Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Jacob Zenn is an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University and senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. In August, the Islamic State-affiliated faction of Boko Haram known as Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) entered Gubio and Magumeri, which are two strategic towns near Borno State’s capital, Maiduguri, in northeastern Nigeria. ISWA looted fuel and supplies, destroyed houses and government buildings, and prayed before retreating into Borno’s hinterlands. The short occupation of these two towns followed Borno’s governor, Babagana Zulum, encouraging civilians in those towns to remain in their homes and assuring civilians the military would protect them. However, the military had left those towns in accord with its new “super camp” strategy. Absent an immediate military presence, thousands of civilians had fled. The “super camp” strategy is apparently driven chiefly by the military’s inability to defend itself against constant ISWA raids on poorly constructed military barracks in rural areas. Under the new strategy, military personnel will be based in a few, well-constructed “super camps,” which ISWA presumably cannot overrun. While the military may have reduced the potential for casualties and theft of military materiel, it has also reduced its ability to combat ISWA in rural areas. This strategy appears to also be the most recent formulation of the military’s “fortress strategy,” which seemingly was never implemented after its initial 2017 announcement. In the countryside, ISWA will likely be able to operate more freely. It will face less resistance as it engages with the population and builds a base of political support. For its part, the military hopes that, from “super camps,” it will be able to conduct mobile raids on ISWA camps and fighters. In the past, however, ISWA has been able to ambush such patrols, obstructing military movements.  Coinciding with last month’s “super camps” announcement and ISWA’s Gubio and Magumeri incursions, casualties related to the insurgency have significantly decreased, according to the Nigeria Security Tracker. From a humanitarian perspective, leaving Borno hinterlands open for ISWA may, counterintuitively, preserve lives. With ISWA “free to roam,” there would likely be less combat between ISWA and the military, and therefore fewer deaths of soldiers, ISWA members, and civilians. But from a political perspective, Nigeria appears to have unofficially ceded control over parts of Borno to ISWA, at least temporarily. As the group promises to support commerce, promote an “Islamic” system, and otherwise leave civilians where it operates alone, state authority is undermined.  Given that ISWA shows little openness to peace negotiations, instead focusing primarily on hostage exchanges for ransom, the decrease in deaths resulting from the “super camp” strategy are a welcome respite from the devastation of ten years of war. But it should not imply, or be conflated with, greater likelihood of more permanent peace. It is unlikely that ISWA would be content with only roaming Borno’s hinterlands. Further, in those areas it controls, would ISWA allow Christians to worship, women to seek education, and other communities disfavored by ISWA to live undisturbed? With space to operate, it could amass new recruits, train them, and generate more tax revenue, at which point it may be capable of attacking “super camps” and threatening major urban areas. Military and civilian death tolls would then rise again.

Adam Valavanis is a former intern with the Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. He received a master’s degree in conflict studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science. West Africa is facing a growing threat from Islamist extremist groups. Many of these groups originated in Mali but have since spilled over its borders, with jihadis establishing themselves in the north and east of Burkina Faso. The country has become a desirable haven for many groups because of the security vacuum that has defined the country following the deposition of longtime strongman Blaise Compaore. The presence of these groups, including Ansaroul Islam, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen, has precipitated a rise in interethnic and interreligious tensions in a country that has for years been characterized by peaceful coexistence.  Burkina Faso's inability to clamp down on many of the extremist groups operating inside its borders has allowed such groups to use the country as a launch pad for attacks in coastal West African countries, most notably Benin. Burkina Faso borders Pendjari National Park in Benin's northwest. This forest has become the site of several incursions by jihadis, who have attacked communities and tourists in the area. The situation has become so dire in the north that both France and the United States have issued travel warnings for Pendjari and the surrounding areas. Such incursions by Islamist groups come at a time of political fragility in Benin, following its controversial legislative elections in April. The protests and general sense of insecurity that have gripped the country in the last few months could provide fertile ground to extremist groups looking to gain a foothold in the country. Officials fear that jihadis have also infiltrated Togo and Ghana.  Currently, the most comprehensive effort to combat Islamist terrorism and intercommunal violence in the region is the G5 Sahel Joint Force, a security partnership between five states in the Sahel and supported by France. Unfortunately, the G5 has faced funding shortfalls, preventing it from quickly and effectively responding to threats as they arise.  For most of the past decade, coastal West Africa has been spared the Islamist violence that has dominated the Sahel. It hosts some of the continent's most stable democracies, including Senegal, Ghana, and Benin. The region has also become a hotspot of foreign investment, attracting interest from the West as well as China and Turkey. The presence of Islamist groups, along with ongoing issues such as corruption and drug trafficking, threatens to upend all of this.  

As Congress argues over the 2020 defense authorization bill, there is one issue that should provide common ground: the benefits of investing in women’s contributions to security. The House has already passed a set of provisions requiring the Defense Department to better draw on women; these should become part of the bill ultimately sent to the White House.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 24 to 30, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1567535855540'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   August 24: Boko Haram killed four and kidnapped twelve in Nganzai, Borno.  August 26: Gunmen kidnapped one and killed two policemen and two others in Ikpoba-Okha.  August 26: Bandits killed three and kidnapped eighteen in Kaduna, Kaduna.  August 26: Bandits killed two in Tangazar, Sokoto. August 26: Nigerian soldiers killed two Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. August 27: Bandits kidnapped fifty people in Kurfi, Katsina.  August 27: Boko Haram killed eleven construction workers in Damboa, Borno.  August 28: Gunmen killed a Catholic priest in Takum, Taraba.  August 28: A cult clash resulted in four deaths in Shomolu, Lagos.  August 29: Gunmen killed five in Kaura, Kaduna.  August 29: Herdsmen killed eight in Riyom, Plateau.   August 30: Boko Haram killed eight Nigerian soldiers in Nganzai, Borno.  August 30: Boko Haram killed four and kidnapped two in Gubio, Borno. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 17 to 23, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1566829510776'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   August 17: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Katsina-Ala, Benue.  August 18: Bandits killed thirteen in Danmusa, Katsina. August 18: Gunmen killed eight in Khana, Rivers. August 18: Boko Haram killed four Nigerian soldiers in Dikwa, Borno.  August 18: Bandits kidnapped six in Safana, Katsina.  August 18: Bandits killed four in Jibia, Katsina.  August 18: Gunmen abducted ten in Chikun, Kaduna.  August 20: Gunmen abducted four in Chikun, Kaduna.  August 20: Robbers killed three policemen and one civilian in Akwanga, Nassarawa. August 21: Boko Haram killed "scores" (estimated at forty) in Gubio and Magumeri LGAs of Borno.  August 22: Kidnappers abducted three in Udi, Enugu. August 22: Gunmen killed five in Ohaji/Egbema, Imo. August 22: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  August 23: Boko Haram killed twelve in Diffa, Niger. August 23: Kidnappers abducted seven in Kaduna North, Kaduna. August 23: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 10 to 16, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1566228511850'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   August 11: Fifteen soldiers, eight ISWA (Boko Haram) militants, and three civilians were killed during a clash in Gubio, Borno. August 11: Gunmen abducted a chief imam's son and two others in Ogun Waterside, Ogun. August 11: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  August 12: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped thirteen in Batsari, Katsina.  August 12: Soldiers killed three civilians at a festival in Obafemi-Owode, Ogun. August 13: Suspected herdsmen killed two in Kabba/Bunu, Kogi. August 14: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and six others in Kaiga-Kindjiria, Chad. August 14: Kidnappers abducted a pastor and his son in Chikun, Kaduna. August 14: Boko Haram killed three soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno.  August 14: Gunmen killed ten in Khana, Rivers. August 15: Gunmen killed one in Obio/Akpor, Rivers.

Should the Haqqani network manage a collapse of the Afghan government, Pakistan threatens to make winning the next war more difficult than previous ones.

The fishing town of Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, has been devastated by both Boko Haram and the Nigerian army. It is currently controlled by the Boko Haram faction, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA). The group is led by Abu Abdallah al-Barnawi, and is separate from, and presumably a rival to, Abubakar Shekau’s faction. Obi Anyadike, a reporter, interviewed eight former residents of Baga who had fled to Maiduguri. He published a report based on his experience in the New Humanitarian, a news organization that was set up by the United Nations in 1995 but is now an independent non-profit. His reporting is hardly definitive about life under ISWA, but it parallels other accounts.  In 2016, following an internal rift, Boko Haram split into at least two factions. One was recognized as the Islamic State’s official branch in West Africa, and thus retained the affiliation. The other has continued to be referred to as Boko Haram, and is still led by Abubakar Shekau, the brutal leader of the group since its deadly reemergence in 2011. The fundamental difference between the two, and which ostensibly led to the split, is the treatment of civilians. ISWA tends to target the Nigerian military and others perceived as agents of the secular Nigerian government. Shekau’s faction apparently views any Muslims who do not follow him—civilian and military—as legitimate targets.  Anyadike’s reporting indicates that ISWA is serious about governing the people in the territory it occupies, creating a daulah, an Islamic state conducted according to Islamic law, that can rival Nigerian state government. In Baga, the daulah provides certain services, allows residents to leave upon the payment of a small tax, and does not interfere with farming. It also appears to treat women and girls better than Shekau’s faction, who forced all girls of marriageable age to marry. It digs wells, provides rudimentary health care, and imposes food price caps—all popular measures. Such a group, Anyadike points out, does indeed pose a different, perhaps more serious, challenge to the Nigerian secular state than Shekau’s. ISWA appears to be engaged in state building, while Shekau’s faction remains a millenarian (“end times”) movement that is deeply violent.  Anyadike raises the possibility that, some day, ISWA might evolve into a political party that supports Islamic law but participates in secular politics. Perhaps. But an ISWA commander he interviewed rejected any possible compromise with the Nigerian secular state; a former ISWA leader, Mamman Nur, was allegedly killed because of participating in back-channel talks with the Nigerian government (and misappropriating funds).

In peace talks with the Afghan Taliban, the United States should not fail to address the evolution of the Haqqani-al-Qaeda nexus.

Sadeeq Garba Shehu is a private defense and security consultant in Nigeria. He is a former group captain in the Nigerian air force and former deputy head of safety and security at the African Union Commission. Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, after two long periods of military rule—1966–79 and 1983–98—during which the military wielded executive, legislative, and judicial power. This has left a historical legacy of a powerful military used to doing whatever it wants with no questions asked. On return to democracy, it also left the country with a political class that is wary of military power, and unwilling and unable to impose democratic civilian oversight of the military.  Lack of oversight has real consequences. The Nigerian military is currently engaged in protracted counter insurgency operations against Boko Haram, and involved in many other internal security operations. It is suffering from an acute readiness crisis. It is now being accepted and acknowledged, even within military and government circles, that the Nigerian military is overstretched, under-manned, grossly under-equipped, ill-trained, and poorly led. To worsen matters, the three services are locked in intense rivalries, with neither the lame-duck chief of defense staff nor the equally powerless minister of defense able to intercede; the service chiefs routinely go over the head of the minister to report to the president, rendering the minister redundant. The services are left to pursue operational approaches individually rather than in concert, and carry prestige projects with no real value to operational capacity, frittering away already scarce and insufficient resources. From 1999 to 2018 Nigeria has been spending on average less than of 0.5 percent of its GDP on defence.  The military faces many proven and unproven allegations of human rights abuses and law of armed conflict violations. To address these, there has been a presidential commission of inquiry on human rights violations and compliance with the rules of engagement, and president Buhari raised the issue in his first inauguration speech and in a speech to the EU Parliament in 2016, promising change. But, years later, there is still insufficient doctrinal guidance and normative material to guide the Nigerian military on the conduct of operations.  As President Buhari begins his second term, there is a lot that both the executive and the legislative branches need to do to reform the defense sector to address, among other things, the issues of readiness and democratic civilian oversight. Such reforms will certainly not come from within the military.  Among other things, successful reforms require four changes. First, the Buhari administration should appoint a minister of defense with a strong personality and extensive knowledge of the Nigerian military. The outgoing minister, though a retired general, struggled unsuccessfully to stamp his authority over the powerful service chiefs. By date of entry, he was junior to the service chiefs. Nevertheless, a retired military general would likely be best suited. Second, the current imprecise chain of command running from the president through to the minister of defense, chief of defense staff, down to the three service chiefs and commander of joint task forces, should be reorganized and streamlined. Third, the process needs support from the Nigerian military top brass, retired Nigerian military officers with the requisite subject matter expertise, as well as Nigeria’s foreign allies. The United States and United Kingdom in particular should move from just providing training to providing equipment and live satellite imagery if the Nigerian military is to attain the readiness status needed to prevail over Boko Haram as part of the global counter terrorism effort. Such imagery has been more difficult to attain following the mistaken bombing in 2017 of an IDP camp in Borno state by the Nigerian Air Force, which led to more than one hundred confirmed deaths. Finally, there needs to be a review of the contentious Section 217 (2) c, and d, of the Nigerian constitution, which allows the military to be engaged in domestic operations, especially in light of the sometimes tragic consequences of such involvement. For such reform to take root, it will require not only the leadership of the Buhari administration, but the close involvement of the legislature.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 3 to 9, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1565624111653'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   August 4: Gunmen killed a pastor and kidnapped his wife in Kaduna South, Kaduna. August 5: Police killed three kidnappers in Emuoha, Rivers.  August 5: Gunmen killed a police officer in Akoko South-East, Ondo. August 5: Five civilians were killed during a clash between Nigerian troops and Boko Haram in Monguno, Borno.  August 6: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Mafa, Borno.  August 7: Nigerian soldiers killed three policemen and three civilians in Ibi, Taraba.  August 7: Gunmen kidnapped six in Ikwerre, Rivers.  August 8: Herdsmen killed one in Mkpat Enin, Akwa Ibom.  August 9: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. 

The El Paso tragedy underscores the need to take stock, again, of strategies for addressing how terrorist and extremist groups exploit the internet to spread hate and incite violence.

The latest mass shootings have prompted calls for more vigorous action by U.S. counterterrorism authorities, but the target is elusive.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 27 to August 2, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1565016448865'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, July 25: Gunmen killed twenty-two and abducted "many" (estimated at ten) in Kankara, Katsina.) July 27: Boko Haram killed sixty-five in Nganzai, Borno.  July 28: Bandits killed three traders in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. July 28: Bandits killed three and abducted six in Batsari, Katsina.  July 29: Twenty-five soldiers and forty-seven ISWAP (Boko Haram) militants were killed during a clash in Kukawa, Borno.  July 29: Gunmen killed three in Katsina, Benue.  July 29: Nigerian police killed four kidnappers in Bali, Taraba.  July 29: Boko Haram killed twenty-five soldiers in Kaga, Borno.  July 30: Boko Haram killed "many" (estimated at ten) in Konduga, Borno.  July 30: Sectarian violence led to eight deaths in Takum LGA and three more in Okpokwu LGA in Benue.  July 31: Bandits killed three and abducted two in Batsari, Katsina. August 1: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  August 1: Gunmen kidnapped five pastors in Ijebu-Ode, Ogun.  August 1: Ten bandits, two soldiers, and one civilian were killed during a clash in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  August 2: Five were killed during a cult clash in Idemili North, Anambra. 

From far away it is difficult to know what daily life is really like in an area controlled or occupied by Boko Haram. Chitra Nagarajan, a journalist and author who has written for the Guardian (UK), among other publications, recently spent time in Yobe State doing research on gender. She has gathered into a Twitter thread a summary of her conversations about life under Boko Haram, specifically, the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) faction. Chitra is a feminist who writes on women’s and queer issues around the world. She at present lives in Maiduguri, the city where Boko Haram began. Her reportage is anecdotal, but provides insights into daily life.  There are at least two factions of Boko Haram, one led by Abubakar Shekau and one by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi, the latter referred to as ISWA. They operate in the area around northeast Nigeria, though some of the factions are reportedly further afield.  Those Chitra spoke with in Yobe State said that ISWA targeted the military and the police rather than civilians, matching what she has heard from residents of Borno State. Still, the group threatened rich men and demanded protection money, which was often paid to avoid relocation. Farmers who crossed paths with ISWA members in the countryside were told they would not be hurt and to continue to go about their work, but some thought ISWA fighters, and by extension, such promises, were “unreliable.” While the Nigerian military sometimes closed down markets and banned fishing, hoping to rob ISWA of resources, ISWA apparently would come to preach in villages and offer financial incentives. According to Chitra, waging economic warfare on ISWA seemed only to generate more sympathy and support for it. Her interlocutors confirmed that banditry is widespread and takes advantage of the general lack of government in the area to rustle cattle. Some posited that some of the bandits were members of ISWA, but seemed to imply that rustling was not sanctioned by ISWA leadership, and that the bandits in question were punished. Should a man leave ISWA (or, presumably, Shekau’s faction) and then go through government rehabilitation (women do not apparently have the same access to such programs) they would often not be welcomed back to their communities and would be forced to relocate.  Chitra’s tweets are congruent with other reports that ISWA does not kill civilians to the same extent as the Shekau faction does, and ISWA’s apparent effort to win over the local population and provide a modicum of governance. She also highlights the relationship between cattle rustling and other criminality with Boko Haram factions. In at least some areas—in this case, where ISWA is predominantly active—Chitra’s tweets seem to imply that daily life goes on much as it did before Boko Haram arrived.