Territorial Disputes

Ashlyn Anderson, Lincoln Davidson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. China conducts live fire drills in the South China Sea. More than one hundred naval vessels, dozens of aircraft, and units from China’s information warfare forces and missile corps participated in the live fire exercises Tuesday, which one Australian expert called a “needlessly excessive show of force.” China’s military responded to critics by saying the exercises were intended to practice integrating information warfare systems with traditional forces, a major part of China’s military doctrine in recent years. Hoping to reassure regional allies concerned about China’s continued dredging and growing military presence in the disputed area, the United States has increased routine surveillance flights in the region in recent weeks. On Thursday, China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson criticized these moves and warned the United States to stop “militarizing” the South China Sea. 2. Malaysian prime minister shakes up cabinet. Prime Minister Najib Razak removed his deputy premier, four ministers, and a deputy minister, as he continues to be buffeted by accusations of corruption. Early this month, a Wall Street Journal report indicated that around $700 million was deposited into Najib’s personal accounts from a state investment fund, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), that he heads. Deputy Premier Muhyiddin Yassin recently disparaged the handling of the debt-laden 1MDB, raised questions over the suspension of The Edge newspaper, and asked Najib to step down from the 1MDB. Amidst the shakeup, the attorney general, who said he had documents concerning Najib and 1MDB, was removed from his post. In addition, the chair of the parliamentary committee investigating the 1MDB allegations was promoted, forcing him to resign and suspending the inquiry until October. 3. India executes 1993 Mumbai bombing conspirator. On Thursday, Yakub Abdul Razak Memon was executed by hanging for his involvement in a 1993 terrorist attack that killed more than 250 people. The execution occurred following the Indian Supreme Court’s rejection of a last-minute appeal the previous night. Memon was sentenced in 2007 as the primary planner behind targeting a dozen locations including the Bombay Stock Exchange. Among the eleven suspects in the case, Memon was the only to receive the death penalty. The bombers sought to avenge Muslims who died in a riot after hard-line Hindu groups demolished a mosque in the city of Ayodhya in 1992. The execution has fueled scrutiny of the death penalty in India, which is falling out of favor. 4. South Korea declares end to MERS outbreak. This past Tuesday, South Korean Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn declared a “de facto” end to the Middle East Respiratory Virus (MERS) outbreak in South Korea. Tuesday’s announcement was early in comparison to World Health Organization (WHO) standards, as it marked only twenty-three days since the last confirmed case. The WHO requires twenty-eight days without a new infection for a country to be in the clear—twice the incubation period of the virus. MERS has claimed thirty-six lives and infected a total of 186 individuals in South Korea since May 20, when a man who had visited the Middle East brought the virus back to South Korea. 5. Animal sacrifice banned in Nepal festival. Nepalese temple authorities have announced they will end a centuries-old Hindu tradition of mass animal slaughter that takes place twice each decade as part of the Gadhimai festival. In past years, pilgrims have sacrificed an estimated five hundred thousand buffaloes, goats, and chickens to the Hindu goddess Gadhimai in hopes of a better life. Animal rights activists have tried to end the slaughter for the last decade, including asking the Indian Supreme Court to slow the cross-border transportation of sacrificial animals. The next Gadhimai festival, scheduled for 2019, will be a “momentous celebration of life” without the animal bloodshed, activists said. Bonus: Chinese investor selling pet alpaca to recoup stock market losses. As the Chinese markets have taken a tumble in recent weeks, one speculator in Kunming named Fang said he has been forced to part with his beloved pet alpaca, which he purchased two years ago. While Fang sees the alpaca as a part of the family, he said he didn’t have any choice but to sell the animal after losing all of his savings in the recent market downturn. Fang is asking $16,000 for the alpaca, but has so far been unable to find a buyer. Alpacas are a popular meme on the Chinese Internet, where they are sometimes referred to as “grass mud horses,” a term coined by Chinese netizens to circumvent censorship of profanity.

If the recent Shangri-La Dialogue demonstrated one thing—aside from the fact that Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong can deliver an important speech that is both strong and subtle—it is that mitigating tensions in the South China Sea remains a problem with no solution in sight. As the Chinese have continued with their reef reclamation and low-level militarization of small islands in the South China Sea, a number of Chinese scholars and foreign policy officials have sought to clarify the reasons behind Beijing’s actions. Yet what emerges from all the disparate voices is a sense that there is no compelling rationale—or at least not one that the foreign policy community can acknowledge. Instead, there is significant effort to impute an acceptable rationale to the country’s destabilizing behavior. Here is a brief sampling: The past is precedent: Other regions and states, such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Dubai, have expanded their territory into maritime areas without complaint, not to mention Vietnam and the Philippines. Economics is driving Chinese actions: China needs the disputed islands to manage its economic interests, including fisheries and offshore oil drilling. It is for the benefit of the region: China welcomes other countries to use the facilities on the reefs—they will help with weather forecasting and maritime rescue. China is responding to growing international expectations. This is all about the United States: Beijing is responding to the U.S. rebalance to Asia and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States fears that China aspires to replace U.S. leadership, and that China’s experience will “outshine” the United States’ economic model, democracy, and values. The intensification of the “China threat” in public discourse in Washington is tied to a fight between U.S. President Barack Obama and Congress over U.S. defense spending and priorities. We have no problems with our neighbors; the United States is overreacting, escalating the situation, and making false accusations. International law has no role in the South China Sea: Territories are formed by historical developments [pdf], not by laws or treaties, meaning China’s sovereign maritime territory predates and is not subject to international law. Our actions are misunderstood; we simply need to explain ourselves better: China needs to bring its own governance, values, and traditions to the table. The Chinese policy of he (harmony/peace), which is the opposite of the Western approach that stresses confrontation and difference, can be China’s contribution to the international community. “Hehism” will require “a lot of explaining” in order to “make the idea stick in the Western mind.” The lack of clarity in messaging does not mean that the Chinese foreign policy community is divided over how Beijing should pursue its interests; instead, it suggests some confusion over what precisely those interests are. Unfortunately, for the rest of the region, the lack of transparency in intent makes it far more difficult to arrive at compromise—or even to believe that Beijing is interested in compromise. In the end, Beijing might as well be saying, “We are doing this because we can,” and that is certainly not a good introduction to “hehism” or any other Chinese contribution to international values.

After this week’s Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore, which featured the U.S.-China war of words that has come to characterize the security meeting, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter traveled on to Vietnam to meet with Hanoi’s defense minister. Carter visited Vietnam’s Naval Command and the city of Haiphong, becoming the first U.S. Defense Secretary to do so. Haiphong harbor famously---or infamously---was mined by the U.S., in 1972, during the Vietnam War. Given China’s threats this past week to establish an air defense zone in the South China Sea, as well as Vietnam’s broader concerns about Beijing’s regional strategy, it is almost certain that the U.S.-Vietnam relationship will grow closer by the end of Obama’s presidency. Concerns in Congress about Hanoi’s poor human rights record---Hanoi’s record has actually worsened in the past five years, according to Freedom House---have not stopped Congress from being generally supportive of closer U.S.-Vietnam ties. (I have served as a consultant for Freedom House’s Freedom in the World chapters on Southeast Asia.) According to a recent Associated Press report, “Rep. Christopher Smith (R-New Jersey), has authored a bill, the Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2015, that would, if enacted, cap financial assistance to Vietnam at fiscal-year 2014 levels, require that easing the prohibition on selling military equipment to Vietnam happen only if steps are taken to improve human rights, and mandate that the U.S. try to overcome the jamming of Radio Free Asia.” But the bill is unlikely to pass. And Senator John McCain is reportedly planning to introduce legislation in the Senate that would further remove restrictions on arms sales to Hanoi. Building on the Secretary of Defense’s visit to Vietnam, the two countries should take several steps to further entrench the bilateral relationship. These should include: Integrating Vietnamese Forces into Annual U.S.-Philippines Joint Exercises The U.S.-Philippines Balikatan joint exercises have grown in size in recent years, as Manila and Washington have become more concerned about China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea. In addition, Manila and Hanoi, which had little history of close strategic ties, have in the past five years begun building a military and strategic relationship. The two countries formally signed a statement of strategic partnership earlier this year. The Obama administration already has promised to start conducting military exercises with Vietnam, and it should broaden those exercises to make them U.S.-Vietnam-Philippines maneuvers. Such a step would help improve the three forces’ interoperability, and also would help solidify Manila’s ties to Hanoi. Boosting Arms Sales The Obama administration should push for the full removal of restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam. As I wrote in a working paper on the pivot in Southeast Asia, the administration could set up an interagency working group to approve the first year or two years of arms sales to Vietnam, monitoring the sales to make sure that the weapons are not being used against Vietnamese civilians. If they were used against Vietnamese civilians, the arms sales could be stopped. Although Vietnam is a highly repressive, one-party state, its military is actually far more professional, and less abusive, than those of many other nations in Southeast Asia. The armed forces are under civilian control, unlike those of neighboring nations like Thailand and Myanmar. In addition, Vietnam offers such significant strategic advantages for the United States (unlike, say, Myanmar) that, on balance, arms sales to Vietnam are worth the possibility that the sales will, in some way, be helping to support an authoritarian government. Building Upon the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership The United States should build upon its comprehensive partnership with Vietnam. In building closer ties, the U.S. government should not only expand the sale of lethal arms to Vietnam but also expand access for American naval vessels at Cam Ranh Bay and increase the number of training programs for senior Vietnamese officers.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Shinzo Abe visits the United States. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the United States this week to discuss the future of U.S.­-Japan relations. Increased security cooperation as well as relations with China topped the agenda. Abe delivered the first-ever speech by a Japanese prime minister to a joint session of Congress. In his speech, Abe described his vision for a stronger alliance between the United States and Japan and expressed his condolences for Japanese behavior in World War II. He announced his determination to “take more responsibility for peace and stability in the world.” U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Abe both made apparent their determination to see the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) through to the end despite significant competing domestic pressures in their respective countries, but so far neither have indicated that their differences in opinion on the specifics of the TPP were resolved. Abe’s visit also includes stops in San Francisco and Los Angeles with the hope of building momentum for economic and military growth in Japan. 2. Nepal devastated by earthquake. Nepal was hit by a 7.8-magnitude earthquake on April 25; aftershocks have followed. There are now over six thousand confirmed deaths; the final total is predicted to exceed ten thousand, as an untold thousands remain missing. The region, which sits on a fault line between the India and Eurasia plates that have formed the Himalayas, was due for an earthquake, but for various reasons, including rapid urbanization, corruption, and a lack of land-use controls, buildings in the capital of Katmandu were vulnerable to seismic disasters. Rebuilding in stricken areas could cost as much as $10 billion. Rescue efforts are ongoing, though hope is fading as more time passes, and only now is aid reaching more remote villages. The New York Times has put together a list of some of the groups soliciting donations for relief efforts. 3. Indonesian firing squad executes eight for drug-related crimes. Despite appeals from foreign governments, Indonesia carried out the death sentences of seven foreigners and one Indonesian. The execution of two Australians, purportedly the ringleaders of the ‘Bali Nine,’ led to the recall of Australia’s ambassador to Indonesia. Among those executed was also a Brazilian diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, apparently unaware of his impending execution up until the last minute. A migrant worker from the Philippines was unexpectedly granted reprieve at the last minute following claims that she unknowingly smuggled heroin into the country. Indonesian President Joko Widodo is seemingly committed to a zero-tolerance stance on drug trafficking, and the majority of the Indonesian public believes the death penalty to be an appropriate punishment for the crime. 4. Divisions over the South China Sea continue. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit was held in Malaysia this week. The ASEAN chairman’s statement, while not directly mentioning China, highlighted reclamation work as eroding trust and confidence and undermining stability in the South China Sea. At the summit, the Philippines pushed Southeast Asian countries to take a stand against China’s expanding footprint in the South China Sea, even as Malaysian representatives made clear their aspirations for China to take the initiative to “stop [island-building] work and sit down with ASEAN member states.” Meanwhile, the U.S. military presence in the region is set to expand with access to eight or more Filipino bases for rotational deployments, two of which will be located near contested territory; Japan is also weighing joint air patrols with the United States over the disputed waters. China’s naval chief has tried to alleviate concerns, suggesting that the artificial islands might in the future be used for joint rescue and disaster-relief operations. 5. North Korea allegedly sentenced fifteen senior officials to be executed in 2015, says South Korea intelligence. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has allegedly ordered the executions of the officials for challenging his authority in the first four months of 2015, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) told a closed-door parliament meeting this week. A member of South Korea’s intelligence committee said the NIS official indicated the vice minister for forestry was sentenced for disagreeing with the forestry program, and the vice chairman for the State Planning Commission was executed for objecting to the shape of a science and technology hall. Kim Jong-un, a young leader, has previously used such deadly purges to consolidate power; in December 2013 he infamously executed his uncle, Jang Sung-taek, on charges of attempting to overthrow the state. Bonus: Katy Perry’s dress sparks controversy with China. This week, pop singer Katy Perry touched a nerve with China when she wore a glittery green dress covered in sunflowers to perform in Taipei, Taiwan. The sunflower happens to be the emblem used by Taiwan’s anti-China protestors last year. Perry also took a Taiwanese flag from an audience member and wore it as a cape as she sang her song, “Unconditionally.” Importantly, the now-infamous sunflower dress is not new to her concert wardrobe; Perry has sported those sunny yellow petals several times since she kicked off her tour in May.

Until the past five years, the Philippines and Vietnam had minimal strategic ties other than working together, through ASEAN initiatives, on a range of nontraditional security issues. The two countries had very different styles of leadership---the Philippines is a vibrant democracy with one of the freest media markets in the world, while Vietnam remains run by a highly opaque Party---and Hanoi remained wary of diverging from its strategy of hedging close ties with China with increasingly close relations with the United States. By contrast, the Philippines, despite a very mixed historical relationship with the United States, was (and is) a U.S. treaty ally and one of Washington’s closest partners in Southeast Asia. Vietnam and the Philippines did not hold joint military exercises, rarely had high-level bilateral interactions between senior political and military leaders, and also had only modest two-way trade. But since 2010, as China’s posture in the South China Sea has become increasingly assertive, and Vietnam and the Philippines have pushed back harder against Beijing than any other Southeast Asian nations, the two ASEAN countries have moved much closer together. At first, the closeness was informal---Philippine and Vietnamese sailors mingling on disputed rocks in the South China Sea to drink beers and play sports, top leaders from the two countries holding unannounced bilateral meetings on the sidelines of ASEAN meetings to discuss possible joint responses to Chinese actions like dredging and reported Chinese building of what appears to be a military-use airstrip on an atoll in the Spratly Islands. Now, Hanoi and Manila appear willing to formalize their cooperation, which should be a worrying thought for Beijing, since this cooperation signals that Southeast Asian nations are now becoming more unified in their opposition to Beijing’s South China Sea policies. Manila and Hanoi will formalize a strategic partnership in the coming weeks, according to Philippine media. The strategic partnership likely will include a commitment to work together to resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, a commitment to holding joint naval exercises, and an agreement to conduct joint scientific studies in the South China Sea---studies that could potentially relate to hydrocarbons or fisheries, the Sea’s two most valuable resources. The strategic partnership still needs to be signed, and its details could still change. But just the fact that Hanoi and Manila are likely to begin holding joint military exercises, a vast shift from their lukewarm bilateral relations in the 2000s, should demonstrate to Beijing that its South China Sea policy is backfiring badly.

A version of this post also appeared at The National, and can be found here. From the air, the Spratly Islands, a cluster of miniature rocks and sandbars 160,000 miles square in the middle of the South China Sea, are almost imperceptible. Even up close, the Spratlys do not look like much – a few islands have tiny rocky beaches or occasional makeshift buildings. A tiny contingent of Filipino Marines camp on a rusty hulk of an American World War II-era ship grounded in the Spratlys. It is hard to believe these outcroppings could be at the center of an international dispute, let alone one that could lead to a future Asian war. But the Spratlys are claimed not only by China, which argues that most of the South China Sea is Beijing’s exclusive economic zone. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei angrily retort that parts of the South China Sea belong to them, including areas that Beijing insists is China’s alone. The Southeast Asian countries and China have been unable to resolve their overlapping claims to the sea, believed to be rich in oil and strategically vital – over five trillion dollars in trade passes through annually.  The Philippines and Vietnam have asked an international tribunal to rule on what areas of the South China Sea are within Beijing’s exclusive economic zones. But any decision will be meaningless; China argues that the tribunal has no power. The Philippines, Vietnam, and every other nation in Asia are preparing to combat China in other, far less legalistic and peaceful ways. In the past three years, under China’s new leadership, Beijing has for the first time since Mao stated its desire to be the dominant nation in Asia. China is asserting its long-dormant claims to unsettled land borders and large portions of Asia’s waters, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea in Northeast Asia, and demanding that it, not America or Japan, lead regional organizations. And with the United States desperately trying to maintain its influence in Asia, countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, and many others that relied on U.S. protection are scrambling to build up their own armies and navies. For more on Southeast Asia’s arms race and its implications, see my new piece in The National.

The past week has been so busy with events, both tragic and hopeful, related to Southeast Asia, that I barely have time to keep up with the news.  A few short thoughts: 1. Is Prabowo Going to Concede? No way. Prabowo Subianto is now tacitly hinting in interviews that, on July 22, he might be declared the loser of Indonesia’s presidential election, and he is now using interviews to argue that, whatever the result announced on July 22, it is likely a fraud. This is a shift from his earlier position stating simply that he was going to win. On July 22 he will expand on his fraud argument and file a case to the Constitutional Court. Jokowi – and Indonesia – better be prepared for a long and drawn-out legal contest. 2. Should Malaysia Airlines Have Used a Different Route for MH17? Obviously, most of the news about MH17 has focused, naturally, on who brought down the plane, who was behind the missile strike, the grief of relatives of the dead, and the long-term implications for great power politics in Eurasia. There has been a kind of truce in Malaysian politics, as everyone in Malaysia is stunned by the tragedy; this kind of truce did not happen with the previous disaster, the disappearance of MH370 – opposition politicians and many commentators (including myself) blasted the Malaysian government for their inept handling of MH370. I think that this truce in Malaysian politics is likely to break down next week, as relatives of the dead from MH17, already angry at what they perceive as government stonewalling about information (though I think that the Malaysian government has done nothing wrong this time around), ask more forcefully why Malaysia Airlines was still flying through airspace above war-torn eastern Ukraine. True, some other Asian carriers also had continued flying through this airspace, probably because it was the cheapest way to get from Europe to Southeast Asia, but other regional carriers, like Qantas and Cathay Pacific, had been avoiding eastern Ukraine’s airspace for months now. Expect family members to put more pressure on the Najib government this week to more fully explain why MH17 was still flying the route. 3. Does China’s Moving a Rig out of Disputed South China Sea Waters Matter? Last week, China moved the China National Petroleum Corporation rig in waters disputed with Vietnam to an area of the South China Sea closer to China. The decision defused, to some extent, the growing tension in the South China Sea between China and Vietnam, which had sparked riots in Vietnam and clashes on the waters. The move was touted by some Southeast Asian analysts as a sign that China is adopting a more moderate approach to South China Sea disputes. Some speculated that Beijing might even be willing to finally agree to a formal code of conduct on the sea or to address Southeast Asian countries’ concerns through international arbitration. (The Philippines has taken its sea dispute with China to international arbitration, but China thus far has essentially refused to respond to the arbitration.) I really doubt that China is going to modify its South China Sea stance in any substantial way. Beijing is never going to agree to go to international arbitration, which would set a precedent that could be used by other countries in disputes with China over seas or land borders. And there are no signs that China is going to make any real moves toward a formal code of conduct on the South China Sea either. Instead, the removal simply signals that, for now, Beijing wants to cool tensions with Hanoi, Manila, the United States, and Jakarta, which also was becoming increasingly angry over Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea. Expect no change in Beijing’s position that it claims most of the South China Sea, and expect another rig to be moved into disputed waters in the next six months to a year. 4. Is Yingluck Shinawatra Going to Return to Thailand? Thailand’s junta last week allowed Thai prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra to leave the country to attend a party for her brother Thaksin in France. She took her only child with her. During her absence from Thailand, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) recommended that Yingluck be indicted for dereliction of duty in relation to the former government’s rice subsidy program. The former prime minister, ousted by the May coup, has vowed to return to Thailand to fight the charges. I’m not so sure that will happen. In Paris, Yingluck’s brother, in exile himself, might counsel her to stay abroad as she is almost sure to be found guilty as long as the junta runs the country.

As the United States pivots to Asia, disputes over territories in the South China Sea have escalated tensions and threatened regional stability.

Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Charles McClean, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Missing Malaysia Airlines flight leaves the fate of 239 passengers shrouded in mystery. Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing disappeared Saturday, and its fate has still not been determined nearly a week after it vanished from radar screens. The most recent information indicates that the plane was deliberately flown off course, making a sharp left and flying hundreds of miles toward India’s remote Andaman and Nicobar islands. India has now joined twelve other countries and more than one hundred ships and aircraft in the search mission, which has extended into the Indian ocean. While no cause has been ruled out for the disappearance, officials are increasingly suspecting foul play, possibly by crew or passengers with aviation experience. The search has been plagued by false leads and contradictory reports: an oil slick found in the Gulf of Thailand was dismissed as unrelated; debris spotted by Vietnam turned out to be trash or wood; and the search radius has been repeatedly expanded. Chinese officials have expressed frustration with Malaysia’s lack of transparency throughout the investigation; two-thirds of the passengers on the flight were Chinese nationals. The fact that two passengers were able to board the flight on fake passports has also exposed serious security gaps in Kuala Lumpur’s airport and focused attention on the black market for stolen passports in Southeast Asia. The passengers with fake passports do not seem to have terrorist ties and are likely Iranian nationals attempting to flee to Europe. 2. Chinese exports unexpectedly low. Chinese exports unexpectedly declined 18.1 percent in February from last year, the biggest drop since the global financial crisis. According to China’s General Administration of Customs in Beijing, the sudden decline left a trade deficit of $22.98 billion for the month. The drop in exports reverberated globally, taking a toll on commodity prices and stock markets. At the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang encouraged the 7.5 percent annual GDP growth target to remain flexible as “severe challenges” lie ahead for the Chinese economy. 3. Philippines accuses Chinese coastguard of preventing delivery of supplies in Ayungin Shoal. Manila has lodged a protest with China after two civilian supply vessels attempting to resupply sailors in the Ayungin Shoal (known as Ren’ai in China) were obstructed by a Chinese coastguard vessel. The Philippines claims the shoal is part of its continental shelf, while China claims much of the South China Sea, including the shoal, for itself. Supplies were later airdropped to the sailors, who occupy a military hospital ship that was intentionally grounded in 1999. The Chinese foreign ministry asserted that the supply vessels in fact carried construction materials to reinforce the Filipino presence on the shoal. 4. North Korea uses front companies, embassies to conduct illegal arms trade, UN report finds. The United Nations Panel of Experts on North Korea found that North Korea continues to trade prohibited goods, including weapons and materials used in nuclear weapons development. The report alleges that front companies and possibly even the North Korean missions to Cuba and Singapore may be involved in the illegal trade activity. The report also refers to foreign suppliers for North Korea’s missile program, and a rocket test-fired into sea in December 2012 was found to contain parts from China, the United States, the former Soviet Union, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. The UN Security Council voted on March 5, 2014, to extend the mandate of the panel of experts by thirteen months, through April 2015. 5. Abe announces Japanese support for the United States in Ukraine crisis. On March 7, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe promised U.S. president Barack Obama that Tokyo would back U.S. efforts to address the Ukraine crisis, including economic sanctions against Russia. Japan’s foreign minister Fumio Kishida said the same day that Japan would also consider giving financial assistance to Ukraine through the International Monetary Fund. The announcements marked a shift in policy, as Tokyo was initially hesitant to back sanctions because of its dependence on Russia for energy imports. Japan also postponed a visit set for this week by Russia’s military chief Valeriy Gerasimov, who was to discuss defense exchanges with Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera. Meanwhile, Shotaro Yachi, head of Japan’s new National Security Council, traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and explained Tokyo’s desire to see a peaceful end to the crisis and respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Bonus: North Korea reelects Kim Jong-un with 100 percent of votes. North Korean state media reported that 100 percent of all registered voters went to the polls for this week’s legislative elections. In a country where voting is mandatory and there is only one yes/no option on the ballot consisting of a single candidate, 100 percent of the voters chose to re-elect Kim Jong-un to the country’s parliament. Citizens celebrated this “single-minded solidarity” for Mr. Kim with singing, dancing, and poetry; Kim Jong-un celebrated with his sister, in her first official appearance. These quinquennial elections allow the North Korean state to keep tabs on its population and bolster Kim Jong-un’s right to rule.

At the end of his current trip to Asia, Secretary of State John Kerry will be stopping in Jakarta and meeting with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary-General Le Luong Minh. Although his visit in Jakarta will be short, Kerry will undoubtedly emphasize the same themes he is hitting throughout the visit, including pushing to restart talks on North Korea’s nuclear program and prodding China to work more seriously with Southeast Asian nations on a real code of conduct for the South China Sea. Matthew Lee of the Associated Press, traveling with Kerry, has a thorough summary of the trip’s agenda here. At the ASEAN Secretariat, Kerry surely will find a welcoming audience for a speech about a South China Sea code of conduct; although he has thus far taken pains to play the role of regional statesman, ASEAN’s Secretary General does hail from Vietnam, one of the two Southeast Asian nations most involved in disputing areas of the Sea with China. Still, it is hard to see what Kerry can say about a code of conduct that would be new in any way, or that would exert more pressure on Beijing than other strategies tried by the administration. Indeed, Kerry might eventually have better luck getting Kim Jong Un to make a deal on his nuclear program than on getting Beijing to agree to a real and binding code of conduct. (The Secretary also will sign two Memorandums of Understanding with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister. These will deal with more modest issues like working together to help other developing countries improve their human rights records.) Despite the short amount of time Kerry is spending in Jakarta, and the focus on ASEAN and regional issues, it would be valuable for him to dip his toe, slightly, into domestic Indonesian politics. He should meet with Jakarta governor Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, who is almost sure to be the next president of Indonesia, and who provides an excellent counter-example to failing democracy in Thailand and Cambodia and Malaysia—an accountable, successful, and democratically elected Southeast Asian leader. [

Three experts join CFR President Richard N. Haass to discuss what actions the United States can take to ensure stability between China and its neighbors in this video of a mock high-level U.S. government meeting.

As more news of the extensive destruction wrought by Typhoon Haiyan rolls in—some storm experts are saying that it is the most powerful typhoon ever to hit land—I have spoken with a number of reporters in the United States and Asia about how the relief effort will be impacted by U.S. relations with the Philippines and the Philippines’ relationships with other major regional powers. The United States and the Philippines, a relationship always fraught with the challenges of former colony/colonizer history and ties between Filipinos in the United States and the Philippines, has clearly been on the upswing over the past five years. The White House would like to credit its rebalancing of U.S. forces and diplomacy to Asia as the driver behind this warming, although I would argue that the Philippines simply was driven to re-embracing Washington by China’s behavior in the South China Sea, and by the rapid realization in Manila of how horribly antiquated the Philippines’ navy was. President Benigno Aquino’s III’s drive against corruption also generally has improved the investment climate in the country and led to greater interest from American companies. Still, despite the upswing I don’t think the U.S. relief effort in Leyte—$20 million in humanitarian aid and an aircraft carrier, several cruisers, and other ships that will help with relief—has much to do with the rebalancing, or pivot.  Washington would deliver a similar relief effort to any country in Southeast Asia with which it had a decent relationship. The U.S. relief effort in Indonesia in 2004 after the Asian tsunami was far larger, despite the fact that Washington and Jakarta at that time had only lukewarm ties, as compared to the treaty alliance between Washington and Manila. The tsunami also was the rare natural disaster that significantly changed domestic and international politics. It helped pave the way to peace in Aceh, and the American relief did help change the image of the United States among some in Indonesia. As Jonah Blank wrote in USA Today: "The goodwill the tsunami relief brought the U.S. is incalculable. Nearly a decade later, the effort may rank as one of the most concrete reasons Southeast Asian nations trust the long-term U.S. commitment to a strategy of ’Asian re-balancing.’" This relief effort, though critical, is not likely to impact U.S.-Philippines relations significantly, since ties are already close. However, I do believe that China’s minimal contribution to relief clearly stems from acrimony between Manila and Beijing and is another sign of Beijing’s departure from its 1990s/early 2000s soft power strategy of investing in building long-term ties in Southeast Asia while minimizing disagreements. China so far has offered the Philippines around $200,000 in disaster aid, with vague promises of more to come, a small sum compared to its 2004 relief efforts after the tsunami. This announcement comes after Beijing essentially revoked Aquino’s permission to attend a prominent China-Southeast Asia trade fair in China earlier in 2013. The aid stinginess is a mistake for Beijing, a squandering of a chance to look like a regional power, a generous country that puts aside disputes in times of humanitarian crisis. Surprisingly, the ultra-nationalist Global Times seems to realize this, noting in an editorial today that China should offer assistance to the Philippines despite disputes over the South China Sea.

President Obama has finally bowed to the inevitable and cancelled his planned trip to Southeast Asia, which was supposed to begin this weekend and to include visits to the East Asia Summit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations leaders’ summit, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit, and a global entrepreneurs’ summit in Malaysia. As I noted in a recent Bloomberg Businessweek piece, the president had a lot of items on the planned Asia agenda, including trying to finalize trade talks for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and using his visit to bolster growing strategic and defense ties with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, among other Southeast Asian nations. Despite the fiscal mess in Washington, Obama should have kept at least part of his Southeast Asia itinerary, the trip to Indonesia for the APEC leaders summit, and then immediately flown back to Washington to deal with the standoff with Congress. He could have thus shown that the administration will make good on its promise to re-engage Southeast Asia even during the most challenging times, a reassurance the region needs after President George W. Bush all but ignored Southeast Asia (and Northeast Asia) when the United States became more intensely involved in wars in South Asia and the Middle East. In addition, Obama’s absence likely will complicate Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations further, since only the president has the power with American business groups to push them to make the kinds of concessions on intellectual property needed to pass the TPP. The president’s absence from the region also certainly will make it harder for those in the administration who wanted the president to take a stronger stance in promoting democracy in Malaysia, Cambodia, and Myanmar. But is the cancellation of Obama’s entire Asia itinerary a disaster, as some analysts have predicted? No. The fact that, as Obama has canceled his Asia trip to deal with the fiscal mess in Washington, Chinese president Xi Jinping is traveling to Southeast Asia, seems to offer a stark symbol of waning American power and dysfunctional American policy-making. [For a summary of this conventional wisdom, read this column] And to some extent, this symbolism rings true. But many of the nations in Southeast Asia are democracies, and though they—and most Americans—may think that the American political process is crazy, they do understand that the president has to address domestic priorities first. And one trip by Xi while Obama is not around is not going to alter the fundamental shift in China-ASEAN relations that has taken place over the past five years, as China has increasingly aggressively stated its position on control of the South China Sea, as well as over other disputed islands in Northeast Asia. China has over the past five years increasingly alienated most of the nations in Southeast Asia, save Malaysia (and to some extent Indonesia) with its behavior regarding the South China Sea. Xi is not going to change that with one visit, just as other senior Chinese officials, who have made multiple visits to Southeast Asia over the past two years, at times when no top American officials were around, also have not smoothed over tensions. The only way for Beijing to do so would be to significantly alter its stance toward resolving the South China Sea standoff, which it shows no intention of doing.