN: Ever been in a Chilean jail? HOLIDAY: No. ARKIN: Ever been in a Mexican jail? HOLIDAY: I haven't been in either, no. But in terms of sort of respect for the rule of law and sort of independence of the judiciary I think there are -- probably I would say Chile. But Colombia, surprisingly, is not bad and that's again another interesting thing. It's not -- to the degree that there's been any sort of prosecution of organized crime I think you can attribute it more to police work and the judicial authorities and not to sort of military interventions. Military approaches tend to just spread the problem around. The reason drugs are coming out of Venezuela now is because we've had some success in controlling the borders or the distribution from Colombia so it all goes now through Venezuela. Mexico is spilling over into Guatemala. So there's no -- we don't have a sort of an overall vision of how to sort of approach this problem. WOLOSKY: Let me -- if I may -- HOLIDAY: Sure. WOLOSKY: Let me answer the question that you asked before which was how does it really affect the national security of the United States. I think I'll answer in then on-Western hemisphere context if that's okay just because first, I'm not an expert in the Western hemisphere, and secondly, because I recognize that there's a lot of debate around counter-narcotics policy specifically. But I'll give you two examples that I think sort of crystallize it from the standpoint of the place that both Will and I sat in the Clinton administration and me for the first part of the Bush administration. We discovered that there was a -- we asked ourselves the question, how is the Taliban in Afghanistan, when it was in place, supplying itself? How were they getting stuff in contravention of a variety of sanctions regimes? We found that there was an illicit aviation network that had over 100 planes upgrading out of the former Russian military official who had commandeered hundreds of, or scores of planes, big planes, cargo planes that he was using out of bases all over the world. He was registering them in some jurisdictions. He was keeping them in other jurisdictions. He employed dozens of people, hundreds of people in furtherance of this illicit project. Now, what he was bringing into Afghanistan for the Taliban and perhaps for others on those planes we presumed to be weapons. We presumed to be money. We presumed to be other material support that was necessary for the regime's survival. That became a problem that was sort of separate and distinct from the issue of how do we deal with al Qaeda. How do we deal with the Taliban? And became how do we deal with this aviation network? And that was a national security problem because we had a very clear interest in shutting off the Taliban's ability to survive. Another problem -- when we were pursuing -- in the earlier phases of NATO expansion we found that many of the countries that were candidates for NATO membership were ones that had problems with international organized crime. And not only did they have problems with international organized crimes, specifically emanating from the former Soviet Union, but those organized crime bodies were embedded in the governance structure of the countries that were being proposed for NATO membership. So the question became how do we assure the integrity of the command and control mechanism of NATO if and when NATO is expanded into some of these countries? So these are clearly, I would say, problems that transcend law enforcement and they become problems that impact the foreign policy interest and the national security interest of the United States writ large. And they, therefore, require sort of all the folks from most part of the government, all the folks from other parts of the government to figure out how to address them and in cases where we believe that we can actually take down some of these organizations to actually put in place mechanisms to take them down. ARKIN: Lee has touched upon the next subject, which I think we should go to which is what are the commonalities -- which is one question -- and then the connections -- the other question -- between these cartels? We're not talking about street organized crime, these international cartels, Mexican and others, to what we now dub terrorist groups. Will? And certainly the Taliban would be -- WECHSLER: Yes. I mean, in some cases they're one and the same. The FARC was designated as a terrorist organization and as a narcotics trafficking organization. Narcotics and other organized crime support many terrorist organizations. I'm heart pressed to think of a terrorist organization that does not use organized crime as a way to help fund and manage its logistics in one way or the other. Some are much more expert and have been doing this for a long time, organizations like Hezbollah. When an organization establishes the infrastructure for trafficking, for moving things illicitly, those who desire to move things illicitly will make use of that infrastructure and we see that all around the world. ARKIN: Yes, but are any of these organizations we call international criminal cartels, international crime, are they a major bank rolling or other support facility for things like al Qaeda? WECHSLER: Again, most criminal organizations are out to make money first and foremost. There are some that have -- they're ideologically based organizations or territorial-based organizations that have other aspirations as well and use organized crime to further those. And there can be a wonderful debate about are they first and foremost a criminal organization or are they first and foremost an ideological organization or a terrorist organization. But I think what's a powerful point to understand is once -- even if the criminal organizations have no ideological objectives, even if they have no wider objectives beyond making money, once they establish the infrastructure necessary to move things illicitly, what we tend to see is that that infrastructure is taken advantage of by other organizations that want to employ it for their own ends. It doesn't mean that they do it a tremendous amount -- different organizations do it to different degrees -- but we definitely see that. ARKIN: Is that by force or agreement? WECHSLER: It's by mutual benefit. If the criminal organization is looking to make money and someone provides them a way to do that, they will quite often take them up on that. ARKIN: And what's different though in Afghanistan than it is in Mexico? WECHSLER: It's very different. ARKIN: And that difference is? HOLIDAY: But just a question to you, Will. I know there's a concern about the sort of pipeline being used by other criminals or terrorists but are there any cases yet of al Qaeda using the drug cartels or the human smuggling networks from Mexico into the United States? Do we know? WECHSLER: From Mexico in the United States or -- HOLIDAY: Yes. Yes. Yes. WECHSLER: The question before was a global phenomenon. HOLIDAY: No. No. I'm just -- WECHSLER: But Mexico to the United States, no. HOLIDAY: We don't have one. WECHSLER: We don't have that. I mean, there're a lot of overstatement that have been made in the last year about this dynamic of the threat from Mexico, the threat -- the problems in Mexico are quite serious, are big challenges and the president there is taking many very powerful steps against them. And the progress that's been made and the changes in the even U.S.-Mexican dynamic on this issue have been quite powerful in a relatively short period of time. That all said, Mexico is not a failed state. It's not going to be a failed state. There's not this massive spillover of violence right across the border. I mean, you go to Ciudad Juarez which is one of the most dangerous places in the world and right across the border is El Paso which I think is the third most safe city in America of its size. All these things which are very much hyped in the press we don't see. There is wider -- ARKIN: You don't see -- (inaudible)? WECHSLER: There are some. The wider implication that I was gong to say is not the spillover like directly across the border though there are some places where we -- but the wider spillover of Mexican criminal organizations, very far from the border that have a very powerful role to play in the criminality in the United States. That's what's been building up over longer periods of time. There are places in the park system in California where industrial size marijuana production is being done by the Mexican drug cartels. I mean, this is -- it's that kind of spillover that's much more significant than the kind that gets more of the press of in a border town there being violence. HOLIDAY: So it seems that while terrorist organizations may be able to take advantage of organized crime networks, do they really need -- I mean, except from getting certain kinds of good to, for example, to pose a direct national security threat to the U.S., do they need organized crime? The U.S. is so porous, its border are so porous it's so easy to sort of get into the U.S. And in fact, one of the characteristics of organized crime is this sort of blurring of the lines between legal and illegal. There's a lot of legal enterprises that are used by organized crime. WECHSLER: The mechanisms, the skills, the models and then given the actual logistics are used by terrorist organizations all around the world. And we see it again and again and again. ARKIN: In combination with criminal cartels. WECHSLER: Absolutely. WOLOSKY: Yes. That does happen. There is a robust network of groups that operate transnationally that seem to know how to find each other with such effectiveness that sometimes when we were in government, we wondered why we couldn't find them as quickly as they found each other. But it is true that if you are a bad guy, whether you're a terrorist organization or another bad guy, and you need some specific thing, whether it's money moved, arms moved, you need a plane, you need something else, you need bad things moved, there are people that you can call and they'll do it and they do it for money. I mean, you may have -- you know, Will pointed to the distinction between terrorist groups which typically, at least in the scholarship we say that they have ideological objectives, you know, international organized crime groups are purely monetary ones but they do know how to find each other. There's ample example of them finding each other. And, you know, I think we spoke to some of the specific examples but they do find each other. WECHSLER: Just very briefly -- one of the strategic improvements in our thinking as a government over the last 10 to 15 years has been a moving away from this siloed approach to thinking about these issues that there are these kinds of criminals and these kinds of terrorists and these kinds of organizations. The reality is that there's a nexus between all of them and when the nexus impacts our national security we have to change the way that we think about national security. So in Afghanistan at the end of last year there was change in the rules of engagement for the drug trafficking organizations with ties to the insurgency to be a formal target of our military actions. In the previous ways of thinking, you would say there's insurgency and there's narcotrafficking. What we've learned is that, A, doesn't meet the facts, and B, hinders our ability to actually -- (inaudible). ARKIN: Is there any evidence of the very powerful, well-organized Mexican and South American cartels sort of Sinaloa cartel being active in forming relationships in Europe or in East Asia or in Southeast Asia? WECHSLER: Very much so. One of the dynamics that we see more recently is the narcotics that are coming out of South America, a lot of which are coming out of Venezuela and I would say that it's not just because of our success in Colombia -- ARKIN: No. WECHSLER: -- but there are some Venezuela specific issues that drive that -- going not only to the U.S. market but going to the European market. And when they look as businessmen to the European market they see that prices are higher. They see that demand has a way to go up for cocaine whereas it's relatively saturated and flat in the United States. And they see that the potential downside for action that is perhaps remote but quite catastrophic in the United States of being put in our jails and actually being caught is an extremely low probability in Europe. They just don't have the enforcement track record that we do. So over the next decade, one would expect an increasing proportion of the cocaine trade to be going to Europe and to the Middle East where it's even more profitable to do so. And one of the great challenges is that there are countries in the way in Western Africa that are already starting to and about to be swamped by this problem. The amount of resources that the cartels can throw at these countries will dwarf the amount of resources that these countries can, on their own, use to defend against this. ARKIN: Well, just a particular issue which is: are the Mexican cartels with their extraordinary distribution systems helping the Afghanis distribute their opium harvest? WECHSLER: I haven't seen anything along those lines. No. I mean, the vast majority of the opium harvest in Afghanistan goes to Europe not to the United States. ARKIN: And therefore, the Mexicans wouldn't be necessarily involved with it. WECHSLER: Yes. I haven't -- of all the problems that we have, that one I'd put away. ARKIN: I guess my question was further which is -- is this country the pronged or sole customer of the Sinaloa cartel and other cartels based in Mexico and the North and South America? WECHSLER: We consume 90 percent of all the cocaine that's coming up there. We -- as President Obama said when we went down to Mexico is that this is a co-responsibility for this. We have a co-responsibility for this problem. And as you said earlier, you know, there was a day when the Mexicans were just a transit state, just a transit state. And this is a common dynamic that we see all around the world is that in a variety of country they choose not to address this issue because they see themselves as being just a transit state. I don't know of any country in the world that has ever remained just a transit state. They eventually become massive users. They become massive organized crime. You can't -- countries make mistakes when they don't address this problem at an earlier stage and they wait until it becomes a massive internal problem. ARKIN: Have they become too powerful, Dave, to put down in Mexico? I know that you said there's not a failed government in Mexico. You said it three times. Not a failed government. So we'll just accept that as the rhythm. But is there power in that government to put down these cartels? HOLIDAY: I wish I had the solution here. ARKIN: I'm going to ask you in a while for one. HOLIDAY: It's easy to sort of critique the current strategy, although we do have to see that play. I mean, I'm somewhat sympathetic to the use of -- to deploying the military in a country where the police are incredibly corrupt and have very little capacity for dealing with the cartels. The question is what are you really trying to achieve because let's assume -- the best scenario -- that we are able to dismantle these cartels. Is that really a possibility? And if it's not -- and is a possibility as long as consumption remains the way it does in the U.S. and Europe of marijuana, cocaine, whatever? If it's not a possibility, then what should our goals be? Now, the goal of Calderon is to sort of break up the cartels into small cartels. Okay. We've done that in Colombia -- cocaine continues to flow, influence in politics continues. So is that a good strategy? Is that going to actually kind of resolve the problem? It may lower the incidence of violence but it's not a very happy scenario. ARKIN: Well, you've lead into my last set -- excuse me. Go ahead. WECHSLER: I just want to say, measure of success here is critically important. If your measure of success is that there's no crime then there's no crime in the history of the world that will ever meet that measure of success. The measure of success I would argue is first and foremost that this criminal activity does not oppose a national security threat to the United States or the country. That's the problem in Mexico is that it has risen to the point where there are ungoverned spaces. In Colombia I think I have to make sure that I leave the audience with perhaps a different -- an alternative view point than the one that you suggested earlier. You know, I was out of the government from the end of the Clinton administration until the beginning of the Obama administration. When I left, over two-thirds of the Colombian people believed that the FARC, that it was going to take Bogotá and was going to take over the whole government. When you look at it at the time, if you look at the areas that the Bogotá government actually controlled, you are not too far out of Bogotá. The situation today is a night and day difference. When I come back into government it is amazing has been changed. Everything that you criticized is absolutely true as well. There is still a tremendous flow of narcotics going up. This is not the kind of conflict where a statue comes down and everyone recognizes that as the victory point. This is a long, methodical process that has already taken over a decade since -- (inaudible) -- Colombia and it's going to take another decade to deal with the wider problems. There are human rights problems. There are continuing problems that go on. But the security situation is a night and day difference down to the point that you made about the justice situation. You would never have said that about the Colombian justice system at the end of the last decade what you said about the Colombian justice system at the end of this decade. And about what comes in -- you said about going for other alternatives and building up what they call the CCAI is designed to so exactly that and this is a Colombian effort, not ours -- it started about four or five years ago -- but it's had real demonstrable progress in building up the areas that have been taken in what we at the Pentagon would see as a classic counterinsurgency strategy to hold and then to build. So there is no shortage of challenges for the Colombian government. The Colombian government would be the very first to talk about them. But I think we do ourselves a disservice if we don't realize how incredibly far they've come, not only to give them credit but as a lessons -- as part of the lessons learned for what we might think about in other context and in other places. There is a road -- there is a path to go down. We're not in end zone yet but we've come a huge degree. ARKIN: I'm going to ask each of you, before I open it up to our guests, what would you do if you had your will, Will, to change our policies or actions to diminish the threat to our country? And I am assuming right now -- the question assumes -- that these cartels are at the very height of their power. They have not become more limpid as time has gone on. They have become more dangerous-- the fact they don't even have free speech any longer in Northern Mexico. WECHSLER: If I could wave a magic wand, of course, you'd get rid of the demand problem in the United States. ARKIN: All you have to do is speak, no magic wands. WECHSLER: You know, that's, of course, a critical element of everything that we do. The other things that I would suggest is amongst the lessons that we've learned in the Colombian context is that requires the government in question to have the critically strong and consistent leadership of a kind that is very rare all around the world. When we have it, we need to take advantage of it. Secondly, we need a whole of government from the United States approach to these issues. The Department of Defense is not in any way, shape or form the lead agency on this. We are a supporting agency. We have some capabilities and skills that are appropriate for these jobs but other agencies have the authorities, have the skills that are vastly more important for these jobs. So we need a whole of government approach to this. And then the one thing that we haven't done a good job -- ARKIN: Do we have that? WECHSLER: We have had that in Colombia. That's part of the success story. ARKIN: Aside from Colombia, do we have what you said, the whole government -- WECHSLER: We have not applied all the lessons of Colombia elsewhere yet. And the other thing that I would say that we didn't really do even well in Colombia is a wider regional approach because you end up getting the balloon effect where you're squeezing it in one place and then the drugs go someplace else. I don't think that was -- my recollection from the '90s is there's actually a judgment that the region perhaps wasn't ready for that kind of regional approach. It might be ready for that kind of regional approach now and it's certainly necessary if we're going to address it more successfully. ARKIN: Lee, if you were the anti-cartel czar -- like the pay czar -- what would you do? WOLOSKY: Well, we may need such a czar because I want to underscore the point that Will made about viewing this problem from a government wide basis. I mean, in many ways our government is still set up to fight states and increasingly, as we know from 9/11, the challenges that we face emanate from non-state actors. And much of the progress that's been made in the past eight years has really been in response to this specific terrorism threat, al Qaeda in particular, but it has not yet addressed these other very important challenges from non-state actors that are not strictly terrorist organizations. And so I'm mostly being facetious about the need for another czar but the point is that -- you know, Will's point is very important. We need to devise a better approach that incorporates the different parts of our government to address these problems. Additionally, we need stronger governance because the reason why we have these problems frequently is because of weak governance in certain states that do not have the ability to fight these organizations that take root on their soil. ARKIN: Dave? HOLIDAY: I don't disagree with anything that's been said. ARKIN: Say more. HOLIDAY: But I will say more. Well, first of all, I agree with the regional approach. The problem is is that -- actually, let me start back. I think there's some good things that the Obama administration has done that is different. There has been an effort to coordinate -- creating this International Organized Crime Task Force or something. The Defense Department is not a member of that. Every other agency in Washington is. So even though it's an international organized crime -- so I'd be curious to understand why that is. But there's clearly sort of been turf battles and turf wars that have gone on that have inhibited the fight against organized crime. The drug czar that has traditionally also tackled international issues has importantly kind of discarded the notion of a war on drugs -- because it's a war that you can't win I would suspect is one of the reasons -- and really started to focus more on prevention and treatment, death related drug issues and kind of breaking the ties between the drugs and crime. And I think that's a very positive thing. I think on the international level, we haven't kind of come up with a new approach. So to go to what we should do, I think the regional approach is important. Unfortunately, that regional approach is happening and the U.S. isn't part of it. The base agreement that the U.S. just signed with Colombia really irked a lot of the South American countries in particular. And it's not just Chavez. It's Brazil and Chile and Argentina and they're all looking to some kind of cooperation that does include the U.S. So the U.S. has a lot to offer and they have a big task in front of them if they're going to sort of engage with the rest of Latin America. I also think that just as we're focusing on demand reduction and essentially decriminalization, as we sort of -- as we leave it to the states to look at medical marijuana laws or decide to move our resources not towards breaking up medical marijuana dispensaries and sort of different initiatives coming out of states to decriminalize, I think we need to allow that to go forward in Latin America as it is going forward because Will mentioned the sort of -- we are the principal producers of marijuana as it turns out that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations are controlling part of that market, the DEA says that 65 percent of the Mexican drug cartels' profits come from marijuana, not from cocaine. So what happens to the business model of the cartels if we decriminalize, if we legalize? Now, we can't do that, as Francisco Thoumi pointed out, until we change the international conventions. So that's another struggle. But I think we have to look at a different paradigm for approaching this issue that's not -- and I totally agree in terms of improving governance and police and judicial apparatuses. One other thing I would just say there, the U.S. seems to be exporting a lot of the RICO like kind of statutes in terms of wiretapping and special courts or asset forfeiture, that sort of thing. Again, Colombia -- a lot of the wiretapping -- when you export these sort of tools to countries in which there's not great accountability, you run into problems and we have the case of Colombia this year where the intelligence service was found to be spending a lot of time fighting on human rights organizations, on opposition politicians including -- you know, there's wiretapped phone calls with U.S. Embassy personnel. So I think those -- now, that kind of thing comes out because of the press often and not because of horizontal accountability institutions like the courts. So I think that's something we need to be concerned about. I think a lot of RICO kinds of procedures are useful but we need to be careful. ARKIN: It leads me just to the last question I'm going to ask before I open it up which -- you talk about the press. There is no free press in Northern Mexico. You agree with that. That is to say -- HOLIDAY: Well, they're intimidated. Yes. ARKIN: It's edited by bullets. HOLIDAY: Yes. There's a lot of self-interest. ARKIN: And we have just below us in Northern Mexico, we have lawlessness, thousands of killing. Is that a law enforcement problem, a governance problem? And what can we directly do about that aside from doing what we did earlier in the last century? Who rode across the border and captured Pancho Villa? But we can't do that now. There's U.N. What can you do about these major cartels? HOLIDAY: You're asking me? ARKIN: Send drones? No. WECHSLER: No. What we can do is while understanding all of the tremendous differences between our experience in Colombia and the experience in Mexico and other places, but we can nevertheless look at the lessons that we've learned in this great success. Everything that's being written now about Mexico I recall reading almost word for word the same articles about Colombia a decade ago. Those articles aren't being written about Colombia because of the successes that we've had. People forget that we didn't have President Uribe when Plan Colombia was started. We do have the advantage of having President Calderon in Mexico who has been very steadfast and very clear in his leadership on this issue. So we have a wonderful opportunity. And now -- and the last administration started taking advantage with the Merida Initiative and the question will be what comes after for the longer term work that needs to be done because this is a long-term issue. This issue is not solved in a matter of months of or years but in a matter of decades. ARKIN: I don't know if we solve what we do with these people in Northern Mexico but I'm sure some of the questions from you will help. If you stand, identify yourself, speak clearly and succinctly. The gentleman in the back there. QUESTIONER: Hello? My name is -- (inaudible). I work for the (Royalton Group ?). Organized crime in the U.S. -- clearly, if what you're saying about the consumption of narcotics in the U.S. is as large as you point, how is it possible that it gets distributed so widely within the U.S.? What are the networks that operate with a lot of impunity to carry out these tasks? And related to that is, is there also a similar network that distributes guns the other way and what are the -- is it so well organized in the United States that we don't even call it organized crime, we don't see it? Can you maybe touch on this point? ARKIN: Lee, I think you should take it. It's a legal question. WOLOSKY: Okay. Well, again, I'll dodge your question a little bit by saying that when we were in the government, when I was in the government and I think I can speak for Will too, although he's speaking for himself quite well, our function was really to stop at the water's edge. In other words, to look out from the water's edge. We didn't involve ourselves -- I didn't involve myself as a government official in domestic law enforcement contexts. So I have not a great deal of visibility on the local networks that are in many cases the end of a global network. You know, I will say, though that just from my experience as a practicing lawyer, certainly the distribution mechanisms in this country for drugs and for guns are very diverse. I mean, you have very well organized networks that are purely domestic in character, engaged in those activities. You have very fragmented and animistic participants engaged in those activities with really little connection to others either in this country or abroad. And you have groups in this country that are working very tightly with component parts that are upgrading outside of the United States. ARKIN: Dave? Will? Dave? Just I think the distribution systems in this country may depend to some extent upon the Mexican cartels. You see evidence of that. We have a huge Mexican population, not just in the southwest but all through our Midwest. And certainly some of those people are engaged in helping in distribution. Now, I don't know that that's a major problem which really is what exists just below the water, the Rio Grande, no questions. Rita. QUESTIONER: Rita Hauser. Will, you particularly laud the success in Colombia but you kind of glossed over the paramilitaries, the abuses that took place in human rights which now we're seeing in Mexico as well, Uribe's attempts to perpetuate his rule which has just (thwarted ?) but maybe will succeed. So it's a more mixed picture than I think you have presented. And I would like to ask at the same time of David how you see these kinds of things in Mexico. There's an article in the current Atlantic, Joe Stahl (ph) which I happened to read last evening which describes the horrendous situation in Northern Mexico particularly the complete corruption of the military and the author concludes that several states in effect has been what he calls a coup that those states are no longer really under the effective control of Calderon. And he asks the question whether or not Calderon's war on drugs which has taken some 14,000 lives and instituted a kind of mini-civil war was the right approach and worth the price? ARKIN: That's a wonderful question. Will, you have Rita suggesting in a way -- she didn't use the words -- but Northern Mexico may be like a failed state. She didn't say it though. WECHSLER: Let me -- first on Colombia. I did -- I'm sorry to leave the impression that there were no problems in Colombia. I tried to make the point I'll make again that civil rights, human rights issue have been a massive problem and will continue to be a significant problem for Colombia. That's the kind of problem that you don't solve. It's a continuing process. Things have improved but there are still concerns and those concerns have been made clear by everyone in our government and also are recognized by the Colombian government. The other areas that need to continue to challenge the Colombian government are continuing of the drug trafficking, again, the overall of volume of cocaine has not decreased the way that we would have wanted it to. And the movement from the FARC to the BACRIMs and the other criminal organizations including some with paramilitary ties -- we need to get on top of those as well. I don't want to leave the impression that we are declaring success and that we're dancing in the end zone with Colombia. We still have a way to go. But I do want to recognize -- to continue the sports metaphor -- about how far we have come down the field. I think to fail to do that would be to miss a very powerful story that I believe is generally underappreciated and one that also has lessons for the wider discussion we've having in Mexico and in other places around the world. ARKIN: Is Calderon becoming an Uribe in that regards? Rita was asking you, can the Mexican government cope with these huge cartels, heavily armed, who have corrupted the army, killed the police? What can they do to get back Northern Mexico? WECHSLER: I think what Calderon says is that we've seen the results of not taking action which is this problem getting bigger and bigger and bigger. And a number of the steps that the Calderon administration has taken have been very, very well received by the population and by the United States. And we look forward to ways to be helpful as they desire. But as I said before, this only works when the countries in question want the United States' help. We can't force it on them. And, speaking for the Department of Defense, we are, again, a supporting role and there are other parts of the United States government that will provide the leadership for the work that we will be doing at the Mexican government's request. I personally thought that that Atlantic article was very, very much overstated for my taste. ARKIN: Do you want to add to that, Dave? HOLIDAY: Well, just the comparison between the paramilitaries in Colombia and the drug cartels in Mexico. And Shannon or Andrew have probably better data on this but my understanding from the Mexico Institute report earlier this year is that most of the violence is not civilian sort of bystanders. Now, in Colombia, the paramilitaries early on functioned as a proxy army against the FARC and there were massacres. So that's a very different situation. You don't have that ideological component here and much of the violence is coming either between rival cartels or between the state -- you know, police, military. And there are obviously lots of civilian casualties but it's not quite the same. In terms of -- I still don't -- maybe at the end of the day we'll have an answer to how to resolve the problems in Northern Mexico. But it is true that whatever we do, unless we have a different approach, we're just going to push it somewhere else. You know, I spoke with the former prime minister of Haiti the other day and she was saying -- you know, concerned about the drug trafficking issue there and I said, well, actually, most of it's now going over Central America. But Secretary Clinton admitted to her, yes, to the extent we have success in Mexico, it's just going to go elsewhere. So we have to look realistically at a situation where we can't sort of engage every small government in the hemisphere and sort of deploy sources. That's just not going to work. It's going to get pushed somewhere. ARKIN: But it could be pushed a long way away? (Laughter.) The lady on the edge. I don't know your name. HOLIDAY: Maggie. QUESTIONER: Meg Crahan, Columbia University. In November of 2008, the attorney general of the state of Texas issued a report stating that approximately 20 percent of the human trafficking by cartels pass through or occurred in Texas. And he called upon the state legislature to adopt regulations in order to make the local authorities as well as the state authorities more empowered to deal with this problem. There's similar weakness both in Texas and California in terms of state banking regulation and elsewhere in terms of arms sales in the United States. Absent state regulation to empower local and state authorities, what can the federal government do to deal with the presence of criminal cartels in a number of areas within states and municipalities? ARKIN: So go to the lawyer first. WOLOSKY: That's a very, very, very -- ARKIN: I surrender my credentials (willingly ?). WOLOSKY: It's a very good question. Of course the federal government has prerogatives in both border control, human movement issues domestically and also with respect to the financial system. But you have identified a very important issue at least in terms of the financial system which is where I've spent most of my time looking and working in the past decade or so because to the extent that local law enforcement and local regulators have primary frontline responsibility for enforcement in many respects they are -- as is implicit in your question -- woefully under-funded, under -- they don't have the skills to deal with problems that are truly international in scope. They don't know what they're looking for in many cases and they don't know how to address it. You know, there's been a lot of work in this are in the past few years. A lot of the money, I believe, needs to come from the federal government. A lot of the training appropriately comes from the federal government whether it's in joint task forces or in other mechanisms. But it's a very important issue. Ironically, there's sort of a flipside to it which is local government that want to play in the international arena and put in place rules the prohibition their pension funds from making investments in certain -- they try to conduct -- certain jurisdictions have tried to conduct an independent foreign policy by -- through regulation, by indicating what state entities and state instrumentalities can and cannot invest in -- different problem but a part of the same coin in the sense that we do have local law enforcement, local regulators on the financial side which still are under-resourced and frankly just do not yet have the tools to deal with problems that are international in scope. ARKIN: I think also she may have been asking whether it would be feasible in this country to either close down or sternly regulate, severely regulate the sale of guns particularly in our southern states, or border states. QUESTIONER: (Off mike.) WOLOSKY: Yes. Good luck on that. ARKIN: What's that? Good luck. WOLOSKY: Good luck on that. ARKIN: The Second Amendment, I know. WOLOSKY: The Second Amendment poses a bit of a problem. ARKIN: Too many turkeys to shoot. WOLOSKY: Yes. ARKIN: The gentleman over here. QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Samuel Logan. I'm with Southern Pulse. I'd like to continue on the human smuggling angle a bit. When we talk about organized crime a lot of the focus happens to be on drugs and guns these days. My understanding is that in Mexico, when you talk about movement of product, illicit product from south to north, humans are second only to the drugs. So I couple that with the understanding that in countries like Honduras to June of this year and Ecuador and Colombia for a time they were very relaxed with visa restrictions allowing all sorts of people to come into their country with an easy stamp, three months, and on you go. So my question is in terms of considering the policy that we're pushing beyond the edge of the water, should we -- when we talk about the Merida Initiative or some sort of continuation of play in Colombia -- should there be a strong component towards human smuggling? And should that component be or not be bundled or coupled with considerations for immigration and deportation policy? Thank you. ARKIN: Does anybody volunteer? Good. HOLIDAY: Yes. I think it should be coupled with immigration reform specifically and I was heartened to see that the Obama administration has not given up on that before -- they're going to push something forward. I think the visa issue is one thing but, again, it's very clear that -- it feels clear to me -- that sort of efforts to seal the border, improve kind of transit in El Paso and California, sort of push things into Arizona, and all the reports, journalistic reports coming out of Mexico indicate that you can't cross the border anymore unless you pay the narcos. So this is what we've done. This is what our policy has done. We've sort of -- again, you drive things underground and you empower criminal organizations. If we have a more open, rational policy which I think this administration would like to push for -- in fact President Bush was fairly rational on this as well, just couldn't get it through Congress -- then I think we have a chance of reversing that situation. ARKIN: You think that narcos control immigration, that is to say illegal immigration to this country from the southern? HOLIDAY: There's quite a few reports indicating that. If you go and hang out on these sort of border towns along Arizona you can't get into the desert unless you -- in the old days you might have paid the cops and now you have to pay the narcos who have the cops under their control. ARKIN: I had the gentleman -- yes, sir. Then I'll get to you. QUESTIONER: I'm Francisco Thoumi. I'm from the University of Texas. I'm a Colombian Americans. Will, I hope you're right. I don't think you are. ARKIN: Who are you looking at when you say that? QUESTIONER: Will. Will. ARKIN: Will. QUESTIONER: So it's -- in the Uribe administration there were only 1.5 displaced persons national democratic security. I want to know who benefits from democratic security. Obviously they don't. Alvaro Uribe has institutionalized a lot of the state. He's concentrated power. You praise the justice system. There's a continuous clash between Alvaro Uribe and the justice system in Colombia. As I say, I hope you are right. I don't think the situation is sustainable. There's been economic growth with no employment and the concentration of wealth has increased dramatically especially in the countryside. So the question is where is the success? We might have short-term success I hope in the future. I totally disagree with you on that. I don't think there is. WECHSLER: What is -- perhaps you know. What's Uribe's latest approval rating inside Colombia? QUESTIONER: Sixty-four percent. Alvaro Uribe is the best president for Colombia because Alvaro Uribe is paternalistic, authoritarian, messianic and he also interprets the law in a way that he brings the law -- (inaudible) -- is the spirit of the law without breaking the law. The problem is not Alvaro Uribe. The problem is Colombian society. And if we do not make reforms that are serious in Colombia, the country will go to pot with Alvaro Uribe as president. ARKIN: Can you respond to that? WECHSLER: We obviously have a different point of view. I'd only look at where Colombia was, where it is today and where the population of Colombia itself feels about the situation. I would also note -- this is a little off topic but one thing that I didn't mention before is that Colombia is now in a position where it can help other countries. Again, it's an amazing thing to think about from the end of the last decade to this decade that they have made public offers to help in Afghanistan, made public efforts to help in training in a variety -- regionally in the Western hemisphere. ARKIN: But not in Venezuela? WECHSLER: Not in Venezuela. ARKIN: I think you had your hand up first. I'll try to get everybody. We have about 10 minutes. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. The question is for Lee. I was interested in what you said about the Taliban had an illicit aviation network run by a former Russian military official and with bases around the world. Was that Viktor Bout? WOLOSKY: Yes. QUESTIONER: Okay. So I understand that the U.S. used Viktor Bout's system -- was either to ferry materials to Afghanistan or Iraq. Isn't that true? WOLOSKY: I read those reports. QUESTIONER: So what does this say about the -- does one hand not know what the other is doing? What does it say about what the U.S. -- how serious it is in dealing with what was a huge threat? I mean, the Taliban now is perhaps our largest single security threat. And are there some other examples from Latin American that perhaps David could mention where we're doing the similar -- what seems to me -- actions that don't make a lot of sense? ARKIN: Thank you. David? HOLIDAY: I have to think about that. WOLOSKY: I'm glad the question was addressed to you. HOLIDAY: No. No. But I compare -- is there a Viktor Bout kind of scenario in Latin American and I have to think about. ARKIN: We'll pass for a moment while you're thinking. Gentleman -- QUESTIONER: Is there an answer for the first part? WOLOSKY: Well, it was that I read those reports. I mean, that happened. I don't know how that happened. That happened after I left the government. I think I'm on record saying that it boggles the mind how folks who were running the Iraq war could have used as a subcontractor, as I understand it on Pentagon contracts to deliver materials into Baghdad, someone who was years before running arms to the Taliban. ARKIN: We have yet to have anybody though on our payroll distributing narcotics in this country. That's true, isn't it? (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Was the U.S. trying to shut it down? What happened? ARKIN: Excuse me, Lucy. We have to have other people to ask. The gentlemen behind you. WECHSLER: There's one thing: Viktor Bout is in jail right now in Thailand for those who don't know the end of this story, and it remains to be seen whether or not they will extradite. ARKIN: You're talking about the -- (inaudible) -- in Mexico being extradited here? WOLOSKY: No. No. Thailand. WECHSLER: Viktor Bout is in jail. Viktor Bout is in Thailand, is in a Thai jail right now and we're awaiting extradition and it remains to be seen whether it will happen. And the Colombians sent a team over to Thailand to explain -- because it's actually involved -- the case involves the FARC -- to explain that the FARC is a terrorist organization and to help the case against Viktor Bout. This is one of many, many examples about -- again, as I was saying about these old stovepipes of issues -- they all come together these nexus, so all three stories that we were talking about come together right now in Thailand. ARKIN: You mean silos? WECHSLER: Silos. Sorry. ARKIN: But your question is what, really? QUESTIONER: Hi. Christopher Johnson, the RAND Corporation. I have just -- I just wanted to see if you guys could comment quickly -- you've been talking a bit about strategies sort of on the military side but I was wondering if you guys could comment on any sort of strategies the U.S. has sort of put in place to deal with some of the micro-problems of sort of recruitment and retention of the sort of the young male population in Latin America that have been heavily involved in -- ARKIN: David. HOLIDAY: Well, I would say we have an active policy of deporting criminals, some of whom have grown up in the U.S. helping out with their reinsertion into Central American societies. Pretty mum about sort of incarceration policies of these -- in fact, we built prisons in El Salvador where gangs are essentially in control of the entire prison. I don't think we have very good strategies at the moment. It feels like you're talking sort of at a street gang level or Mara Salvatrucha and that sort of thing. Sam Logan can talk a lot about that too. But -- yes. I think as part of the Merida Initiative there is a component there of supporting crime prevention especially in Central America but it's quite small in comparison to probably what is needed. ARKIN: I'm sorry. You were -- I'm trying to keep mental order of who put up their hands. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. (Brian O'Neill ?). I wanted to ask a question in this context of organized crime and threats bearing in mind what Will's reminded us a couple of times of not dealing with these issues in silos whether it's criminal or terrorist or national security interest. What do we know about state sponsored activities in Venezuela, whether activities or funding out of the country or other countries but destabilizing democratic institutions for perpetuating or funding or encouraging undemocratic behaviors. Honduras comes to mind, Nicaragua comes to mind, Ecuador and Bolivia. Looking forward, perhaps the election in Peru coming up and that perhaps the connection between the state of Venezuela and the state of Iran and even Hezbollah which I hear props up every once in a while in a Bolivian context or even a Peruvian context. ARKIN: Will, that sounds like a national defense question. WECHSLER: Yes. We obviously have very significant concerns and I think that the clearest statement of them is that the fact that Venezuela is decertified in the U.S. government system as being fundamentally non-cooperative in our efforts. That tends to happen when there are -- not the situation I was referring to before when folks are overwhelmed by a problem but when folks are part of the problem themselves. ARKIN: Does that answer your question? QUESTIONER: Perhaps there's much that you can say. (Laughter.) HOLIDAY: I mean, I think that Venezuela gives a lot of aide to these other countries. But it's often going -- I don't know that it's related to organized crime as much as sort of propping up populist movements or -- now, in some cases though -- and Nicaragua is a very worrying case for me and I think to the extent that Chavez is propping up that regime which has become increasingly authoritarian if not already. I mean, they've sort of had a coup of their own by judicial decree. So I think that's concerning. How that plays into the organized crime issue, I'm not so sure yet. ARKIN: Let's continue our menu of frustrations. In the back. QUESTIONER: Paula Cling (ph) from Semana News magazine in Colombia. You all commented on the strong leadership of Uribe. I just wanted to know about post-Uribe like following on the gentleman's question about weak institutions that might be left behind, any vacuums he might leave behind like a post-Uribe Colombia. ARKIN: I don't know whether to say we hope we get somebody as good as Uribe or as bad. WECHSLER: I think that the main interest of the United States is to ensure that the working relationship that we developed is one that's between countries and will continue no matter what the situation I think when president -- I'll just defer to what President Obama said when he met with Uribe and commented clearly on the position of the United States government for a progress that follows constitutional norms. QUESTIONER: Hi. Kara McDonald with the Council on Foreign Relations. We speak frequently of whole of government approaches and the need for not just military and political approaches but also socioeconomic approaches, the question about the young male population. And, Will, you mentioned both the demand side as well as the supply side and the importance of that. To what degree in the U.S. government today is there an integration of the domestic policy discussion of addressing drug use in America, the demand problem, with the strategies in our foreign affairs and our national security apparatus to deal in a whole of government way? And then very quickly. I'm wondering in the nexus between organized crime and other illicit activities, what evidence have we seen of the nexus between organized crime and proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies? WECHSLER: I'd say that our drugs are -- Karl Krouski (ph) is very much focused on exactly what you're talking about about bringing both the supply and the demand side to the U.S. to work together. And from what I've seen, he's -- I've been impressed with his focus on all of this. On the proliferation side, we definitely see criminal organizations involved in widespread weapons proliferation. On the nuclear side in particular we've seen -- there have been publicized reports but I'm probably not going to go past that. WOLOSKY: I mean, on that last part I consider the A.Q. Khan network to have been an international criminal network in certain respects. It bore more of the indicia that international criminal groups bear in terms of how it stored and moved money, how it moved people around and things of that sort, how it used different jurisdictions to do that. ARKIN: I don't know that it's appropriate to end this on the issue of the relationship between narcotics and nuclear weapons but the time says I have. So thank you all for coming. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2009, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. JIM LINDSAY: I'm Jim Lindsay, director of studies and vice president here at the council. It's my great pleasure and honor to welcome you all here today to the Council on Foreign Relations Symposium on "Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: An Overlooked Threat." We are holding today's symposium in collaboration with the Latin American Program and the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Dr. Andrew Selee, director of Latin American Program is here and I want to just thank you to Andrew and his organization for agreeing to cosponsor the symposium. What I would like to do -- and it's of course always important to note that we can't do the sort of program we do here at the council without the support and generosity of a number of people who I'd like to just mention right here. First is Rita Hauser. Rita Hauser is here in the front row. Rita has been a generous supporter of the council over the years and has given us a gift that makes it possible for us to engage in these sort of annual conferences where we reach out and collaborate with another think tank. And it's been an important contribution to the council. I want to say thank you very much, Rita. Second -- today's event is made possible by the Tinker Foundation, which has supported our work in Latin America. And I believe Nancy Truitt is somewhere in the room, a senior adviser to the Tinker Foundation but perhaps I got it wrong. Last, I want to thank the Robina Foundation which has underwritten the council's brand new initiative on international institutions and global governance, which has been an effort to try to look at international institutions as they exist at the beginning of the 21st century and try to devise more effective avenues for promoting multilateral cooperation. What brings us here today for discussion is based on the observation that the illicit flow of goods, money, information and people is an increasing source of tension in relations between the developed countries and developing countries. Nowhere is this more true than in the Western hemisphere. Latin America is a major source of cocaine and many other illegal substances for the U.S. market, as well as for Europe. And the problems created by the drug trade increasingly coming to dominate U.S.-Hemispheric relations. Within the hemisphere, Mexico has emerged as the newest power center for organized crime. A couple of decades ago Mexico was largely viewed as a transit country for illegal drugs from Colombia. Today, Mexican drug trafficking organizations now are a major player of their own. They are a major presence in source countries such as Bolivia and Colombia. They control supply routes through Central America and they control drug distribution rings here in the United States. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in its "2008 National Drug Threat Assessment" that, and I quote, "Mexican drugs trafficking organizations now represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States." It's also worth pointing out that the rise of Mexican drug trafficking organizations has been a major threat to democracy in Mexico and it's created a wide number of problems south of the border. The reality is that the transnational nature of organized crime means that unilateral policies or policies that simply rely on doing something at the border will not work. Multilateral cooperation is essential. Unfortunately, I think it's fair to say that the governments of the Western hemisphere have yet to develop adequate multilateral responses. We instead see a wealth of different and conflicting policy choice and drug traffickers have been able to exploit the lack of coordinated governmental response. And that brings us to the subject of today's symposium. And the symposium essentially has three main goals: first is to try to assess the state of organized crime situation in the Western hemisphere and discuss its underlying causes. Second, the symposium today is looking to analyze the local, national and regional strategies that have been pursued so far to identify those strategies that are counterproductive as well as those best practices that should be emulated and extended. Third, the purpose of today's symposium is to generate concrete policy ideas for combating organized crime in the Western hemisphere. And we're going to have three panels. The first panel will look at "Organized Crime and Transnational Threats" in the hemisphere, essentially an effort to explain or review the expansion of organized crime networks in the region. Panel two is entitled "Local and National Policy Responses." Here we're going to move to discuss local and national experiences, policy responses, and the lessons learned in Colombia and Mexico. And the third panel "Hemispheric and Multilateral Reponses" is going to review the national and regional policies of the United States toward organized crime. One last thing that's probably the most important thing I have here to do today is to A, tell you that this is on the record -- people are speaking for the record -- and the most important thing actually is to say if you have one of these little devices, a Blackberry or a cell phone, anything that can go beep in the middle of, if you could turn it off or put it on mute, we would greatly appreciate it. Once again, I want to thank you very much for coming here today. And now I'm going to turn it over to Stanley Arkin to introduce the first panel. STANLEY S. ARKIN: Thank you. This is a very distinguished panel in that all of them have extraordinary experience which touches or thinks about organized crime without actually participating in it. And, by the way, there's no -- (inaudible) -- today. DAVID HOLIDAY: Are you sure? ARKIN: I hope not in your case. David Holiday, who has spent a very big piece of his life working on civil rights or decent living in Central America and he is now an officer of the Open Society Institute and in particular in Latin American focus. Lee Wolosky -- I've known for years. He's a very fine lawyer. He works for David Boies. He does international cases. We even worked on one or two together. And he worked at the White House working with transnational risks and has a lot to say about organized crime. This is not because he works for a large law firm, but because he has insights that go beyond that in a scholarly way. And Will Wechsler is a deputy under secretary at of our Department of Defense. We'll ask some interesting issues as to why we have the Department of Defense doing something we always think in this country the Department of Justice does or even worldwide. And let me start by saying that organized crime is a very, very embracive two words. It can mean anything from the people down the street who form a neighborhood gang, Bloods, Crips, can be Hell's Angels and up to what we ordinarily in this country think of as organized crime -- it's always Italian which shows the extraordinary quality of this country and its melting pot qualities changed substantially so that the Italians are now being very much competed with by the Russians and the Vietnamese and the Hmong and virtually every other kind of nationality which forms its own organized crime of one kind or another. We're focusing here, as Jim said, on organized crime in this hemisphere because I think largely the enormous narcotics problem and probably people problem. By that I mean, immigration and perhaps even people which are forced into particular kinds of occupations which we don't like or think are right. Let me start by asking Lee Wolosky, a legal scholar, how you would define this kind of transnational organized crime and give us a bit of your insight as to how it was formed and functions. LEE S. WOLOSKY: Sure. But let me answer not as a legal scholar, if I may, but as a policy person or a former policy person. ARKIN: I agree. WOLOSKY: I think that the primary characteristic of what we're talking about in this forum and what we should be talking about in this forum is whether or not a particular activity impacts national security or impacts the foreign policy objectives of the United States and therefore rises beyond a law enforcement problem to a problem that requires broader components of the U.S. government including the Department of Defense to have a role in resolving it. And that is in fact how this issue sort of came about, international organized crime as a national security issue was first identified by President Clinton, who was fond of talking about initially something called the dark side of globalization. And Clinton would go around in the mid-'90s in the White House talking to its White House staff about all the bad things that attended the end of the Cold War all the bad collateral effects that came from the increased mobility -- ARKIN: Organized crime did precede President Clinton. WOLOSKY: Absolutely. ARKIN: Good. WOLOSKY: But I think the point I would leave this group with -- and I'll stop here -- just to respond to your question is that I think organized crime as a national security problem did not precede President Clinton. President Clinton was the first president to stand up in a speech that he gave at the United Nation, actually the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, and he said, international organized crime is a threat to the national security of the United States and I'm going to do a variety of things including signing a document called a presidential decision directive, PDD 42, which said as much and instructed his federal bureaucracy, not just law enforcement but other parts of the federal government to devise certain responses. Now, it's true and appropriate for this forum that the very first action that was taken under this new presidential directive was a targeted campaign of really warfare against the Cali Cartel in Colombia because the president had identified international narcotics trafficking as being perhaps at that time the prototype or the archetype of international organized crime. But there followed from that a number of other groups and organizations that were targeted under that basic step. ARKIN: But the Cali cartel, renowned as a narcotics cartel with all kinds of stories coming out about their culture, how they live together and recruited and impacts they've had on their country, Colombia, but were they an organized crime group just out to make money breaking some fundamental laws or did they also have a political quality to them? Were they allied with the FARC, say, for example, which made it more of a transnational problem? WOLOSKY: Well, that's something that I think maybe one of our regional experts would want to speak to more than I would. But certainly I think that in Colombia under that basic framework we identified both independent and forces that were acting together that impacted the national security of the United States. So not only did we go to war with the drug cartels under this framework but we proceeded to designate not only the FARC but the ELN and other groups that were destabilizing Colombia as foreign terrorist organizations. And then we, again, under the same framework -- but again on the implementation I'll defer to others -- we launched Plan Colombia in 2000, which has had a very profound effect in stabilizing Colombia. ARKIN: Just so we're complete in terms organized crime in Colombia, South America, in this hemisphere, narcotics may be the major business, but you would agree that money laundering which flows from that and obviously has an impact upon on our financial systems and then people movements, immigrants being extracted or placed in other countries and perhaps even slavery of some kinds is also a part of their business. That's true as well? WOLOSKY: Absolutely. And many of the groups that we came to target were not only drug trafficking organizations but were alien smuggling operations, human trafficking organizations which typically trafficked women into prostitution. Arms trafficking organizations, organizations that we were concerned had the ability and willingness to traffic in radiological or radioactive and other types of materials. So yes, not just drugs but a lot of other bad stuff as well. ARKIN: Now, is there anything perhaps I ought to ask you, David, which makes this kind of organized crime more a part of the at least ostensibly legitimate governments which exist in South America, Central America and Mexico? Is there a greater intertwining of organized crime in those countries than say there is in this country? HOLIDAY: Sure. That's clearly been the case in Colombia and Mexico and increasingly in Central America especially Guatemala where this year we sort of learned about the para-politics scandal in Colombia in which the paramilitaries which are essentially drug trafficking organizations have bought off any number of congresspeople and other including the cousin of the president who's in jail currently. In Mexico, there're sort of large -- there are different estimates about what sort of percentage of the territory is governed in a sense alternatively by drug traffickers from 8 percent to much higher. But, yes, both the economy and the politics are extremely penetrated. In Guatemala there's -- for many years there's been talk of a parallel government, a parallel power that essentially is the sort of power behind the throne so electoral politics starts to mean less and less in these kinds of situations. Can I go back and ask Lee, though, what is it about international organized crime that is a national security threat? Is it -- for example, with the drug traffickers -- is it the introduction of illicit drugs into a country? ARKIN: We were leaving that for Will. HOLIDAY: Okay. That's fine. Whoever. I don't want to -- but I'm left with that sort of what's our definition. ARKIN: That's a great question. HOLIDAY: And is there any international organized crime that is not a national security threat? WOLOSKY: Do you want to answer that? WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Sure. ARKIN: This is not counting Pancho Villa. WECHSLER: Yes. There are certainly lots of crime and organized crime that goes on all around the world that's not a national security threat. We risk overwhelming our national security apparatus by expanding the definition too large. But I'll give you some examples of some things that clearly are national security threats and are recognized as such and have been increasingly recognized as such over the last two decades of fairly linear progression across multiple administrations where we have very clear enemies of the United States, some of which we're fighting right now, that are funded by the proceeds of organized crime, organized crime that's a threat to the national security interests of the United States. Where we have criminal organizations who are threatening the basic governance or are threatening the legitimacy of a state that is an ally or of great interest, particular interest to the United States, that is also a clear national security interest to the United States. It is both of those areas where the work of the U.S. government expands beyond the traditional law enforcement agencies and involves the wider national security community. ARKIN: Is there an aspect of our national justice agencies or Department of Justice, leave out our state prosecutorial agencies, but the FBI, Department of Justice being intrusive in these South American, Central American countries in terms of what we ask of them, in terms of what we expect of them? And I'm not talking just about renditions or extraditions. WECHSLER: Well, there are a lot of lessons learned from the relatively powerful and underappreciated successes that we've had in Colombia over the last decade on the security side. And one of the clear lessons learned is that you need to have clear, strong leadership in the country in question that's willing to cooperate with the United States as the one who lead these efforts -- that's we're going to have the sort of spine of steel that we've seen from Uribe -- and then willing to accept the help from our law enforcement organizations on terms that work for them. When we find ourselves in situations where we don't have an adequate partner, then not only do you run into some of these questions that you just raised, but in the end of the day the work is not that effective. ARKIN: But more to the point, we don't allow Mexican or Guatemalan or Brazilian law enforcement officers to roam around this country while they seek to penetrate our organized crime of which we have some for sure, whereas we have our people doing just that, whether they're flying airplanes that are on the ground. WECHSLER: Everything that we would do in these areas would be with the -- if it's done effectively would be with the cooperation of the local government. The local government has to ask us to be there, has to want this kind of assistance. Typically, they've gotten there but they found that the enemy that they're against has vastly more resources than the state itself, has vastly more capabilities than the state itself. And that's the challenge that they find themselves in and so then they look for resources -- when they choose to combat this threat they find themselves looking for resources outside their state. And when it works very well as it has over the last decade in Colombia, it is a methodical long-term plan of shared responsibility between not only the United States and the countries in question but the wider international community as well. ARKIN: But aside from Colombia, wouldn't it be true that every Northern, South American country and every Central American country, save maybe Honduras today, has some resentment about American law enforcement officers coming in? WECHSLER: Well, it's -- I don't know I would be so sweeping but I would say -- and I defer a lot -- ARKIN: And left out Colombia. WECHSLER: I defer a lot of this to my colleagues in the Justice Department who work more directly. But what I would say is that where this works is where we are working in concert with the government in question. In some places in this hemisphere we're working in great concert. It's not just in Colombia but in others we're not at all. And when we're not, when you don't have that leadership, you end up finding the countries in a very challenging situation. ARKIN: Dave, could you talk about why in the last 20 years -- I think some people said 10, 20 -- 20 years where we've recognized this is a serious problem and not before? HOLIDAY: Well, to the extent that we're talking about drug trafficking I do think there is -- I wouldn't entirely root it in this but the 1988 U.N. Convention on Drugs, which sort of set a framework in which by definition any possession of illicit drugs should be criminalized. And I think that we've seen a lot of changes over the last 20 years. I'm going to speak in very broad strokes here so I hope I don't simplify it. But when I look at the kinds of policies that have emanated from a sort of both a military and a criminal prosecution of the situation, I think you can see a lot of -- that we've often contributed to the problem more than we've helped. In the U.S., the sort of the prison population has grown enormously due to the incarceration of often non-violent drug offenders. Prisons both in the United States and in Latin America have become factories for organized crime. ARKIN: Just a minute. We know that the U.S. has more people per capita in jail than any country in the world. HOLIDAY: That's right. And we often -- I would be interested to know, for example -- we don't know a lot about our counter-narcotics sort of treaties and agreements. They're often secret agreements. But I know that 10 years ago Ecuador -- we conditioned our counter-narcotics assistance on an increase in arrests, again, just blossoming their prison population in the current government, which is not considered an ally but is taking perhaps a different approach to how to deal with this kind of problem. So that's one thing. The other issue is I think that Colombia has become because there was this ideological component, obviously a civil war in Colombia, and it became tied up with the drug war, that sort of came on to our radar. Now, there are scholars who argue that a lot of, again, our policies of trying to attacking the FARC in particular and the ELN in Colombia -- the guerrilla organizations -- was counterproductive -- eradication policies which sort of pushed the local population into the hands of the guerrillas and increased their political capital because we were not prepared to offer alternative livelihoods. And frankly, the problem is with a lot of these strategies, which we're sort of now importing to Mexico, is that the sort of direct confrontation with the drug cartels has not necessarily reduced the flow of drugs. And so it's hard for me to look at Colombia and say that there's a success there because organized crime, one of the -- when you're a clandestine or sort of underground organization it's much easier to adapt and the governments and the other forces are much slower to adapt. And we've seen sort of the emergence of smaller cartels. So it's not just the FARC that's doing drug trafficking but also these other cartels from former paramilitaries. So I think -- I don't see that that has been successful at all. In the case of Mexico one can argue, as some have done -- Vanda Felbab-Brown from the Brookings Institution has written about this -- that sort of pushing to sort of confront the cartels increased the violence and instilled sort of -- the jury is still out as to whether that's going to somehow reduce violence in the long run, reduce the political power of the cartels. Certainly I think the sort of level of influence of cartels both in Colombia and Mexico is still pretty immense. ARKIN: Is there any justice system south of the border -- certainly Canada has a justice system but it's quite small compared to ours -- is there any justice system south from the border including Central America, Mexico, South America which you can speak of respectfully? HOLIDAY: Actually, the Colombian justice system isn't bad. ARKIN: Except for Colombia. HOLIDAY: And Chile I would say. ARKIN: Chile? HOLIDAY: Chile. ARKIN: Ever been in a Chilean jail? HOLIDAY: No. ARKIN: Ever been in a Mexican jail? HOLIDAY: I haven't been in either, no. But in terms of sort of respect for the rule of law and sort of independence of the judiciary I think there are -- probably I would say Chile. But Colombia, surprisingly, is not bad and that's again another interesting thing. It's not -- to the degree that there's been any sort of prosecution of organized crime I think you can attribute it more to police work and the judicial authorities and not to sort of military interventions. Military approaches tend to just spread the problem around. The reason drugs are coming out of Venezuela now is because we've had some success in controlling the borders or the distribution from Colombia so it all goes now through Venezuela. Mexico is spilling over into Guatemala. So there's no -- we don't have a sort of an overall vision of how to sort of approach this problem. WOLOSKY: Let me -- if I may -- HOLIDAY: Sure. WOLOSKY: Let me answer the question that you asked before which was how does it really affect the national security of the United States. I think I'll answer in then on-Western hemisphere context if that's okay just because first, I'm not an expert in the Western hemisphere, and secondly, because I recognize that there's a lot of debate around counter-narcotics policy specifically. But I'll give you two examples that I think sort of crystallize it from the standpoint of the place that both Will and I sat in the Clinton administration and me for the first part of the Bush administration. We discovered that there was a -- we asked ourselves the question, how is the Taliban in Afghanistan, when it was in place, supplying itself? How were they getting stuff in contravention of a variety of sanctions regimes? We found that there was an illicit aviation network that had over 100 planes upgrading out of the former Russian military official who had commandeered hundreds of, or scores of planes, big planes, cargo planes that he was using out of bases all over the world. He was registering them in some jurisdictions. He was keeping them in other jurisdictions. He employed dozens of people, hundreds of people in furtherance of this illicit project. Now, what he was bringing into Afghanistan for the Taliban and perhaps for others on those planes we presumed to be weapons. We presumed to be money. We presumed to be other material support that was necessary for the regime's survival. That became a problem that was sort of separate and distinct from the issue of how do we deal with al Qaeda. How do we deal with the Taliban? And became how do we deal with this aviation network? And that was a national security problem because we had a very clear interest in shutting off the Taliban's ability to survive. Another problem -- when we were pursuing -- in the earlier phases of NATO expansion we found that many of the countries that were candidates for NATO membership were ones that had problems with international organized crime. And not only did they have problems with international organized crimes, specifically emanating from the former Soviet Union, but those organized crime bodies were embedded in the governance structure of the countries that were being proposed for NATO membership. So the question became how do we assure the integrity of the command and control mechanism of NATO if and when NATO is expanded into some of these countries? So these are clearly, I would say, problems that transcend law enforcement and they become problems that impact the foreign policy interest and the national security interest of the United States writ large. And they, therefore, require sort of all the folks from most part of the government, all the folks from other parts of the government to figure out how to address them and in cases where we believe that we can actually take down some of these organizations to actually put in place mechanisms to take them down. ARKIN: Lee has touched upon the next subject, which I think we should go to which is what are the commonalities -- which is one question -- and then the connections -- the other question -- between these cartels? We're not talking about street organized crime, these international cartels, Mexican and others, to what we now dub terrorist groups. Will? And certainly the Taliban would be -- WECHSLER: Yes. I mean, in some cases they're one and the same. The FARC was designated as a terrorist organization and as a narcotics trafficking organization. Narcotics and other organized crime support many terrorist organizations. I'm heart pressed to think of a terrorist organization that does not use organized crime as a way to help fund and manage its logistics in one way or the other. Some are much more expert and have been doing this for a long time, organizations like Hezbollah. When an organization establishes the infrastructure for trafficking, for moving things illicitly, those who desire to move things illicitly will make use of that infrastructure and we see that all around the world. ARKIN: Yes, but are any of these organizations we call international criminal cartels, international crime, are they a major bank rolling or other support facility for things like al Qaeda? WECHSLER: Again, most criminal organizations are out to make money first and foremost. There are some that have -- they're ideologically based organizations or territorial-based organizations that have other aspirations as well and use organized crime to further those. And there can be a wonderful debate about are they first and foremost a criminal organization or are they first and foremost an ideological organization or a terrorist organization. But I think what's a powerful point to understand is once -- even if the criminal organizations have no ideological objectives, even if they have no wider objectives beyond making money, once they establish the infrastructure necessary to move things illicitly, what we tend to see is that that infrastructure is taken advantage of by other organizations that want to employ it for their own ends. It doesn't mean that they do it a tremendous amount -- different organizations do it to different degrees -- but we definitely see that. ARKIN: Is that by force or agreement? WECHSLER: It's by mutual benefit. If the criminal organization is looking to make money and someone provides them a way to do that, they will quite often take them up on that. ARKIN: And what's different though in Afghanistan than it is in Mexico? WECHSLER: It's very different. ARKIN: And that difference is? HOLIDAY: But just a question to you, Will. I know there's a concern about the sort of pipeline being used by other criminals or terrorists but are there any cases yet of al Qaeda using the drug cartels or the human smuggling networks from Mexico into the United States? Do we know? WECHSLER: From Mexico in the United States or -- HOLIDAY: Yes. Yes. Yes. WECHSLER: The question before was a global phenomenon. HOLIDAY: No. No. I'm just -- WECHSLER: But Mexico to the United States, no. HOLIDAY: We don't have one. WECHSLER: We don't have that. I mean, there're a lot of overstatement that have been made in the last year about this dynamic of the threat from Mexico, the threat -- the problems in Mexico are quite serious, are big challenges and the president there is taking many very powerful steps against them. And the progress that's been made and the changes in the even U.S.-Mexican dynamic on this issue have been quite powerful in a relatively short period of time. That all said, Mexico is not a failed state. It's not going to be a failed state. There's not this massive spillover of violence right across the border. I mean, you go to Ciudad Juarez which is one of the most dangerous places in the world and right across the border is El Paso which I think is the third most safe city in America of its size. All these things which are very much hyped in the press we don't see. There is wider -- ARKIN: You don't see -- (inaudible)? WECHSLER: There are some. The wider implication that I was gong to say is not the spillover like directly across the border though there are some places where we -- but the wider spillover of Mexican criminal organizations, very far from the border that have a very powerful role to play in the criminality in the United States. That's what's been building up over longer periods of time. There are places in the park system in California where industrial size marijuana production is being done by the Mexican drug cartels. I mean, this is -- it's that kind of spillover that's much more significant than the kind that gets more of the press of in a border town there being violence. HOLIDAY: So it seems that while terrorist organizations may be able to take advantage of organized crime networks, do they really need -- I mean, except from getting certain kinds of good to, for example, to pose a direct national security threat to the U.S., do they need organized crime? The U.S. is so porous, its border are so porous it's so easy to sort of get into the U.S. And in fact, one of the characteristics of organized crime is this sort of blurring of the lines between legal and illegal. There's a lot of legal enterprises that are used by organized crime. WECHSLER: The mechanisms, the skills, the models and then given the actual logistics are used by terrorist organizations all around the world. And we see it again and again and again. ARKIN: In combination with criminal cartels. WECHSLER: Absolutely. WOLOSKY: Yes. That does happen. There is a robust network of groups that operate transnationally that seem to know how to find each other with such effectiveness that sometimes when we were in government, we wondered why we couldn't find them as quickly as they found each other. But it is true that if you are a bad guy, whether you're a terrorist organization or another bad guy, and you need some specific thing, whether it's money moved, arms moved, you need a plane, you need something else, you need bad things moved, there are people that you can call and they'll do it and they do it for money. I mean, you may have -- you know, Will pointed to the distinction between terrorist groups which typically, at least in the scholarship we say that they have ideological objectives, you know, international organized crime groups are purely monetary ones but they do know how to find each other. There's ample example of them finding each other. And, you know, I think we spoke to some of the specific examples but they do find each other. WECHSLER: Just very briefly -- one of the strategic improvements in our thinking as a government over the last 10 to 15 years has been a moving away from this siloed approach to thinking about these issues that there are these kinds of criminals and these kinds of terrorists and these kinds of organizations. The reality is that there's a nexus between all of them and when the nexus impacts our national security we have to change the way that we think about national security. So in Afghanistan at the end of last year there was change in the rules of engagement for the drug trafficking organizations with ties to the insurgency to be a formal target of our military actions. In the previous ways of thinking, you would say there's insurgency and there's narcotrafficking. What we've learned is that, A, doesn't meet the facts, and B, hinders our ability to actually -- (inaudible). ARKIN: Is there any evidence of the very powerful, well-organized Mexican and South American cartels sort of Sinaloa cartel being active in forming relationships in Europe or in East Asia or in Southeast Asia? WECHSLER: Very much so. One of the dynamics that we see more recently is the narcotics that are coming out of South America, a lot of which are coming out of Venezuela and I would say that it's not just because of our success in Colombia -- ARKIN: No. WECHSLER: -- but there are some Venezuela specific issues that drive that -- going not only to the U.S. market but going to the European market. And when they look as businessmen to the European market they see that prices are higher. They see that demand has a way to go up for cocaine whereas it's relatively saturated and flat in the United States. And they see that the potential downside for action that is perhaps remote but quite catastrophic in the United States of being put in our jails and actually being caught is an extremely low probability in Europe. They just don't have the enforcement track record that we do. So over the next decade, one would expect an increasing proportion of the cocaine trade to be going to Europe and to the Middle East where it's even more profitable to do so. And one of the great challenges is that there are countries in the way in Western Africa that are already starting to and about to be swamped by this problem. The amount of resources that the cartels can throw at these countries will dwarf the amount of resources that these countries can, on their own, use to defend against this. ARKIN: Well, just a particular issue which is: are the Mexican cartels with their extraordinary distribution systems helping the Afghanis distribute their opium harvest? WECHSLER: I haven't seen anything along those lines. No. I mean, the vast majority of the opium harvest in Afghanistan goes to Europe not to the United States. ARKIN: And therefore, the Mexicans wouldn't be necessarily involved with it. WECHSLER: Yes. I haven't -- of all the problems that we have, that one I'd put away. ARKIN: I guess my question was further which is -- is this country the pronged or sole customer of the Sinaloa cartel and other cartels based in Mexico and the North and South America? WECHSLER: We consume 90 percent of all the cocaine that's coming up there. We -- as President Obama said when we went down to Mexico is that this is a co-responsibility for this. We have a co-responsibility for this problem. And as you said earlier, you know, there was a day when the Mexicans were just a transit state, just a transit state. And this is a common dynamic that we see all around the world is that in a variety of country they choose not to address this issue because they see themselves as being just a transit state. I don't know of any country in the world that has ever remained just a transit state. They eventually become massive users. They become massive organized crime. You can't -- countries make mistakes when they don't address this problem at an earlier stage and they wait until it becomes a massive internal problem. ARKIN: Have they become too powerful, Dave, to put down in Mexico? I know that you said there's not a failed government in Mexico. You said it three times. Not a failed government. So we'll just accept that as the rhythm. But is there power in that government to put down these cartels? HOLIDAY: I wish I had the solution here. ARKIN: I'm going to ask you in a while for one. HOLIDAY: It's easy to sort of critique the current strategy, although we do have to see that play. I mean, I'm somewhat sympathetic to the use of -- to deploying the military in a country where the police are incredibly corrupt and have very little capacity for dealing with the cartels. The question is what are you really trying to achieve because let's assume -- the best scenario -- that we are able to dismantle these cartels. Is that really a possibility? And if it's not -- and is a possibility as long as consumption remains the way it does in the U.S. and Europe of marijuana, cocaine, whatever? If it's not a possibility, then what should our goals be? Now, the goal of Calderon is to sort of break up the cartels into small cartels. Okay. We've done that in Colombia -- cocaine continues to flow, influence in politics continues. So is that a good strategy? Is that going to actually kind of resolve the problem? It may lower the incidence of violence but it's not a very happy scenario. ARKIN: Well, you've lead into my last set -- excuse me. Go ahead. WECHSLER: I just want to say, measure of success here is critically important. If your measure of success is that there's no crime then there's no crime in the history of the world that will ever meet that measure of success. The measure of success I would argue is first and foremost that this criminal activity does not oppose a national security threat to the United States or the country. That's the problem in Mexico is that it has risen to the point where there are ungoverned spaces. In Colombia I think I have to make sure that I leave the audience with perhaps a different -- an alternative view point than the one that you suggested earlier. You know, I was out of the government from the end of the Clinton administration until the beginning of the Obama administration. When I left, over two-thirds of the Colombian people believed that the FARC, that it was going to take Bogotá and was going to take over the whole government. When you look at it at the time, if you look at the areas that the Bogotá government actually controlled, you are not too far out of Bogotá. The situation today is a night and day difference. When I come back into government it is amazing has been changed. Everything that you criticized is absolutely true as well. There is still a tremendous flow of narcotics going up. This is not the kind of conflict where a statue comes down and everyone recognizes that as the victory point. This is a long, methodical process that has already taken over a decade since -- (inaudible) -- Colombia and it's going to take another decade to deal with the wider problems. There are human rights problems. There are continuing problems that go on. But the security situation is a night and day difference down to the point that you made about the justice situation. You would never have said that about the Colombian justice system at the end of the last decade what you said about the Colombian justice system at the end of this decade. And about what comes in -- you said about going for other alternatives and building up what they call the CCAI is designed to so exactly that and this is a Colombian effort, not ours -- it started about four or five years ago -- but it's had real demonstrable progress in building up the areas that have been taken in what we at the Pentagon would see as a classic counterinsurgency strategy to hold and then to build. So there is no shortage of challenges for the Colombian government. The Colombian government would be the very first to talk about them. But I think we do ourselves a disservice if we don't realize how incredibly far they've come, not only to give them credit but as a lessons -- as part of the lessons learned for what we might think about in other context and in other places. There is a road -- there is a path to go down. We're not in end zone yet but we've come a huge degree. ARKIN: I'm going to ask each of you, before I open it up to our guests, what would you do if you had your will, Will, to change our policies or actions to diminish the threat to our country? And I am assuming right now -- the question assumes -- that these cartels are at the very height of their power. They have not become more limpid as time has gone on. They have become more dangerous-- the fact they don't even have free speech any longer in Northern Mexico. WECHSLER: If I could wave a magic wand, of course, you'd get rid of the demand problem in the United States. ARKIN: All you have to do is speak, no magic wands. WECHSLER: You know, that's, of course, a critical element of everything that we do. The other things that I would suggest is amongst the lessons that we've learned in the Colombian context is that requires the government in question to have the critically strong and consistent leadership of a kind that is very rare all around the world. When we have it, we need to take advantage of it. Secondly, we need a whole of government from the United States approach to these issues. The Department of Defense is not in any way, shape or form the lead agency on this. We are a supporting agency. We have some capabilities and skills that are appropriate for these jobs but other agencies have the authorities, have the skills that are vastly more important for these jobs. So we need a whole of government approach to this. And then the one thing that we haven't done a good job -- ARKIN: Do we have that? WECHSLER: We have had that in Colombia. That's part of the success story. ARKIN: Aside from Colombia, do we have what you said, the whole government -- WECHSLER: We have not applied all the lessons of Colombia elsewhere yet. And the other thing that I would say that we didn't really do even well in Colombia is a wider regional approach because you end up getting the balloon effect where you're squeezing it in one place and then the drugs go someplace else. I don't think that was -- my recollection from the '90s is there's actually a judgment that the region perhaps wasn't ready for that kind of regional approach. It might be ready for that kind of regional approach now and it's certainly necessary if we're going to address it more successfully. ARKIN: Lee, if you were the anti-cartel czar -- like the pay czar -- what would you do? WOLOSKY: Well, we may need such a czar because I want to underscore the point that Will made about viewing this problem from a government wide basis. I mean, in many ways our government is still set up to fight states and increasingly, as we know from 9/11, the challenges that we face emanate from non-state actors. And much of the progress that's been made in the past eight years has really been in response to this specific terrorism threat, al Qaeda in particular, but it has not yet addressed these other very important challenges from non-state actors that are not strictly terrorist organizations. And so I'm mostly being facetious about the need for another czar but the point is that -- you know, Will's point is very important. We need to devise a better approach that incorporates the different parts of our government to address these problems. Additionally, we need stronger governance because the reason why we have these problems frequently is because of weak governance in certain states that do not have the ability to fight these organizations that take root on their soil. ARKIN: Dave? HOLIDAY: I don't disagree with anything that's been said. ARKIN: Say more. HOLIDAY: But I will say more. Well, first of all, I agree with the regional approach. The problem is is that -- actually, let me start back. I think there's some good things that the Obama administration has done that is different. There has been an effort to coordinate -- creating this International Organized Crime Task Force or something. The Defense Department is not a member of that. Every other agency in Washington is. So even though it's an international organized crime -- so I'd be curious to understand why that is. But there's clearly sort of been turf battles and turf wars that have gone on that have inhibited the fight against organized crime. The drug czar that has traditionally also tackled international issues has importantly kind of discarded the notion of a war on drugs -- because it's a war that you can't win I would suspect is one of the reasons -- and really started to focus more on prevention and treatment, death related drug issues and kind of breaking the ties between the drugs and crime. And I think that's a very positive thing. I think on the international level, we haven't kind of come up with a new approach. So to go to what we should do, I think the regional approach is important. Unfortunately, that regional approach is happening and the U.S. isn't part of it. The base agreement that the U.S. just signed with Colombia really irked a lot of the South American countries in particular. And it's not just Chavez. It's Brazil and Chile and Argentina and they're all looking to some kind of cooperation that does include the U.S. So the U.S. has a lot to offer and they have a big task in front of them if they're going to sort of engage with the rest of Latin America. I also think that just as we're focusing on demand reduction and essentially decriminalization, as we sort of -- as we leave it to the states to look at medical marijuana laws or decide to move our resources not towards breaking up medical marijuana dispensaries and sort of different initiatives coming out of states to decriminalize, I think we need to allow that to go forward in Latin America as it is going forward because Will mentioned the sort of -- we are the principal producers of marijuana as it turns out that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations are controlling part of that market, the DEA says that 65 percent of the Mexican drug cartels' profits come from marijuana, not from cocaine. So what happens to the business model of the cartels if we decriminalize, if we legalize? Now, we can't do that, as Francisco Thoumi pointed out, until we change the international conventions. So that's another struggle. But I think we have to look at a different paradigm for approaching this issue that's not -- and I totally agree in terms of improving governance and police and judicial apparatuses. One other thing I would just say there, the U.S. seems to be exporting a lot of the RICO like kind of statutes in terms of wiretapping and special courts or asset forfeiture, that sort of thing. Again, Colombia -- a lot of the wiretapping -- when you export these sort of tools to countries in which there's not great accountability, you run into problems and we have the case of Colombia this year where the intelligence service was found to be spending a lot of time fighting on human rights organizations, on opposition politicians including -- you know, there's wiretapped phone calls with U.S. Embassy personnel. So I think those -- now, that kind of thing comes out because of the press often and not because of horizontal accountability institutions like the courts. So I think that's something we need to be concerned about. I think a lot of RICO kinds of procedures are useful but we need to be careful. ARKIN: It leads me just to the last question I'm going to ask before I open it up which -- you talk about the press. There is no free press in Northern Mexico. You agree with that. That is to say -- HOLIDAY: Well, they're intimidated. Yes. ARKIN: It's edited by bullets. HOLIDAY: Yes. There's a lot of self-interest. ARKIN: And we have just below us in Northern Mexico, we have lawlessness, thousands of killing. Is that a law enforcement problem, a governance problem? And what can we directly do about that aside from doing what we did earlier in the last century? Who rode across the border and captured Pancho Villa? But we can't do that now. There's U.N. What can you do about these major cartels? HOLIDAY: You're asking me? ARKIN: Send drones? No. WECHSLER: No. What we can do is while understanding all of the tremendous differences between our experience in Colombia and the experience in Mexico and other places, but we can nevertheless look at the lessons that we've learned in this great success. Everything that's being written now about Mexico I recall reading almost word for word the same articles about Colombia a decade ago. Those articles aren't being written about Colombia because of the successes that we've had. People forget that we didn't have President Uribe when Plan Colombia was started. We do have the advantage of having President Calderon in Mexico who has been very steadfast and very clear in his leadership on this issue. So we have a wonderful opportunity. And now -- and the last administration started taking advantage with the Merida Initiative and the question will be what comes after for the longer term work that needs to be done because this is a long-term issue. This issue is not solved in a matter of months of or years but in a matter of decades. ARKIN: I don't know if we solve what we do with these people in Northern Mexico but I'm sure some of the questions from you will help. If you stand, identify yourself, speak clearly and succinctly. The gentleman in the back there. QUESTIONER: Hello? My name is -- (inaudible). I work for the (Royalton Group ?). Organized crime in the U.S. -- clearly, if what you're saying about the consumption of narcotics in the U.S. is as large as you point, how is it possible that it gets distributed so widely within the U.S.? What are the networks that operate with a lot of impunity to carry out these tasks? And related to that is, is there also a similar network that distributes guns the other way and what are the -- is it so well organized in the United States that we don't even call it organized crime, we don't see it? Can you maybe touch on this point? ARKIN: Lee, I think you should take it. It's a legal question. WOLOSKY: Okay. Well, again, I'll dodge your question a little bit by saying that when we were in the government, when I was in the government and I think I can speak for Will too, although he's speaking for himself quite well, our function was really to stop at the water's edge. In other words, to look out from the water's edge. We didn't involve ourselves -- I didn't involve myself as a government official in domestic law enforcement contexts. So I have not a great deal of visibility on the local networks that are in many cases the end of a global network. You know, I will say, though that just from my experience as a practicing lawyer, certainly the distribution mechanisms in this country for drugs and for guns are very diverse. I mean, you have very well organized networks that are purely domestic in character, engaged in those activities. You have very fragmented and animistic participants engaged in those activities with really little connection to others either in this country or abroad. And you have groups in this country that are working very tightly with component parts that are upgrading outside of the United States. ARKIN: Dave? Will? Dave? Just I think the distribution systems in this country may depend to some extent upon the Mexican cartels. You see evidence of that. We have a huge Mexican population, not just in the southwest but all through our Midwest. And certainly some of those people are engaged in helping in distribution. Now, I don't know that that's a major problem which really is what exists just below the water, the Rio Grande, no questions. Rita. QUESTIONER: Rita Hauser. Will, you particularly laud the success in Colombia but you kind of glossed over the paramilitaries, the abuses that took place in human rights which now we're seeing in Mexico as well, Uribe's attempts to perpetuate his rule which has just (thwarted ?) but maybe will succeed. So it's a more mixed picture than I think you have presented. And I would like to ask at the same time of David how you see these kinds of things in Mexico. There's an article in the current Atlantic, Joe Stahl (ph) which I happened to read last evening which describes the horrendous situation in Northern Mexico particularly the complete corruption of the military and the author concludes that several states in effect has been what he calls a coup that those states are no longer really under the effective control of Calderon. And he asks the question whether or not Calderon's war on drugs which has taken some 14,000 lives and instituted a kind of mini-civil war was the right approach and worth the price? ARKIN: That's a wonderful question. Will, you have Rita suggesting in a way -- she didn't use the words -- but Northern Mexico may be like a failed state. She didn't say it though. WECHSLER: Let me -- first on Colombia. I did -- I'm sorry to leave the impression that there were no problems in Colombia. I tried to make the point I'll make again that civil rights, human rights issue have been a massive problem and will continue to be a significant problem for Colombia. That's the kind of problem that you don't solve. It's a continuing process. Things have improved but there are still concerns and those concerns have been made clear by everyone in our government and also are recognized by the Colombian government. The other areas that need to continue to challenge the Colombian government are continuing of the drug trafficking, again, the overall of volume of cocaine has not decreased the way that we would have wanted it to. And the movement from the FARC to the BACRIMs and the other criminal organizations including some with paramilitary ties -- we need to get on top of those as well. I don't want to leave the impression that we are declaring success and that we're dancing in the end zone with Colombia. We still have a way to go. But I do want to recognize -- to continue the sports metaphor -- about how far we have come down the field. I think to fail to do that would be to miss a very powerful story that I believe is generally underappreciated and one that also has lessons for the wider discussion we've having in Mexico and in other places around the world. ARKIN: Is Calderon becoming an Uribe in that regards? Rita was asking you, can the Mexican government cope with these huge cartels, heavily armed, who have corrupted the army, killed the police? What can they do to get back Northern Mexico? WECHSLER: I think what Calderon says is that we've seen the results of not taking action which is this problem getting bigger and bigger and bigger. And a number of the steps that the Calderon administration has taken have been very, very well received by the population and by the United States. And we look forward to ways to be helpful as they desire. But as I said before, this only works when the countries in question want the United States' help. We can't force it on them. And, speaking for the Department of Defense, we are, again, a supporting role and there are other parts of the United States government that will provide the leadership for the work that we will be doing at the Mexican government's request. I personally thought that that Atlantic article was very, very much overstated for my taste. ARKIN: Do you want to add to that, Dave? HOLIDAY: Well, just the comparison between the paramilitaries in Colombia and the drug cartels in Mexico. And Shannon or Andrew have probably better data on this but my understanding from the Mexico Institute report earlier this year is that most of the violence is not civilian sort of bystanders. Now, in Colombia, the paramilitaries early on functioned as a proxy army against the FARC and there were massacres. So that's a very different situation. You don't have that ideological component here and much of the violence is coming either between rival cartels or between the state -- you know, police, military. And there are obviously lots of civilian casualties but it's not quite the same. In terms of -- I still don't -- maybe at the end of the day we'll have an answer to how to resolve the problems in Northern Mexico. But it is true that whatever we do, unless we have a different approach, we're just going to push it somewhere else. You know, I spoke with the former prime minister of Haiti the other day and she was saying -- you know, concerned about the drug trafficking issue there and I said, well, actually, most of it's now going over Central America. But Secretary Clinton admitted to her, yes, to the extent we have success in Mexico, it's just going to go elsewhere. So we have to look realistically at a situation where we can't sort of engage every small government in the hemisphere and sort of deploy sources. That's just not going to work. It's going to get pushed somewhere. ARKIN: But it could be pushed a long way away? (Laughter.) The lady on the edge. I don't know your name. HOLIDAY: Maggie. QUESTIONER: Meg Crahan, Columbia University. In November of 2008, the attorney general of the state of Texas issued a report stating that approximately 20 percent of the human trafficking by cartels pass through or occurred in Texas. And he called upon the state legislature to adopt regulations in order to make the local authorities as well as the state authorities more empowered to deal with this problem. There's similar weakness both in Texas and California in terms of state banking regulation and elsewhere in terms of arms sales in the United States. Absent state regulation to empower local and state authorities, what can the federal government do to deal with the presence of criminal cartels in a number of areas within states and municipalities? ARKIN: So go to the lawyer first. WOLOSKY: That's a very, very, very -- ARKIN: I surrender my credentials (willingly ?). WOLOSKY: It's a very good question. Of course the federal government has prerogatives in both border control, human movement issues domestically and also with respect to the financial system. But you have identified a very important issue at least in terms of the financial system which is where I've spent most of my time looking and working in the past decade or so because to the extent that local law enforcement and local regulators have primary frontline responsibility for enforcement in many respects they are -- as is implicit in your question -- woefully under-funded, under -- they don't have the skills to deal with problems that are truly international in scope. They don't know what they're looking for in many cases and they don't know how to address it. You know, there's been a lot of work in this are in the past few years. A lot of the money, I believe, needs to come from the federal government. A lot of the training appropriately comes from the federal government whether it's in joint task forces or in other mechanisms. But it's a very important issue. Ironically, there's sort of a flipside to it which is local government that want to play in the international arena and put in place rules the prohibition their pension funds from making investments in certain -- they try to conduct -- certain jurisdictions have tried to conduct an independent foreign policy by -- through regulation, by indicating what state entities and state instrumentalities can and cannot invest in -- different problem but a part of the same coin in the sense that we do have local law enforcement, local regulators on the financial side which still are under-resourced and frankly just do not yet have the tools to deal with problems that are international in scope. ARKIN: I think also she may have been asking whether it would be feasible in this country to either close down or sternly regulate, severely regulate the sale of guns particularly in our southern states, or border states. QUESTIONER: (Off mike.) WOLOSKY: Yes. Good luck on that. ARKIN: What's that? Good luck. WOLOSKY: Good luck on that. ARKIN: The Second Amendment, I know. WOLOSKY: The Second Amendment poses a bit of a problem. ARKIN: Too many turkeys to shoot. WOLOSKY: Yes. ARKIN: The gentleman over here. QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Samuel Logan. I'm with Southern Pulse. I'd like to continue on the human smuggling angle a bit. When we talk about organized crime a lot of the focus happens to be on drugs and guns these days. My understanding is that in Mexico, when you talk about movement of product, illicit product from south to north, humans are second only to the drugs. So I couple that with the understanding that in countries like Honduras to June of this year and Ecuador and Colombia for a time they were very relaxed with visa restrictions allowing all sorts of people to come into their country with an easy stamp, three months, and on you go. So my question is in terms of considering the policy that we're pushing beyond the edge of the water, should we -- when we talk about the Merida Initiative or some sort of continuation of play in Colombia -- should there be a strong component towards human smuggling? And should that component be or not be bundled or coupled with considerations for immigration and deportation policy? Thank you. ARKIN: Does anybody volunteer? Good. HOLIDAY: Yes. I think it should be coupled with immigration reform specifically and I was heartened to see that the Obama administration has not given up on that before -- they're going to push something forward. I think the visa issue is one thing but, again, it's very clear that -- it feels clear to me -- that sort of efforts to seal the border, improve kind of transit in El Paso and California, sort of push things into Arizona, and all the reports, journalistic reports coming out of Mexico indicate that you can't cross the border anymore unless you pay the narcos. So this is what we've done. This is what our policy has done. We've sort of -- again, you drive things underground and you empower criminal organizations. If we have a more open, rational policy which I think this administration would like to push for -- in fact President Bush was fairly rational on this as well, just couldn't get it through Congress -- then I think we have a chance of reversing that situation. ARKIN: You think that narcos control immigration, that is to say illegal immigration to this country from the southern? HOLIDAY: There's quite a few reports indicating that. If you go and hang out on these sort of border towns along Arizona you can't get into the desert unless you -- in the old days you might have paid the cops and now you have to pay the narcos who have the cops under their control. ARKIN: I had the gentleman -- yes, sir. Then I'll get to you. QUESTIONER: I'm Francisco Thoumi. I'm from the University of Texas. I'm a Colombian Americans. Will, I hope you're right. I don't think you are. ARKIN: Who are you looking at when you say that? QUESTIONER: Will. Will. ARKIN: Will. QUESTIONER: So it's -- in the Uribe administration there were only 1.5 displaced persons national democratic security. I want to know who benefits from democratic security. Obviously they don't. Alvaro Uribe has institutionalized a lot of the state. He's concentrated power. You praise the justice system. There's a continuous clash between Alvaro Uribe and the justice system in Colombia. As I say, I hope you are right. I don't think the situation is sustainable. There's been economic growth with no employment and the concentration of wealth has increased dramatically especially in the countryside. So the question is where is the success? We might have short-term success I hope in the future. I totally disagree with you on that. I don't think there is. WECHSLER: What is -- perhaps you know. What's Uribe's latest approval rating inside Colombia? QUESTIONER: Sixty-four percent. Alvaro Uribe is the best president for Colombia because Alvaro Uribe is paternalistic, authoritarian, messianic and he also interprets the law in a way that he brings the law -- (inaudible) -- is the spirit of the law without breaking the law. The problem is not Alvaro Uribe. The problem is Colombian society. And if we do not make reforms that are serious in Colombia, the country will go to pot with Alvaro Uribe as president. ARKIN: Can you respond to that? WECHSLER: We obviously have a different point of view. I'd only look at where Colombia was, where it is today and where the population of Colombia itself feels about the situation. I would also note -- this is a little off topic but one thing that I didn't mention before is that Colombia is now in a position where it can help other countries. Again, it's an amazing thing to think about from the end of the last decade to this decade that they have made public offers to help in Afghanistan, made public efforts to help in training in a variety -- regionally in the Western hemisphere. ARKIN: But not in Venezuela? WECHSLER: Not in Venezuela. ARKIN: I think you had your hand up first. I'll try to get everybody. We have about 10 minutes. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. The question is for Lee. I was interested in what you said about the Taliban had an illicit aviation network run by a former Russian military official and with bases around the world. Was that Viktor Bout? WOLOSKY: Yes. QUESTIONER: Okay. So I understand that the U.S. used Viktor Bout's system -- was either to ferry materials to Afghanistan or Iraq. Isn't that true? WOLOSKY: I read those reports. QUESTIONER: So what does this say about the -- does one hand not know what the other is doing? What does it say about what the U.S. -- how serious it is in dealing with what was a huge threat? I mean, the Taliban now is perhaps our largest single security threat. And are there some other examples from Latin American that perhaps David could mention where we're doing the similar -- what seems to me -- actions that don't make a lot of sense? ARKIN: Thank you. David? HOLIDAY: I have to think about that. WOLOSKY: I'm glad the question was addressed to you. HOLIDAY: No. No. But I compare -- is there a Viktor Bout kind of scenario in Latin American and I have to think about. ARKIN: We'll pass for a moment while you're thinking. Gentleman -- QUESTIONER: Is there an answer for the first part? WOLOSKY: Well, it was that I read those reports. I mean, that happened. I don't know how that happened. That happened after I left the government. I think I'm on record saying that it boggles the mind how folks who were running the Iraq war could have used as a subcontractor, as I understand it on Pentagon contracts to deliver materials into Baghdad, someone who was years before running arms to the Taliban. ARKIN: We have yet to have anybody though on our payroll distributing narcotics in this country. That's true, isn't it? (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Was the U.S. trying to shut it down? What happened? ARKIN: Excuse me, Lucy. We have to have other people to ask. The gentlemen behind you. WECHSLER: There's one thing: Viktor Bout is in jail right now in Thailand for those who don't know the end of this story, and it remains to be seen whether or not they will extradite. ARKIN: You're talking about the -- (inaudible) -- in Mexico being extradited here? WOLOSKY: No. No. Thailand. WECHSLER: Viktor Bout is in jail. Viktor Bout is in Thailand, is in a Thai jail right now and we're awaiting extradition and it remains to be seen whether it will happen. And the Colombians sent a team over to Thailand to explain -- because it's actually involved -- the case involves the FARC -- to explain that the FARC is a terrorist organization and to help the case against Viktor Bout. This is one of many, many examples about -- again, as I was saying about these old stovepipes of issues -- they all come together these nexus, so all three stories that we were talking about come together right now in Thailand. ARKIN: You mean silos? WECHSLER: Silos. Sorry. ARKIN: But your question is what, really? QUESTIONER: Hi. Christopher Johnson, the RAND Corporation. I have just -- I just wanted to see if you guys could comment quickly -- you've been talking a bit about strategies sort of on the military side but I was wondering if you guys could comment on any sort of strategies the U.S. has sort of put in place to deal with some of the micro-problems of sort of recruitment and retention of the sort of the young male population in Latin America that have been heavily involved in -- ARKIN: David. HOLIDAY: Well, I would say we have an active policy of deporting criminals, some of whom have grown up in the U.S. helping out with their reinsertion into Central American societies. Pretty mum about sort of incarceration policies of these -- in fact, we built prisons in El Salvador where gangs are essentially in control of the entire prison. I don't think we have very good strategies at the moment. It feels like you're talking sort of at a street gang level or Mara Salvatrucha and that sort of thing. Sam Logan can talk a lot about that too. But -- yes. I think as part of the Merida Initiative there is a component there of supporting crime prevention especially in Central America but it's quite small in comparison to probably what is needed. ARKIN: I'm sorry. You were -- I'm trying to keep mental order of who put up their hands. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. (Brian O'Neill ?). I wanted to ask a question in this context of organized crime and threats bearing in mind what Will's reminded us a couple of times of not dealing with these issues in silos whether it's criminal or terrorist or national security interest. What do we know about state sponsored activities in Venezuela, whether activities or funding out of the country or other countries but destabilizing democratic institutions for perpetuating or funding or encouraging undemocratic behaviors. Honduras comes to mind, Nicaragua comes to mind, Ecuador and Bolivia. Looking forward, perhaps the election in Peru coming up and that perhaps the connection between the state of Venezuela and the state of Iran and even Hezbollah which I hear props up every once in a while in a Bolivian context or even a Peruvian context. ARKIN: Will, that sounds like a national defense question. WECHSLER: Yes. We obviously have very significant concerns and I think that the clearest statement of them is that the fact that Venezuela is decertified in the U.S. government system as being fundamentally non-cooperative in our efforts. That tends to happen when there are -- not the situation I was referring to before when folks are overwhelmed by a problem but when folks are part of the problem themselves. ARKIN: Does that answer your question? QUESTIONER: Perhaps there's much that you can say. (Laughter.) HOLIDAY: I mean, I think that Venezuela gives a lot of aide to these other countries. But it's often going -- I don't know that it's related to organized crime as much as sort of propping up populist movements or -- now, in some cases though -- and Nicaragua is a very worrying case for me and I think to the extent that Chavez is propping up that regime which has become increasingly authoritarian if not already. I mean, they've sort of had a coup of their own by judicial decree. So I think that's concerning. How that plays into the organized crime issue, I'm not so sure yet. ARKIN: Let's continue our menu of frustrations. In the back. QUESTIONER: Paula Cling (ph) from Semana News magazine in Colombia. You all commented on the strong leadership of Uribe. I just wanted to know about post-Uribe like following on the gentleman's question about weak institutions that might be left behind, any vacuums he might leave behind like a post-Uribe Colombia. ARKIN: I don't know whether to say we hope we get somebody as good as Uribe or as bad. WECHSLER: I think that the main interest of the United States is to ensure that the working relationship that we developed is one that's between countries and will continue no matter what the situation I think when president -- I'll just defer to what President Obama said when he met with Uribe and commented clearly on the position of the United States government for a progress that follows constitutional norms. QUESTIONER: Hi. Kara McDonald with the Council on Foreign Relations. We speak frequently of whole of government approaches and the need for not just military and political approaches but also socioeconomic approaches, the question about the young male population. And, Will, you mentioned both the demand side as well as the supply side and the importance of that. To what degree in the U.S. government today is there an integration of the domestic policy discussion of addressing drug use in America, the demand problem, with the strategies in our foreign affairs and our national security apparatus to deal in a whole of government way? And then very quickly. I'm wondering in the nexus between organized crime and other illicit activities, what evidence have we seen of the nexus between organized crime and proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies? WECHSLER: I'd say that our drugs are -- Karl Krouski (ph) is very much focused on exactly what you're talking about about bringing both the supply and the demand side to the U.S. to work together. And from what I've seen, he's -- I've been impressed with his focus on all of this. On the proliferation side, we definitely see criminal organizations involved in widespread weapons proliferation. On the nuclear side in particular we've seen -- there have been publicized reports but I'm probably not going to go past that. WOLOSKY: I mean, on that last part I consider the A.Q. Khan network to have been an international criminal network in certain respects. It bore more of the indicia that international criminal groups bear in terms of how it stored and moved money, how it moved people around and things of that sort, how it used different jurisdictions to do that. ARKIN: I don't know that it's appropriate to end this on the issue of the relationship between narcotics and nuclear weapons but the time says I have. So thank you all for coming. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2009, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. JIM LINDSAY: I'm Jim Lindsay, director of studies and vice president here at the council. It's my great pleasure and honor to welcome you all here today to the Council on Foreign Relations Symposium on "Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: An Overlooked Threat." We are holding today's symposium in collaboration with the Latin American Program and the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Dr. Andrew Selee, director of Latin American Program is here and I want to just thank you to Andrew and his organization for agreeing to cosponsor the symposium. What I would like to do -- and it's of course always important to note that we can't do the sort of program we do here at the council without the support and generosity of a number of people who I'd like to just mention right here. First is Rita Hauser. Rita Hauser is here in the front row. Rita has been a generous supporter of the council over the years and has given us a gift that makes it possible for us to engage in these sort of annual conferences where we reach out and collaborate with another think tank. And it's been an important contribution to the council. I want to say thank you very much, Rita. Second -- today's event is made possible by the Tinker Foundation, which has supported our work in Latin America. And I believe Nancy Truitt is somewhere in the room, a senior adviser to the Tinker Foundation but perhaps I got it wrong. Last, I want to thank the Robina Foundation which has underwritten the council's brand new initiative on international institutions and global governance, which has been an effort to try to look at international institutions as they exist at the beginning of the 21st century and try to devise more effective avenues for promoting multilateral cooperation. What brings us here today for discussion is based on the observation that the illicit flow of goods, money, information and people is an increasing source of tension in relations between the developed countries and developing countries. Nowhere is this more true than in the Western hemisphere. Latin America is a major source of cocaine and many other illegal substances for the U.S. market, as well as for Europe. And the problems created by the drug trade increasingly coming to dominate U.S.-Hemispheric relations. Within the hemisphere, Mexico has emerged as the newest power center for organized crime. A couple of decades ago Mexico was largely viewed as a transit country for illegal drugs from Colombia. Today, Mexican drug trafficking organizations now are a major player of their own. They are a major presence in source countries such as Bolivia and Colombia. They control supply routes through Central America and they control drug distribution rings here in the United States. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in its "2008 National Drug Threat Assessment" that, and I quote, "Mexican drugs trafficking organizations now represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States." It's also worth pointing out that the rise of Mexican drug trafficking organizations has been a major threat to democracy in Mexico and it's created a wide number of problems south of the border. The reality is that the transnational nature of organized crime means that unilateral policies or policies that simply rely on doing something at the border will not work. Multilateral cooperation is essential. Unfortunately, I think it's fair to say that the governments of the Western hemisphere have yet to develop adequate multilateral responses. We instead see a wealth of different and conflicting policy choice and drug traffickers have been able to exploit the lack of coordinated governmental response. And that brings us to the subject of today's symposium. And the symposium essentially has three main goals: first is to try to assess the state of organized crime situation in the Western hemisphere and discuss its underlying causes. Second, the symposium today is looking to analyze the local, national and regional strategies that have been pursued so far to identify those strategies that are counterproductive as well as those best practices that should be emulated and extended. Third, the purpose of today's symposium is to generate concrete policy ideas for combating organized crime in the Western hemisphere. And we're going to have three panels. The first panel will look at "Organized Crime and Transnational Threats" in the hemisphere, essentially an effort to explain or review the expansion of organized crime networks in the region. Panel two is entitled "Local and National Policy Responses." Here we're going to move to discuss local and national experiences, policy responses, and the lessons learned in Colombia and Mexico. And the third panel "Hemispheric and Multilateral Reponses" is going to review the national and regional policies of the United States toward organized crime. One last thing that's probably the most important thing I have here to do today is to A, tell you that this is on the record -- people are speaking for the record -- and the most important thing actually is to say if you have one of these little devices, a Blackberry or a cell phone, anything that can go beep in the middle of, if you could turn it off or put it on mute, we would greatly appreciate it. Once again, I want to thank you very much for coming here today. And now I'm going to turn it over to Stanley Arkin to introduce the first panel. STANLEY S. ARKIN: Thank you. This is a very distinguished panel in that all of them have extraordinary experience which touches or thinks about organized crime without actually participating in it. And, by the way, there's no -- (inaudible) -- today. DAVID HOLIDAY: Are you sure? ARKIN: I hope not in your case. David Holiday, who has spent a very big piece of his life working on civil rights or decent living in Central America and he is now an officer of the Open Society Institute and in particular in Latin American focus. Lee Wolosky -- I've known for years. He's a very fine lawyer. He works for David Boies. He does international cases. We even worked on one or two together. And he worked at the White House working with transnational risks and has a lot to say about organized crime. This is not because he works for a large law firm, but because he has insights that go beyond that in a scholarly way. And Will Wechsler is a deputy under secretary at of our Department of Defense. We'll ask some interesting issues as to why we have the Department of Defense doing something we always think in this country the Department of Justice does or even worldwide. And let me start by saying that organized crime is a very, very embracive two words. It can mean anything from the people down the street who form a neighborhood gang, Bloods, Crips, can be Hell's Angels and up to what we ordinarily in this country think of as organized crime -- it's always Italian which shows the extraordinary quality of this country and its melting pot qualities changed substantially so that the Italians are now being very much competed with by the Russians and the Vietnamese and the Hmong and virtually every other kind of nationality which forms its own organized crime of one kind or another. We're focusing here, as Jim said, on organized crime in this hemisphere because I think largely the enormous narcotics problem and probably people problem. By that I mean, immigration and perhaps even people which are forced into particular kinds of occupations which we don't like or think are right. Let me start by asking Lee Wolosky, a legal scholar, how you would define this kind of transnational organized crime and give us a bit of your insight as to how it was formed and functions. LEE S. WOLOSKY: Sure. But let me answer not as a legal scholar, if I may, but as a policy person or a former policy person. ARKIN: I agree. WOLOSKY: I think that the primary characteristic of what we're talking about in this forum and what we should be talking about in this forum is whether or not a particular activity impacts national security or impacts the foreign policy objectives of the United States and therefore rises beyond a law enforcement problem to a problem that requires broader components of the U.S. government including the Department of Defense to have a role in resolving it. And that is in fact how this issue sort of came about, international organized crime as a national security issue was first identified by President Clinton, who was fond of talking about initially something called the dark side of globalization. And Clinton would go around in the mid-'90s in the White House talking to its White House staff about all the bad things that attended the end of the Cold War all the bad collateral effects that came from the increased mobility -- ARKIN: Organized crime did precede President Clinton. WOLOSKY: Absolutely. ARKIN: Good. WOLOSKY: But I think the point I would leave this group with -- and I'll stop here -- just to respond to your question is that I think organized crime as a national security problem did not precede President Clinton. President Clinton was the first president to stand up in a speech that he gave at the United Nation, actually the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, and he said, international organized crime is a threat to the national security of the United States and I'm going to do a variety of things including signing a document called a presidential decision directive, PDD 42, which said as much and instructed his federal bureaucracy, not just law enforcement but other parts of the federal government to devise certain responses. Now, it's true and appropriate for this forum that the very first action that was taken under this new presidential directive was a targeted campaign of really warfare against the Cali Cartel in Colombia because the president had identified international narcotics trafficking as being perhaps at that time the prototype or the archetype of international organized crime. But there followed from that a number of other groups and organizations that were targeted under that basic step. ARKIN: But the Cali cartel, renowned as a narcotics cartel with all kinds of stories coming out about their culture, how they live together and recruited and impacts they've had on their country, Colombia, but were they an organized crime group just out to make money breaking some fundamental laws or did they also have a political quality to them? Were they allied with the FARC, say, for example, which made it more of a transnational problem? WOLOSKY: Well, that's something that I think maybe one of our regional experts would want to speak to more than I would. But certainly I think that in Colombia under that basic framework we identified both independent and forces that were acting together that impacted the national security of the United States. So not only did we go to war with the drug cartels under this framework but we proceeded to designate not only the FARC but the ELN and other groups that were destabilizing Colombia as foreign terrorist organizations. And then we, again, under the same framework -- but again on the implementation I'll defer to others -- we launched Plan Colombia in 2000, which has had a very profound effect in stabilizing Colombia. ARKIN: Just so we're complete in terms organized crime in Colombia, South America, in this hemisphere, narcotics may be the major business, but you would agree that money laundering which flows from that and obviously has an impact upon on our financial systems and then people movements, immigrants being extracted or placed in other countries and perhaps even slavery of some kinds is also a part of their business. That's true as well? WOLOSKY: Absolutely. And many of the groups that we came to target were not only drug trafficking organizations but were alien smuggling operations, human trafficking organizations which typically trafficked women into prostitution. Arms trafficking organizations, organizations that we were concerned had the ability and willingness to traffic in radiological or radioactive and other types of materials. So yes, not just drugs but a lot of other bad stuff as well. ARKIN: Now, is there anything perhaps I ought to ask you, David, which makes this kind of organized crime more a part of the at least ostensibly legitimate governments which exist in South America, Central America and Mexico? Is there a greater intertwining of organized crime in those countries than say there is in this country? HOLIDAY: Sure. That's clearly been the case in Colombia and Mexico and increasingly in Central America especially Guatemala where this year we sort of learned about the para-politics scandal in Colombia in which the paramilitaries which are essentially drug trafficking organizations have bought off any number of congresspeople and other including the cousin of the president who's in jail currently. In Mexico, there're sort of large -- there are different estimates about what sort of percentage of the territory is governed in a sense alternatively by drug traffickers from 8 percent to much higher. But, yes, both the economy and the politics are extremely penetrated. In Guatemala there's -- for many years there's been talk of a parallel government, a parallel power that essentially is the sort of power behind the throne so electoral politics starts to mean less and less in these kinds of situations. Can I go back and ask Lee, though, what is it about international organized crime that is a national security threat? Is it -- for example, with the drug traffickers -- is it the introduction of illicit drugs into a country? ARKIN: We were leaving that for Will. HOLIDAY: Okay. That's fine. Whoever. I don't want to -- but I'm left with that sort of what's our definition. ARKIN: That's a great question. HOLIDAY: And is there any international organized crime that is not a national security threat? WOLOSKY: Do you want to answer that? WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Sure. ARKIN: This is not counting Pancho Villa. WECHSLER: Yes. There are certainly lots of crime and organized crime that goes on all around the world that's not a national security threat. We risk overwhelming our national security apparatus by expanding the definition too large. But I'll give you some examples of some things that clearly are national security threats and are recognized as such and have been increasingly recognized as such over the last two decades of fairly linear progression across multiple administrations where we have very clear enemies of the United States, some of which we're fighting right now, that are funded by the proceeds of organized crime, organized crime that's a threat to the national security interests of the United States. Where we have criminal organizations who are threatening the basic governance or are threatening the legitimacy of a state that is an ally or of great interest, particular interest to the United States, that is also a clear national security interest to the United States. It is both of those areas where the work of the U.S. government expands beyond the traditional law enforcement agencies and involves the wider national security community. ARKIN: Is there an aspect of our national justice agencies or Department of Justice, leave out our state prosecutorial agencies, but the FBI, Department of Justice being intrusive in these South American, Central American countries in terms of what we ask of them, in terms of what we expect of them? And I'm not talking just about renditions or extraditions. WECHSLER: Well, there are a lot of lessons learned from the relatively powerful and underappreciated successes that we've had in Colombia over the last decade on the security side. And one of the clear lessons learned is that you need to have clear, strong leadership in the country in question that's willing to cooperate with the United States as the one who lead these efforts -- that's we're going to have the sort of spine of steel that we've seen from Uribe -- and then willing to accept the help from our law enforcement organizations on terms that work for them. When we find ourselves in situations where we don't have an adequate partner, then not only do you run into some of these questions that you just raised, but in the end of the day the work is not that effective. ARKIN: But more to the point, we don't allow Mexican or Guatemalan or Brazilian law enforcement officers to roam around this country while they seek to penetrate our organized crime of which we have some for sure, whereas we have our people doing just that, whether they're flying airplanes that are on the ground. WECHSLER: Everything that we would do in these areas would be with the -- if it's done effectively would be with the cooperation of the local government. The local government has to ask us to be there, has to want this kind of assistance. Typically, they've gotten there but they found that the enemy that they're against has vastly more resources than the state itself, has vastly more capabilities than the state itself. And that's the challenge that they find themselves in and so then they look for resources -- when they choose to combat this threat they find themselves looking for resources outside their state. And when it works very well as it has over the last decade in Colombia, it is a methodical long-term plan of shared responsibility between not only the United States and the countries in question but the wider international community as well. ARKIN: But aside from Colombia, wouldn't it be true that every Northern, South American country and every Central American country, save maybe Honduras today, has some resentment about American law enforcement officers coming in? WECHSLER: Well, it's -- I don't know I would be so sweeping but I would say -- and I defer a lot -- ARKIN: And left out Colombia. WECHSLER: I defer a lot of this to my colleagues in the Justice Department who work more directly. But what I would say is that where this works is where we are working in concert with the government in question. In some places in this hemisphere we're working in great concert. It's not just in Colombia but in others we're not at all. And when we're not, when you don't have that leadership, you end up finding the countries in a very challenging situation. ARKIN: Dave, could you talk about why in the last 20 years -- I think some people said 10, 20 -- 20 years where we've recognized this is a serious problem and not before? HOLIDAY: Well, to the extent that we're talking about drug trafficking I do think there is -- I wouldn't entirely root it in this but the 1988 U.N. Convention on Drugs, which sort of set a framework in which by definition any possession of illicit drugs should be criminalized. And I think that we've seen a lot of changes over the last 20 years. I'm going to speak in very broad strokes here so I hope I don't simplify it. But when I look at the kinds of policies that have emanated from a sort of both a military and a criminal prosecution of the situation, I think you can see a lot of -- that we've often contributed to the problem more than we've helped. In the U.S., the sort of the prison population has grown enormously due to the incarceration of often non-violent drug offenders. Prisons both in the United States and in Latin America have become factories for organized crime. ARKIN: Just a minute. We know that the U.S. has more people per capita in jail than any country in the world. HOLIDAY: That's right. And we often -- I would be interested to know, for example -- we don't know a lot about our counter-narcotics sort of treaties and agreements. They're often secret agreements. But I know that 10 years ago Ecuador -- we conditioned our counter-narcotics assistance on an increase in arrests, again, just blossoming their prison population in the current government, which is not considered an ally but is taking perhaps a different approach to how to deal with this kind of problem. So that's one thing. The other issue is I think that Colombia has become because there was this ideological component, obviously a civil war in Colombia, and it became tied up with the drug war, that sort of came on to our radar. Now, there are scholars who argue that a lot of, again, our policies of trying to attacking the FARC in particular and the ELN in Colombia -- the guerrilla organizations -- was counterproductive -- eradication policies which sort of pushed the local population into the hands of the guerrillas and increased their political capital because we were not prepared to offer alternative livelihoods. And frankly, the problem is with a lot of these strategies, which we're sort of now importing to Mexico, is that the sort of direct confrontation with the drug cartels has not necessarily reduced the flow of drugs. And so it's hard for me to look at Colombia and say that there's a success there because organized crime, one of the -- when you're a clandestine or sort of underground organization it's much easier to adapt and the governments and the other forces are much slower to adapt. And we've seen sort of the emergence of smaller cartels. So it's not just the FARC that's doing drug trafficking but also these other cartels from former paramilitaries. So I think -- I don't see that that has been successful at all. In the case of Mexico one can argue, as some have done -- Vanda Felbab-Brown from the Brookings Institution has written about this -- that sort of pushing to sort of confront the cartels increased the violence and instilled sort of -- the jury is still out as to whether that's going to somehow reduce violence in the long run, reduce the political power of the cartels. Certainly I think the sort of level of influence of cartels both in Colombia and Mexico is still pretty immense. ARKIN: Is there any justice system south of the border -- certainly Canada has a justice system but it's quite small compared to ours -- is there any justice system south from the border including Central America, Mexico, South America which you can speak of respectfully? HOLIDAY: Actually, the Colombian justice system isn't bad. ARKIN: Except for Colombia. HOLIDAY: And Chile I would say. ARKIN: Chile? HOLIDAY: Chile. ARKIN: Ever been in a Chilean jail? HOLIDAY: No. ARKIN: Ever been in a Mexican jail? HOLIDAY: I haven't been in either, no. But in terms of sort of respect for the rule of law and sort of independence of the judiciary I think there are -- probably I would say Chile. But Colombia, surprisingly, is not bad and that's again another interesting thing. It's not -- to the degree that there's been any sort of prosecution of organized crime I think you can attribute it more to police work and the judicial authorities and not to sort of military interventions. Military approaches tend to just spread the problem around. The reason drugs are coming out of Venezuela now is because we've had some success in controlling the borders or the distribution from Colombia so it all goes now through Venezuela. Mexico is spilling over into Guatemala. So there's no -- we don't have a sort of an overall vision of how to sort of approach this problem. WOLOSKY: Let me -- if I may -- HOLIDAY: Sure. WOLOSKY: Let me answer the question that you asked before which was how does it really affect the national security of the United States. I think I'll answer in then on-Western hemisphere context if that's okay just because first, I'm not an expert in the Western hemisphere, and secondly, because I recognize that there's a lot of debate around counter-narcotics policy specifically. But I'll give you two examples that I think sort of crystallize it from the standpoint of the place that both Will and I sat in the Clinton administration and me for the first part of the Bush administration. We discovered that there was a -- we asked ourselves the question, how is the Taliban in Afghanistan, when it was in place, supplying itself? How were they getting stuff in contravention of a variety of sanctions regimes? We found that there was an illicit aviation network that had over 100 planes upgrading out of the former Russian military official who had commandeered hundreds of, or scores of planes, big planes, cargo planes that he was using out of bases all over the world. He was registering them in some jurisdictions. He was keeping them in other jurisdictions. He employed dozens of people, hundreds of people in furtherance of this illicit project. Now, what he was bringing into Afghanistan for the Taliban and perhaps for others on those planes we presumed to be weapons. We presumed to be money. We presumed to be other material support that was necessary for the regime's survival. That became a problem that was sort of separate and distinct from the issue of how do we deal with al Qaeda. How do we deal with the Taliban? And became how do we deal with this aviation network? And that was a national security problem because we had a very clear interest in shutting off the Taliban's ability to survive. Another problem -- when we were pursuing -- in the earlier phases of NATO expansion we found that many of the countries that were candidates for NATO membership were ones that had problems with international organized crime. And not only did they have problems with international organized crimes, specifically emanating from the former Soviet Union, but those organized crime bodies were embedded in the governance structure of the countries that were being proposed for NATO membership. So the question became how do we assure the integrity of the command and control mechanism of NATO if and when NATO is expanded into some of these countries? So these are clearly, I would say, problems that transcend law enforcement and they become problems that impact the foreign policy interest and the national security interest of the United States writ large. And they, therefore, require sort of all the folks from most part of the government, all the folks from other parts of the government to figure out how to address them and in cases where we believe that we can actually take down some of these organizations to actually put in place mechanisms to take them down. ARKIN: Lee has touched upon the next subject, which I think we should go to which is what are the commonalities -- which is one question -- and then the connections -- the other question -- between these cartels? We're not talking about street organized crime, these international cartels, Mexican and others, to what we now dub terrorist groups. Will? And certainly the Taliban would be -- WECHSLER: Yes. I mean, in some cases they're one and the same. The FARC was designated as a terrorist organization and as a narcotics trafficking organization. Narcotics and other organized crime support many terrorist organizations. I'm heart pressed to think of a terrorist organization that does not use organized crime as a way to help fund and manage its logistics in one way or the other. Some are much more expert and have been doing this for a long time, organizations like Hezbollah. When an organization establishes the infrastructure for trafficking, for moving things illicitly, those who desire to move things illicitly will make use of that infrastructure and we see that all around the world. ARKIN: Yes, but are any of these organizations we call international criminal cartels, international crime, are they a major bank rolling or other support facility for things like al Qaeda? WECHSLER: Again, most criminal organizations are out to make money first and foremost. There are some that have -- they're ideologically based organizations or territorial-based organizations that have other aspirations as well and use organized crime to further those. And there can be a wonderful debate about are they first and foremost a criminal organization or are they first and foremost an ideological organization or a terrorist organization. But I think what's a powerful point to understand is once -- even if the criminal organizations have no ideological objectives, even if they have no wider objectives beyond making money, once they establish the infrastructure necessary to move things illicitly, what we tend to see is that that infrastructure is taken advantage of by other organizations that want to employ it for their own ends. It doesn't mean that they do it a tremendous amount -- different organizations do it to different degrees -- but we definitely see that. ARKIN: Is that by force or agreement? WECHSLER: It's by mutual benefit. If the criminal organization is looking to make money and someone provides them a way to do that, they will quite often take them up on that. ARKIN: And what's different though in Afghanistan than it is in Mexico? WECHSLER: It's very different. ARKIN: And that difference is? HOLIDAY: But just a question to you, Will. I know there's a concern about the sort of pipeline being used by other criminals or terrorists but are there any cases yet of al Qaeda using the drug cartels or the human smuggling networks from Mexico into the United States? Do we know? WECHSLER: From Mexico in the United States or -- HOLIDAY: Yes. Yes. Yes. WECHSLER: The question before was a global phenomenon. HOLIDAY: No. No. I'm just -- WECHSLER: But Mexico to the United States, no. HOLIDAY: We don't have one. WECHSLER: We don't have that. I mean, there're a lot of overstatement that have been made in the last year about this dynamic of the threat from Mexico, the threat -- the problems in Mexico are quite serious, are big challenges and the president there is taking many very powerful steps against them. And the progress that's been made and the changes in the even U.S.-Mexican dynamic on this issue have been quite powerful in a relatively short period of time. That all said, Mexico is not a failed state. It's not going to be a failed state. There's not this massive spillover of violence right across the border. I mean, you go to Ciudad Juarez which is one of the most dangerous places in the world and right across the border is El Paso which I think is the third most safe city in America of its size. All these things which are very much hyped in the press we don't see. There is wider -- ARKIN: You don't see -- (inaudible)? WECHSLER: There are some. The wider implication that I was gong to say is not the spillover like directly across the border though there are some places where we -- but the wider spillover of Mexican criminal organizations, very far from the border that have a very powerful role to play in the criminality in the United States. That's what's been building up over longer periods of time. There are places in the park system in California where industrial size marijuana production is being done by the Mexican drug cartels. I mean, this is -- it's that kind of spillover that's much more significant than the kind that gets more of the press of in a border town there being violence. HOLIDAY: So it seems that while terrorist organizations may be able to take advantage of organized crime networks, do they really need -- I mean, except from getting certain kinds of good to, for example, to pose a direct national security threat to the U.S., do they need organized crime? The U.S. is so porous, its border are so porous it's so easy to sort of get into the U.S. And in fact, one of the characteristics of organized crime is this sort of blurring of the lines between legal and illegal. There's a lot of legal enterprises that are used by organized crime. WECHSLER: The mechanisms, the skills, the models and then given the actual logistics are used by terrorist organizations all around the world. And we see it again and again and again. ARKIN: In combination with criminal cartels. WECHSLER: Absolutely. WOLOSKY: Yes. That does happen. There is a robust network of groups that operate transnationally that seem to know how to find each other with such effectiveness that sometimes when we were in government, we wondered why we couldn't find them as quickly as they found each other. But it is true that if you are a bad guy, whether you're a terrorist organization or another bad guy, and you need some specific thing, whether it's money moved, arms moved, you need a plane, you need something else, you need bad things moved, there are people that you can call and they'll do it and they do it for money. I mean, you may have -- you know, Will pointed to the distinction between terrorist groups which typically, at least in the scholarship we say that they have ideological objectives, you know, international organized crime groups are purely monetary ones but they do know how to find each other. There's ample example of them finding each other. And, you know, I think we spoke to some of the specific examples but they do find each other. WECHSLER: Just very briefly -- one of the strategic improvements in our thinking as a government over the last 10 to 15 years has been a moving away from this siloed approach to thinking about these issues that there are these kinds of criminals and these kinds of terrorists and these kinds of organizations. The reality is that there's a nexus between all of them and when the nexus impacts our national security we have to change the way that we think about national security. So in Afghanistan at the end of last year there was change in the rules of engagement for the drug trafficking organizations with ties to the insurgency to be a formal target of our military actions. In the previous ways of thinking, you would say there's insurgency and there's narcotrafficking. What we've learned is that, A, doesn't meet the facts, and B, hinders our ability to actually -- (inaudible). ARKIN: Is there any evidence of the very powerful, well-organized Mexican and South American cartels sort of Sinaloa cartel being active in forming relationships in Europe or in East Asia or in Southeast Asia? WECHSLER: Very much so. One of the dynamics that we see more recently is the narcotics that are coming out of South America, a lot of which are coming out of Venezuela and I would say that it's not just because of our success in Colombia -- ARKIN: No. WECHSLER: -- but there are some Venezuela specific issues that drive that -- going not only to the U.S. market but going to the European market. And when they look as businessmen to the European market they see that prices are higher. They see that demand has a way to go up for cocaine whereas it's relatively saturated and flat in the United States. And they see that the potential downside for action that is perhaps remote but quite catastrophic in the United States of being put in our jails and actually being caught is an extremely low probability in Europe. They just don't have the enforcement track record that we do. So over the next decade, one would expect an increasing proportion of the cocaine trade to be going to Europe and to the Middle East where it's even more profitable to do so. And one of the great challenges is that there are countries in the way in Western Africa that are already starting to and about to be swamped by this problem. The amount of resources that the cartels can throw at these countries will dwarf the amount of resources that these countries can, on their own, use to defend against this. ARKIN: Well, just a particular issue which is: are the Mexican cartels with their extraordinary distribution systems helping the Afghanis distribute their opium harvest? WECHSLER: I haven't seen anything along those lines. No. I mean, the vast majority of the opium harvest in Afghanistan goes to Europe not to the United States. ARKIN: And therefore, the Mexicans wouldn't be necessarily involved with it. WECHSLER: Yes. I haven't -- of all the problems that we have, that one I'd put away. ARKIN: I guess my question was further which is -- is this country the pronged or sole customer of the Sinaloa cartel and other cartels based in Mexico and the North and South America? WECHSLER: We consume 90 percent of all the cocaine that's coming up there. We -- as President Obama said when we went down to Mexico is that this is a co-responsibility for this. We have a co-responsibility for this problem. And as you said earlier, you know, there was a day when the Mexicans were just a transit state, just a transit state. And this is a common dynamic that we see all around the world is that in a variety of country they choose not to address this issue because they see themselves as being just a transit state. I don't know of any country in the world that has ever remained just a transit state. They eventually become massive users. They become massive organized crime. You can't -- countries make mistakes when they don't address this problem at an earlier stage and they wait until it becomes a massive internal problem. ARKIN: Have they become too powerful, Dave, to put down in Mexico? I know that you said there's not a failed government in Mexico. You said it three times. Not a failed government. So we'll just accept that as the rhythm. But is there power in that government to put down these cartels? HOLIDAY: I wish I had the solution here. ARKIN: I'm going to ask you in a while for one. HOLIDAY: It's easy to sort of critique the current strategy, although we do have to see that play. I mean, I'm somewhat sympathetic to the use of -- to deploying the military in a country where the police are incredibly corrupt and have very little capacity for dealing with the cartels. The question is what are you really trying to achieve because let's assume -- the best scenario -- that we are able to dismantle these cartels. Is that really a possibility? And if it's not -- and is a possibility as long as consumption remains the way it does in the U.S. and Europe of marijuana, cocaine, whatever? If it's not a possibility, then what should our goals be? Now, the goal of Calderon is to sort of break up the cartels into small cartels. Okay. We've done that in Colombia -- cocaine continues to flow, influence in politics continues. So is that a good strategy? Is that going to actually kind of resolve the problem? It may lower the incidence of violence but it's not a very happy scenario. ARKIN: Well, you've lead into my last set -- excuse me. Go ahead. WECHSLER: I just want to say, measure of success here is critically important. If your measure of success is that there's no crime then there's no crime in the history of the world that will ever meet that measure of success. The measure of success I would argue is first and foremost that this criminal activity does not oppose a national security threat to the United States or the country. That's the problem in Mexico is that it has risen to the point where there are ungoverned spaces. In Colombia I think I have to make sure that I leave the audience with perhaps a different -- an alternative view point than the one that you suggested earlier. You know, I was out of the government from the end of the Clinton administration until the beginning of the Obama administration. When I left, over two-thirds of the Colombian people believed that the FARC, that it was going to take Bogotá and was going to take over the whole government. When you look at it at the time, if you look at the areas that the Bogotá government actually controlled, you are not too far out of Bogotá. The situation today is a night and day difference. When I come back into government it is amazing has been changed. Everything that you criticized is absolutely true as well. There is still a tremendous flow of narcotics going up. This is not the kind of conflict where a statue comes down and everyone recognizes that as the victory point. This is a long, methodical process that has already taken over a decade since -- (inaudible) -- Colombia and it's going to take another decade to deal with the wider problems. There are human rights problems. There are continuing problems that go on. But the security situation is a night and day difference down to the point that you made about the justice situation. You would never have said that about the Colombian justice system at the end of the last decade what you said about the Colombian justice system at the end of this decade. And about what comes in -- you said about going for other alternatives and building up what they call the CCAI is designed to so exactly that and this is a Colombian effort, not ours -- it started about four or five years ago -- but it's had real demonstrable progress in building up the areas that have been taken in what we at the Pentagon would see as a classic counterinsurgency strategy to hold and then to build. So there is no shortage of challenges for the Colombian government. The Colombian government would be the very first to talk about them. But I think we do ourselves a disservice if we don't realize how incredibly far they've come, not only to give them credit but as a lessons -- as part of the lessons learned for what we might think about in other context and in other places. There is a road -- there is a path to go down. We're not in end zone yet but we've come a huge degree. ARKIN: I'm going to ask each of you, before I open it up to our guests, what would you do if you had your will, Will, to change our policies or actions to diminish the threat to our country? And I am assuming right now -- the question assumes -- that these cartels are at the very height of their power. They have not become more limpid as time has gone on. They have become more dangerous-- the fact they don't even have free speech any longer in Northern Mexico. WECHSLER: If I could wave a magic wand, of course, you'd get rid of the demand problem in the United States. ARKIN: All you have to do is speak, no magic wands. WECHSLER: You know, that's, of course, a critical element of everything that we do. The other things that I would suggest is amongst the lessons that we've learned in the Colombian context is that requires the government in question to have the critically strong and consistent leadership of a kind that is very rare all around the world. When we have it, we need to take advantage of it. Secondly, we need a whole of government from the United States approach to these issues. The Department of Defense is not in any way, shape or form the lead agency on this. We are a supporting agency. We have some capabilities and skills that are appropriate for these jobs but other agencies have the authorities, have the skills that are vastly more important for these jobs. So we need a whole of government approach to this. And then the one thing that we haven't done a good job -- ARKIN: Do we have that? WECHSLER: We have had that in Colombia. That's part of the success story. ARKIN: Aside from Colombia, do we have what you said, the whole government -- WECHSLER: We have not applied all the lessons of Colombia elsewhere yet. And the other thing that I would say that we didn't really do even well in Colombia is a wider regional approach because you end up getting the balloon effect where you're squeezing it in one place and then the drugs go someplace else. I don't think that was -- my recollection from the '90s is there's actually a judgment that the region perhaps wasn't ready for that kind of regional approach. It might be ready for that kind of regional approach now and it's certainly necessary if we're going to address it more successfully. ARKIN: Lee, if you were the anti-cartel czar -- like the pay czar -- what would you do? WOLOSKY: Well, we may need such a czar because I want to underscore the point that Will made about viewing this problem from a government wide basis. I mean, in many ways our government is still set up to fight states and increasingly, as we know from 9/11, the challenges that we face emanate from non-state actors. And much of the progress that's been made in the past eight years has really been in response to this specific terrorism threat, al Qaeda in particular, but it has not yet addressed these other very important challenges from non-state actors that are not strictly terrorist organizations. And so I'm mostly being facetious about the need for another czar but the point is that -- you know, Will's point is very important. We need to devise a better approach that incorporates the different parts of our government to address these problems. Additionally, we need stronger governance because the reason why we have these problems frequently is because of weak governance in certain states that do not have the ability to fight these organizations that take root on their soil. ARKIN: Dave? HOLIDAY: I don't disagree with anything that's been said. ARKIN: Say more. HOLIDAY: But I will say more. Well, first of all, I agree with the regional approach. The problem is is that -- actually, let me start back. I think there's some good things that the Obama administration has done that is different. There has been an effort to coordinate -- creating this International Organized Crime Task Force or something. The Defense Department is not a member of that. Every other agency in Washington is. So even though it's an international organized crime -- so I'd be curious to understand why that is. But there's clearly sort of been turf battles and turf wars that have gone on that have inhibited the fight against organized crime. The drug czar that has traditionally also tackled international issues has importantly kind of discarded the notion of a war on drugs -- because it's a war that you can't win I would suspect is one of the reasons -- and really started to focus more on prevention and treatment, death related drug issues and kind of breaking the ties between the drugs and crime. And I think that's a very positive thing. I think on the international level, we haven't kind of come up with a new approach. So to go to what we should do, I think the regional approach is important. Unfortunately, that regional approach is happening and the U.S. isn't part of it. The base agreement that the U.S. just signed with Colombia really irked a lot of the South American countries in particular. And it's not just Chavez. It's Brazil and Chile and Argentina and they're all looking to some kind of cooperation that does include the U.S. So the U.S. has a lot to offer and they have a big task in front of them if they're going to sort of engage with the rest of Latin America. I also think that just as we're focusing on demand reduction and essentially decriminalization, as we sort of -- as we leave it to the states to look at medical marijuana laws or decide to move our resources not towards breaking up medical marijuana dispensaries and sort of different initiatives coming out of states to decriminalize, I think we need to allow that to go forward in Latin America as it is going forward because Will mentioned the sort of -- we are the principal producers of marijuana as it turns out that the Mexican drug trafficking organizations are controlling part of that market, the DEA says that 65 percent of the Mexican drug cartels' profits come from marijuana, not from cocaine. So what happens to the business model of the cartels if we decriminalize, if we legalize? Now, we can't do that, as Francisco Thoumi pointed out, until we change the international conventions. So that's another struggle. But I think we have to look at a different paradigm for approaching this issue that's not -- and I totally agree in terms of improving governance and police and judicial apparatuses. One other thing I would just say there, the U.S. seems to be exporting a lot of the RICO like kind of statutes in terms of wiretapping and special courts or asset forfeiture, that sort of thing. Again, Colombia -- a lot of the wiretapping -- when you export these sort of tools to countries in which there's not great accountability, you run into problems and we have the case of Colombia this year where the intelligence service was found to be spending a lot of time fighting on human rights organizations, on opposition politicians including -- you know, there's wiretapped phone calls with U.S. Embassy personnel. So I think those -- now, that kind of thing comes out because of the press often and not because of horizontal accountability institutions like the courts. So I think that's something we need to be concerned about. I think a lot of RICO kinds of procedures are useful but we need to be careful. ARKIN: It leads me just to the last question I'm going to ask before I open it up which -- you talk about the press. There is no free press in Northern Mexico. You agree with that. That is to say -- HOLIDAY: Well, they're intimidated. Yes. ARKIN: It's edited by bullets. HOLIDAY: Yes. There's a lot of self-interest. ARKIN: And we have just below us in Northern Mexico, we have lawlessness, thousands of killing. Is that a law enforcement problem, a governance problem? And what can we directly do about that aside from doing what we did earlier in the last century? Who rode across the border and captured Pancho Villa? But we can't do that now. There's U.N. What can you do about these major cartels? HOLIDAY: You're asking me? ARKIN: Send drones? No. WECHSLER: No. What we can do is while understanding all of the tremendous differences between our experience in Colombia and the experience in Mexico and other places, but we can nevertheless look at the lessons that we've learned in this great success. Everything that's being written now about Mexico I recall reading almost word for word the same articles about Colombia a decade ago. Those articles aren't being written about Colombia because of the successes that we've had. People forget that we didn't have President Uribe when Plan Colombia was started. We do have the advantage of having President Calderon in Mexico who has been very steadfast and very clear in his leadership on this issue. So we have a wonderful opportunity. And now -- and the last administration started taking advantage with the Merida Initiative and the question will be what comes after for the longer term work that needs to be done because this is a long-term issue. This issue is not solved in a matter of months of or years but in a matter of decades. ARKIN: I don't know if we solve what we do with these people in Northern Mexico but I'm sure some of the questions from you will help. If you stand, identify yourself, speak clearly and succinctly. The gentleman in the back there. QUESTIONER: Hello? My name is -- (inaudible). I work for the (Royalton Group ?). Organized crime in the U.S. -- clearly, if what you're saying about the consumption of narcotics in the U.S. is as large as you point, how is it possible that it gets distributed so widely within the U.S.? What are the networks that operate with a lot of impunity to carry out these tasks? And related to that is, is there also a similar network that distributes guns the other way and what are the -- is it so well organized in the United States that we don't even call it organized crime, we don't see it? Can you maybe touch on this point? ARKIN: Lee, I think you should take it. It's a legal question. WOLOSKY: Okay. Well, again, I'll dodge your question a little bit by saying that when we were in the government, when I was in the government and I think I can speak for Will too, although he's speaking for himself quite well, our function was really to stop at the water's edge. In other words, to look out from the water's edge. We didn't involve ourselves -- I didn't involve myself as a government official in domestic law enforcement contexts. So I have not a great deal of visibility on the local networks that are in many cases the end of a global network. You know, I will say, though that just from my experience as a practicing lawyer, certainly the distribution mechanisms in this country for drugs and for guns are very diverse. I mean, you have very well organized networks that are purely domestic in character, engaged in those activities. You have very fragmented and animistic participants engaged in those activities with really little connection to others either in this country or abroad. And you have groups in this country that are working very tightly with component parts that are upgrading outside of the United States. ARKIN: Dave? Will? Dave? Just I think the distribution systems in this country may depend to some extent upon the Mexican cartels. You see evidence of that. We have a huge Mexican population, not just in the southwest but all through our Midwest. And certainly some of those people are engaged in helping in distribution. Now, I don't know that that's a major problem which really is what exists just below the water, the Rio Grande, no questions. Rita. QUESTIONER: Rita Hauser. Will, you particularly laud the success in Colombia but you kind of glossed over the paramilitaries, the abuses that took place in human rights which now we're seeing in Mexico as well, Uribe's attempts to perpetuate his rule which has just (thwarted ?) but maybe will succeed. So it's a more mixed picture than I think you have presented. And I would like to ask at the same time of David how you see these kinds of things in Mexico. There's an article in the current Atlantic, Joe Stahl (ph) which I happened to read last evening which describes the horrendous situation in Northern Mexico particularly the complete corruption of the military and the author concludes that several states in effect has been what he calls a coup that those states are no longer really under the effective control of Calderon. And he asks the question whether or not Calderon's war on drugs which has taken some 14,000 lives and instituted a kind of mini-civil war was the right approach and worth the price? ARKIN: That's a wonderful question. Will, you have Rita suggesting in a way -- she didn't use the words -- but Northern Mexico may be like a failed state. She didn't say it though. WECHSLER: Let me -- first on Colombia. I did -- I'm sorry to leave the impression that there were no problems in Colombia. I tried to make the point I'll make again that civil rights, human rights issue have been a massive problem and will continue to be a significant problem for Colombia. That's the kind of problem that you don't solve. It's a continuing process. Things have improved but there are still concerns and those concerns have been made clear by everyone in our government and also are recognized by the Colombian government. The other areas that need to continue to challenge the Colombian government are continuing of the drug trafficking, again, the overall of volume of cocaine has not decreased the way that we would have wanted it to. And the movement from the FARC to the BACRIMs and the other criminal organizations including some with paramilitary ties -- we need to get on top of those as well. I don't want to leave the impression that we are declaring success and that we're dancing in the end zone with Colombia. We still have a way to go. But I do want to recognize -- to continue the sports metaphor -- about how far we have come down the field. I think to fail to do that would be to miss a very powerful story that I believe is generally underappreciated and one that also has lessons for the wider discussion we've having in Mexico and in other places around the world. ARKIN: Is Calderon becoming an Uribe in that regards? Rita was asking you, can the Mexican government cope with these huge cartels, heavily armed, who have corrupted the army, killed the police? What can they do to get back Northern Mexico? WECHSLER: I think what Calderon says is that we've seen the results of not taking action which is this problem getting bigger and bigger and bigger. And a number of the steps that the Calderon administration has taken have been very, very well received by the population and by the United States. And we look forward to ways to be helpful as they desire. But as I said before, this only works when the countries in question want the United States' help. We can't force it on them. And, speaking for the Department of Defense, we are, again, a supporting role and there are other parts of the United States government that will provide the leadership for the work that we will be doing at the Mexican government's request. I personally thought that that Atlantic article was very, very much overstated for my taste. ARKIN: Do you want to add to that, Dave? HOLIDAY: Well, just the comparison between the paramilitaries in Colombia and the drug cartels in Mexico. And Shannon or Andrew have probably better data on this but my understanding from the Mexico Institute report earlier this year is that most of the violence is not civilian sort of bystanders. Now, in Colombia, the paramilitaries early on functioned as a proxy army against the FARC and there were massacres. So that's a very different situation. You don't have that ideological component here and much of the violence is coming either between rival cartels or between the state -- you know, police, military. And there are obviously lots of civilian casualties but it's not quite the same. In terms of -- I still don't -- maybe at the end of the day we'll have an answer to how to resolve the problems in Northern Mexico. But it is true that whatever we do, unless we have a different approach, we're just going to push it somewhere else. You know, I spoke with the former prime minister of Haiti the other day and she was saying -- you know, concerned about the drug trafficking issue there and I said, well, actually, most of it's now going over Central America. But Secretary Clinton admitted to her, yes, to the extent we have success in Mexico, it's just going to go elsewhere. So we have to look realistically at a situation where we can't sort of engage every small government in the hemisphere and sort of deploy sources. That's just not going to work. It's going to get pushed somewhere. ARKIN: But it could be pushed a long way away? (Laughter.) The lady on the edge. I don't know your name. HOLIDAY: Maggie. QUESTIONER: Meg Crahan, Columbia University. In November of 2008, the attorney general of the state of Texas issued a report stating that approximately 20 percent of the human trafficking by cartels pass through or occurred in Texas. And he called upon the state legislature to adopt regulations in order to make the local authorities as well as the state authorities more empowered to deal with this problem. There's similar weakness both in Texas and California in terms of state banking regulation and elsewhere in terms of arms sales in the United States. Absent state regulation to empower local and state authorities, what can the federal government do to deal with the presence of criminal cartels in a number of areas within states and municipalities? ARKIN: So go to the lawyer first. WOLOSKY: That's a very, very, very -- ARKIN: I surrender my credentials (willingly ?). WOLOSKY: It's a very good question. Of course the federal government has prerogatives in both border control, human movement issues domestically and also with respect to the financial system. But you have identified a very important issue at least in terms of the financial system which is where I've spent most of my time looking and working in the past decade or so because to the extent that local law enforcement and local regulators have primary frontline responsibility for enforcement in many respects they are -- as is implicit in your question -- woefully under-funded, under -- they don't have the skills to deal with problems that are truly international in scope. They don't know what they're looking for in many cases and they don't know how to address it. You know, there's been a lot of work in this are in the past few years. A lot of the money, I believe, needs to come from the federal government. A lot of the training appropriately comes from the federal government whether it's in joint task forces or in other mechanisms. But it's a very important issue. Ironically, there's sort of a flipside to it which is local government that want to play in the international arena and put in place rules the prohibition their pension funds from making investments in certain -- they try to conduct -- certain jurisdictions have tried to conduct an independent foreign policy by -- through regulation, by indicating what state entities and state instrumentalities can and cannot invest in -- different problem but a part of the same coin in the sense that we do have local law enforcement, local regulators on the financial side which still are under-resourced and frankly just do not yet have the tools to deal with problems that are international in scope. ARKIN: I think also she may have been asking whether it would be feasible in this country to either close down or sternly regulate, severely regulate the sale of guns particularly in our southern states, or border states. QUESTIONER: (Off mike.) WOLOSKY: Yes. Good luck on that. ARKIN: What's that? Good luck. WOLOSKY: Good luck on that. ARKIN: The Second Amendment, I know. WOLOSKY: The Second Amendment poses a bit of a problem. ARKIN: Too many turkeys to shoot. WOLOSKY: Yes. ARKIN: The gentleman over here. QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Samuel Logan. I'm with Southern Pulse. I'd like to continue on the human smuggling angle a bit. When we talk about organized crime a lot of the focus happens to be on drugs and guns these days. My understanding is that in Mexico, when you talk about movement of product, illicit product from south to north, humans are second only to the drugs. So I couple that with the understanding that in countries like Honduras to June of this year and Ecuador and Colombia for a time they were very relaxed with visa restrictions allowing all sorts of people to come into their country with an easy stamp, three months, and on you go. So my question is in terms of considering the policy that we're pushing beyond the edge of the water, should we -- when we talk about the Merida Initiative or some sort of continuation of play in Colombia -- should there be a strong component towards human smuggling? And should that component be or not be bundled or coupled with considerations for immigration and deportation policy? Thank you. ARKIN: Does anybody volunteer? Good. HOLIDAY: Yes. I think it should be coupled with immigration reform specifically and I was heartened to see that the Obama administration has not given up on that before -- they're going to push something forward. I think the visa issue is one thing but, again, it's very clear that -- it feels clear to me -- that sort of efforts to seal the border, improve kind of transit in El Paso and California, sort of push things into Arizona, and all the reports, journalistic reports coming out of Mexico indicate that you can't cross the border anymore unless you pay the narcos. So this is what we've done. This is what our policy has done. We've sort of -- again, you drive things underground and you empower criminal organizations. If we have a more open, rational policy which I think this administration would like to push for -- in fact President Bush was fairly rational on this as well, just couldn't get it through Congress -- then I think we have a chance of reversing that situation. ARKIN: You think that narcos control immigration, that is to say illegal immigration to this country from the southern? HOLIDAY: There's quite a few reports indicating that. If you go and hang out on these sort of border towns along Arizona you can't get into the desert unless you -- in the old days you might have paid the cops and now you have to pay the narcos who have the cops under their control. ARKIN: I had the gentleman -- yes, sir. Then I'll get to you. QUESTIONER: I'm Francisco Thoumi. I'm from the University of Texas. I'm a Colombian Americans. Will, I hope you're right. I don't think you are. ARKIN: Who are you looking at when you say that? QUESTIONER: Will. Will. ARKIN: Will. QUESTIONER: So it's -- in the Uribe administration there were only 1.5 displaced persons national democratic security. I want to know who benefits from democratic security. Obviously they don't. Alvaro Uribe has institutionalized a lot of the state. He's concentrated power. You praise the justice system. There's a continuous clash between Alvaro Uribe and the justice system in Colombia. As I say, I hope you are right. I don't think the situation is sustainable. There's been economic growth with no employment and the concentration of wealth has increased dramatically especially in the countryside. So the question is where is the success? We might have short-term success I hope in the future. I totally disagree with you on that. I don't think there is. WECHSLER: What is -- perhaps you know. What's Uribe's latest approval rating inside Colombia? QUESTIONER: Sixty-four percent. Alvaro Uribe is the best president for Colombia because Alvaro Uribe is paternalistic, authoritarian, messianic and he also interprets the law in a way that he brings the law -- (inaudible) -- is the spirit of the law without breaking the law. The problem is not Alvaro Uribe. The problem is Colombian society. And if we do not make reforms that are serious in Colombia, the country will go to pot with Alvaro Uribe as president. ARKIN: Can you respond to that? WECHSLER: We obviously have a different point of view. I'd only look at where Colombia was, where it is today and where the population of Colombia itself feels about the situation. I would also note -- this is a little off topic but one thing that I didn't mention before is that Colombia is now in a position where it can help other countries. Again, it's an amazing thing to think about from the end of the last decade to this decade that they have made public offers to help in Afghanistan, made public efforts to help in training in a variety -- regionally in the Western hemisphere. ARKIN: But not in Venezuela? WECHSLER: Not in Venezuela. ARKIN: I think you had your hand up first. I'll try to get everybody. We have about 10 minutes. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. The question is for Lee. I was interested in what you said about the Taliban had an illicit aviation network run by a former Russian military official and with bases around the world. Was that Viktor Bout? WOLOSKY: Yes. QUESTIONER: Okay. So I understand that the U.S. used Viktor Bout's system -- was either to ferry materials to Afghanistan or Iraq. Isn't that true? WOLOSKY: I read those reports. QUESTIONER: So what does this say about the -- does one hand not know what the other is doing? What does it say about what the U.S. -- how serious it is in dealing with what was a huge threat? I mean, the Taliban now is perhaps our largest single security threat. And are there some other examples from Latin American that perhaps David could mention where we're doing the similar -- what seems to me -- actions that don't make a lot of sense? ARKIN: Thank you. David? HOLIDAY: I have to think about that. WOLOSKY: I'm glad the question was addressed to you. HOLIDAY: No. No. But I compare -- is there a Viktor Bout kind of scenario in Latin American and I have to think about. ARKIN: We'll pass for a moment while you're thinking. Gentleman -- QUESTIONER: Is there an answer for the first part? WOLOSKY: Well, it was that I read those reports. I mean, that happened. I don't know how that happened. That happened after I left the government. I think I'm on record saying that it boggles the mind how folks who were running the Iraq war could have used as a subcontractor, as I understand it on Pentagon contracts to deliver materials into Baghdad, someone who was years before running arms to the Taliban. ARKIN: We have yet to have anybody though on our payroll distributing narcotics in this country. That's true, isn't it? (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Was the U.S. trying to shut it down? What happened? ARKIN: Excuse me, Lucy. We have to have other people to ask. The gentlemen behind you. WECHSLER: There's one thing: Viktor Bout is in jail right now in Thailand for those who don't know the end of this story, and it remains to be seen whether or not they will extradite. ARKIN: You're talking about the -- (inaudible) -- in Mexico being extradited here? WOLOSKY: No. No. Thailand. WECHSLER: Viktor Bout is in jail. Viktor Bout is in Thailand, is in a Thai jail right now and we're awaiting extradition and it remains to be seen whether it will happen. And the Colombians sent a team over to Thailand to explain -- because it's actually involved -- the case involves the FARC -- to explain that the FARC is a terrorist organization and to help the case against Viktor Bout. This is one of many, many examples about -- again, as I was saying about these old stovepipes of issues -- they all come together these nexus, so all three stories that we were talking about come together right now in Thailand. ARKIN: You mean silos? WECHSLER: Silos. Sorry. ARKIN: But your question is what, really? QUESTIONER: Hi. Christopher Johnson, the RAND Corporation. I have just -- I just wanted to see if you guys could comment quickly -- you've been talking a bit about strategies sort of on the military side but I was wondering if you guys could comment on any sort of strategies the U.S. has sort of put in place to deal with some of the micro-problems of sort of recruitment and retention of the sort of the young male population in Latin America that have been heavily involved in -- ARKIN: David. HOLIDAY: Well, I would say we have an active policy of deporting criminals, some of whom have grown up in the U.S. helping out with their reinsertion into Central American societies. Pretty mum about sort of incarceration policies of these -- in fact, we built prisons in El Salvador where gangs are essentially in control of the entire prison. I don't think we have very good strategies at the moment. It feels like you're talking sort of at a street gang level or Mara Salvatrucha and that sort of thing. Sam Logan can talk a lot about that too. But -- yes. I think as part of the Merida Initiative there is a component there of supporting crime prevention especially in Central America but it's quite small in comparison to probably what is needed. ARKIN: I'm sorry. You were -- I'm trying to keep mental order of who put up their hands. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. (Brian O'Neill ?). I wanted to ask a question in this context of organized crime and threats bearing in mind what Will's reminded us a couple of times of not dealing with these issues in silos whether it's criminal or terrorist or national security interest. What do we know about state sponsored activities in Venezuela, whether activities or funding out of the country or other countries but destabilizing democratic institutions for perpetuating or funding or encouraging undemocratic behaviors. Honduras comes to mind, Nicaragua comes to mind, Ecuador and Bolivia. Looking forward, perhaps the election in Peru coming up and that perhaps the connection between the state of Venezuela and the state of Iran and even Hezbollah which I hear props up every once in a while in a Bolivian context or even a Peruvian context. ARKIN: Will, that sounds like a national defense question. WECHSLER: Yes. We obviously have very significant concerns and I think that the clearest statement of them is that the fact that Venezuela is decertified in the U.S. government system as being fundamentally non-cooperative in our efforts. That tends to happen when there are -- not the situation I was referring to before when folks are overwhelmed by a problem but when folks are part of the problem themselves. ARKIN: Does that answer your question? QUESTIONER: Perhaps there's much that you can say. (Laughter.) HOLIDAY: I mean, I think that Venezuela gives a lot of aide to these other countries. But it's often going -- I don't know that it's related to organized crime as much as sort of propping up populist movements or -- now, in some cases though -- and Nicaragua is a very worrying case for me and I think to the extent that Chavez is propping up that regime which has become increasingly authoritarian if not already. I mean, they've sort of had a coup of their own by judicial decree. So I think that's concerning. How that plays into the organized crime issue, I'm not so sure yet. ARKIN: Let's continue our menu of frustrations. In the back. QUESTIONER: Paula Cling (ph) from Semana News magazine in Colombia. You all commented on the strong leadership of Uribe. I just wanted to know about post-Uribe like following on the gentleman's question about weak institutions that might be left behind, any vacuums he might leave behind like a post-Uribe Colombia. ARKIN: I don't know whether to say we hope we get somebody as good as Uribe or as bad. WECHSLER: I think that the main interest of the United States is to ensure that the working relationship that we developed is one that's between countries and will continue no matter what the situation I think when president -- I'll just defer to what President Obama said when he met with Uribe and commented clearly on the position of the United States government for a progress that follows constitutional norms. QUESTIONER: Hi. Kara McDonald with the Council on Foreign Relations. We speak frequently of whole of government approaches and the need for not just military and political approaches but also socioeconomic approaches, the question about the young male population. And, Will, you mentioned both the demand side as well as the supply side and the importance of that. To what degree in the U.S. government today is there an integration of the domestic policy discussion of addressing drug use in America, the demand problem, with the strategies in our foreign affairs and our national security apparatus to deal in a whole of government way? And then very quickly. I'm wondering in the nexus between organized crime and other illicit activities, what evidence have we seen of the nexus between organized crime and proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies? WECHSLER: I'd say that our drugs are -- Karl Krouski (ph) is very much focused on exactly what you're talking about about bringing both the supply and the demand side to the U.S. to work together. And from what I've seen, he's -- I've been impressed with his focus on all of this. On the proliferation side, we definitely see criminal organizations involved in widespread weapons proliferation. On the nuclear side in particular we've seen -- there have been publicized reports but I'm probably not going to go past that. WOLOSKY: I mean, on that last part I consider the A.Q. Khan network to have been an international criminal network in certain respects. It bore more of the indicia that international criminal groups bear in terms of how it stored and moved money, how it moved people around and things of that sort, how it used different jurisdictions to do that. ARKIN: I don't know that it's appropriate to end this on the issue of the relationship between narcotics and nuclear weapons but the time says I have. So thank you all for coming. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2009, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
  • Global
    Organized Crime and Transnational Threats
    Play
    Watch experts discuss organized crime including the circumstances under which criminal activities constitute a threat to national security. This session was part of the CFR symposium, Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: An Overlooked Threat?, undertaken in collaboration with the Latin American Program and Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and made possible by the generous support of the Hauser Foundation, Tinker Foundation, and a grant from the Robina Foundation for CFR's International Institutions and Global Governance program.
  • Transnational Crime
    Global Terrorism: The FBI's Role
    Play
    As the FBI adapts to effectively address threats from global terrorism it seeks to act as a global security, national security, and law enforcement organization. Join Robert S. Mueller to discuss the efforts of the FBI to fulfill this mission in partnership with its counterparts around the world, and the citizens it serves.
  • Transnational Crime
    Global Terrorism: The FBI’s Role
    Play
    Listen to Robert S. Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as he details his agency's efforts to effectively address threats from global terrorism as a global security, national security, and law enforcement organization.
  • Mexico
    It’s time for Mexico to take the lead, from Mexico’s The News
    It’s hard to believe that Calderon is coming up for 2 years in office, one-third of his term. Much has been said of Calderon’s domestic agenda, but in the op-ed below, published in Mexico’s major English-language newspaper, The News, I analyze his foreign policy achievements. I argue that President Calderon has done much to restore Mexico’s bilateral relationships, but that so far his administration has failed to take on a global leadership role. With four more years in office, Calderon should shift Mexico’s foreign policy course to actively shape the international agenda. It’s time for Mexico to lead BY Shannon O’Neil Special to The News November 28, 2008 As he celebrates his two-year anniversary in office, President Felipe Calderón gets mixed reviews on his domestic and foreign policy. Many point to the numerous successful reforms - pension, tax, justice, and energy - that have passed as evidence he can deftly guide serious issues through a divided Congress. These achievements do stand in stark contrast to the gridlocked Vicente Fox administration. Yet others dismiss these reforms as too little, too late, and lament the wasted potential for real change. This ambivalence is not limited to national politics. While much lower in profile, Calderón´s foreign policy elicits both praise and dismissals. It shines in comparison to Fox´s, which left Mexico’s relations with Venezuela and Cuba in tatters and U.S. relations weakened by recriminations on both sides. But as in the domestic arena, many worry Calderón is wasting the opportunity to fundamentally transform Mexico’s role on the world stage. Upon entering Los Pinos, Calderón quickly moved to repair broken bilateral fences. In his first year, he returned Mexican ambassadors to both Venezuela and Cuba, taking the first necessary steps to re-engage with all of Latin America. He followed up with visits to Argentina and Chile, and received Presidents Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil at home. Through these renewed ties, his government pushed to increase trade and to further energy partnerships - all important for Mexico´s future. This new hemispheric camaraderie permitted Mexico´s successful U.N. Security Council seat bid, providing Calderón a new international platform in 2009. While at times seeming almost desperate to ignore his northern neighbor - during his first trip there as head of state in April he even bypassed Washington - Calderón’s administration has actually made more concrete headway with the United States than many of his predecessors. The harsh realities of his "get tough" domestic agenda, and the increasing worries of U.S. policy-makers about drug-related violence in Mexico, have facilitated this newfound cooperation. Negotiations with President George W. Bush culminated in the three-year package known as the Mérida Initiative, which provides $400 million in the first year for the fight against the drug cartels. Just as important, these discussions changed the terms of the drug war debate, getting the United States to at least grudgingly accept some responsibility in the violence and to promise to stem the flow of illegal guns and money into Mexico. QUIET CONFIDENCE On other bilateral issues, Calderón has been notably silent. Coming on Fox’s burned heels, he has virtually ignored U.S.-bound migration in his discussions with the U.S. president. Calls for better treatment of Mexico’s citizens abroad, and for economic development and job creation at home to stem the steady human flow outward, have been geared almost exclusively to his domestic audience. On NAFTA, too, the administration has been uncommonly reticent, particularly amid calls by U.S. democrats for its renegotiation. Two years in, Calderón’s foreign policy has promoted better Latin American relations, and assuaged past rifts with the United States. Not bad - but not visionary. As the 13th-largest economy in the world, and according to The Economist, soon to break into the ranks of the top 10, Mexico has been decidedly quiet on the international front. It is time for Mexico to lead. The current financial crisis provides an unprecedented opportunity. Given its own tortuous history with financial upheaval (and more than one near-death experience of its banking sector), Mexico has quite a lot of wisdom to share. And since the exclusive G-7 has given way to the G-20 in worldwide negotiations, Mexico now has a seat at the table. Other countries understand this. Brazil is the most obvious example, and one to be emulated rather than envied. Its steady and confident leadership on the world stage (backed by good macroeconomic policies and solid domestic economic growth), seduces not just international businesses and investors, but also worldwide diplomats. Having the world’s ear, Brazil´s eminence has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In contrast, Mexico´s more timid foreign policy stance leaves it out of the game. In the coming months, we will likely see a narrowing of the Mexican government’s domestic policy agenda. The unfortunate combination of escalating criminal violence, the almost certain National Action Party losses in next year´s midterm elections, and the deepening of the global financial crisis will prove too much for an ambitious reform program in the second half of the president´s term. But this unlucky trifecta for the home front opens the opportunity for a more aggressive foreign policy approach. Mexico should turn outward in earnest, building on the solid blocks of support developed so far by Mexico´s diplomats. With now two years of distance from Fox´s unfortunate travails, the arrival of a new administration in Washington provides an opening for the Calderón government to shift Mexico´s foreign policy course. Through the U.N. Security Council seat, its OECD and G-20 membership, and its intricate economic, security, social, and cultural ties with what is still the most powerful world economy and government, Mexico has a chance to shape the international agenda. It is an opportunity Calderón should not waste. About the writer: Shannon O’Neil is Douglas Dillon Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
  • Mexico
    Changing the Merida Initiative Priorities
    I’ve finally seen a full breakdown and explanation of the numbers behind the first year of the Merida Initiative, the Bush Administration’s proposal to cooperate with and aid Mexico in the fight against drugs and terrorism. It can be found here in the second Appendix. This ambitious plan aims to better arm Mexico’s front line civilian and military agencies, to create new roles and offices necessary to better monitor and fight crime, to transform the workings of police and judicial institutions, and to increase the role of civil society organizations in these processes. Looking at the actual budget breakdown, the focus on long-term institutional changes and professionalization of law enforcement and judicial agencies—which are essential for the sustainability of any success in the war against drugs—is not particularly impressive. Direct training for police and judicial officials comprises only $35mn of the $500 mn. Adding in office equipment, computer systems, forensic labs, and support for civil society that is directly tied toward increasing transparency and accountability increases the amount for institutional improvements to nearly $100 mn. Yet this is still just 20% of the money designated for FY2008. Instead, the Merida expenditure is front-loaded toward the gear. These include over $100 mn for 8 transport helicopters, $100 mn for 2 surveillance planes, and $140 mn for other equipment including satellite communication systems, ion scanners, x-ray technologies, and extensive database development. The main reason given for this breakdown is that the Mexican military and civilian agencies need more sophisticated machinery right now to combat the drug trade. While this may be true, there are significant drawbacks to this approach. First, institutional changes and professionalization take a long time to take root and achieve real results—so the sooner these changes begin the better for Mexico and the United States. Second, policies to reduce corruption and strengthen the rule of law provide less quantifiable benefits. They are much more likely to get cut from future budgets, particularly if the Merida Initiative is not deemed an rapid success (which, without improvements in the performance of the police and judiciary, is likely). Finally, given the real deficiencies in law enforcement and judicial institutions in Mexico, does the United States really want to equip them with sophisticated technologies before beginning expansive efforts at professionalization? Until these institutions are more transparent and accountable, improving surveillance and other capacities may be counterproductive. These issues need to be debated when Congress takes up the Merida Initiative, most likely in February. While this agreement is an important step for U.S. security and for bilateral relations, its success will depend in large part on its structure. In order to make the most of this opportunity to work closely with Mexico and to improve the safety of citizens on both sides of the border, greater support for real changes to Mexico’s institutions—from the start—is vital.
  • Immigration and Migration
    CFR interview on Mexico's Merida Initiative
    Here is a recent interview I conducted with Bernard Gwertzman at the Council on Foreign Relations: Interview November 6, 2007
  • Mexico
    The Famosa "Merida Initiative"
    So the long awaited "Plan Mexico" has finally been announced by President Bush. He is asking for $500 million for Mexico in the coming year, and $1.4 billion over the next two years. Smaller amounts of money - $50 million - will be provided to Central American countries. The package stresses equipment and training to bolster the Mexican government’s current fight against narcotraffickers. Here in Mexico, there are worries about the strings attached to this agreement. While the Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa has said that there will be no U.S. military officials brought in, that didn’t stop radio programs, other press, and public figures from worrying about potential concessions that have or will have to be made. While U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Tony Garza is calling this a "fundamental shift" in U.S. policy, it is really more money for much of the same - improving security by combating drug cartels directly with better intelligence and firepower. Almost nothing has been said about the more fundamental problems that face Mexico - namely the weakness of the police and judicial institutions that are necessary to enforce the rule of law, be it against the illegal drug trade or any other sort of crime. Better equipment may only help in the short term. Unless Mexico can strengthen its institutions - to serve and protect its population, to professionally investigate crimes, and to prosecute and convict criminals - the influx of money and equipment will not resolve Mexico’s, nor the United States’, problems.
  • Lebanon
    Lasensky: Syria Clearly Acting As If It Has ‘Something to Hide’
    Scott Lasensky, a Middle East specialist for the United States Institute of Peace, says pressure is mounting on President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria overthe assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February and the recent killing of a prominent Lebanese editor, Gibran Tueni. "If you listen to [UN investigator Detlev] Mehlis, if you read the press and hear how the Syrians are reacting, there is no other conclusion than the Assad regime is behaving as if it has something to hide."He says the United States should be careful to continue to work within the UN Security Council on the Syria issue. He also says he is worried about the political situation in Lebanon, which is volatile in the aftermath of the Syrian troop withdrawal earlier in the year. "We see now Lebanese politics becoming very, very tense and there is a lot of concern among Lebanese, not to mention outsiders, that Lebanon could possibly descend again into sectarian violence."Lasensky, a former fellow at CFR, was interviewed on December 14, 2005 by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org.There have been two developments regarding Syria in the last couple of days. One was the submission by UN Investigator Detlev Mehlis to the Security Council of his updated report on the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, to which he has linked Syrian officials. And on the same day, a very prominent Lebanese journalist named Gibran Tueni was blown to bits in Beirut. There are big rallies in Lebanon today accusing Syria of being behind the latest assassination, too. What do you think about the future of the leadership in Syria?The politics are very opaque there. One can certainly speculate that this latest killing in Lebanon came about because Syrian leaders were feeling very bullish and felt that they’re on the offensive. Or you could speculate that it was done by a rogue element or even a third party looking to embarrass the Syrians. Rather than speculate, I think that, as a result of fear from the Mehlis investigation and from the changing political environment, it is clear Syria is not off the hook. But, at the same time, I don’t think the United Nations has turned up a smoking gun just yet. It’s not a slam-dunk case, but if you listen to Mehlis, if you read the press and hear how the Syrians are reacting, there is no other conclusion than the Assad regime is behaving as if it has something to hide. You mean the reluctance to really allow the investigation to proceed unhampered?Yes. They clearly have something to hide, not only on the Hariri case, but on a whole lot of other incidents that we know about. Some of this is cleaning up a mess that had been ignored for some time. The international community, including the United States, made a deal with the devil after the first Gulf War and we winked a bit when the Syrians consolidated their hold on Lebanon. This was happening just before the first Gulf War, and now the second Gulf War has proved to be a second bookend. Now you see the international community trying to set things straight and, I think, trying to make good now after leaving Lebanon in the clutches of Syria for well over a decade. Of course at the time, the Syrians went into Lebanon, as you just indicated, and the world community was pleased with anything that would end that civil war. That’s true. The one thing I think we haven’t figured out this time around is that after forcing the Syrian troops out of Lebanon—and it happened very quickly—earlier this year, the international community didn’t have a plan for the day after. We see now Lebanese politics becoming very, very tense, and there is a lot of concern among Lebanese, not to mention outsiders, that Lebanon could possibly descend again into sectarian violence. There is a great deal of tension in Lebanon. That’s not to argue that the Syrians should have stayed, but the rapidity with which they were chased out earlier this year leaves a lot of things unanswered. Lebanese politics, which has always been something of a powder keg, was very much contained for quite some time by the Syrian occupation. The Lebanese there are quite relieved, I think, to have the Syrians gone, at least formally. But there is a lot of concern about their own politics. This is what the second UN investigation is looking into. Remember, Security Council Resolution 1559 called for stabilizing the situation in Lebanon. This is the so-called Terje Roed-Larsen mission [Roed-Larsen is the appointed special envoy for the implementation of Resolution 1559]. The Lebanese are worried about any kind of residual, informal Syrian presence in the country. The Larsen mission deals not only with the Syrian withdrawal, but also with the Lebanese militias, such as Hezbollah, having to give up their arms, right?Yes. The disarmament of militias, including Hezbollah, is one of the thorniest of all the problems Lebanon is facing right now. So, the Mehlis report has taken the headlines, but we should remember there is a second process going on, and the UN envoy Larsen, who has dealt with Arab-Israeli and Palestinian issues for a long time, is working quietly behind the scenes to try to untie that knot.Your organization, the US Institute of Peace, has issued a briefing paper on Syria and political change that was written by you and Mona Yacoubian, a visiting scholar. Would you like to summarize that document?Sure. Again, politics in Syria are very much a riddle and things are very opaque. But from talking to diplomats, from gathering the evidence, it is clear that there are new rifts appearing among the Allawite ruling elite. It’s not as if the regime’s power is necessarily falling apart, but there are new rifts and these reflect that the longtime options for the regime under President Bashar al-Assad are narrowing. No. 2, the opposition is more active than ever before both inside and outside the country, and at the tip of the spear is the [fundamentalist group] Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ikhwan. From what we see, at least the initial signs are that the Muslim Brotherhood is quite different from the one that appeared twenty, twenty-five years ago in Syria. They’re evolving, they’re talking about nonviolent change, and they’re reaching out to other opposition groups, including secular opposition groups. There are a lot of interesting trends to look at there. But at the same time, I would say if you look around the Syrian political scene and you see where the disaffected parties and blocs are coming from, some are the oppositionists on the left and some are from an Islamist opposition that includes some of the Sunni urban elite and longtime leading Syrian families, who have been increasingly marginalized. It also includes some of the disaffected members of the ruling clique of the former president, Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad. You see there is growing dissatisfaction among these different blocs, but you see there is very little indication that they will unite and form a grand alliance and remake Syrian politics. So the regime’s grip on power remains pretty solid, but there is a lot to look at in terms of what I call the thawing of Syrian politics. Syrian political development has been essentially frozen for thirty-five years and things are thawing a bit now. But it reminds me a lot of the height of the Cold War, when the Sovietologists looked at Moscow to see who shows up at a parade and who doesn’t, that kind of gossip. To a large extent, that’s what watching Syria is all about these days as well.I guess the ruling Baath party is not in the mood for really open elections.No. There was a lot of talk when Bashar al-Assad came into power four, five years ago that the regime possibly could reform from within. But at this point, it’s clear that prospect is virtually nil. Bashar has relied increasingly on a circle of family members and reforms, particularly economic reforms, that turn out to be quite cosmetic. The idea that he will be a reformist president has long disappeared.And relations with the United States are absolutely frozen, as far as I can tell.Yes, the United States is trying to isolate Syria. We’ve had very little diplomatic activity and I don’t think we’ve even had a resident ambassador since the Hariri assassination. We’re talking to the Syrians, but only through the United Nations or third parties. I think there are two difficult patterns that we have to wrestle with now in terms of Syria. One is its past behavior in the region. They do have a history of buckling under pressure. I think this is part of the U.S. calculation. But at the same time, there is another trend in Syrian behavior, which is they have a history of what I call designing around external pressure. The best example is how they’ve manipulated Lebanon and used Hezbollah to pressure Israel, despite the fact that Israel maintains an overwhelming monopoly on power vis-a-vis Syria. Yes, there is some evidence in the past to suggest that you can gain something by pressuring this regime, this minority regime with a military backing. But at the same time, they do find ways to get around external pressure and to wreak havoc. What is critical now for the United States is to burrow ourselves into the United Nations and its multilateral mechanisms. If it becomes a U.S.-Syrian confrontation, then obviously it’d be bad for us and it’d be bad for the prospect of change in Syria. That would feed into a larger problem now between the U.S. and the Arab world. You can list ten reasons why you don’t want it to become a U.S.-Syrian confrontation. It’s very important to have the French on board, it’s very important to lean on the Arab governments in the region to try to talk some sense to the Syrians. We have to be working through an international framework. The United States at the moment seems happy enough to let the Security Council handle it. Absolutely. Here you find a reassuring willingness to press Syria on behalf of the Security Council. There are a lot of reasons for this consensus in the Security Council, including France’s long ties to Syria and Lebanon. It looks pretty likely that the mandate for the Hariri investigation may get expanded to cover some of these other killings. That would be important. Some Lebanese are calling for an international tribunal. It’s hard to say whether that’s necessarily the right way to go, or if it’s even feasible at this point. I think there is a good chance the UN mandate will be extended, and that’s only going to further increase the pressure on the Syrians who, as I said, are behaving as if they have something to hide. And that’s sort of what was behind Mehlis’ first report that said it’s impossible to think that this took place without Syrian involvement. You know, he didn’t have the smoking gun, he didn’t have a lot of hard evidence, but from the way they behave and from other little bits and pieces of evidence here and there, it’s clear they’ve got something to hide.The United States and France haven’t agreed on much recently.No, not in the Middle East. They agree on goals. I think where we disagree now is on tactics and how to achieve our objectives. This is all about strategy, not about objectives, I think. But the French, like the Americans, are also standing back right now in terms of the internal reform agenda. The demands on Syria very much relate to their behavior in the region and to Lebanon.And Iraq, of course.The quandary for the United States and France and other outside parties is whether this essentially is going to be treated like the Libya case, where it’s really about curtailing and stopping external behavior, or will the outside parties go a little bit further? Will we go beyond the Libya case and actually make our policy demands about internal issues as well? One of the Bush administration’s top priorities is affecting change, affecting a transformed political environment in the Middle East. So whether they’re going to give them a pass on internal issues remains to be seen. I mean you have some signs, very small signs. Over the weekend, the White House released a statement asking that a number of political prisoners in Syria be released unconditionally. Oh, I missed that.Including an opposition activist named Kamal Labwani. Now Labwani left Syria, he went to Europe a few weeks ago and met with government officials, met with other Syrian opposition speakers, exiles, and he came to Washington and met people from the State Department. And in fact, he went to the White House and met senior representatives at the National Security Council. When he landed back in Damascus, he got arrested. Now, are we going to go as far as some Syrian oppositionists would like and make very clear and wide-ranging demands for political reform in the country? I’m not sure it’s the right thing to do now. There is so much momentum working against Syria and there is so much consensus in the international community to follow up on the Lebanon investigation and to maybe expand it. The United States hopes that this will have a boomerang effect and help us on our Iraq agenda, which is to get that [Syrian-Iraqi] border more secure. I wouldn’t look for the United States going all out on the path of demanding widespread political reform, but I think it’s something down the road. It’s interesting, you still have Syrian oppositionists who talk to Americans and other outsiders and they plead, they say "you need to press for internal reform as well." They very much want assistance from the outside. It’s quite remarkable considering how poor our reputation is in Syria and among the Syrian public. The local oppositionists—and there is some debate about this—but there are quite a few local oppositionists and some exiles and figures who do want a greater international campaign for internal reform.Lastly, are Israel-Syrian peace negotiations dead?I would say they’re on long-term hold. The Israelis are sitting quite comfortably now, watching as the international community bears down on Syria. They’re more worried about Iran right now. The Israelis, particularly now, while they’re reformulating their own political scene, are completely obsessed when it comes to foreign policy with the Palestinian issue. They are in no mood to start these negotiations with the Syrians and the Syrians aren’t either. Every time you hear from the Syrians that they want to revive the talks with Israel to finally end the 1973 war, it’s transparent that it’s just a way out of their current fix. It’s not a sincere offering. The Israelis are sitting pretty right now watching this. There is a little bit of anxiety, obviously, on the Hezbollah issue. The Israelis have an uneasy relationship across the Lebanese border, a sort of balance of terror almost. Israelis, you know, don’t treat Hezbollah as they treat Palestinian groups. Hezbollah does have an impressive lethal military capability. The Israelis are watching the situation unfold and they want to be sure that it doesn’t lead to Hezbollah lashing out across the border, as happened a couple of weeks ago as a way to maybe distract pressure against Syria.
  • Transnational Crime
    Timeline: Famous Trials of World Leaders
    This publication is now archived. IntroductionSince 1945, a slew of prominent world figures have been brought before various domestic and international courts and tribunals. Some have been convicted, while others, like Slobodan Milosevic of the former Yugoslavia, are still on trial. Then there are those, such as Augusto Pinochet of Chile or Charles Taylor of Liberia, who have somehow managed to elude prosecution for years.The trial of Saddam Hussein, set to begin October 19, is the latest in a long line of war-crimes tribunals. The fate of the former Iraqi dictator is still unknown, but spectators will be watching closely as prosecutors, all of them Iraqi nationals, outline Hussein’s role in the crimes against humanity and genocide that occurred during his rule. Nuremberg Trials(1945-49) The Nuremberg Trials, the largest in history, lasted four years and attempted to bring surviving leaders of the Nazi regime and engineers of the Holocaust to justice. The trials began with the “Major War Figures Case,” which came before the International Military Tribunal established by the Allied forces; eleven of the twenty-one defendants were sentenced to death. In the twelve other cases that followed, sixty-five defendants were convicted and more than twenty were executed. Tokyo War Crimes Trials(1946-48) Under the watch of U.S. Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur, the International Military Tribunal of the Far East prosecuted twenty-eight high-ranking Japanese leaders for war crimes committed during World War II. The most famous was the arrest, conviction, and execution of the former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. All of the defendants were found guilty; seven were sentenced to death, sixteen to life terms, two to lesser terms, two died during the trials, and one was found insane. Secret Military Tribunal of Nicolae Ceausescu(1989) After almost twenty-five years of communist reign in Romania, President Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, were found guilty of crimes against humanity by a secret military tribunal. The two were executed by firing squad on Christmas Day 1989. News of the couples’ death stunned the country but also led to a public celebration on the streets. The trial lasted only a couple of days and international reaction—especially from the White House—was that it was unfortunate the trial had not been held in public. UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(1993-present) A UN Security Council resolution established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to try those responsible for war crimes in the Balkans beginning in 1991. The most famous defendant is former President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, whose trial began in 2002 and is still underway. So far the tribunal has indicted 162 people, the majority of them ethnic Serbs; fifty-nine suspects are in custody awaiting trial, and ten remain at large. The two Bosnian Serbs most responsible for the Srebrenica genocide—considered the worst human rights atrocity committed on European soil since World War II—are still at large. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(1994-present) Since 1997, twenty-two out of eighty-three people have been convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, including former prime minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda. Kambanda pled guilty to six counts—including genocide—and was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity committed in 1994, when an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were massacred and more than two million fled the country. This past August, the tribunal announced seven new indictments, and it is currently prosecuting seven different cases. Trial of Adolfo Scilingo(1995-2005) Almost ten years after his alleged crimes, Argentine Navy Captain Adolfo Scilingo was brought before a Spanish court for accusations he was responsible for thirty murders, 225 acts of terrorism, and 286 acts of torture during Argentina’s 1976-1983 military dictatorship. Scilingo was convicted in April 2005 for crimes against humanity, including the charge that he was on board a military plane when as many as twenty people were dumped alive into the sea. Legal Battle of Augusto Pinochet(1998) Pinochet was arrested at a London Hospital in October 1998, but after a year-long legal battle, officials ruled he should not be extradited to Spain to face trial for allegations of torture committed while president of Chile from 1973-90. In March 2000, he returned to Chile, where he is scheduled to be questioned by a Chilean judge about his role in the murders of 119 dissidents. Due to Pinochet’s health problems, he has yet to be questioned or tried by a court of law. Special Court for Sierra Leone(2002) The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up jointly by the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to try those most responsible for crimes against humanity in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 1996. Currently, eleven people stand indicted for war crimes, including murder, rape, enslavement, extermination, and attacks against UN peacekeepers. The most famous defendant still at large is Liberia’s former president Charles Taylor, who was offered asylum by Nigeria in 2003. Iraqi Special Tribunal(2003-present) The Iraqi Special Tribunal was established by the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council in December 2003 to try former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein for human-rights atrocities committed during his rule. Hussein stands accused of ordering the 1982 execution of about 150 Shiite Iraqis in the northern town of Dujail, slaughtering some 5,000 Kurds with chemical gas in Halabja in 1988, and invading Kuwait in 1990.
  • Europe
    The Balkans: Assessing the Progress and Looking to the Future
    Statement to the House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittee on Europeby William L. NashMajor General, USA, (Ret.)Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Preventive ActionCouncil on Foreign RelationsThank you for inviting me to address this hearing of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe. It comes at a critical moment for the Balkans, less than a month after Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic’s assassination in Serbia and little more than a week after the resignation of the Bosnian Serb member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency amid scandals surrounding illegal arms exports to Iraq and alleged spying incidents. Today I wish to talk briefly about the current conditions in, and the challenges facing, the Balkan region, and to review some of the findings and recommendations in the Council on Foreign Relations’ recent independent task force report, Balkans 2010. I ask that the full text of the Balkans 2010 report be entered in to the record, and would like to note that the report is available at the Council on Foreign Relations’ website, at cfr.org. Unless otherwise noted, the report reflects the consensus views of task force members. I should clarify at the outset that when I say "Balkans," I am referring primarily to the states of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia.The Balkan violence of the 1990s has run its course. With democratic governments in all of the former Yugoslav republics and regionwide ambitions to join the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there is no longer a risk of major war between states. The Dayton Agreement ended the brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and continues to provide both a framework for that country to move toward Europe and the means to root out the ethnic separatism that still holds it back. In Kosovo, the repression of the ethnic Albanians has ended and work is well underway in rebuilding that damaged society. Slobodan Milosevic, the primary architect of the decade’s violence, is on trial for his crimes at the international tribunal in The Hague. Across the states and regions of the former Yugoslavia, democratic governments share a common ambition to join the European Union and NATO.But work remains, and there are three areas from our report that I would like to emphasize. The first is the absolute necessity of confronting the politico-criminal syndicates that are endangering the development of democracy and free markets across the Balkans. The second and related point is the importance of building the rule of law, both civil and criminal, in the region. And the third is the essential reform of the international presence in the Balkans.I’ll start with the politico-criminal syndicates. In the course of working on the Balkans 2010 report, it became clear that many task force members considered the organized criminal groups to be the single greatest threat to regional stability, in large part because the groups’ survival depends on crushing the effort to introduce transparency, accountability, and moderation into the political and economic systems of the state. The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, attributed to an organized crime network with strong ties to former president Slobodan Milosevic’s regime, tragically illustrates the scope and power of these groups, which include criminal profiteers in alliance with hardline politicians, unreformed agents of the police and security services, and corrupt members of the judiciary.Since the Prime Minister’s murder, there has been a high-profile and wide-ranging effort in Serbia to break the grip of these syndicates, and this effort was rightly praised by Secretary of State Powell during his recent visit to Belgrade. However, this sort of concerted effort against politico-criminal syndicates is needed beyond Serbia. In fact, a principal recommendation of the Balkans 2010 task force was the implementation of vigorous campaigns aimed at crippling the politico-criminal syndicates that threaten internal and regional security. The task force recommended that these campaigns be a cooperative effort involving international actors and local forces, and that they be launched first in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the international presence is greatest. Now that Serbia has taken the initiative against these groups, it is all the more important that authorities in other areas, including the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), follow suit with targeted campaigns against the individuals and groups associated with the illegal intersection of government and financial power. The United States should firmly support these efforts. Simply put, reform won’t stick so long as these politico-criminal groups are flourishing.The second major issue I want to address is the importance of building the rule of law. First, you can’t talk about building the rule of law in the region without reiterating the absolute necessity of arresting war criminals, especially Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and sending them to The Hague. I was heartened that Secretary of State Powell strongly encouraged Serbia’s new Prime Minister, Zoran Zivkovic, to continue cooperation with the Hague Tribunal during his recent trip to Belgrade, and even more so that Mr. Zivkovic pledged on April 7th to fulfill Serbia’s obligations to the Court. I also believe that conditionality remains the best stick we have to ensure that progress on this front continues, so long as the conditions are set in broad terms, with time limits sufficiently liberal to allow local actors some leeway in achieving the required standards. Inflexible and arbitrary cut-off dates can be counterproductive when substantial progress toward the required standards is underway. But when there is continuous failure to abide by conditions, there must be a willingness to halt funding to demonstrate the consequences of inactionBut rule of law is about more than bringing war criminals to justice. It means a legal system in which justice is administered openly and fairly according to prescribed statutes and regulations, individuals and organizations are held accountable, judges are impartial, minority rights are protected, and legitimate rulings are enforced. It encompasses both criminal and civil law: the latter is crucial for economic development, and economic development, in turn, is crucial to any hope for a successful, stable future for the Balkans. Indeed, strengthening the rule of law in both civil and criminal spheres is vital for achieving progress on other fronts in the region, as Secretary of State Powell rightly pointed out when he linked the extradition of war criminals with success against organized crime and the implementation of military reform.Finally, I want to focus on the role and structure of the international presence in the region, in particular the current and future roles of the United States and the European Union vis- à- vis the Balkans. By this I mean two things: ensuring that the European Union and NATO are the primary agents of international influence in the Balkans over the coming decade; and restructuring the current international presence to eliminate independent policymaking by ad hoc structures and transferring those responsibilities to permanent European or responsible local institutions.The guiding principle for the task force’s work was that the Balkans’ future lies in Europe - both formally, in terms of integration into European structures and institutions, and informally, in terms of shared norms and interests. If Europe is the goal, then Europe has to be the path, albeit with strong U.S. support and interests. Accordingly, the task force argued that the EU’s plan for the region - the Stabilization and Association Process - is, in conjunction with NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and Membership Action Plan, the best tool for putting the Balkan states on the path to full integration with western Europe by 2010.The Balkans represent both a testing ground for the capability of the EU as well as an opportunity for the development of a new type of collaboration between the United States and Europe, which could eventually become a template for future trans-Atlantic cooperation. While it is in America’s interest to encourage the Balkan states’ efforts to change - especially by using its influence in NATO to ensure a stable security situation and to guide military reform - it is also in America’s interest to recognize and support the EU’s lead in setting standards and providing assistance, and to help the EU stay the course and keep it accountable for its end of the deal.This is not to say that the United States can pull up stakes and leave the Balkans to the Europeans. In fact, there are elements of American involvement that are unmatched by Europe and will remain crucial in the region, including the U.S.’s unique political clout and its ability to speak with one voice. There are approximately 1,800 U.S. troops in Bosnia and 2,400 in Kosovo, drawn down significantly from previous highs but still necessary to help keep the peace and signal the U.S.’s ongoing commitment. Nor am I saying that the United States cannot stick up for its principles, interests, or methods - such as the use of conditionality - where those may diverge from our allies. Rather, the crucial point is that, while continued American engagement remains necessary for the Balkan states to achieve the stability that will make them productive partners, the current challenges facing the United States from areas other than the Balkans means that it is in the U.S. interest to take a supporting, rather than dominant role in Balkans reconstruction.In terms of the structure of the international presence: in the interest of time I won’t say much about that here, except that the current structure of international bodies in the region is inefficient and requires streamlining, and furthermore that the ultimate goal for the international presence is eventually to dismantle the ad hoc structures and transfer that authority to permanent European institutions or, preferably, competent local institutions. I refer you to the task force report for a more detailed discussion.I again thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today and, more particularly, for keeping a focus on the Balkans at a time when it is not at the forefront of world affairs. It is this long-term commitment by the U.S. and its allies that has been the foundation for the remarkable transformation of this region. Until recently, I never thought I’d have to defend the idea that staying the course and finishing a job is a necessary part of any international intervention. But we would not be at this juncture, discussing the fine points of completing the institution building of these fledgling democracies, if we had not gone through these often messy, complicated, but worthwhile tasks. Thank you.
  • Transnational Crime
    The Potential Impact of Homeland Security Reorganization on Federal Law Enforcement Activities
    Statement of Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies Council on Foreign Relations [email protected] (212) 434-9676 on “The Potential Impact of Homeland Security Reorganization on Federal Law Enforcement Activities Unrelated to Terrorism and Narcotics Interdiction.” presented before the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. Monday, June 17, 2002 Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is Stephen Flynn. I am the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations where I am directing a multi-year project on “Safeguarding the Homeland: Rethinking the Role of Border Controls.” I have also served as a consultant on the homeland security issue to the U.S. Commission on National Security (Hart-Rudman Commission) and to the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commision). Just recently, I retired as a Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard after 20 years of active duty service. Throughout the 1990s while serving as a professor at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, I have studied many of the criminal challenges that have occupied the attention of this sub-committee. I have noted with concern three developments relevant to the subject of today’s hearing with regard to organized crime. First, is the trend towards diversification. Criminal organizations rarely restrict their activities to a single “specialty” like narcotics trafficking, but are engage in other criminal conspiracies such as cargo theft, migrant smuggling, trade fraud, software piracy, and internet fraud. For instance, during a field visit to Southern Florida in June 1999, I learned from the Miami Dade-FBI Cargo Theft Task force that there was substantial Colombian involvement in the theft of high technology moving between the Free Trade Zone in northwestern Miami and the port of Miami. Around the same time, bootleg-software and illegal Asian migrants were arriving in the United States in containers in Los Angeles and Long Beach as a part of smuggling operations run by Chinese gangs. Nigerian criminals, who have a long-standing reputation as master con-artists, took to the internet to lure new victims into fraud schemes. These examples also point to the second trend which gathered momentum in the 1990s which is the increasingly global scope of the activities of criminal organizations. More and more criminals operate as non-state actors who find borders essentially meaningless. In fact, the thugs find the requisites of sovereignty to be largely an ally in their global enterprises. Since sovereign governments reserve for themselves the right to draft laws, to establish rules and procedures for operating its criminal justice system, and to establish public policy priorities; law enforcement necessarily must be pursued against a backdrop of widely differing national jurisdictions. The inevitable lack of harmonization muddies the prospect for seamless international cooperation among enforcement authorities. The collapse of the Soviet Union ironically contributed to this challenge by adding more states to the community of nations—many of them with nascent or dysfunctional criminal justice systems. One result is that organized criminal networks are finding the world to be their oyster. The third trend has been the closer linkages between organized crime and terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgency groups. The end of the Cold War ushered in the end of superpower benefactors who had often supported groups fighting what were effectively a form of proxy warfare between the Soviet Union and the United States. With the falling of the wall, an important source of cash and weapons largely dried up, but the conflicts throughout the developing world did not. Antagonists on both sides had to find an alternative source to bankroll their cause and to arm their foot soldiers. Most found that crime paid, particularly if they could operate from the relative sanctuary of a failed or weak state. Somalia, Afghanistan and Colombia are prime exemplars of this unfortunate bit of post-Cold War fallout. I point to these three developments—diversification, globalization, and the crime-terrorism-guerrilla nexus—to make a critical point relative to the subject of this hearing today: the challenges of terrorism and narcotics interdiction can not be isolated from the issue of organized crime more generally. The corollary that flows from this conclusion is that many of the enforcement activities that target crimes such as cargo theft, tax evasion, migrant smuggling, and internet fraud will reap important dividends in fighting narcotics smuggling and terrorist activities directed at the U.S. homeland. Consider the case of U.S. seaports. According to the report of the U.S. Interagency Commission on Crime & Security in U.S. Seaports in 2000, among the “significant criminal activity” that takes place in the nation’s major seaports are drug smuggling, stowaways, trade fraud, cargo theft, environmental crimes, export control violations, and the illegal export of currency and stolen vehicles. These crimes occur against a backdrop where seaports serve as the global on-ramps and off-ramps for the overwhelming majority of the imports and exports that move to and from North America. Thus, for would-be terrorists, seaports satisfy the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from the volume and velocity of the people, goods, and conveyances that pass through them. In the present situation, a would-be terrorist can expect favorable odds that enforcement authorities will be unable to detect and intercept a container or vessel carrying a deadly weapon, including a weapon of mass destruction. “Motive” is derived from the role that maritime transportation plays in the supply chains of many companies. This critical dependency translates into the tempting possibility that an attack involving the maritime transportation system could inflict serious harm throughout the U.S. economy. In short, the absence of a robust capacity to filter the illicit from the licit in the face of: (a) a heightened terrorist threat environment, and (b) the growing volume of people and goods moving through international trade corridors, places U.S. and global commerce at substantial risk of disruption. But the complexity of the port security agenda highlights the difficulty of securing progress within the existing governmental framework: (1) Seaports cannot be separated from the international transport system to which they belong. Ports are in essence nodes in a network where cargo is loaded on or unloaded from one mode—a ship—to or from other modes—trucks, trains, and, on occasion, planes. Therefore, seaport security must always be pursued against the context of transportation security. In other words, efforts to improve security within the port requires that parallel security efforts be undertaken in the rest of the transportation and logistics network. If security improvements are limited to the ports, the result will be to generate the “balloon effect”; i.e., pushing illicit activities horizontally or vertically into the transportation and logistics systems where there is a reduced chance of detection or interdiction. (2) Port security initiatives must be harmonized within a regional and international context. Unilateral efforts to tighten security within U.S. ports without commensurate efforts to improve security in the ports of our neighbors will lead shipping companies and importers to “port-shop”; i.e., to move their business to other market-entry points where their goods are cleared more quickly. Thus the result of unilateral, stepped-up security within U.S. ports could well be to erode the competitive position of important America ports while the locus of the security risk simply shifts outside of our reach to Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean to ports such as Halifax, Montreal, Vancouver, and Freeport. (3) Since U.S. ports are among America’s most critical infrastructure, they should not be viewed as a primary line of defense in an effort to protect the U.S. homeland. The last place we should be looking to intercept a ship or container that has been co-opted by terrorists is in a busy, congested, and commercially vital seaport. The complexity of the seaport security agenda also points to the need to temper aspirations for fail-safe security at home with a risk management approach. Risk management involves developing the means to identify transnational activities and actors that pose little or no risk to the United States so that limited regulatory, enforcement, and security resources can be targeted at those which present a high risk. Such an approach places a premium on good intelligence and developing a capacity to practice what cyber-security experts call “anomaly detection.” In the computer industry, anomaly detection represents the most promising means for detecting hackers intent on stealing data or transmitting computer viruses. The process involves monitoring the cascading flows of computer traffic with an eye toward discerning normal traffic; i.e.; that which moves by way of the most technologically rational route. Once this baseline is established, software is written to detect aberrant traffic. A good computer hacker will try to look as much as possible like a legitimate user. But because he is not legitimate, he inevitably must do some things differently. Good cyber-security software will detect that variation and deny access. For those hackers who manage to get through, their breach is identified and shared so that this abnormal behavior can be removed from the guidance of what is normal and acceptable. In much the same way, the overwhelming majority of the cross-border traffic that moves through the global networks upon the United States and the global community depends—move in predictable patterns. If regulators and enforcement authorities whose daily tasks place them in contact with those networks are given access to intelligence about real or suspected threats and are provided the means to gather, share, and mine data that provide a comprehensive picture of “normal” traffic to enhance their odds of detecting threats when they materialize. Even in the absence of specific intelligence, front-line agents can still often detect abnormal behavior because of their intimate understanding of the environment in which they operate, and the relationships they have with legitimate players who operate in that milieu. This is what happens when a Coast Guard boarding officer is tipped off by a mariner about a fishing vessel that appears to be operating erratically, and when he stops and inspects that vessel, he discovers that it has the wrong kind of gear for the fishery in which the captain claims he is working. The officer then conducts an exhaustive search and locates contraband within a carefully disguised compartment on that vessel. Stressing the importance of anomaly detection as a tool for identifying and intercepting criminal or terrorist activity highlights the fact that an important element of the homeland security mission requires that front-lines agencies must have the means to do well what they have been traditionally tasked to do. That is, it is in pursuing their day-to-day work that they will develop the expertise, the relationships, and possess the authority to stop and intercept that which they discover to be aberrant. Coast Guard men and women who are out on daily patrols to interdict drugs and illegal migrants, to protect fisheries, to advance safety among recreational boaters, and monitoring the movements of hazardous materials on ships and within ports who are going to have the physical presence and the requisite presence of mind and authority to pick out more nefarious activities. Similarly, it is the Customs inspector who routinely examines a shipping manifest to insure compliance with U.S. revenue laws that is best positioned to spot a shipment that makes no commercial sense, such as a very low-cost commodity moving on a high-cost conveyance. For the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the skills it takes to prevent agricultural products that could contain natural blights or diseases from entering the country, equips them to spot acts of terrorism involving the global food supply. Based on the above, getting homeland security right requires three things. First, a paradigm shift that moves away from a “gates, guards, and guns” approach to security and towards a network/risk-management approach for mitigating the threats associated with catastrophic terrorism. Second, that the capacity of the agencies who play the role of first-detectors and first-responders in these networks must be commensurate with the responsibilities they shoulder. Third, that the work of these agencies must be supported by enhanced communication and coordination with the national security and intelligence communities. The obvious question this ambitious agenda raises is: can this be accomplished without a major realignment of those agencies? The past and post-September 11 experience to date would suggest that the answer is no. We must be candid in recognizing that front-line regulatory and enforcement agencies whose roles are most critical to advancing this expanded homeland security agenda have been neglected for years. Further, this neglect has not been benign. Their parent departments, Congressional appropriators, and OMB reviewers have historically treated them as orphans. Placed in an environment where the inevitable decisions about resource trade-offs are made by overseers with a non-enforcement and non-security focus, we should not be surprised that these agencies are so poorly positioned to get from where we are to where we need to be. Against this backdrop and in light of the fact that the catastrophic terrorism promises to be a long-term challenge versus a near-term crisis, the President has appropriately proposed major reorganization. In the end, organizing for homeland security is really a subset of the broader challenge of how to we work to ensure that security is an organic part of the global networks: (1) that criminals and terrorists will increasingly target or exploit, and (2) upon which the United States and the international community depends. The events of September 11 should have fatally undermined the prevalent myth of the 1990s that “less is more” in advancing globalization. Managing complex, concentrated, and interdependent systems requires protocols and the means to ensure those protocols are being abided by. Done smartly, this can be accomplished—must be accomplished—by robust partnerships between the private and public sector and through much more international cooperation. This cannot be done in a leadership or organizational vacuum. Further, if we avoid doing the heavy lifting now, in the aftermath of future terrorists attacks, we will have to tackle these issues with the inevitably diminished government legitimacy that goes with being judged as having done too little, too late to provide the core function of government—assuring the safety and security of its people. In short, the American people can look forward to a “two-for” by combining many of the front-line law enforcement agencies into a new Department of Homeland Security. One, they will get a more robust capability for detecting and intercepting terrorists before they arrive or carry out their attacks on American soil. Second, they will get more capable agents and agencies to combat crime. Any effort to trade off the one for the other would only be self-defeating. Thank you. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DR. STEPHEN E. FLYNN Stephen Flynn has been a Senior Fellow with the National Security Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, headquartered in New York City, since June 1999. On March 15, 2002, he was appointed as the inaugural occupant of the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Chair. Currently at the Council, Dr. Flynn is directing a multi-year project on “Protecting the Homeland: Rethinking the Role of Border Controls.” He is author of several book chapters and articles on homeland security, border control, transportation security, and the illicit drug trade. His recent publications include, “America the Vulnerable,” in Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2002), “The Unguarded Homeland” in How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War, PublicAffairs Books (Nov 2001); and "Beyond Border Control.” Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2000). In January 2002, Dr. Flynn was appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism in Transportation and Distribution Systems. He has served in the White House Military Office during the George H.W. Bush administration and as a director for Global Issues on the National Security Council staff during the Clinton administration. From August 2000 to February 2001, he served as a consultant on the homeland security issue to the U.S. Commission on National Security (Hart-Rudman Commission). He was a Guest Scholar in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution from 1991-92, and in 1993-94 he was an Annenberg Scholar-in-Residence at the University of Pennsylvania. A 1982 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Dr. Flynn served in the Coast Guard on active duty for 20 years, retiring at the rank of Commander. He received the M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. degrees in International Politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in 1990 and 1991. He has received academic prizes for his undergraduate and graduate studies. In 1991 he became the first Coast Guard officer to be selected as a Council on Foreign Relations’ International Affairs Fellow. Dr. Flynn has lectured around the United States and abroad on the homeland security, border control, drugs and crime issue, has provided testimony on Capitol Hill and before the Canadian House of Commons, and has appeared as a guest commentator on Nightline, the Charlie Rose show, 60 Minutes, CNN, National Public Radio, and BBC Radio. During his Coast Guard seagoing career, he had two tours as commanding officer of the Coast Guard Cutters REDWOOD and POINT ARENA, and one tour as operations officer of the Coast Guard Cutter SPAR. His professional awards include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, the Coast Guard Commendation Medal and the Coast Guard Achievement Medal. In 1999, he received the Coast Guard Academy’s Distinguished Alumni Achievement award.