Defense and Security

Terrorism and Counterterrorism

  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 24-30
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 24 to October 30, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     October 24: Approximately two security forces and three armed civilians were killed during a clash in Oredo, Edo. October 24: Security forces killed ten looters in Calabar, Cross River. October 24: Stampeding from looters killed six in Jalingo, Taraba. October 24: Six Boko Haram militants and one police officer were killed during a clash in Tarmuwa, Yobe. October 24: Boko Haram killed eight farmers in Konduga, Borno. October 24: Suspected bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Faskari, Katsina. October 24: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Giwa, Kaduna. October 24: Nigerian soldiers killed two Boko Haram militants in Abadam, Borno. October 25: Suspected bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Faskari, Katsina. October 25: Hoodlums killed one police officer in an attack on a police station in Ibadan, Oyo. October 25: Soldiers killed four looters in Jos North, Plateau. October 25: Suspected bandits kidnapped five in Maru, Zamfara. October 25: Twenty-two Boko Haram militants, one civilian, and five soldiers were killed during a clash in Damboa, Borno. October 25: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped four in Nasarawa, Nassarawa. October 26: Bandits killed one customs officer in Ringim, Jigawa. October 26: Hoodlums killed one police inspector in Abakaliki, Ebonyi. October 27: Bandits killed one civilian and kidnapped three, and police officers killed five of the bandits in Safana, Katsina. October 27: Gunmen kidnapped seventeen at a mosque in Toto, Nassarawa. October 27: Gunmen kidnapped four in Lafia, Nassarawa. October 28: Gunmen killed one police officer and one civilian in Ado, Benue. October 29: Bandits killed thirty in Dandume, Katsina. October 29: Bandits killed four in Maradun, Zamfara. October 29: Bandits killed one and kidnapped fifteen in Maru, Zamfara. October 29: Soldiers killed three Boko Haram militants in Maiduguri, Borno. October 29: Nigerian troops killed three bandits and lost one soldier in Faskari, Katsina. October 30: Kidnappers abducted three in Akoko North-East, Ondo.
  • Nigeria
    Northwest Nigeria Potential Jihadi Linchpin in West Africa
    Up to now, radical jihadi activity in West Africa has been centered in Mali—with spillover to adjacent parts of Burkina Faso and Niger—and the Lake Chad Basin. The two locales are now increasingly bridged by jihadi activity in northwest Nigeria, where resurgent struggles over land and water with a cast of ethnically aligned fighters and flourishing criminality provide them with new space. Jihadi movements in all three regions are fractious, subject to bloody internal rivalries, and overlap with criminal elements. They do share a declared goal of establishing polities based on Islamic law—sharia—and the destruction of the fragile, postcolonial secular states in the region. (National borders, established by the former colonial powers, are largely meaningless for most local people, as well as for criminals and jihadis.) Were they to be successful, however, it is by no means clear that they could establish coherent territorial governance much above the village level. No charismatic leader such as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Osama bin Laden, or even Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has emerged to impose unity on the various jihadi groups now active from the Lake Chad Basin to the western Sahel. More likely would be decentralized regimes of warlordism led by Islamist and criminal opportunists. Criminally inflected chaos and a humanitarian disaster are more likely than a resurrected, unified Islamic State. France has the most modern military force countering the jihadis—Operation Barkhane numbers some 4,500 soldiers—and supports most of the weak militaries of francophone West Africa. The United States provides France with limited logistical and intelligence support from its drone base in Niger. It also trains small numbers of soldiers drawn from local militaries. Jihadi forces at present are resurgent throughout the region. Were the French to leave, jihadis would likely overrun Mali and adjacent territories even if they could not govern them. In the Lake Chad Basin—mostly in Nigeria but also in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger—the jihadis are primarily factions of Boko Haram, some with links to the Islamic State, others to al-Qaeda. (Observers are divided as to the tactical or strategic significance of those links.) Nigeria has taken the lead in attempting to coordinate its efforts with those of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Other than in Niger, the United States has no significant security presence in the Lake Chad region or the western Sahel. Across the region, the jihadis, far from defeated, appear to be strengthening. Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin have a much larger population and, accordingly, the humanitarian disaster associated with fighting is much greater than in the western Sahel. (The United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and other international donors already provide significant humanitarian assistance right across West Africa, including the Sahel.) These two centers of jihadism are separated by northwest Nigeria. That region is increasingly plagued by conflicts over water and land use, exacerbated by human and cattle population growth, climate change, and poor governance. A borderland between the Sahara, the Sahel, and better-watered lands to the south, the region has long been a center of smuggling as well as trading. With a harsh and variable climate—as in the rest of the Sahel—population movements have been a constant. So, too, have been waves of Islamic religious revival, which influence present-day jihadi activity. Jihadi groups are taking advantage of a general societal breakdown in certain areas. The Nigerian government has responded by seeking to crush the jihadis and the bandits through military and police methods, so far to no avail. Government-sponsored proposals, some fanciful, prescribe reorganization of the cattle industry. None address the huge population increase, climate change, and poor governance that provide jihadis and criminals with oxygen. A different strategy is possible. Much of northwest Nigeria is included in the domains of the Sultan of Sokoto and his subordinate emirs. (The sultan is the preeminent Muslim traditional ruler in Nigeria, and his domains stretch into neighboring countries.) Muslim rulers provide traditional justice that often commands greater popular confidence than that handed down by the government in far-off Abuja. Their agents sometimes have a good understanding of what is happening on the ground—the local drivers of conflict. Jihadis despise these traditional rulers as heretics and seek to kill them whenever possible. In the northeast, for example, Boko Haram was nearly successful in killing the Shehu of Borno, generally regarded as second only to the sultan in the traditional hierarchy that jihadis seek to destroy. Were Abuja to cooperate more closely with traditional rulers that command popular confidence, its confrontation with the jihadis could be more successful.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 17-23
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 17 to October 23, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 17: Three #EndSARS protestors were killed in Osogbo, Osun. October 17: One #EndSARS protestor was killed in Abuja, FCT.  October 17: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos.  October 18: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno.  October 19: Six #EndSARS protestors were killed in Abuja, FCT. October 19: Six were killed when a prison in Benin, Oredo, Edo was broken into. October 19: Four #EndSARS protestors were killed in Etsako West, Edo.  October 19: Six Chadian soldiers and ten Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash on the Chadian side of Lake Chad. October 19: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" ISWA militants in Abadam, Borno.  October 20: Two police officers and six others were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ibadan, Oyo. October 20: Six civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos. October 20: Three civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Abuja, FCT. October 20: Two police officers and three protestors were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Orile, Ikeja, Lagos.  October 20: Police officers killed two #EndSARS protestors in Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos. October 20: Police officers killed fifteen #EndSARS protestors in Ibeju/Lekki, Lagos. October 20: Bandits killed twenty-two in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. October 20: Four civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Kano, Kano. October 20: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Aba, Abia. October 20: Three civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Jos, Plateau. October 20: Seventeen were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Mushin, Lagos. October 20: Four were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Epe, Lagos. October 20: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Oredo, Edo. October 20: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. October 21: Three were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Port Harcourt, Rivers. October 21: Three police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Oyigbo, Rivers. October 21: Two civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Enugu East, Enugu. October 21: Bandits kidnapped a family of four in Katsina, Katsina. October 21: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Njaba, Imo. October 21: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Mbaitoli, Imo. October 21: One police officer and one civilian were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ado-Odo/Ota, Ogun. October 21: Two civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos. October 21: Police officers killed three #EndSARS protestors in Ondo, Ondo.  October 22: One police officer was beheaded in #EndSARS-related violence in Nnewi, Anambra. October 22: Three were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Onitsha, Anambra. October 22: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ibadan, Oyo.  October 22: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Akure, Ondo. October 22: Kidnappers abducted two pastors and one church member in Aniocha South, Delta.  October 22: Police officers killed five looters in Alimosho, Lagos. October 23: Five were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Calabar, Cross River. October 23: One customs officer and one aggressor were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Illorin, Kwara. October 23: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Nnewi, Anambra.
  • Sudan
    Removing Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List
    This week, President Trump made the long-anticipated announcement that the United States is prepared to remove Sudan from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST). Sudan has been on the list of pariahs for 27 years, and delisting has been a priority of its new government since the historic uprising of Sudanese civilians in 2019 that triggered a coup and ushered in a transitional period in which the military and civilians uneasily share power. While the process to complete the lifting of the SST designation requires Congressional cooperation and will take several weeks, the announcement is a most welcome step for Sudan, and for all those around the world hoping to see Sudan’s historic political transition succeed in birthing a stable, accountable, and representative new Sudan. Yet this milestone is not uncomplicated for many Sudanese. First, Sudan’s economy is on the ropes, and leaders trying to guide the country through a fragile transition are coping with soaring inflation and massive debt. Delisting is positive economic news in that it removes significant barriers to critical banking relationships, eases investors’ concerns about reputational risk, and allows the United States to support debt relief for Sudan at the international financial institutions. But for Sudanese people suffering immediate economic hardship and food insecurity, the fact that Sudan has agreed to pay $335 million to compensate victims of the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in exchange for delisting can be a bitter pill. Sudan’s people had little voice in the decisions of its abusive and authoritarian government during the long tenure of President Omar al-Bashir. The pain of families affected by acts of terrorism cannot be ignored, and it is not hard to understand their demands for justice and accountability. At the same time, one can understand how paying for the sins of a government that Sudanese citizens shed blood to remove can feel like misplaced punishment. The Trump Administration’s linkage of SST delisting with its desire to see Sudan normalize its relationship with Israel has only added to the discomfort of some who feel their hand has been forced on a contentious and unrelated issue.  Of course, all actors have to confront the realities of the delisting process. But those who would dismiss domestic Sudanese complications as unimportant are missing an important point. For decades the United States worked to encourage change in the nature of Sudan’s government, applying pressures like the SST designation to a brutally violent authoritarian state. Today, the United States should want popular sentiment to matter to Sudan’s leaders, and it should be heartened by the fact that they have to balance popular opinion with foreign policy imperatives. As civilians try to wrest control of Sudan’s future away from securocrats, opening up the possibility of a democratic Sudan that can play an important bridging role in the broader Red Sea area, U.S. policymakers should keep their eye on the ball and proceed with sensitivity and meaningful support. Sudan’s future, and how its population feels about its leaders and their relationship to the United States, matter to our own long-term interests.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 10-16
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 10 to October 16, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     October 10: Kidnappers abducted twenty-four people in Kuje, FCT.  October 10: One person was killed during protests against the Special-Anti Robbery Squad (SARS) in Ogbomosho, Oyo.  October 10: Gunmen killed nine in Giwa, Kaduna.  October 10: Gunmen killed two in Bauchi, Bauchi.  October 11: Soldiers killed two during a curfew protest in Sanga, Kaduna.   October 11: Bandits killed eight in Faskari, Katsina.  October 11: Three people were killed during protests against SARS in Ogbomosho, Oyo.  October 11: Gunmen killed a mobile police officer in Okpe, Delta. October 12: One police officer and one civilian were killed during protests against SARS in Surulere, Lagos. October 12: Bandits killed six vigilantes in Rafi, Niger State. October 12: Boko Haram killed fourteen farmers in Maiduguri, Borno. October 13: Vigilante members killed eleven herdsmen in Kurfi, Katsina. October 13: A military airstrike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Batsari, Katsina.  October 15: Armed robbers killed a mobile police officer in Warri, Delta.  October 15: Gunmen killed three at a mosque in Koton Karfe, Kogi.  October 15: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA members in Abadam, Borno.  October 16: Communal violence led to nine deaths in Isoko South, Delta.  October 16: Two people were killed during protests against SARS in Oredo, Edo.  October 16: ISWA killed fourteen soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  October 16: Boko Haram killed three people and kidnapped five children in Oudal, Cameroon. Learn more about John Campbell's upcoming book, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, out in early December 2020.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 3-9
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 3 to October 9, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     October 3: The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) killed a civilian in Ughelli North, Delta.  October 3: Gunmen killed a pastor in Ekiti West, Ekiti.   October 3: A police officer killed a civilian in Abuja, FCT.  October 3: Suspected Fulani bandits killed nine in Batsari, Katsina. October 3: Bandits kidnapped twenty in Jibia, Katsina.  October 4: One was killed in election-related violence in Akure, Ondo.  October 4: Troops killed two bandits in Kachia, Kaduna.  October 5: Sectarian violence led to six deaths in Riyom, Plateau.  October 5: Troops killed a bandit leader and "some" others (estimated at five total) in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  October 5: Bandits kidnapped six in Maru, Zamfara.  October 6: Herdsmen killed two in Bassa, Plateau.  October 7: Kidnappers abducted three in Kuje, FCT. October 7: Kidnappers abducted twelve in Ughelli North, Delta.  October 8: One police officer and one civilian were killed during an EndSARS protest in Ughelli North, Delta.  October 8: Police officers killed two robbers in Ikot-Ekpene, Akwa Ibom. October 8: Suspected herdsmen killed two in Afikpo, Ebonyi. October 8: Air strikes killed "many" (estimated at twenty) bandits in Batsari, Katsina. October 9: Gunmen killed one police officer and one civilian in Ethiope East, Delta.  October 9: Police officers dispersed protestors with gunshots in Osogbo, Osun. October 9: Bandits killed three in Giwa, Kaduna.    Learn more about John Campbell's forthcoming book Nigeria and the Nation-State
  • Kenya
    Justice, Terrorism, and Nairobi's Westgate Mall
    The 2013 al-Shabab attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall lasted four days and left sixty-seven shoppers dead, the youngest an eight-year-old child. The attack was fully captured on the mall's security cameras and broadcast around the world. The attack was seen as a response to Kenyan military activity in Somalia against al-Shabab that began in 2011. At the time, the attack became, for the developed world, the face of jihadi terrorism in Africa. It also highlighted the incapacity of the Kenyan security services: soldiers and police fired on one another and looted shops. Since then, Westgate has receded in importance as terrorist attacks have accelerated. In 2015, al-Shabab killed 148 in an attack on Kenya's Garissa University. A 2019 al-Shabab attack in Nairobi killed twenty-one; a January 2020 attack on a Kenyan airfield killed three U.S. citizens. Al-Shabab remains active in Somalia. Terrorism in other parts of Africa overshadows Westgate. For example, in West Africa jihadi terrorism appears to be strengthening in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. In southern Africa terrorists are newly active in Mozambique. As for Westgate, the mall partially reopened in 2015, and altogether in 2018. Among food, clothes, and other routine merchandise, it continues to purvey the Western luxury goods that are anathema to jihadis. At present, mall security is provided by an Israeli company.  The four apparent perpetrators of the Westgate attack were killed at the time. However, the forensics were sloppily done, offering no assurance that some perpetrators did—or did not—escape. Three were subsequently arrested for allegedly helping the attackers. All are ethnically Somali and two are Kenyan citizens. The three were indicted in 2013; after numerous delays, two were convicted on October 7 and will be sentenced on October 22. The third, the one who does not hold Kenyan citizenship, was acquitted. Some four different magistrates were involved as the judicial process slowly unfolded; there was no jury. Testimony was heard from 140 witnesses, but apparently telephone records of the defendants’ conversations with the perpetrators before the attack was the primary basis for conviction of the two. When it opened, Westgate was seen as an icon of Kenya's middle class and of the "Africa rising" narrative. Following the 2013 attack, it symbolized the horrors of terrorism. Now, it is essentially a footnote, except perhaps in Kenya itself.
  • Election 2020
    Right-Wing Extremists: A Looming Threat to the U.S. Election
    Heavily armed, right-wing groups are poised to rebel against the election if President Trump loses, an extraordinary danger to U.S. democracy.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: September 26-October 2
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 26 to October 2, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. September 26: Kidnappers abducted four in Aniocha North, Delta.  September 26: Air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno.  September 27: Bandits killed one and kidnapped seven in Danko Wasagu, Kebbi.  September 27: Cultists killed one at a church in Oruk-Anam, Akwa Ibom.  September 28: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Kajuru, Kaduna.  September 28: Two herdsmen were killed in Ivo, Ebonyi.  September 28: Boko Haram killed two Cameroonian soldiers in Zeleved, Cameroon.  September 29: ISWA killed ten Nigerian soldiers in Marte, Borno.  September 29: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Marte, Borno.  September 30: Suspected Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members killed one police officer in Oyigbo, Rivers.  October 1: Military air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  October 2: Nigerian police officers killed six armed robbers in Uyo, Akwa Ibom. 
  • Niger
    How to Build Better Militaries in Africa: Lessons from Niger
    Alexander Noyes (@alexhnoyes) is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Ashley Bybee is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Paul Clarke is an adjunct research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. In August, jihadists in Niger killed six French aid workers and two Nigeriens just outside of the capital, Niamey. Terrorist attacks have increased by 250 percent over the last two years in Africa's Sahel region, according to the State Department. To help counter the threat of terrorism and build the capacity of African militaries, the U.S. government spends over $1.5 billion a year on security assistance to the African continent. Does this support work?  Reliable security cooperation and assistance data are scarce. But the existing evidence suggests that the current U.S. focus on training and equipping African partners, without due attention to governance and institutional-level reforms, has been insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst.  Focusing solely on increasing the operational capabilities of security forces in Africa runs the risk of strengthening unaccountable, corrupt, and predatory security sectors, throwing away U.S. taxpayer dollars on equipment that will not be sustained, and undermining U.S. governance and human rights priorities.  The deficiencies of the traditional train and equip approach in Africa are well documented, including anecdotes of U.S.-supplied equipment rusting on runways due to neglect, investments swallowed by corruption, and U.S.-supported militaries being used for government repression or launching coups.  A 2018 RAND study found that prior to 1990, U.S. security assistance to Africa in fact did more harm than good and was associated with an increase in civil wars. The impact of more recent efforts has also been paltry, as U.S. security assistance since 1990 in Africa "appears to have had little or no net effect on political violence."  The study found, however, that a more holistic focus on governance and institution building showed more promise. Such assistance can be a more effective way to achieve both U.S. and partner country objectives, leading to "durable improvements" in the security environment. Our research in Niger – where we served as subject matter experts for U.S. defense-institution building initiatives – supports this finding. Niger is a key partner of the U.S. in West Africa. The United States provides a range of assistance to Niger, but the country stands out because strategic-level reforms have been taken seriously by both the United States and the partner country.  Niger continues to suffer from corruption, serious allegations of abuse, and often tumultuous civil-military relations. Yet our research found that the country has made strides over the past five years toward building better defense institutions and improving its defense management practices. Niger's political leadership – at the highest levels – appears to be genuinely interested in reforms aimed at improving the professionalism and performance of their defense and internal security forces.  Our experience in Niger points to four main lessons for how to build better military institutions in low-capacity countries facing a host of threats in Africa (and beyond).  Generate high-level political will. Local buy-in and senior level political will are crucial to all security sector reform efforts, but are particularly important for institution building. Identifying and cultivating change agents to take the lead in devising and implementing potentially disruptive reforms is key to ensuring gains are made and progress is sustained. In Niger, a full-time senior-level coordinator, with excellent high-level access and working relationships with senior leaders, was critical.  Codify shared commitments. Where U.S. and partner interests align, successful reforms are more likely. In Niger, an official Joint Country Action Plan – essentially a memorandum of understanding between senior leaders on both sides – helped establish and codify shared priorities and goals, and lay out tangible ways to achieve them.  Focus on the institutional as well as the operational. Niger conducts myriad military operations and hosts U.S. defense-institution building teams concurrently. Identifying opportunities to apply defense-institution building principles to current operations is a sweet spot where partners' operational effectiveness can be enhanced while simultaneously building more effective and accountable defense institutions.  Engage holistically – support military and police reforms equally. In many African countries, police forces are just as important to security – and in need of reform – as the military. With Nigeriens in the lead, U.S. teams helped create a unified interministerial structure that allowed the military and police to work more effectively and streamline joint reforms. Institution building and reform processes are long-term endeavors where progress should be measured in decades, not years. Even where clear progress is made, defense institution building is surely no panacea for fledgling democracies struggling with recent coup legacies and allegations of abuse.  While Niger still has a long way to go, the country's recent experience suggests useful ways to help build more effective, affordable, and accountable defense sectors in other low-capacity countries facing similar challenges and threats.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: September 19-25
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 19 to September 25, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     September 19: Bandits kidnapped forty-two people in Maru, Zamfara.  September 19: Police officers killed two robbers in Suleja, Niger state.  September 19: Communal violence led to four deaths in Awka South, Anambra.  September 20: Nigerian soldiers killed three civilians in Andoni, Rivers.  September 20: Boko Haram killed seven Nigerian soldiers in Damboa, Borno while "many/scores" (estimated at twenty) of Boko Haram militants were killed.  September 20: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Guma, Benue.  September 20: Gunmen killed two soldiers and one police officer while two of the attackers were killed during a clash in Ukwa West, Abia.  September 22: Military air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  September 23: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram commanders in Kukawa, Borno.  September 23: Communal violence led to two deaths in Izzi, Ebonyi.  September 24: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Jos South, Plateau.  September 24: Nigerian troops killed twenty-one bandits and lost three soldiers in Faskari, Katsina.  September 24: Chadian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Barkalam and Bilabrim, Chad.   September 24: Air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. September 25: Air strikes killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  September 25: Boko Haram killed twelve police officers, five soldiers, four militia members, and nine civilians in Kukawa, Borno.  September 25: Nigerian troops killed two kidnappers in Nasarawa, Nasarawa.  September 25: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Takum, Taraba. 
  • Mozambique
    Failures of Governance Exacerbate Situation in Mozambique
    The worsening crisis in northern Mozambique is a case study in why governance matters. For years, the prevailing narrative about Mozambique was all about peace dividends, economic growth, and the promise of the country’s extraordinary natural resources. To be sure, there were warning signs about endemic corruption, and the growth was never inclusive. But now the headlines are dominated by the fighting in Cabo Delgado, where ISIS-linked insurgents have terrorized the population, killing over 1,500 people, displacing over 300,000, creating a food security crisis, and exposing the profound weakness of the state. That weakness has been exacerbated by international criminal networks that have been active for many years in the country, establishing deep roots and taking advantage of a political culture that allows the powerful to evade the law. Mozambican officials famously hid secret loans from citizens and international partners, leading to a sprawling scandal that still taints officials at the highest levels. Meanwhile, from the heroin trade to ruby smuggling, crime has become entwined with the state, leaving it both less capable and less trusted. That environment has proven fertile for violent extremists. Since 2017, attacks from insurgents, known as Ansar al-Sunna, have been growing in frequency and sophistication. The government’s response may well be making the problem worse. Human rights organizations have documented grotesque abuses committed by security services charged with protecting citizens, further alienating the population.  The failures of these forces has prompted Mozambique to turn to foreign mercenaries for help; the state simply doesn't have the capacity to provide basic security within its borders. Meanwhile, Mozambique’s neighbors and international partners are becoming increasingly uncomfortable. The Southern African Development Community, or SADC, has expressed concern but is presently more wary of involvement than of contagion. Multinational firms invested in Mozambique’s natural gas fields wish to secure their investments but find few desirable and capable partners in doing so. But the fragility of Mozambique has been evident for years. Perhaps if, a decade ago, the international community had expended more energy supporting the civil society actors who have been calling attention to these deep-rooted problems—and pressed harder to support solutions—Mozambique today might demonstrate more resilience, and the outlook would be less bleak.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: September 12-18
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 12 to September 18, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     September 12: Bandits killed one and kidnapped sixteen in Chikun, Kaduna.  September 12: Bandits killed two in Okene, Kogi.  September 13: A military air strike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  September 14: Bandits killed two Federal Road Safety Corps officials and kidnapped ten in Karu, Nassarawa.  September 14: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Safana, Katsina.  September 14: Bandits killed one and abducted one in Faskari, Katsina.  September 14: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Takum, Taraba.  September 14: Nigerian troops killed four militants in Bade, Yobe.  September 15: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Gboyin, Ekiti.  September 15: Military strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  September 15: ISWA killed eight in Kaga LGA and three in Konduga LGA in Borno.  September 16: Kidnappers abducted eight in Chikun, Kaduna.  September 17: Bandits killed two police officers and kidnapped two civilians in Tangaza, Sokoto.  September 17: Police killed two robbers in Suleja, Niger.  September 17: Boko Haram killed ten Chadian soldiers in Lake Chad. September 17: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  September 17: Boko Haram killed three in Magumeri, Borno.  September 18: Bandits killed five farmers in Malumfashi, Katsina. September 18: Gunmen kidnapped seven in Igabi, Kaduna.  September 18: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped three in Dekina, Kogi. September 18: Kidnappers abducted two in Chikun, Kaduna. 
  • Nigeria
    Boko Haram Arms Stockpiling Indicates Long-Term Threat
    Eric G. Berman, director of the Small Arms Survey from 2016 to 2019 and formerly with the United Nations, has published widely on African peace and security issues. His current research focuses on arms flows in the Lake Chad Basin region. On September 2, Boko Haram (ISWA) militants reportedly killed 10 Nigerian soldiers in Borno state. Such bloodshed has become so commonplace that it often fails to garner much interest. International news outlets spilled little ink to report the incident. Nevertheless, the failures of the region's militaries—as well as the Lake Chad Basin Commission's Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)—to combat Boko Haram merit greater attention from policymakers and the international community.  The widespread and persistent human rights abuses Boko Haram routinely metes out against civilians is covered as routine. Indeed, readers of this blog will be familiar with CFR's ambitious multiyear Nigeria Security Tracker project. Most of the nearly 10,000 entries since 2011 refer to incidents of Boko Haram attacks. The International Crisis Group has issued numerous in-depth reports of Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria as well as in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Reporting on Boko Haram's arsenal and modes of acquisition exists, but is comparatively thin and largely anecdotal.   Boko Haram's strikes on the MNJTF and co-deployed national armed forces have been numerous and successful. Boko Haram has no shortage of targets. The MNJTF comprises thousands of troops from four LCBC member states: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (Benin, not a LCBC member, also contributes). Soldiers from these countries—in much larger numbers—supplement this peacekeeping force and are co-deployed in the same sectors. An ongoing, partial review of open-source reporting on more than 100 attacks on armed forces personnel since 2015 reveals that Boko Haram has overrun fixed sites of companies and battalions in all four countries.  The true scale and scope of materiel Boko Haram has seized is very difficult to ascertain. Boko Haram has reason to inflate its military successes, and governments from the region have little incentive to publicize their losses. Reporting is imprecise. It is difficult to know strengths that correspond to “patrols,” “convoys,” “companies,” and “battalions.” There are persistent reports that soldiers lack proper levels of ammunition with which to defend themselves. Crew-served materiel as well as armored vehicles at fixed sites are often in disrepair and number below what military doctrine requires. What is not in doubt is that these attacks have netted Boko Haram millions of rounds of ammunition, thousands of assault rifles and assorted firearms, and hundreds of military vehicles, including armored tanks and self-propelled artillery. The seizure of non-lethal materiel, such as petrol, communications gear, and uniforms, also occurs on a sizeable scale and has important ramifications. Insurgent groups' attacks on peacekeepers and co-deployed military units and confiscation of lethal materiel is a long-standing and widespread phenomenon. But the success that Boko Haram has enjoyed is deeply worrisome.  Better understanding the full extent of the problem is an important first step. A study that moves past anecdotal accounts will enhance the prospects for accountability and facilitate security sector reform, which is of fundamental importance due to credible reports of poor morale and leadership. Enhanced stockpile management and record-keeping is also needed. Fortunately, existing arms control measures—many of them legally binding—already exist. But international and regional actors too often pay them lip service despite largely footing the bills. Arms export policies need to be reassessed given how much materiel is being lost to unintended recipients. This list is indicative and not exhaustive. States and organizations that contribute troops, military equipment, money, and political support for ongoing efforts to counter Boko Haram need to reassess their current approaches to combatting the threat. The United States has an important role to play as a strategic partner to states in the region and a generous funder of small arms management and destruction initiatives. Current efforts arguably empower and embolden the very target they seek to neutralize.
  • South Africa
    Transnational White Supremacist Militancy Thriving in South Africa
    Jacob Ware is a research associate for counterterrorism and the Studies program at the Council on Foreign Relations. His research focuses on global far-right terrorism and countering violent extremism, and his work has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, CNN, War on the Rocks, and in the academic journal Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. As white supremacist militancy has raced across the Western world, it has not spared South Africa from being swept up in the chaos. Domestic South African white supremacist movements both inform white supremacist movements elsewhere, and at the same time are influenced by global trends on the extreme right. South Africa, of course, has its own long—and painful—history of white supremacism. The formal apartheid system, which governed the country for over 40 years, institutionally oppressed the Black population, concentrating political, economic, and judicial power exclusively in white hands. Since the 1990s, when apartheid finally collapsed, race relations have remained raw, and the white population still holds much of the economic capital. The country remains one of the world's premier examples of the postcolonial challenges in managing racial tensions and promoting a sustainable national identity in a democratic context with the rule of law. Accordingly, South Africa still inflames the passions of white supremacists around the world. Dylann Roof, murderer of nine African Americans at Bible study at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina in June 2015, was in no small part inspired by white supremacism in southern Africa—his Facebook profile picture showed him in a jacket emblazoned with the flags of Rhodesia, a bastion of white supremacy before it achieved independence as Zimbabwe, and apartheid-era South Africa, and his manifesto was published on a personal website titled “The Last Rhodesian.” The centrality of South Africa to the white supremacist struggle around the world has been summarized by the radical website American Renaissance in March 2018: “the fate of white people around the world is linked to that of the Afrikaners.” Within South Africa, there are periodic reminders of the enduring threat of white supremacist violence. In 2019, for instance, four members of the “Crusaders,” a white supremacist group, were arrested for plotting attacks against Black targets. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), founded in 1973 by noted white supremacist Eugène Terre'Blanche, also remains active today. The group apparently boasts around 5,000 members, and in 2010, members of the group were arrested for plans to attack Black townships in the wake of the murder of Terre'Blanche—which some claimed was racially motivated. The plotters, based in Pretoria, had also threatened foreigners and players traveling to the country for the 2010 World Cup. And in 2002, a far-right group calling itself the “Warriors of the Boer Nation” claimed responsibility for a series of blasts targeting the township of Soweto, in which one woman was killed. The transnational white supremacist threat has manifested itself in devastating attacks in the U.S., Europe (especially Norway and Germany), and New Zealand, where an extremist murdered 51 in twin attacks at two mosques in Christchurch in March 2019. And the same networks responsible for violence elsewhere have reached Africa's southernmost state. The Base, a neo-Nazi organization whose members have been arrested for major plots in Maryland and Georgia, had recruited in South Africa. And Simon Roche, a senior figure in the Suidlanders, an Afrikaner survivalist group, marched with other white supremacists at the Charlottesville Unite the Right rally in August 2017—an event at which a young woman was killed in a far-right car ramming attack. One is always tempted to dismiss such activism if it hasn't yet manifested in violence—but as one Cape Town-based journalist recently wrote, “We laugh at the far right because it makes them seem less frightening, but it doesn't make them any less dangerous.” After all, in the age of social media radicalization and lone actor terrorism, all it takes is one. As the threat remains contained, South Africa's counterterrorism measures should surgically target more extreme fringes. Confronting race-based conspiracy theories—such as the false claim that Black South Africans were killing white farmers that was infamously tweeted by President Trump in August 2018—is essential. It can be pursed both through promoting truthfulness online and marginalizing proponents of hate speech. South Africa's intelligence agencies, meanwhile, should be aware of international networks' and groups' efforts to recruit and radicalize within the country, while continuing to maintain vigilance over groups active in South Africa itself.