Territorial Disputes

Protesters march with banners and placards during an anti-China demonstration on a street in Hanoi June 19, 2011. Several dozen Vietnamese protested in front of the Chinese embassy and marched through Hanoi for the third Sunday running after Beijing sent one of its biggest maritime patrol ships into the disputed waters of the South China Sea. (John Ruwitch/Courtesy Reuters) It is summertime, and everyone is out sailing on the South China Sea. Unfortunately, the waters have gotten a bit choppy.  The Philippines and Vietnam, in particular, are riled up over China’s most recent demonstrations of assertiveness: Chinese vessels have reportedly been busy intruding into Philippine waters and cutting the cables of two boats under the flag of PetroVietnam. Both Vietnam and the Philippines have called for assistance from the international community to help rein China in. At stake, of course, are the potentially vast oil and natural gas resources that many believe the South China Sea possesses. For decades, six claimants—Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, China, the Philippines, and Brunei—have bickered and skirmished over who is entitled to what. Ancient claims of sovereignty run up against the Law of the Sea and Exclusive Economic Zones. Rhetorical and actual skirmishes have become a way of life. Indeed the situation has been far more dangerous in the past with live fire exchanged and fishermen or sailors killed. What’s different now, however, is the context in which these conflicts are playing out. And this matters – a lot. As its naval capacity has increased, China has made clear its intent to expand its range of activity throughout the region. Having formally shifted policy from a “near seas” to a” far coastal” defense, China has in effect declared itself a regional and emerging global naval power.  In mid-June, it sent a 3,000 ton Haixun-31 ship through the South China Sea to “monitor shipping, carry out surveying, inspect oil wells and protect maritime security.” In response to China’s increasing activism, regional nations have invited the United States to enter directly into the fray.  The U.S. is formally obligated to defend or provide for the defense of the Philippines and Taiwan; and military relations with Vietnam have been expanding rapidly. The Chinese have been quick to denounce any interference by the United States; however, the United States shows little inclination to listen, consulting with the parties, and clearly asserting U.S. national interest in freedom of navigation and respect for international law.  Even the U.S. Congress has gotten in to the game, recently pushing a resolution that registers Congressional disapproval for China’s actions in the South China Sea. So what is the answer?  Ideally, of course, all the claimants sit down and honor the 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” accord. This would mean moving forward with discussions and negotiations on how to work together to develop the resources of the South China Sea. (Of course, this was supposed to happen with China and Japan in the East China Sea, as well.) Less ideally, the United States becomes a more permanent player in the ongoing fracas—as it has in the Mekong River dispute—acting as a counterweight to China in support of the smaller Southeast Asian countries’ interests. The U.S. could also use the ASEAN Regional Forum, its bilateral relations with the other claimants, and perhaps even its new seat at the East Asian Summit to bring pressure to bear on China to sit down with everyone else and discuss the challenge at hand. At this point, however, only one thing seems certain, anyone out there sailing on the South China Sea should get ready for a rough ride.

Yesterday, video of the collisions between a Chinese fishing trawler and the Japanese coast guard appeared on YouTube—sent from an account named Sengoku38. Six separate videos, for a total of 44 minutes of footage, taken apparently from the decks of Japanese coast guard vessels showed the tensions aboard as the Chinese vessel altered course twice to collide with two different Coast Guard patrol ships. The videos have since been removed from YouTube, but the evening NHK news coverage showed the key minutes of the footage. The entire country today wants to know: who is Sengoku38? The chief of the Japanese coast guard held a press conference to say the YouTube footage was being compared with the Coast Guard videos to ascertain its authenticity. A special hearing was called in the Diet to question how such material could escape government control. In addition, a box of DVDs with a sign saying, "Help yourself to the Coast Guard videos," was found outside a Tokyo commuter station. The police is investigating. The Japanese government explained its decision not to release the video because it was evidence in a legal investigation against the Chinese fishing trawler captain. Yet early on the Land and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara, who is now Japan’s foreign minister, suggested that the tape of the incident might be made public. In the ensuing month, rumors abounded as to the “real” content of those videos. After pressure from the opposition parties in parliament, the Kan government agreed to show a closed committee of Diet members a shortened version of the tapes on November 1. So, how did these videos get on to YouTube, and who is Sengoku38? The Japanese government has asked YouTube for help in the investigation. The YouTube account name, of course, uses the name of Japan’s cabinet secretary, Yoshito Sengoku, who was the government spokesperson throughout the two-week crisis with China. There seems little doubt that these videos are the ones taken by the Coast Guard, and this raises the possibility that the leak came from a disgruntled government employee. This raises two questions for Japan. The first is how the material got out despite the government’s insistence on strict control. But the other concern is the impact the video leak will have on Sino-Japanese relations now that the public of both countries have seen the footage. Media coverage of the public reaction in Japan reveals a pretty strong consensus that the video should have been made public early on so that the events that took place on the waters around Senkaku could be fully understood by Japan’s citizens. Yet early coverage of the Chinese internet discussions of the footage suggests that Chinese viewers see a completely different story—a heroic captain fighting off Japan’s coast guard. These disparate interpretations of the events on September 7th remain a stumbling block for both governments as they seek to find a resolution to the diplomatic rift. With Hu Jintao expected to visit Japan next week for the APEC meeting, public sensitivities over who was to blame for the collisions in the Senkaku waters will complicate plans for a summit meeting. (Photo Courtesy: REUTERS/Kyodo)

Over the past two months, the South China Sea, which always has the potential to be a flashpoint between China and nations in Southeast Asia, has indeed become a flashpoint – between China and the United States. Yet the tensions over the sea are more than a short term problem. Resolving the competing claims in the South China Sea will be a critical test of China’s emerging power and its ability to deal with its neighbors, as well as the United States’ ability to work with Southeast Asian states to manage China’s rise. See my new expert brief on the South China Sea here. (Photo: Ho New/courtesy Reuters)

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/B Mathur Although their leaders and foreign secretaries did meet in 2009, the February 25 talks between India and Pakistan were the first since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks aimed at normalizing dialogue. And they had raised hopes in some quarters that New Delhi and Islamabad might reenter into a peace process. For now, such expectations are very unrealistic. It’s worth asking four questions about today’s talks: 1. Were the talks significant? Somewhat. It’s no mean achievement that New Delhi and Islamabad returned to the table. But today’s discussion was about restoring contact, not making a breakthrough. An awful lot of water has passed under the bridge since the Mumbai attacks--and the two sides don’t agree on the parameters for discussion. India views Pakistan’s actions since Mumbai as insufficient. It has presented Islamabad with dossiers of information, but complains that many of the Mumbai suspects continue to walk free, not least Hafiz Saeed, the accused mastermind of the attacks, who only last week called for fresh attacks at a rally outside Lahore. Pakistan argues that it has acted against terrorism. It seeks to focus on political differences, not least the future of Kashmir, and wants an early return to formal peace talks, known as the "composite dialogue." But this isn’t likely anytime soon. 2. Is a breakthrough even possible? It is, but not easily. The two sides have come close to reaching breakthroughs in the past, principally through a "backchannel" negotiation that picked up a head of steam between 2004 and 2007. In one account, the two sides were down to "semicolons" in 2007. But the most sensitive disputes, such as Kashmir, are as much political as intellectual. And the politics on both sides just aren’t conducive to reaching a settlement. Conventional wisdom in India is that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh badly wants a breakthrough. But his Pakistan policy is very vulnerable politically. And Pakistan is fragmented between multiple power centers: Its military (the most important power center) is especially skeptical of India. And Indian leaders do not believe that Pakistan’s civilian politicians can deliver. 3. Could India and Pakistan go to war again? Yes. After the Mumbai attacks, the Indian government came under enormous pressure to respond. Another attack could increase the pressure further. Mumbai stole international headlines, but several major Indian metropolises were bombed throughout 2008: Jaipur in May; Ahmadabad and Bangalore in July; and New Delhi’s most famous shopping area, Connaught Place, in September. India has carefully avoided blaming Pakistan for attacks two weeks ago in Pune, but political pressure will intensify in the event of a future attack. Indians are divided over the effectiveness of military options. Some argue that tough military measures contributed to subsequent breakthroughs in the backchannel negotiations. Others disagree. 4. Does the United States have a role? Not an obvious one. Clearly, American interests are engaged by the possibility of war--and tension reduction is in the U.S. interest. But third-party intervention is utterly unwelcome in India. And it hasn’t been especially conducive to breakthroughs in the past. Pakistan would certainly welcome greater U.S. involvement, but India would reject an American role outright. And a public U.S. role narrows the political space available for Singh to maneuver: Any peace package seen to have been reached under U.S. pressure would be dead on arrival in Indian politics. Barack Obama learned this lesson the hard way. As a candidate, he told TIME’s Joe Klein that he would appoint a U.S. envoy to seek peace in Kashmir. As president, he quickly backed off after strenuous Indian objections. But some in his administration cling to the idea. And as I write in the new issue of Foreign Affairs, this remains a source of tension and one of five areas of difference that could threaten U.S.-India relations.

This publication is now archived. Nagorno-Karabakh’s recent history One of the former Soviet Union’s most intractable and longstanding conflicts is Nagorno-Karabakh. An enclave the size of Delaware wedged between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh has been a sore spot since 1988, when the region’s legislature passed a resolution to join Armenia. Legally speaking, the republic lies within Azerbaijan’s borders, but the majority of its inhabitants are ethnic Armenians. The region’s attempt at secession was rejected by Azerbaijan and sparked a bout of violence that created hundreds of thousands of refugees. Once the Soviet Unioncollapsed, Nagorno-Karabakh’s legislature decided to declare outright independence. The republic now enjoys a de facto independence, though neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan recognizes the republic’s territorial sovereignty. In 1992, full-scale war between Azerbaijan and Armenia broke out. By the middle of the year, Armenia controlled the bulk of Nagorno-Karabakh and pushed further into Azerbaijani territory to establish the so-called Lachin Corridor, an umbilical cord linking the breakaway republic with Armenia proper. By 1993, Armenian forces had occupied nearly 20 percent of the Azerbaijani territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and expelled hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azeris. That was followed up by a Russia-brokered ceasefire in 1994, which is how the situation has remained more than a decade later. Today, Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding region remain under Armenian control. Nearly one-seventh of Azerbaijan is under Armenian occupation. Around 700,000 Azeri refugees—or just under 10 percent of Azerbaijan’s entire population—remain displaced in the region, in addition to some 235,000 Armenian refugees. All told, 25,000 lives were lost on both sides during the separatist struggle. The conflict’s effects on domestic politics Throughout the 1990s, Nagorno-Karabakh weighed heavily over both countries’ domestic politics. After Azerbaijan was occupied in 1992, Baku’s Communist president, Ayaz Mutalibov, was forced to resign. This paved the way for Abulfaz Elchibey, a nationalist of the Populist Front Party who drew Azerbaijan closer to Turkey but pushed Russian forces out. Elchibey refused to negotiate a settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh, insisting instead on a military victory. On his watch, Azerbaijan lost ground both economically and militarily. In 1993, when Colonel Surat Huseynov, a rebel army commander, overtook Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, Gyandzha, and looked ready to stage a coup in Baku, Elchibey fled to his native Nakhichevan, an enclave of Azerbaijan cut off from the rest of the country, but called on a former Communist boss and fellow native of Nakhichevan, Heydar Aliyev, to defend the capital. Aliyev instead assumed control of the country via a presidential election and made Huseynov his prime minister. In Armenia, national politics are intermixed with that of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic, which technically remains part of Azerbaijan (the international community does not recognize the republic’s claim for independence). Its current president, Robert Kocharian, is a former Communist official and native of the republic, where he served as president from 1994-97. Kocharian, as head of Armenia, has taken a middle-of-the-road approach to the separatist conflict: He has refused calls from the Armenian diaspora to fully incorporate the republic within Armenia, fearing a rebuke from the international community, but he has also proved unwilling to give up Armenia’s—some would say illegal—occupation of the disputed territory. Prospects for peace Since 1994, there have been a number of unsuccessful attempts to broker peace by the so-called Minsk Group, a subset of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) chaired by Russia, the United States, and France. According to the United States Institute for Peace, “ceasefire agreements were routinely broken literally within minutes of their signing.” The more recent rounds of negotiations, called the “Prague Process,” have yielded no breakthroughs either, while groups like the International Crisis Group (ICG) continue to create new ways to end the conflict. ICG’s recent report recommends twenty possible solutions to settling the dispute. There has been muted talk of holding a plebiscite in Nagorno-Karabakh to determine the republic’s final status but the details remain to be determined. One obstacle to peace is the issue of sequencing. All three sides—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh—refuse to budge until the others make a concession: Azerbaijan wants Armenia to end its occupation first and withdraw its forces before discussing the republic’s final status; Armenia is seeking a resolution first on the status question before pulling out its forces; Nagorno-Karabakh wants its independence officially recognized prior to all other negotiations. Another obstacle to peace is geopolitics. Many of the international players involved in the negotiations have ulterior motives, experts say. Russia, for example, has no interest in seeing the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh resolved, says Elizabeth Fuller, a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty expert on the Caucasus, because some degree of instability enhances Moscow’s hand in the region. Azerbaijan also suspects Russia of being too pro-Armenia; for instance, Russia’s Defense Ministry was caught supplying a large amount of military hardware to Armenia from 1994-96. Azerbaijan also sees France as pro-Armenia, because of the country’s sizable—and influential—Armenian diaspora. Ditto the United States, which also has a powerful Armenian lobby, although in recent years, experts say Washington has begun courting Azerbaijan more because of its geo-strategic position as a partner in the war on terrorism and a global supplier of non-OPEC oil. Finally, Turkey has a large role to play in the conflict. With a long history of poor relations with Armenia over Ankara’s refusal to apologize for the 1915 genocide of some 1.5 million Armenians, Yerevan sees Istanbul as too pro-Azerbaijan.Turkey’s refusal to reopen the Armenian-Turkish border to facilitate Turkish-Armenian trade—requested by a powerful Turkish business lobby interested in Armenian markets—further intensified Yerevan’s suspicions. Overall, time is not onArmenia’s side, given thatAzerbaijan’s economy, due to its surge in oil exports, has outpaced Armenia’s, says Svante Cornell, deputy director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies. “[The Armenians] are realizing they may have to settle and sue for peace,” he says. “The fact is they do occupy this territory.” Because of Azerbaijan’s influx of petrodollars, it will soon be able to double the size of its military, Fuller says. “The question is: How good are [Azerbaijan’s] armed forces? Armenia’s is a very professional force,” she says. Eventually, Cornell envisions that Nagorno-Karabakh will remain, at least on the map, a sovereign part of Azerbaijan but will retain de facto independence. He says the outcome of Azerbaijan’s parliamentary elections should have little effect on negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh. Bilateral talks are set to resume in December but no one expects a solution to the crisis anytime soon.