Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Command and control among Boko Haram factions operating in Nigeria’s Borno state and adjacent territories remains obscure. One faction appears to be led by Abubakar Shekau, well-known for his taunting, bloody videos, and his kidnapping of the Chibok school girls in 2014. Another, the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), apparently backed by the Islamic State (IS), was once led by Abu Musab al- Barnawi, though Mamman Nur was understood to hold real power. Last year, Nur appears to have been assassinated because he was too “soft.” In March 2019, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was replaced by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi. (Al-Barnawi denotes that the person is “from Borno,” so the current and former ISWA leaders do not necessarily have any blood relationship.) The report of a leadership change is based on IS audio recordings, though the extent of IS control over the leadership struggle with ISWA is not entirely clear. If, indeed, Abu Musab and Mamman Nur were “soft,” it is likely that Abu Abdullan Ibn Umar will be “hard.” However, what “hard” and “soft” actually means is obscure, as is the relationship between the Boko Haram factions and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Northeast Nigeria and adjacent regions continue to be the center of Islamist jihadist extremism. Scores of civilians were targeted and killed in southeast Niger by Boko Haram in early April, forcing thousands to flee to Diffa, a Nigerien border city. With the collapse of the IS in Iraq and Syria, some observers are characterizing Borno as the “largest remaining Caliphate,” though how and to what extent it is a direct successor to IS remains unclear.  The Nigerian army, in conjunction with the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF), continues to claim military success against Boko Haram. In neighboring Chad, officials are claiming that Chadian forces killed sixty-three “terrorists” in a mid-April attack on a military facility. But, the number of Boko Haram incidents has not declined. In early April, the Islamic State West Africa released a video showing its execution of five Nigerian soldiers; subsequently, it was determined that three of the soldiers were members of the Civilian Joint Task Force, an informal militia that assists the regular army. In the past, such videos have had a deleterious effect on military morale. The factions, for now, appear relatively distinct. The original split in 2016 had to do with, among other things, Shekau’s leadership style, his understanding of Islam, and his targeting of Muslim civilians. ISWA, according to experts, has been more focused on winning hearts and minds, and has even developed a tax base. Especially since leadership changes over the past year, ISWA has attacked a number of military targets with success, overrunning military bases and stealing equipment. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, military casualties have increased significantly since July 2018. The Shekau and al-Barnawi factions of Boko Haram continue to evolve and even grow. Changes in leadership and tactics raise questions about the extent of their affiliation with IS and overall stability, but they also indicate that the movement is far from defeated.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 6 to 12, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1555337301078'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 6: The Nigerian Air Force killed twenty-five bandits in Birnin-Magaji, Zamfara. April 6: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and nine others in Jere, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. April 6: Police killed three bandits while the bandits killed two officers and three civilians in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. April 6: Gunmen kidnapped eight in Kosofe, Lagos. April 6: Herdsmen killed six in Anambra West, Anambra. April 6: Sectarian violence led to fifteen deaths in Izzi, Ebonyi. April 7: Herdsmen killed a policeman and seven others in Omala, Kogi. April 7: Thirty-six bandits and vigilantes were killed during a clash in Kankara, Katsina. April 8: Herdsmen killed twenty-one in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in and around Maradun, Zamfara.  April 9: Eighteen bandits and vigilantes were killed during a clash in Sabuwa, Katsina. April 9: Bandits killed five in Batsari, Katsina.  April 9: Nigerian soldiers repelled a Boko Haram attack in Damaturu, Yobe, killing "many" (estimated at twenty) militants.  April 9: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves, one policeman, and two security forces in Diffa, Niger.  April 9: Herdsmen killed five in Ethiope East, Delta.  April 10: Gunmen abducted four travelers in Ethiope East, Delta.  April 11: Sectarian violence led to fifteen deaths in Ukum, Benue.  April 11: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and two others in Monguno, Borno.  April 1–11: Over ten days, Nigerian troops killed thirty-five bandits in and around Zurmi, Zamfara. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 30 to April 5, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1554736096952'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 30: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Michika, Adamawa. March 30: Nigerian troops killed one bandit; two vigilantes were also killed in Tsafe, Zamfara. March 30: Bandits killed forty-three in Shinkafi, Zamfara. March 31: Nigerian soldiers killed sixteen Boko Haram militants in Lake Chad. March 31: The Nigerian Air Force killed five bandits in Gusau, Zamfara. March 31: Kidnappers abducted twelve firewood traders in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. March 31: Sectarian violence led to one death in Oke-Ero, Kwara. April 1: Thirty-seven commuters were kidnapped in Kachia, Kaduna. April 1: Boko Haram attacked Chibok, Borno. No casualties were reported.  April 1: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. April 1: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Wukari, Taraba. March 29–April 1: The Islamic State claimed to have killed thirteen Nigerian soldiers around Kukawa, Borno.  April 2: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Donga, Taraba. April 2: Herdsmen killed five in Logo, Benue. April 2: Bandits killed fifty civilians and Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Kaura Namoda, Zamfara. April 3: The Islamic State claimed to have killed five Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) soldiers around Kukawa, Borno.  April 4: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Ukum, Benue.

The United States has been helping Somalia fight al-Shabab militants for more than a decade, but rights groups say increasing drone strikes are putting civilians at risk.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 23 to 29, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1554126554847'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 23: Boko Haram killed seven Nigeriens and kidnapped two in Diffa, Niger. March 24: Herdsmen killed two in Akwanga, Nassarawa. March 25: A Catholic priest was kidnapped in Kachia, Kaduna.  March 25: Sectarian violence resulted in "many" (estimated at ten) deaths in Izzi, Cross River. March 25: A Boko Haram landmine killed thirteen soldiers in Gwoza, Borno.  March 26: A North Korean doctor was abducted in Tsafe, Zamfara.  March 26: Boko Haram killed ten and lost two militants in Diffa, Niger. March 27: Kidnappers abducted a policeman and four others in Esan South, Edo; the policeman was later killed.  March 27: Gunmen abducted the former Nigeria Bar Association Chairman in Jalingo, Taraba.  March 27: Boko Haram killed one policeman and one civilian in Biu, Borno.  March 27: Gunmen abducted four in Akwanga, Nassarawa.  March 27: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Omala, Kogi. March 28: Police killed five kidnappers in Ikwerre, Rivers. March 28: Boko Haram killed one in Chibok, Borno.  March 29: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) killed five Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno; another two militants were killed by a landmine planted by Boko Haram. 

In the aftermath of the New Zealand mosque attacks, public debate is mounting in Western democracies over the severity of the threat posed by far-right extremists.

According to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), a respected and credible human rights non-governmental organization, Burkinabe security services have executed summarily more than 115 civilians in operations against jihadi militants between April 2018 and January 2019. HRW also reports that the Islamists have killed forty-two alleged government collaborators during that same period. Burkina Faso has been dealing with Islamist militant attacks for the last three years, but over the past three months in particular, attacks have accelerated; the Burkinabe government declared a state of emergency in January. In response to accusations of human rights violations, the authorities have acknowledged the charges and stated that they are being investigated. The Burkinabe security services’ murder—for that is what it is—of civilians is tragically reminiscent of the early days of the Boko Haram insurrection in northeast Nigeria. Ever since, abuses by Nigerian security services have been a driver of Boko Haram recruitment. The fear must be that this pattern will reproduce itself in Burkina Faso. To break the cycle, the Burkinabe authorities must conduct a credible investigation—something most observers conclude the Nigerians have failed to do—and bring the perpetrators to justice.  U.S. military assistance is typically contingent on respect for human rights. In February, for example, the U.S. military cut some military aid to Cameroon over human rights abuses associated with operations against the separatist movement in the west. Not only are these abuses counterproductive, it makes it more difficult for France, the United States, and other Western countries to support Burkina Faso in their struggle against jihadist terrorist groups.

U.S. policymakers have long overlooked women’s involvement in terrorism, and rarely enlisted their participation in efforts to combat radicalization. A new bill would require U.S. counterterrorism policy to address the roles that women play as victims, perpetrators, and preventers.

This week: Social media platforms race to remove video of Christchurch terror attack; EU levies third antitrust fine against Google; Russia rolls out new censorship laws; and top aluminum company hit by ransomware attack. 

By Van Jackson New Zealand may appear to be a paradise in the Pacific, but it is afflicted by many of the problems facing other liberal democracies, such as a rising suicide rate and deep socioeconomic inequalities with no clear solution. To this list of shared problems, tragically, one can now add white nationalist terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Christchurch on March 15, in which fifty were killed and dozens more wounded, was the worst such attack in New Zealand history. Focusing on transnational strategic threats, and looking from New Zealand, policymakers generally have not viewed white nationalist terrorism as a strategic concern, though both New Zealand and Australia have histories of white nationalism, including long histories of exclusionary immigration laws. But the brand of terrorism that resulted in the massacre in New Zealand is a strategic threat, and one that has been a blind spot for New Zealand and the national security establishments of its Five Eyes partners—the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, whose bureaucratic-level intelligence sharing was established decades ago. The Five Eyes intelligence partnership among these five states has, over time, been effective in monitoring and responding to the challenges of the Cold War, the threat of Islamist terrorism, and more recently in managing the evolving strategic threat that China poses in the Asia-Pacific and other regions. The threat of terrorism from white nationalists, however, is in some ways a more dangerous threat than either of these challenges, simply because it has been largely ignored by policymakers. Terrorism from white radicals is a transnational threat. Similar attacks to the Christchurch killing have occurred in Canada, European countries like Norway and the United Kingdom, and the United States. More will come, and these extremists view themselves as part of a war that is only just beginning. A manifesto from one of the alleged New Zealand attackers says as much, but white nationalist groups in the United States have discussed the idea of a battle emerging around the world as well. Radical white nationalist terrorism has been a blind spot for the national security communities in many countries. Although law enforcement agencies like the FBI have highlighted the threat—the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security noted in a report in 2017 that white nationalist extremists had committed more attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2017 than any other group—policymakers still often have not taken this threat seriously enough. In part, national security leaders and politicians in many states may have ignored white nationalist terrorism as a transnational threat since white nationalists traffic in theories and ideas that echo rhetoric found in some more mainstream political circles. The extremists express shared beliefs about a white race under threat, the inferiority of other races and non-Christian religions, and other conspiracy theories. White nationalist terrorists are acting on ideas of hate that transcend borders, using technologies, like social media and live streaming, that transcend borders, and celebrating other white nationalist figures from around the world, to create an imagined future (of theirs) that they believe transcends borders. The national security communities of the Five Eyes countries need to work together to combat the transnational ideas and the technologies that can be used to turn extremist ideas into action, and ensure that mainstream politicians’ rhetoric does not dampen a meaningful response to this growing threat, or obfuscate its character. Yet while intelligence officials have noted that Five Eyes partners have created a massive intelligence sharing network regarding other types of transnational terrorism, they also have noted that this intelligence sharing has not generally extended to domestic terrorists and terrorist groups, even white nationalist ones. Indeed, intelligence officials told the Washington Post that while Five Eyes countries might tell a partner state about a potentially imminent terrorist attack by a domestic extremist in that other country, they do not routinely share information about domestic terror threats in partner states. Now, that must change. Van Jackson is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, the Defense & Strategy Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, and a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 9 to 15, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1552925998539'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 9: Nigerian troops killed twenty-three Boko Haram militants in Abadam, Borno.  March 9: Electoral violence resulted in two deaths in Ibadan South-West LGA and one death in Lagelu LGA, Oyo. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in one death in Ahoada West LGA, two deaths in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA, and four deaths in Khana LGA, Rivers. March 9: Gunmen killed a policeman and abducted twenty Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) ad hoc staff in Danusa, Katsina. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in one death in Kankara, Katsina. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in two deaths in Akoko South-West LGA and four deaths in Odigbo LGA, Ondo. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in one death in Igboeze North, Enugu. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in two deaths in Idemili North, Anambra. March 9: Six INEC staff were kidnapped, then released in Lokoja, Kogi.  March 9: A ballot box snatcher was killed in Ukanafun, Akwa Ibom. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in two deaths in Guma, Benue. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in one death in Ughelli South, Delta. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in one death in Nkwerre, Imo. March 9: Bandits killed four and kidnapped "several" (estimated at five) in Isa, Sokoto. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in one death in Olamabor LGA and two deaths in Ankpa LGA, Kogi. March 9: Bandits killed one in Kajuru, Kaduna. March 9: Electoral violence resulted in one death in Akwanga, Nassarawa. March 9: Pirates kidnapped five sailors off the coast of Brass, Bayelsa. March 10: Bandits killed thirty-five in Kajuru, Kaduna. March 10: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Madagali, Adamawa. Boko Haram was suspected. March 10: Fifteen were kidnapped from a bus in Ikwerre, Rivers. March 11: Bandits killed fifty-two in Kajuru, Kaduna. March 11: Troops killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. February 15–March 11: Over the last month fifty-five bandits, three soldiers, and one vigilante were killed during continued military operations in and around Zurmi, Zamfara. March 12: Bandits killed twenty-two in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. March 12: Gunmen killed a driver and kidnapped a Lebanese man in Kano, Kano; they later killed the kidnapped man on March 14. March 12: Bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Kankara, Katsina. March 12: Gunmen attacked a police station and killed four policemen in Owan East, Edo. March 12: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) claimed to have killed thirty-nine Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. March 12: Post-election violence resulted in eight deaths in Jalingo, Taraba. March 12–14: Post-election violence resulted in five deaths in Bauchi, Bauchi. March 14: Gunmen abducted a renowned Quranic reader and five others in Kankara, Katsina.  March 15: Gunmen killed two policeman in Yenegoa, Bayelsa. 

This article was originally published in the Times of India. Why is it so difficult for US media to use the word “terrorism” in the context of South Asia? Escalating tensions between India and Pakistan over the past three weeks have produced greater international coverage of the region. Yet in conveying the news, some US outlets have relied on the word “militant” to describe terrorist groups operating from Pakistan. This vocabulary choice doesn’t suggest organisations with universally condemnable violent tactics, but instead something more ambiguous about their use of violence. But armed groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba are terrorist organisations by any definition. US media should stop sidestepping the word “terrorist” when writing about these groups, and portray the regional security situation accurately. What does the coverage look like? The facts include a very serious sequence of events that began with a terrorist attack on a paramilitary convoy in Pulwama and led to the use of air strikes and fears of possible war between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. In describing and analysing this sequence, a Washington Post article examined why Pakistan “has not been able to rein in anti-India militants”. Reuters employed the term to discuss Pakistan’s renewed vow to crackdown on these groups. Covering Indian foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale’s February 26 remarks explaining India’s air strikes, an Associated Press timeline rephrased him, substituting “militants” for “terrorists”. In the New York Times, a story on the Financial Action Task Force (an inter-governmental group on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing) used “militants” in the headline and alternated between “militant” and “terrorist” in the article. This soft-peddling may appeal to journalists trained to abhor hyperbole. But it makes no sense. The JeM and LeT are two particularly dangerous India-focused terrorist groups headquartered in Pakistan. Despite periodic government crackdowns, usually under international pressure after an attack in India, both groups have thrived in Pakistan virtually unfettered. So poorly enforced are any supposed sanctions against them that last year the LeT tried to register as a political party to contest national elections, and after that was rejected, ended up fielding candidates anyway under a different name. While Pakistan houses a variety of terrorist groups — including the Afghanistan-focused Haqqani Network — JeM and LeT in particular destabilise the South Asian region by mounting terrorist attacks in India, raising the spectre of further escalation. India holds JeM responsible for attacks on its parliament in December 2001, an airbase in Pathankot, Punjab in January 2016, an army camp in Uri, Kashmir in September 2016, and the Valentine’s Day attack that sparked the current crisis. It has been implicated in the 2001 suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly, an assassination attempt on former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, and the murder of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl. Similarly, LeT is responsible for, most notably, the Mumbai attack of November 2008, which killed 166 people, as well as the 2001 parliament attack. JeM and LeT have been under international terrorism sanctions for nearly two decades. In October 2001, both were added to a sanctions list under UN Security Council Resolution 1267. This requires member-states to freeze assets, impose a travel ban, and “prevent the direct or indirect supply” of arms and other assistance to designated groups. In December 2001, the US government added JeM and LeT to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list, and further designated LeT under Executive Order 13224, another terrorism sanction. Pakistan actually banned both these groups in January 2002, although they promptly regrouped under other names and remained active from Pakistani soil. But both are officially on the Pakistani National Counter Terrorism Authority’s proscribed list. In other words, there should not be any dispute over their status as terrorists.  Perhaps writing about “militants” instead of “terrorists” is meant to suggest even-handedness, a means of balancing what India says with what Pakistan often denies. Or perhaps the rationale lies in a newsroom ethos of lowering the emotional tenor by using a word less likely to create fear. It may even result from an incomplete awareness of the many years throughout which these two groups have been under international scrutiny and legal proscription. Regardless of the reason, the practice downgrades the threat these groups pose to regional peace. But JeM and LeT are a menace to South Asia. Scenarios of conflict escalation between India and Pakistan inevitably begin with a terrorist attack in India, traced back to Pakistan-based groups. That’s exactly what happened on February 14. It could happen again if not tackled permanently. For that reason alone, JeM and LeT should be recognised for the dangers that they are. And above all, call them by their name: terrorists.