Defense and Security

Transnational Crime

  • Cybersecurity
    Brazil Must Rebalance Its Approach to Cybersecurity
    Robert Muggah is the research director of the Igarapé Institute, an independent think tank based in Rio de Janeiro. Nathan B. Thompson is a researcher at Igarapé. When Brazil attends the Group of 20 Summit in Hangzhou next week, cybersecurity will be on the top of everyone’s mind. This includes President Obama who received a letter from U.S. senators this week urging him raise the issue with his Chinese hosts. A spate of high profile cyberattacks against U.S. government agencies, UK phone retailers and South Korean credit card companies are a dark reminder of the real dangers of security breaches and data theft. Cyber criminals are far ahead of international and domestic law enforcement. And the costs of cybercrime to the global economy are enormous, estimated to reach $2.1 trillion a year by 2019. Brazil also has reason to be nervous. The country is at the epicenter of a global cybercrime wave. It ranks second in the world for online banking fraud and financial malware. And the problem appears to be worsening. The number and intensity of cyberattacks has risen significantly over the past few years. A 2012 study estimated the annual costs of cybercrime at R$16 billion (US$4.9 billion). An electronic banking payment scheme netted hackers over R$8 billion (US$2 billion) alone over a two-year period. There is a ready supply of cybercrime tools and skills on the dark web. One of the reasons Brazilians are so vulnerable is because the country was an early adopter of online banking. The latest data indicate that more than 54 percent of all banking transactions are made using internet-connected devices. Brazil’s online migration also spawned a generation of cyber criminals with a demonstrated ability to wreak digital havoc. In 2015, more than half of the cyberattacks reported to Brazilian authorities were of Brazilian origin, though it is an issue seldomly discussed in local media. Brazil has taken a number of steps to fight the problem. The Ministry of Justice and the Federal Police have ramped-up the investigation and prosecution of online crimes such as child pornography. Brazil’s experience with mega-events has steadily expanded the role of the armed forces, with the Ministry of Defense’s cyber defense center (CDCiber) gaining more responsibilities. Some civil liberties advocates fear that the pendulum may have swung too far in favor of a securitization of cyberspace. An open question is whether Brazil’s approach to addressing cybercrime is the right one. The massive outlay of digital security and surveillance infrastructure for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games is a case in point. If these platforms are left running indefinitely without adequate oversight by civilian authorities, there is real potential for abuse. Justice Minister Alexandre de Moraes has said explicitly that Brazil intends to maintain the surveillance infrastructure now in place, though he has offered few details about checks and balances to guarantee that civil liberties are protected. There are also signs that Brazil’s Congress is ratcheting up its surveillance of cyberspace. As a result of a congressional commission on cybercrime (CPICIBER), there are a number of bills that purport to increase penalties for cyber criminality, but may in fact curb basic digital freedoms. For example, one bill proposes that social media content that impugns someone’s honor must be removed within 48 hours. CPICIBER’s legislative proposals were widely condemned and several digital rights groups issued their own set of recommendations and guidance in addition to sending an open letter to Brazil’s Congress—efforts which resulted in some modest modifications to the commission’s proposals. Brazil should consider taking a closer look at other G20 countries for effective ways to address cybercrime. Germany, for example, recently enacted legislation requiring financial institutions to report when they are a victim of a data breach or other cyber-attack, imposing penalties for non-compliance. The European Parliament recently issued a similar directive, which EU countries must now implement into domestic legislation. The Brazilian government should consider adopting similar reporting mechanisms. Brazil could also consider joining the other 49 countries that have signed and ratified the Budapest Convention, a framework that facilitates international cooperation on fighting cybercrime while protecting human rights and due process. While Brazil has complained about not being involved in its original drafting, it is the only internationally-binding instrument to address cybercrime. At a minimum, the government needs to require greater transparency of service providers and financial institutions to ensure a more data-driven approach to cybersecurity. Brazil has good reason to work with G20 partners to prevent cybercrime. After all, the majority of its citizens have been victimized by digital criminals operating abroad and, for the most part, at home. But the answer is not more intrusive surveillance. Rather, the focus must be on strengthening federal policing capabilities, developing sound legislation and improving Brazilians’ digital hygiene. If Brazil continues on its present course, there is a real danger that the proposed cure will be worse than the disease.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Net Politics September 2, 2016 Net Politics
  • Colombia
    Credible Commitment and the Colombian Peace Plebiscite
    The Colombian peace process began in 2012, and by June 2016, appeared to have reached preliminary agreement on a deal that would result in the cessation of hostilities, ending a war that has killed more than a quarter of a million Colombians. Yet somewhat surprisingly, while the deal was initially celebrated as a milestone, recent polling suggests that a declining share of Colombians would actually support it: 39 percent in August, down from 56 percent in July. The reasons for opposition are multiple, including belief that some abuses by the FARC are too atrocious to merit amnesty, annoyance at the possibility that FARC representatives may be given congressional seats, fear that state capacity to effectively implement the accords is too weak in previously contested regions of the country, opposition to land restitution programs, and resentment at the possibility that government forces may be judged by the same tribunal that judges FARC members. Domestic political considerations also play a role, including the long-standing feud between President Juan Manuel Santos and his conservative predecessor, Álvaro Uribe; and declining support for Santos, which may drag down support for the deal. But surely the Santos government was aware of most of these challenges? And why on earth pledge to have the deal ratified by the public, if doing so would subject it to all sorts of criticism and the possibility of defeat? The answer may lie in the three intertwined strategic explanations: First, academics point to the importance of strategic calculations in ending civil wars: reaching peace depends on what sort of incentives dissident groups have to resort to violence rather than committing to peace. Oftentimes the situation must get so bad that opposing sides have little choice but to reach agreement, painful though that may be. But even once both sides are committed to negotiating, structuring the post-conflict incentives is often a case of the pragmatic and artful bending of each side’s desired outcomes toward a core of commonly acceptable, if seldom entirely desirable, compromises. By all accounts, the FARC’s leadership is near exhaustion, but they had some advantages, including the ability to hold on indefinitely in impenetrable terrain and cause murderous violence at will. The big challenge was to ensure that they saw benefits to negotiating an end to the conflict, which implied government concessions that would bring them to the table. Second, achieving the peace is a game with many players, in which the negotiators may not have unconditional support at home. Even in a two-sided conflict, each side’s negotiators must go home to their constituents and explain the deal, often to second-guessing armchair negotiators who have no reason to reflect on how many late nights and what sorts of complex concessions went into each element of the treaty, and who may be more focused on the war than on the peace (suffice it to note, by way of example, that even as the United States’ Civil War wound down, Abraham Lincoln was unable to push forward his amnesty resolution for the South because of homegrown opposition in the North). Third, the logic behind ending the violence is quite different from the logic of maintaining the peace: there is an inherent tension between the types of commitments that both sides need to make in order to end aggression and the long-term conditions that would maintain the peace. All sides to the conflict need to be able to offer some sort of credible guarantee that they have abjured violence: the winning side has to offer some credible assurance that it won’t simply use the peace to obliterate the losers, while the disadvantaged side needs to offer good reasons why it won’t try to improve its bargaining position through violence once the winning side begins to make concessions for the long-term. In committing to public ratification of any peace deal, the Santos government added a broad range of voters to the mix of implicit parties to the negotiations, in ways that may increase the legitimacy of the peace, enhance the transparency of the process, and lock in the treaty politically. Santos also scored an important victory in the constitutional court’s decision that the plebiscite should face an up or down vote, rather than a messy set of votes on each point of the agreement. Although it adds to the difficulties of the peace agreement, the fact that the deal was always subject to public ratification may also have provided a strategic advantage to Colombian government negotiators. From the negotiating table in Havana, Colombian negotiators could point south at Uribe and other hardliners, warning their FARC counterparts that there were limits to what they plausibly concede. The prospect of democratic ratification, in other words, may have shrunk the possible range of options the Colombian government could agree to, but by narrowing the negotiating space, it may also have made the government’s commitment to its bargaining position more credible. Going forward, the most complex challenge will be to finalize the negotiations with the FARC even as the plebiscite campaign is simultaneously underway. Already “Yes” and “No” supporters are locked in rhetorical battle over how to frame the issues in the public eye. The silver lining is that the need to obtain democratic approval may have enabled the Santos government to obtain a better deal from the FARC than might have otherwise been possible. Whether that deal will prove acceptable to voters, of course, is the big question that will dominate Colombian politics for the remainder of the year.
    Blog Post by Matthew M. Taylor August 22, 2016 Latin America’s Moment
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 25–July 1
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 25, 2016 to July 1, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. <a href=’#’><img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https://public.tableau.com/static/images/NS/NSTWeeklyJune25-July1/WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard/1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /></a>   June 25: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Mafa, Borno. June 25: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of eight in Girei, Adamawa. June 26: Nigerian soldiers killed four armed bandits in Maru, Zamfara. June 27: Unknown gunmen killed four in Igabi, Kaduna. June 28: Nigerian troops killed three cattle rustlers in Maru, Zamfara. June 29: The Nigerian military killed four kidnappers in Emuoha, Rivers. June 29: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and thirteen others at a mosque and a video club in Djakana, Cameroon. June 29: Pirates killed three oil workers in Nembe, Bayelsa. June 30: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Guzamala, Borno. July 1: A Sierra Leonean diplomat was kidnapped in Kaduna. The exact location has not yet been made public.
    Blog Post by John Campbell July 5, 2016 Africa in Transition
  • United States
    Measuring Mexico’s Social Cohesion
    Social cohesion, or the strength of a country’s social fabric, is often raised in discussions of security. The World Bank describes it as “fundamental for societies to progress towards development goals,” and for making countries more resilient to bloodshed. In Mexico, policymakers argue social cohesion is both a casualty and a solution for reducing violence. To measure these ties, the think tank México Evalúa constructed the Neighborhood Social Cohesion Index (ICSV). They canvassed four housing complexes scattered throughout Mexico—many isolated, without public services, and composed of poorer households with limited education. The residents were asked to rate their communities on a low to high scale of one to ten in terms of social identity, trust between neighbors, a sense of belonging, and engagement in the community. The four ratings were averaged to produce an aggregate score. Social cohesion in all four communities ranged between 5.1 and 5.4 on the index, indicating that Mexico’s social fabric is not entirely broken, even in these difficult surroundings. In every community a strong sense of belonging and shared identity persisted, even when community engagement lagged. The polls found hope for the future, with nearly nine in ten neighbors saying that if encouraged, they would be “willing to work for the benefit of their community.” The survey also explored the causal links between social cohesion and perceptions of insecurity. Those communities that were rated more cohesive tended to feel safer, and vice-versa. Perceptions of insecurity were high overall: only 12 percent of residents said they would let their children walk alone in their neighborhood, fewer than a third would walk themselves alone at night. One of the pillars of the Mérida Initiative, the main vehicle for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation over the last decade, focuses on building “stronger and more resilient communities.” On the ground, this money has gone to after school programs, citizen watchdogs in law enforcement offices, and creating and expanding drug treatment courts, among other programs. México Evalúa’s survey suggests that expanding basic public services and cleaning up public parks would strengthen communities, as would actively recruiting neighbors to get involved in local events and activities. The Mexican and U.S. governments should use measures such as the Neighborhood Social Cohesion Index both before and after they invest more in fragile communities, to help determine which of the dozens of potential programs actually make things better.
    Blog Post by Shannon K. O'Neil May 26, 2016 Latin America’s Moment
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 30 - May 6
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 30, to May 6, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   April 30: Suspected cultists killed nineteen in Ahoada East, Rivers. May 1: Nigerian troops killed nine Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. May 1: Six civilians were killed during a clash between customs officials and smugglers in Egbado South, Ogun. May 1: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of twenty in Nasarawa, Nasarawa. May 2: Nigerian troops killed four pirates in Ogbia, Bayelsa. May 4: Nigerian troops killed eighteen cattle rustlers in Maru, Zamfara. May 4: Militants calling themselves the "Niger Delta Avengers" blew up a Chevron oil platform in Warri North, Delta.
    Blog Post by John Campbell May 9, 2016 Africa in Transition
  • International Organizations
    This Is Your UN on Drugs: From Prohibition to Flexibility in Counternarcotics Policy
    Coauthored with Theresa Lou, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. World leaders gather at the United Nations this week (April 19-21) for the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the world drug problem. This is the first such event since 1998, when member states committed themselves to policies aimed at eliminating illegal drugs by 2008. Trillions of taxpayer dollars and many destroyed lives later, that goal remains elusive—and illusory. This year’s UNGASS offers an overdue opportunity to rethink the war on drugs, and to appreciate how much attitudes have changed over the last eighteen years. Simply put, the longstanding global consensus behind prohibition is fracturing. Though there is little appetite to overhaul the three main international treaties—the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Expanded Convention, and the 1988 Convention against Drug Trafficking—a growing number of governments are calling for greater national flexibility in interpreting and enforcing these international obligations. The war on drugs has been a costly failure with far-reaching, negative impacts. A short list includes unacceptable violence, political instability, mass incarceration, and human rights violations. Even the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) concedes this point: “Global drug control efforts have had a dramatic unintended consequence: a criminal black market of staggering proportions…. The illicit drug business is worth billions of dollars a year, part of which is used to corrupt government officials and poison economies.” As the Global Commission on Narcotic Drugs concluded in its landmark 2011 report, supply-side efforts that focus on eradication, interdiction, and prosecution have had little impact on global markets, even as they provide cartels and gangs with massive resources to destabilize source and transit countries. Rather than insisting on “zero tolerance” and forcing all countries into “the same rigid approach to drug policy—the same laws, and the same tough approach to their enforcement,” the commission concluded, it was time to experiment at the national level. This reformist thesis has garnered adherents in Latin America, which has borne the heaviest brunt of the war on drugs. Murder rates in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia are among the world’s highest, while drug-related violence takes 30 lives a day in Mexico. Given these figures, it came as little surprise in 2012 when the presidents of Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico jointly asked the United Nations to “analyze all available options…with the aim of establishing a new paradigm….” Agreeing that the “one-law-fits-all” strategy was counterproductive, the Organization of American States (OAS) in 2013 endorsed the concept of “differentiated approaches,” arguing that governments should tailor their policies to local contexts and “individual concerns,” and might even experiment with decriminalization and legalization. More generally, the OAS defined drug addiction as a public health issue, calling on authorities to focus on treating rather than imprisoning addicts. In 2014, Uruguay became the first country in the hemisphere to legalize marijuana sales. Canada’s recently elected prime minister, Justin Trudeau, has indicated that his government will follow suit. However, these progressive sentiments are hardly universal within the Western Hemisphere, much less across the broader UN membership. Standing in opposition to the reform-minded coalition of Latin American and Western European countries (including Portugal, which decriminalized all drugs in 2001) is a larger conservative bloc spanning much of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as Russia, which is dead set against liberalization. This divergence has been attributed to different historical experiences and threat perceptions. In Latin America, for example, aggressive strategies are associated with U.S. imperialism, whereas in East Asia imperial powers are remembered for addicting people to opium. Likewise, Latin Americans associate the global prohibition regime with intense crime and violence, a phenomenon absent from Asia despite similar drug production, trafficking, and consumption levels. As for the United States, its traditional standing as the global champion and enforcer of narcotics prohibition has become more complicated and tenuous. Much of the problem comes from below—that is, from the individual U.S. states. How credibly can U.S. diplomats defend the 1961 Single Convention when Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia, have already legalized marijuana for recreational use? At home, the federal government has adopted an innovative policy of “enforcement discretion,” in effect allowing states to experiment so long as they abide by certain rules. The White House, meanwhile, has subtly shifted the national conversation about drug addiction away from a focus on crime (and resulting incarceration) and toward public health approaches. Abroad, the United States has struggled with how to adapt to this changing landscape. Over the past two years, the Obama administration has tried to make the best of an awkward situation, arguing that the three major counter-narcotics treaties are not a straitjacket, and that countries should make use of the flexibility that they provide. As William Brownfield, assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, argues, “there is a degree of discretion authorize and permitted by those conventions themselves…” Still, as Brownfield himself noted in an interview, “My use of the word ‘flexibility’ has been a policy Rorschach. People understand it according to what they want it to mean.” For the United States, the notion that the conventions are more flexible than anybody previously thought—while legally dubious—has obvious political utility, promising to mute potential tensions. So will UNGASS bring about any sweeping reforms to global drug policy? Not likely, to judge from the draft outcome document produced at last month’s Vienna meeting of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Wherever possible, the document pays homage to the existing conventions. By reaffirming their commitment to the objectives of the current prohibitionist regime, member states have all but ensured the debate will be held within the confines of the status quo, while acknowledging that the conventions “allow for sufficient flexibility” for states to design and implement policies according to their needs. Overall, the global appetite for change remains small. Major powers have little interest in reopening the international drug policy debate, and few countries are willing to openly recognize the structural deficiencies of the existing UN treaty framework for drugs. By papering over the current global “dissensus,” UN negotiators may avoid a headache in New York. It’s less clear that this rhetorical sleight of hand will be sustainable over the long turn. If parties to the three conventions continue to move in radically different directions—with some holding the hard line and others moving toward decriminalization or even legalization—a rupture in the global drug regime seems inevitable. The fragile consensus can likely tolerate disagreements over the treatment of cannabis. But fundamental divergences over the legal status of harder drugs like heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamines—and state obligations for interdiction and prosecution of such trafficking—could create enormous frictions, as well as open new criminal opportunities for legal and regulatory arbitrage. Rather than delivering the final word, this year’s UNGASS will be just the opening discussion in an ongoing—and ideally, more honest and realistic—conversation about the challenge of narcotics and the most promising approaches to limiting their damaging impacts. Attitudes toward drugs are evolving in many societies, and UNGASS is proof that these grassroots changes can affect global debates. At the last UNGASS, back in 1998, the assembled governments pledged themselves to the fantastical goal of a “drug free” world. This week’s slogan is for “a society free of drug abuse by 2019.” That is admittedly a subtle tweak. But given the history of the global war on drugs, it surely constitutes progress.
    Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick April 19, 2016 The Internationalist
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 9-15
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 9, to April 15, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   April 10: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of fifteen in Gashaka, Taraba. April 11: Pirates kidnapped six Turkish crewmembers from a ship off the coast of Rivers. April 11: Pirates kidnapped one Egyptian and one Filipino from a ship off the coast of Lagos. April 11: Police killed two students during a protest in Port Harcourt, Rivers. April 11: Nigerian troops killed twenty-two Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. April 11: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of forty-four in Bali, Taraba. April 11: A reporter was kidnapped in Owerri, Imo. April 14: Sectarian violence led to "scores" of deaths (estimated at forty) in Makurdi, Benue.  
    Blog Post by John Campbell April 18, 2016 Africa in Transition
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Somalia Ready for Oil Exploration?
    This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Last month, Soma Oil and Gas, a London based energy company, searching for hydrocarbon deposits off the coast of Somalia, announced that it had completed a seismic survey to ascertain the potential for recoverable oil and gas deposits. Although further details have yet to be released, chief executive Rob Sheppard announced that the results were encouraging. However, Somalia, and potential investors, should proceed with caution when considering entering this frontier market. East African oil exploration, and in Somalia specifically, is not a secret. Energy firms like Royal Dutch Shell and Exxonmobil operated in Somalia before the government collapsed in 1991. But recent gains against the insurgent group al Shabaab in the south and the decrease in piracy off the coast have sparked a regeneration of the industry. The Somali president, riding these positive evolutions, recently stated that the country is “open for business.” Although recent security developments are encouraging, substantial hurdles still exist. The Heritage Institute recently released “Oil in Somalia: Adding Fuel to the Fire?,” by Dominik Balthasar. The paper discusses how the oil industry in Somalia could have a promising future, but it also explores the risks facing Somalia if the development of its petroleum resources is not carefully managed. Balthasar rightly asks, “is Somalia ready for oil?” The historic challenges that have limited business opportunities in Somalia, domestic insurgency and piracy, have diminished for now, but these threats have not disappeared. Al Shabaab has been largely pushed out of southern Somalia by multinational forces, but has recently proven that it is still able to operate in the north of Kenya. As Kenya flexes to counter al Shabaab in its own country, it could provide an opportunity for al Shabaab to return to its previous strongholds in Somalia. And even as piracy has largely stopped, it is conceivable that al Shabaab or others could see oil tankers as opportunities to resurrect that practice as well. Beyond these security challenges there may be political disadvantages to developing the hydrocarbon sector in Somalia. Balthasar notes, among other things, that oil will likely exacerbate existing rifts and political tensions. In the context of the recent political turmoil and contentious federalism process, it is clear that any foreign oil companies would face a high degree of political instability and uncertainty. Balthasar also points out that the legal and constitutional conditions in Somalia are ambiguous in determining who can enter or negotiate contracts with oil companies. Without a well-defined regulatory environment for oil and gas resources, federal states, semi-autonomous regions, and the central government could all separately negotiate and enter into conflicting extraction agreements with private companies. The opaque regulatory nature of these resources has already proven problematic in the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland. Even with updated agreements on how to negotiate for and claim oil fields, Puntland and Somaliland have already leveraged their autonomy and granted their own licenses without the central government’s blessing. This is all likely to lead to further turmoil and maybe even conflict over profitable fields and the distribution of revenues. Somalia is probably not ready for oil development. With excellent access to shipping lanes and supposedly massive untapped wealth (perhaps as much as 110 billion barrels) it is no surprise that multinational oil companies are intrigued, but responsible investors would be wise to think twice. The underlying political instability and security challenges of Somalia will likely inhibit the long term feasibility and profitability of these projects. It could also cause backsliding for the hard fought improvements in Somalia’s government.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell January 15, 2015 Africa in Transition
  • Trade
    Protecting the Global Supply of Medicines
    Today, IIGG releases a new policy innovation memorandum entitled “Designing a Global Coalition of Medicines Regulators.” This policy memo assesses the regulatory landscape of the global supply chain for medicines and proposes that a multilateral coalition of regulatory authorities would substantively improve the ability of public regulators to keep pace with a dynamic global marketplace. Here is an excerpt: Globalization has transformed the marketplace for medicines in recent decades, giving rise to new threats including the poor traceability of global supply chains, counterfeit and substandard medicines, and antibacterial resistance. Aware that public drug authorities must cooperate to meet the emerging challenges of modern medicines regulation, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been discussing with counterpart agencies abroad creating a "global coalition of regulators." Yet a coalition alone is not enough; the devil, as always, will be in the details. In pursuit of this goal, the FDA and partner medicines regulatory agencies should design a coalition with five distinct features: narrow scope, to promote realistic goals; flexibility, to adapt to future circumstances; selective membership, to maximize like­mindedness, particularly in the early stages; nongovernmental (NGO) participation, to leverage the capacities of both NGOs and for-profit corporations; and institutional partnerships, to orchestrate the activities of other regulatory organizations. Read the full publication here.
    Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick August 20, 2014 The Internationalist
  • Diplomacy and International Institutions
    The Global Debate Over Illegal Drugs Heats Up
    Having been frozen for four decades, a long-deferred debate over the "war on drugs" is finally heating up. Ever since the Nixon administration, the dominant paradigm informing U.S. and global policy towards narcotics has been prohibition. That failed approach is now being challenged by a slew of influential reports, path-breaking national policies in the Western Hemisphere, and state-level experiments within the United States. Just how turbulent the debate has become was clear at yesterday’s roundtable on the future of international drug policy, hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The United States will need to chart a new policy course if it hopes to retain credibility and influence as global attitudes toward drugs continue to evolve. The U.S. law enforcement approach has focused on attacking sources of supply, interdicting shipments of drugs and incarcerating dealers. It has also targeted demand, imprisoning and fining addicts and casual users. And yet these repressive efforts have made little dent in the global drug trade. By artificially inflating profits, prohibition has only incentivized criminal activity. Traffickers have successfully shifted production sites and transit routes in response to crackdowns. Criminality, corruption and violence have destabilized vulnerable governments. Prison populations have swollen with addicts and casual users.  And yet drugs are cheaper and more available than ever before. Fortunately, a long-deferred debate over how to handle the global drug trade is gaining momentum. The first cracks in the prohibitionist edifice appeared in 2011, with the publication of the Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. The commission—co-chaired by former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo, former Brazilian president Fernando Enrique Cardoso, and former U.S. secretary of state George Shultz, and including other global luminaries like Kofi Annan, Paul Volcker, and Javier Solana—pulled no punches.  The report’s opening paragraph said it all: The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world. Fifty years after the initiation of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and 40 years after President Nixon launched the US government’s war on drugs, fundamental reforms in national and global drug control policies are urgently needed. It was time, the commission concluded, to “break the taboo on debate and reform.” The report categorically rejected the “repressive” measures that had “clearly failed to effectively curtail supply or consumption.” The commission endorsed a public health approach to reducing drug use and dependence, an end to incarceration of low-level drug offenders, and a shift from prohibition to regulation and harm reduction, with ample room for national experimentation—including decriminalization and even legalization. The Western Hemisphere has been most receptive to this appeal. The secretary-general of the Organization of American States, Jose Miguel Insulza, last year released a bracing Report on the Drug Problem in the Americas, documenting the damage of the war on drugs and endorsing "differentiated approaches" tailored to national contexts and concerns.  In Central America, ravaged by drug-related violence, Guatemalan President Otto Peréz Molina has insisted that prohibition has failed and that the only solution is “regulation.” In Colombia, which has received billions of dollars in U.S. counterdrug assistance since 2000, president Juan Manuel Santos has announced, “It’s time to think again about the war on drugs.”  Further south, Uruguay has become the first country in the Americas to legalize the marijuana trade. Meanwhile, in the United States, Colorado and Washington have legalized recreational use of cannabis, and eighteen other states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized its use.  And at the federal level, both President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder have noted the futility and injustice of continuing to imprison millions of Americans for low-level drug offenses. The United States, long the watchdog of the global prohibition regime, is facing a new diplomatic landscape as a result of all this turbulence. Speaking at CSIS, Ambassador William Brownfield, assistant secretary of the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), called it the most significant “national and global debate on drug policy” in history. It is one where the United States increasingly finds itself on the defensive, alternately whipsawed by attacks on its prohibitionist national stance and criticisms of the conduct of its individual states. Last October, Brownfield found himself before the  International Narcotics Control Board, where he was asked to explain why the United States could claim to be “in compliance” with the obligations of the three main international drug conventions, given legal and fast-developing cannabis markets in Washington and Colorado. The diplomatic challenge for the United States is to adjust its prohibitionist stance to new hemispheric and global realities. And it does not have much time. In 2016 the United Nations General Assembly will convene a Special Session (UNGASS) on Drug Policy—the first such event in eighteen years. To move the global debate on drug policy in a constructive direction, the United States has just two years to go from enforcer to reformer. At CSIS, Brownfield expressed confidence that the United States can gain international support for a global drug regime based on four pillars: Defend the integrity of the three existing international drug conventions. Some aspects of these treaties—the 1961 Single Convention, the 1971 Expanded Convention, and the 1988 Convention against Drug Trafficking—may be  outdated. But Brownfield insists that it is far easier to “adjust” these instruments than negotiate completely new ones (much less get Senate approval for ratification). Allow flexible interpretations of the drug conventions. Like the U.S. constitution, these must be seen as “living documents” that can be interpreted “as the world changes.” Tolerate different national strategies and policies: It is inevitable that each UN member state will develop its own approach to controlling narcotics, based on its cultural and political realities. Combat organized criminal groups: Whatever one’s position on legalization, all governments must commit to fighting violent drug traffickers. Other speakers at the CSIS debate were far more critical of the United States, arguing that its commitment to prohibition and repressive drug policies continue to obstruct a new, more realistic global approach to drugs. What U.S. officials were unwilling to address, argued Global Commission members Michel Kazatchkine and Ruth Dreifus, was the most fundamental question: “Have we been successful or not (in our current policies of repression and prohibition)?" "Let’s open an honest debate,” Kazatchkine implored. He noted the “absurdity” that at the most recent UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs meeting in March in Vienna, the final resolution had not even permitted use of the phrase “harm reduction,” which the United States, Japan, and some other countries had considered too controversial. Clearly, the debate over the future of U.S. and global drug policy is only beginning.
    Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick April 1, 2014 The Internationalist
  • Transnational Crime
    The Obama Administration Must Act Fast to Prevent the Internet’s Fragmentation
    Here in Sydney, Australia, where I’m attending a conference of CFR’s Council of Councils—a global network of prominent think tanks—a dialogue about the future of Internet governance has highlighted brewing controversy about the management of cyberspace. The conversation has convinced me that the Obama administration has a closing window of opportunity to safeguard international support for an open global Internet. It must immediately quicken dialogue with allies and partners to ensure that outrage over the NSA spying program does not result in the irreparable fragmentation of cyberspace. By the end of this year, two major international meetings may crystallize international support for greater sovereign control over cyberspace if the administration does not rally like-minded allies in opposition to statist regulation of the Internet. Revelations of the NSA’s massive PRISM program have angered critical U.S. allies and partners and eroded trust in the United States as the leading champion of liberal world order. The loss of Western solidarity has come at a critical juncture, emboldening authoritarian governments seeking greater control over cyberspace. As a result of these self-inflicted wounds, the United States will find itself on the defensive this year at two critical cyberspace summits: in São Paulo, Brazil, in April, and in Busan, South Korea, in October-November. At stake is nothing less than the integrity of the global open Internet we have so long taken for granted. This debate came to a head at the twelfth World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai in December 2012, where a majority of International Telecommunications Union (ITU) members—eighty-nine countries—supported an initiative backed by Russia and China to transfer to sovereign states greater control over the Internet. The United States and other Western governments opposed these moves as a blatant effort by governments to control citizen access to information and, in principle, crush dissent. The Dubai summit ended in stalemate but momentum was clearly with the majority. (Even ICANN, in its Montevideo communique from October 2013, conceded that the future would include a greater state role in Internet governance.) Since the dawn of the digital age, the United States had consistently supported an open, decentralized, and secure cyber domain that remains largely in private hands. Even before the Snowden disclosures, that vision was under threat, thanks to disagreements among governments on three fundamental issues. First, some world leaders are questioning whether the ITU ought to play a more active role in regulating cyberspace. To the degree that the Internet is “governed,” the primary regulatory body remains ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), an independent, nonprofit corporation based in Los Angeles. The outsized role of ICANN—and the widespread perception of U.S. (and broader Western) control over the Internet—has long been a sore point for authoritarian states, as well as many developing countries, which would prefer to move cyber governance to the intergovernmental ITU. A second threat to the open Internet has been a surge in cyber crime—and disagreement over how to hold sovereign jurisdictions accountable for criminality emanating from their territories. Estimates of the magnitude of cyber crime range from large to astronomical. In 2012, NSA director general Keith Alexander put the annual global cost at $1 trillion.  Most cyber crime is undertaken by nonstate actors against private sector targets for motives of financial gain. But national authorities have also been involved in economic espionage, both directly and through proxies. The most infamous case involves a unit of China’s People’s Liberation Army, which allegedly has been at the forefront of Chinese hacking efforts to steal industrial secrets and technology from leading U.S. companies. Third, the growing specter of cyberconflict—even cyber war—among nations threatens a secure and open Internet. Worldwide, dozens of governments are developing doctrines and capabilities to conduct “information operations.” This includes, of course, the United States, which has established a robust Cyber Command within the Department of Defense. Meanwhile, there is no international consensus on what constitutes a “cyberattack,” what responses to these incursions are permissible, and whether and how existing laws of war might be applied to cyberconflict. The total absence of global norms governing surveillance and data protection in cyberspace only exacerbates these disagreements. The details of NSA spying have elicited outrage among many U.S. allies and partners, from Germany to Brazil. There is, to be sure, a whiff of hypocrisy in these complaints, not least in European countries that possess extensive cyber snooping programs of their own and have long cooperated with NSA efforts by supplying data on their own citizens. Like Claude Rains in Casablanca, they profess themselves “shocked, shocked” to learn that such things might occur. And yet the domestic outrage and resulting diplomatic headaches are real. The Snowden revelations have called into question existing transatlantic arrangements for data sharing, including exchange of information on airline passengers, financial transactions, and banking deposits for anti-terrorism purposes. In response, the European Commission also threatened to suspend the “Safe Harbor” rule, which allows U.S. companies with European operations to transfer data on EU citizens outside the EU, though it ultimately abandoned the proposal. The European Parliament, meanwhile, drafted rules to make U.S. social media providers subject to “EU law rather than secret American court orders,” and impose massive fines for noncompliance. While these rules stalled in October, the Parliament is set to vote on March 12 on proposals to halt trade talks with the United States if the country does not increase protection for the private data of EU citizens. All this has set off alarm bells within U.S. technology companies, which fear being shut out of an EU market of 500 million customers. On December 8, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, LinkedIn, Twitter, and AOL—eight companies with a total value of $1.4 trillion—published an open letter to President Obama and Congress supporting radical reforms to preserve global public “trust in the Internet.” The companies clearly worry that separate national rules of data protection will reduce their bottom lines. And President Obama’s January speech about reforming NSA phone surveillance did little to assuage concerns. Specifically, Brad Smith, general counsel to Microsoft, called for a new “international legal framework—an international convention—to create surveillance and data access rules across borders.” The idea is to supplement the cumbersome network of bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance treaties with new, streamlined processes for authorizing real-time data sharing between governments. Such an arrangement would replace unilateral, unauthorized data mining with a cooperative framework among nations that better safeguards individual liberties. Given the difficulties of negotiating a universal UN convention on the matter, Microsoft’s Smith proposes beginning with a negotiated agreement among like-minded governments—and gradually extending membership to others willing to embrace these norms. Such a coalition approach to multilateral cooperation has intriguing precedents. Two potential models include the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created to combat money laundering, and the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), designed to interdict illegal transfers of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. It would be naïve, of course, to imagine that the United States and other countries will cease spying on one another, even—at times—on their closest friends. Still, some more common, explicit guidelines may reduce head-on diplomatic collisions in the era of Big Data mining. Whatever the model, the time for the United States to act is now. In April, Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, who has blasted PRISM as an affront to international law and national sovereignty, will host a major international summit to consider new global rules for privacy in the digital age. In late October, the International Telecommunications Union will convene in South Korea for its thirteenth summit. Atop the agenda will be expanding the ITU’s role—and that of member states—in governing the Internet. In both forums, the United States will be on the defensive. To avoid a debacle that irreparably fragments cyberspace, the Obama administration needs to shift to a “war room” footing, anticipate the raft of unproductive initiatives it might confront and work behind the scenes to cobble together an international coalition committed to preserving the foundations of an open Internet.
    Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick February 26, 2014 The Internationalist
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Tracking the Traffickers: The Debate over Legalizing Trade in Rhino Horn
    This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. 2014 has had a bad beginning with respect to the preservation of Africa’s remaining rhino populations. The South African government announced that by January 17, thirty-seven rhinos had been killed in South Africa. According to the Washington Post on January 31, over 1,600 have been killed worldwide in the past two years. There could be fewer than 25,000 rhino left worldwide. Conservationists, activists, governments, and many others are putting forward resources, manpower, and strategies to combat this slaughter for profit. The South African government made a public call for conservation and anti-poaching strategy submissions. One strategy that is receiving increasing attention is the possibility of legalizing the trade in rhino horn – of farming rhinos – to feed the growing demand in Asia. The debate is necessary, but so is caution. Should the door of legal trade be opened, it could prove impossible to close; even if it backfires on conservation efforts. A recent report, commissioned by the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), which was published in November 2013, will fuel debate over the pros and cons, the known and unknown consequences of legalizing the trade in rhino horn. Already the proposal has proponents and critics. The fundamental argument of the report is that there are too many unknowns about legalizing the trade; more research is necessary. Legalizing could flood the market with legal horn and at the same time facilitate the continued (or increased) trade in illegal horn. Or, it could work as advocates intend and undercut illegal horn prices, driving poachers and traders out of business; we just don’t know. Given the outrage over the recent auction held in Texas for a black rhino hunt in Namibia, and the continued anger over Spanish king Juan Carlos’ Botswana elephant hunt; in the West at least, popular opinion is firmly against legalization. There are strong arguments that the legal sales of 102 tons of elephant ivory to Chinese and Japanese traders in 2008 fueled the explosive expansion of the ivory trade in Asia, a trade which currently feeds the massive escalation of elephant poaching in Africa. The legal ivory provided the very smokescreen for illegal ivory it was intended to undercut. Given the currently numerous, and growing, initiatives against poaching, for conservation, and exposing Asian consumers of rhino horn to its lack of medicinal properties and the horror of its trade, perhaps the strongest arguments against legalization are its unpredictable consequences. And then there is the unfortunate precedent of the bad consequences of the legal sale of ivory.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell February 5, 2014 Africa in Transition
  • Regional Organizations
    Latin America Charts Its Own Course: Reflections on the Mexico City CoC Meeting
    For more than two centuries the United States has loomed—for good and ill—over its southern neighbors. But that longstanding hegemonic role is fading. After two decades of robust growth and democratic consolidation, Latin America is increasingly charting its own course, not only in the hemisphere but, increasingly, around the globe. The diverse and dynamic region below the Rio Grande may still be America’s “backyard”, but it’s no backwater. And it’s evident that the United States is only beginning to adjust to these realities. This was the clear message of the fourth regional conference of the Council of Councils, titled “The Future of the Americas in Global Governance,” which was convened in Mexico City on November 24-26. Co-hosted by the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) and Brazil’s Gitulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), the meeting united the CoC’s global network of think tanks and the parallel Hemispheric Councils of International Relations. Two questions guided our agenda and deliberations: What is the state of regional integration in the hemisphere? And how can Latin America contribute to global governance? Our discussions—in the grand confines of the Mexican Foreign Ministry—included keynote addresses from José Miguel Insulza, the director-general of the Organization of American States (OAS), and José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, the Mexican minister of foreign affairs. The panel sessions focused on five issues: whether a “Latin American” region actually exists; how regional and global trade initiatives should relate to one another; what role Latin America can play in the Group of Twenty (G20); whether it is time for new approaches to combat drug trafficking and criminal violence; and how the Americas should respond to the revolution in global energy markets. In the coming days, we’ll describe these deliberations in a comprehensive meeting report. In the meantime, I’ll try to summarize the most compelling take-aways:                           Latin America exists, but in various guises: The conversations in Mexico City revealed a common “Latin American” identity but also the limits of that unity. To be sure, the countries of the region have broadly shared economic and other interests, but their political values often diverge, as evinced by frictions between Venezuela and other members of the Bolivarian Alliance and more conservative states like Colombia or Peru. A major point of contention remains the limits of national sovereignty, particularly when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights norms. Coherent regional policies are also complicated by the proliferation of competing frameworks of cooperation. As in Asia, Latin America is awash in regional and sub-regional institutions. These sometimes overlapping bodies include the OAS (of which the United States and Canada are members), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (of which which they are not), the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA)—to name just a few. While such diversity has advantages, it also suggests a politically fragmented region, in which institutions are weak by design. Latin America’s coherence—and future—will depend on relations between Brazil and Mexico: As the continent’s only Lusophone country, Brazil has long been ambivalent about its status as a “Latin American” country. That is slowly changing, as it emerges as (by far) the most powerful nation in South America . Brazil’s challenge is to balance its natural leadership role in the region with its growing global ambitions. Meanwhile, north of the isthmus, the center of gravity focuses increasingly on Mexico, which has recently enjoyed impressive growth of its own. Today, Brazil and Mexico account for some 60 percent of Latin America’s total GDP. Yet, while the two countries are linked by growing commercial and cultural ties, their diplomatic relations remain underdeveloped—correct but distant. Unless these two giants develop a more sophisticated strategic partnership, it will be difficult for Latin America, per se, to develop a coherent, independent international voice, underpinned by robust institutions. Preferential trade agreements present both opportunity and risk: The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) suggest a world that has given up on global multilateral trade “rounds” through the WTO and instead moved toward the more easily grasped benefits of “plurilateral” trade liberalization. The response in Latin America has varied by country. Most governments have moved to open their economies and pursued preferential trade agreements, with the Pacific Alliance nations of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile at the forefront. Others, including the ALBA nations, are clinging to more defensive, protectionist policies that show little promise. The risk is that a “two-speed” Latin America may emerge, with more closed economies left behind. There is also a danger that Latin American countries will be pulled in one of two directions—across the Pacific, to take advantage of trade with Asia—or across the Atlantic—to exploit openings with Europe. More generally, all participants stressed that TPP, TTIP, and other such arrangements must remain open, in principle, to Latin American economies (including Brazil) that are currently excluded. Latin America is determined to seek new approaches to drugs and crime: In Carl Sandburg’s epic poem The People, Yes, a little girl watching soldiers march in a parade muses, “Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come.” Governments and opinion-makers across Latin America are increasingly adopting that very attitude toward Washington’s bankrupt, forty-year old “war on drugs.” In 2012, at the request of its member states, the OAS produced a groundbreaking report, The Drug Problem in the Americas. It documented, in meticulous detail, the devastating impact that current supply side approaches to combating the illegal drug trade have had in both producer and transit countries, generating—among other things—horrific levels of violence in Mexico and Central America. The report—and the conversations in Mexico City—revealed a growing appetite among Latin American countries for alternative approaches to crop eradication and interdiction. From Guatemala to Colombia to Uruguay, sitting political leaders are, for the first time, considering alternatives to criminalization and prohibition—mirroring experimentation occurring among some states in the United States itself. Conference participants agreed that the time had come to take a public health approach to the drug problem and focus more on harm reduction—including lowering levels of violence in the most affected nations. (By coincidence, today the United States celebrates the 80th anniversary of the 21st Amendment, which repealed Prohibition. We might consider the lesssons of that failed policy in the context of the ongoing drug war). The United States lacks a strategic approach to the Western Hemisphere: Repeatedly, participants complained of the drift that seemed to characterize Washington’s policy towards Latin America. The Obama administration appears to operating by the seat of its pants, they noted, rather than developing a coherent, strategic approach to its southern neighbors. Washington’s clear preferences are to deal with individual nations on a bilateral, case-by-case basis; to ignore troublemakers like Venezuela and other ALBA members in hopes their influence will fade; and to work behind the scenes to extinguish fires like the diplomatic fallout from the Snowden affair, which have alienated many Latin American leaders, not least Brazilian president Dilma Roussef. The conferees in Mexico City had searched in vain, they said, to find a more positive U.S. agenda for the hemisphere—including on the vexing issue of migration.  
    Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick December 5, 2013 The Internationalist
  • China
    Tracking the Traffickers: A More Comprehensive Anti-Poaching Approach
    This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. In the fight to save Africa’s wildlife and stem the tide of senseless slaughter for profit, awareness campaigns across the globe are as crucial as more boots on the ground in the game reserves and parks. Many consumers of ivory, rhino horn, and other wildlife products –such as tiger parts– do not know deadly supply chain through which ivory comes to be in shops around the world, or don’t care. One Chinese government worker interviewed for a New York Times article in March this year commented that: “As long as the quality of the ivory is good, who cares what happened to the elephant.” But this is not just an African or an Asian issue. The United States after all, remains the third largest market for trafficked wildlife. There is a great need, not only for enhanced and tightened anti-poaching efforts, but for much greater popular awareness of the monstrous fate of the wildlife being “harvested.” If demand falls, so too will profit, and therefore motivation for poaching. Organized crime, insurgents, terror groups, and  independent "entrepreneurs" are targeting the elephants and other African wildlife because it is profitable. If profits die out, they will move on. This wildlife crisis is market driven, rather than ideological. The Philippines in June this year, became the first non-African nation to destroy their ivory stockpile. The United States has also begun to embrace a comprehensive approach in its recent anti-poaching and trafficking policies. In a highly public display in Colorado on November 14, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service destroyed its six ton stockpile of confiscated ivory. They also invited other countries to follow their example. President Obama issued an Executive Order on July 1, 2013 that establishes enhanced legal and judicial steps against poaching. It also provides for U.S. “technical and financial assistance… where appropriate.” He also established a Presidential Task Force on Wildlife Trafficking and tasked it with developing and implementing a National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking. Former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton and her daughter Chelsea Clinton in September launched a U.S. $80 million anti-poaching plan at the Clinton Global Initiative. This is Hillary Clinton’s first major initiative since she stepped down as secretary of state at the beginning of 2013. While such public efforts and initiatives are important in the fight to save the elephants, and other targeted wildlife, to be most effective they should target each link in the poaching and trafficking chain. The Clintons’ initiative concentrates on poaching prevention and prosecution. There also remains a need to concentrate on raising awareness of the consequences of the carnage that poaching and trafficking wreck on the wildlife populations. There are reports that Hollywood stars Leonardo DiCaprio, Tom Hardy, and Tobey Maguire are collaborating on an anti-poaching movie. That would be a highly positive step. Awareness campaigns run in China (the largest end market for ivory) are showing some progress in sensitizing people against participating in the wildlife trafficking market. Such awareness raising campaigns would likely go a long way to decreasing American demand for wildlife products as well.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell November 22, 2013 Africa in Transition
  • Arms Industries and Trade
    A Strategy to Reduce Gun Trafficking and Violence in the Americas
    The flow of high-powered weaponry from the United States to Latin America and the Caribbean exacerbates soaring rates of gun-related violence in the region and undermines U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. Though the Senate rejected measures to expand background checks on firearms sales, reinstate a federal assault-weapons ban, and make straw purchasing a federal crime, the Obama administration can still take executive action to reduce the availability and trafficking of assault weapons and ammunition in the Americas. The Problem With the launch of the Merida Initiative in 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed to a regional security framework guided by the principle of shared responsibility. Among its domestic obligations, the United States committed to intensify its efforts to combat the illegal trafficking of weapons and ammunition to Mexico and elsewhere in the Americas. Six years later, little has changed: the U.S. civilian firearms market continues to supply the region's transnational criminal networks with high-powered weaponry that is purchased with limited oversight, especially from unlicensed individuals at gun shows, flea markets, pawn shops, and on the Internet. Lax U.S. gun laws enable straw purchasers, including those under investigation in Operation Fast and Furious, to legally procure thousands of AK-47 and AR-15 variants every year and traffic them across the border to sell them illegally to criminal factions. U.S. government data highlights the problem. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) Web-based firearm trace request and analysis system, eTrace, enables law enforcement officials to collaborate with ATF to track the path of recovered weapons from the manufacturer or importer though the distribution chain to the first retail purchase. Over 70 percent of the ninety-nine thousand weapons recovered by Mexican law enforcement since 2007 were traced to U.S. manufacturers and importers. Likewise, 2011 eTrace data for the Caribbean indicates that over 90 percent of the weapons recovered and traced in the Bahamas and over 80 percent of those in Jamaica came from the United States. The ATF has not released data for Central America, but the numbers are likely similar. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports that easy access to firearms is a major factor influencing homicide trends in Latin America and the Caribbean; the gun-related homicide rate in Latin America exceeded the global average in 2010 by more than 30 percent. The World Bank estimates that crime and violence cost Central America nearly 8 percent of its GDP when accounting for the costs of law enforcement, security, and health care. The U.S. government has empowered law enforcement in the region to recover and investigate the source of weapons used by criminal factions. In December 2009, the ATF introduced the Spanish version of eTrace. Since 2012, the State Department has funded the Organization of American States' (OAS) program to provide firearm-marking equipment and training to law enforcement in twenty-five countries. Yet, these efforts notwithstanding, Mexican authorities intercepted only 12.7 percent of the roughly 250,000 guns smuggled into Mexico between 2010 and 2012, while the ATF intercepted no more than 2 percent. In effect, the United States undermines its own efforts at preventing arms trafficking with its unwillingness to strengthen oversight of the firearms industry and lukewarm support for multilateral agreements. The United States is one of three countries that have not ratified the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA). In addition to requiring parties to criminalize the illegal manufacture, import, or export of high-powered weapons, the treaty encourages information exchange and cooperation on initiatives including the marking and tracing of weapons and the identification of criminal transit routes. President Bill Clinton signed CIFTA in 1997 and submitted it for ratification to the Senate, where it has lingered for over a decade. Likewise, although the United States voted in favor of the United Nations' Arms Trade Treaty in April 2013, it has yet to sign or ratify the treaty. Given the political complexity of legislative action to reduce arms trafficking, Latin American governments have moved to disarm criminal networks by tightening their own gun codes: Mexico prohibits the sale of handguns with calibers greater than .38 and Colombia bans civilians from carrying firearms in Medellin and Bogota. Brazil, Mexico, and El Salvador have implemented gun buyback programs. At the 2012 Summit of the Americas, heads of state demanded a new approach to the failed war on drugs, including greater efforts to disarm criminal networks. U.S. allies have repeatedly urged the United States to reinstate the federal assault-weapons ban and take action against weapons trafficking. Their patience—and the United States' credibility as a responsible partner—is waning. U.S. action will strengthen those regional heads of state who want to work with the United States and who also regard lax U.S. gun laws as fueling violence and anti-Americanism among their own publics. Across the board, Latin American governments are turning toward the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the Union of South American Nations, which pointedly exclude the United States, to handle regional political and security dilemmas. Stronger action to regulate the southward flow of weapons represents an opportunity for the Obama administration to enhance U.S. relevance in the region, especially at the early stages of new regional institutions and security protocols. Recommendations In the absence of major legislative action, the Obama administration should pursue the following executive and diplomatic actions—consistent with the Second Amendment—to reduce the trafficking of firearms that contribute to crime and violence across the Americas: Expand nationwide the state-level multiple-sale reporting requirement for assault weapons. In 2011, the Obama administration adopted a federal rule that requires gun dealers in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico to report sales of more than two semiautomatic rifles to the same person within a five-day period. Unintentionally, the rule shifted gun sales to states not covered by the requirement, prompting the need for improved oversight of all suspicious semiautomatic firearm sales. Incorporate strategies to reduce existing stocks of illegal firearms into U.S.-Brazil dialogue on defense and security. As home to the two largest firearms industries in the hemisphere, the United States and Brazil have a mutual interest in incorporating this topic into their ongoing bilateral policy dialogues. For example, sharing best practices regarding gun buyback programs in border regions on the U.S.-Mexican and Brazilian-Bolivian borders will build mutual confidence between the two largest Hemispheric powers. Exclude firearms and ammunition products from the Export Control Reform Initiative. As currently crafted, President Barack Obama's reform initiative may make it easier for U.S. manufacturers to export military-style weapons to allies. Liberalizing export restrictions on firearms poses a serious security risk to the Americas; potential reexport of firearms without U.S. oversight could jeopardize local law enforcement efforts to keep weapons from criminal groups and rogue security forces in the region. Apply the "sporting test" standards of the 1968 Gun Control Act. This provision prohibits the import of weapons not "suitable or readily adaptable for sporting purposes," including but not limited to military-style firearms. Throughout the 1990s, under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the ATF adhered to the sporting test guidelines, preventing thousands of assault weapons from entering the U.S. firearms market. Enforcement of the test lapsed under President George W. Bush and has not been reestablished under President Obama. Continue to support federal, state, and local initiatives to improve regulation of the U.S. civilian firearms market. As grassroots organizations prepare their long-term legislative strategies, the White House should back state and local legislation, based on reforms in Maryland and Connecticut, which bans the sale of assault rifles and high-capacity magazines, broadens existing background check requirements for firearm purchases, and modernizes gun-owner registries by requiring, among others, that buyers submit their fingerprints when applying for a gun license. While piecemeal regulation of the U.S. civilian firearms market does not represent a comprehensive solution, passage of state and local measures, including gun buyback programs, will reduce the number of weapons in circulation and available for smuggling and generate momentum for a broader federal approach over the long run. Conclusion Strengthening U.S. gun laws will not eliminate gun violence in Latin America, where weak judiciaries and police forces, the proliferation of gangs and black markets, and deep inequality exacerbate violent conflict. Nonetheless, lax U.S. gun regulations do enable international trafficking. While the effects of tighter regulation will not be felt overnight, such steps will offset widespread regional views that the United States remains indifferent to its own role in exacerbating one of Latin America's most significant challenges. Although recent federal gun control measures have run aground on congressional opposition, the Obama administration retains considerable leeway in the foreign policy arena, where concerted action can help U.S. allies in Latin America make the case to their constituents and to other skeptical governments that the United States can be a legitimate partner in combating transnational crime. At a juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations that again features both tension and opportunity, these actions will demonstrate that the United States is prepared, if imperfectly, to fulfill its shared responsibility for regional security and enhance American standing and positive influence in Latin America.
    Policy Innovation Memorandum by Julia E. Sweig July 29, 2013 Latin America Studies Program