Defense and Security

Territorial Disputes

  • China
    Will Australia Join South China Sea FONOPs? Don’t Count on It
    Professor James Laurenceson is Deputy Director of the Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) at the University of Technology Sydney. News last month that a U.S. Navy carrier strike group had moved into the South China Sea raised expectations that under President Donald J. Trump the United States might dramatically step up freedom of navigation patrols (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. This in turn raises questions about how U.S. allies such as Australia, which has refused to join these patrols in the past, might respond to a shift in policy. The Trump administration has yet to formally designate China a currency manipulator as promised during the election campaign, although the president himself has not shied away from labelling it as such in interviews.  Nor has the administration moved beyond strong rhetoric to slapping tariffs on Chinese imports. But the South China Sea could provide the theater for President Trump’s tough words on China to become tough actions. The president has vowed to boost military spending, including on the navy. Several members of his administration, such as chief strategist Steve Bannon, have suggested that the United States and China could go to war over the South China Sea in coming years. Secretary of Defense James Mattis also has struck a hawkish tone on the South China Sea in the past, albeit this has been tempered more recently. If the administration decides to dramatically increase the number of FONOP patrols in the South China Sea, Washington will almost certainly be going at it alone, despite significant concerns about China’s militarization of parts of the South China Sea among U.S. partners like Singapore, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Australia. Over the last two years, U.S. admirals have regularly hinted that Australia and other countries should also be running freedom of navigation patrols that penetrate the twelve-nautical-mile zones around Chinese-claimed features in the South China Sea. To date, no U.S. partners in the region have taken up the invitation from Washington. Australia has been seen widely in Washington to be the most likely candidate to join a new wave of stepped-up FONOPs. But the Australian position does not appear to be changing, even with the change in administration in Washington and a potentially tougher U.S. policy on the South China Sea. Canberra supports the right of the United States to run such patrols in accordance with both countries’ understanding of international law. At the same time, as Foreign Minister Julie Bishop explained to the Australian parliament last October, Australia has resisted joining FONOPs because it is the government’s view that doing so would only escalate tensions in the South China Sea. There is another factor that possibly helps to explain the limited Australian and regional response to Chinese assertiveness in recent years, even if it is rarely stated officially. A claim made repeatedly is that more than $5 trillion of global commerce passes through the South China Sea annually. However, the bulk of this trade is to or from China, which Australian officials believe Beijing does not want to impede. Foreign Minister Bishop was reported to have delivered the message that Australia would not join FONOPs to President Trump’s foreign policy team in a visit to Washington last week. That the Australian media, after reports of a tense phone call between the Australian prime minister and President Trump, is alert to signs of Prime Minister Turnbull buckling to any pressure from President Trump, including on FONOPs, actually makes it less likely that Turnbull will commit to joining U.S.-led FONOPs. There are, to be sure, voices in Australia that advocate joining the United States in conducting FONOPs in the South China Sea. Last November, Peter Jennings, the Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a Canberra-based think tank, said that if President Trump pressed on the issue: “I think the only sensible answer is we too, like the Americans, should be undertaking freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.” In contrast, just last week, a respected former Australian defence chief, Angus Houston, expressed his support for the government’s view that joining U.S.-led FONOPs in the South China Sea would be unwise. Last week also saw a visit to Australia by Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Shortly before his arrival there was some excited commentary that Australia and Indonesia might do joint South China Sea patrols themselves. But such talk is not new and the final joint statement issued by the two countries made no mention of such plans; President Widodo has, overall, focused Indonesians on domestic issues rather than trying to stake out a role on major regional challenges. If any Australia-Indonesia joint patrols ever do materialize, they will likely focus on disaster preparedness and environmental management, not testing China’s territorial claims. There is one possible development that could cause Australia to change its current approach and embrace U.S.-led FONOPs. That would be if China began dredging at Scarborough Shoal. Last July, an international panel in The Hague found the shoal to be a high-tide elevation. This means that it could be a feature upon which China could attempt to base a territorial claim and claim a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea. Still, following the tribunal’s other findings that China had violated international law by building on low-tide elevations and causing environmental damage within the Philippines exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, dredging at Scarborough and then using it to base a territorial claim would be highly provocative, and could cause Canberra to reconsider its approach to FONOPs. For now, however, even if Washington increases the frequency of its freedom of navigation patrols, the Australian strategy is likely to remain unchanged. Canberra will continue focusing on de-escalating tensions and prioritizing diplomacy in dealing with the South China Sea.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound March 2, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • Territorial Disputes
    Will Nagorno-Karabakh’s Frozen Conflict Heat Up?
    Eshani Bhatt is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Last weekend, a firefight erupted between Azerbaijani forces and Armenian-backed separatists near the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, killing five Azerbaijanis. Nagorno-Karabakh remains a hotbed of tension after skirmishes along the line of contact, which separates Nagorno-Karabakh from the rest of Azerbaijan, escalated and killed one hundred people in April 2016, marking the worst violence since a 1994 cease-fire agreement. The contested region in the southwestern part of Azerbaijan is made up of mostly Armenians who have sought to break away since 1988 when Azerbaijan and Armenia gained their independence. Nagorno-Karabakh forces, with the support of Armenia, then waged a full-scale war against Azerbaijan and gained control of almost 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s geographic area over six years before the 1994 cease-fire was reached. Due to increased tensions since April 2016, Russia’s treaty commitment to defend Armenia, Turkey’s pledge to protect Azerbaijan, and a peace process that has stalled, increased firefight could have expansive implications for Eastern Europe and the United States’ relationship with Russia. In a new contingency planning memorandum from the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action, Carey Cavanaugh outlines in “Renewed Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh” that the likelihood that violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan will escalate in the next twelve months is high. Both countries have weak economies and unreliable infrastructure, and prolonged fighting could cause major disruptions in Azerbaijan’s delivery of energy resources to Western markets. New oil and gas pipelines in the South Caucasus have the potential to become critical alternatives to energy imports to the European Union, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia, reducing energy dependence on Russian gas. Several contingencies, either inadvertent military action or deliberate provocation by either side, could ignite conflict and entangle outside actors, including Russia, Iran, and Turkey, which is a U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, which the United States co-chairs with Russia and France, is in charge of the mediation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The United States has long been interested in promoting democracy and economic independence in former Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, and is invested in preserving peace in Eastern Europe. War over Nagorno-Karabakh jeopardizes U.S. efforts over the past two decades to promote the political and economic stability within the Caucasus region. While Russia is committed to defend Armenia by treaty, it benefits from an economic relationship with Azerbaijan, supplying more than 80 percent of the country’s recent armaments purchases—four billion dollars since 2010. This contingency planning memorandum argues that working with Russia to resolve this conflict could be an opportunity to improve U.S.-Russian relations, as both countries have an interest in minimizing violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Cavanaugh offers a range of preventive options for the United States to employ in order to avoid a major escalation of violence:                       Encourage the Minsk Group to transfer mediation authority to the United Nations or threaten to withdraw from the Minsk Group leadership, in order to pressure parties to work toward a solution. Push parties to implement confidence- and security-building measures that Armenia and Azerbaijan have already agreed upon and explore more effective measures. Threaten to discourage economic support, through international financial institutions, and private investments unless both countries illustrate a willingness to compromise. Explore the possibility of including Turkey in periodic Minsk Group discussions.   Ultimately, Cavanaugh argues that the United States should pressure Armenia and Azerbaijan to compromise, adopting a more assertive approach to mediation through its role as a Minsk Group co-chair. Cooperating with Russia to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh presents an important opportunity to improve the U.S.-Russian relationship. To learn more about what contingencies could lead increased violence and how the United States can help prevent it and work toward a resolution, read Carey Cavanaugh’s “Renewed Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh.”
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko March 1, 2017 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
  • Territorial Disputes
    Renewed Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh
    Introduction The likelihood that Armenians and Azerbaijanis will clash over Nagorno-Karabakh in the next twelve months is high. The situation remains tense following fierce fighting in April 2016 that marked the worst bloodshed since the 1994 cease-fire that established the current territorial division. Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous region in Azerbaijan populated mostly by Armenians, sought to break away from central government control in 1988. When Armenia and Azerbaijan gained their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region also declared independence. This triggered a full-scale war in which Nagorno-Karabakh forces, with support from Armenia, gained control over most of the autonomous region plus seven additional provinces, totaling 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s geographic area. Tensions have built up steadily over the past six years, as energy-rich Azerbaijan enlarged its military capability, public opposition by Armenians and Azerbaijanis to a compromise settlement grew, and cease-fire violations became commonplace. During the April 2016 military clashes, there were roughly three hundred and fifty casualties, with more than one hundred military personnel and civilians killed. Azerbaijan deployed tanks, helicopters, and assault drones to recapture two small slices of territory controlled by Nagorno-Karabakh forces. The United States, Russia, and France—co-chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group responsible for mediating the conflict—used diplomacy to halt the violence. They have been unable, however, to revitalize the peace process. Renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh could reverberate in dangerous ways. Russia is committed by treaty to defend Armenia, Turkey has pledged to protect Azerbaijan, and Iran borders both nations and contains an Azerbaijani minority that far outnumbers the population of Azerbaijan itself. Furthermore, the South Caucasus region has been essential to efforts to reduce the European Union’s energy dependence on Russia and has been a major recipient of Western foreign direct investment and aid. New oil and gas pipelines have benefited Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey; their economies now depend on the revenues and energy this vulnerable network provides. Renewed conflict risks triggering civil unrest or a humanitarian crisis in Armenia and Azerbaijan, or neighboring states, and could lead to even greater Russian military involvement in the region. The high level of attention Washington has paid to Nagorno-Karabakh—which includes twenty years of working alongside Russia and France as co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group—underscores the strong U.S. interest in preserving peace. The Contingencies The likelihood of another outbreak of fighting at the level observed in April 2016, or higher, is significant. That clash roused nationalist sentiments, fed growing political discontent in Armenia, and showed Azerbaijan that it can regain some territory by force. Conflict could resume as a result of inadvertent military actions or a deliberate provocation. Inadvertent military action. Heavily armed military units are presently deployed in close proximity to one another along the line of contact separating Nagorno-Karabakh from the rest of Azerbaijan (see map) as well as the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. No peacekeepers separate the warring forces, and OSCE maintains a “monitoring group” of only six observers. Given the volatility of the current situation, a random act or miscalculation along the line of contact or the Armenian-Azerbaijani border could elicit a more pronounced military response. Such exchanges have occurred frequently since 1994 without triggering further escalation, but the April 2016 clash is widely thought to have changed this dynamic. There is now a greater risk that a relatively minor military scuffle could be used to score political points or gain a battlefield advantage, which in turn could lead to further escalation. Many South Caucasus observers believe the April 2016 “four-day war” started this way. When the fighting broke out, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan were in Washington for the Nuclear Security Summit. It was not a propitious time to fight, but happenstance presented an opportunity for Azerbaijan to rally public support and marginally improve its position along the line of contact. The Armenian side could similarly escalate a future skirmish if circumstances arise in which greater confrontation would publicly reaffirm its ability to prevail in combat, especially in light of its poor military performance in April 2016. Deliberate provocation. Either side could consider taking provocative actions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh to advance military, political, or economic goals that could disturb, if not drastically alter, the general stability that has persisted over the past two decades. The Azerbaijani government insists that the status quo is unacceptable, arguing that Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be independent and stressing that the seven provinces seized in the early 1990s remain occupied in contravention of four UN Security Council resolutions. Azerbaijan is most likely to use military force to bring the issue to a head and ultimately seek to change the status quo. Since 2006, the country has been on an armaments shopping spree, spending over $22 billion to acquire a formidable arsenal of modern military equipment that Armenia cannot match. These purchases have eroded Armenia’s traditional military edge which was based on not just armaments but also superior leadership, training, and commitment. Now that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has learned that territory can be liberated by force without real political cost, he could use Baku’s perceived military advantage to affect a strategic change in the line of contact. Azerbaijan could also initiate a small-scale military operation to build popular support and dampen complaints about poor governance and continued economic weakness. The April 2016 clash demonstrated the effectiveness of this strategy. President Aliyev had been pointedly criticized for restricting opposition parties, arresting activists, and curtailing freedom of the press. These actions, coupled with a sharply declining economy, resulted in mass protests in early 2016. When fighting broke out with Armenia, however, patriotism soared, flags flew from windows, and young people declared their readiness to enlist. Today, Azerbaijan’s economy continues to sputter, energy prices remain volatile, and its currency continues to depreciate. In 2016, the country’s gross domestic product contracted by at least 3 percent. Growing poverty makes further social unrest in 2017 likely. Similar reasoning could prompt Armenia to up the ante in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s economy is also weak, and  protests there have included fierce criticism of the handling of Nagorno-Karabakh. Important military leaders were replaced following the fighting last April. In July 2016, dozens of Karabakh war veterans seized a Yerevan police station and held hostages, and thousands of Armenian citizens took to the streets in support. This led to the prime minister’s resignation in September. Protesters accused Armenia’s leadership of treachery for considering territorial concessions. The government is under pressure to show that it will stay tough in the OSCE Minsk Group negotiations and that it remains capable of defending Nagorno-Karabakh and retaining control of the surrounding occupied territories. Armenia could decide that the time is ripe to formally recognize an independent Nagorno-Karabakh. At the time of the April fighting, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan declared the government was prepared to take this dramatic step should “military operations continue and grow in intensity.” Azerbaijan has made clear such recognition would force it to withdraw from Minsk Group negotiations and pursue a military solution. The Armenians also have long stated that if they are attacked, Azerbaijan’s energy sector would be an immediate military objective. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is a particularly vulnerable target, closely skirting the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact (not far from Mardakert, the site of some of the fiercest fighting in April) and the Armenian border. Another potential target could be the mammoth Sangachal Terminal, which is pivotal for processing oil and gas from Azerbaijan’s offshore platforms. Either action would cripple Georgia (which relies on Azerbaijan for 90 percent of its natural gas imports) and harm Turkey. No outside actors would obtain any significant advantage from renewed large-scale combat, so external meddling is currently not a particular concern. However, Russia derives some benefit from general instability and certainly profits by selling arms to both sides. A major confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan could bring Turkey and Russia into direct military contact or draw Iran into the conflict, but these scenarios remain less likely. Warning Indicators Because tensions are high and military forces are already deployed, there are no warning indicators for the unplanned, small-scale skirmishes that could lead to military escalation. One dangerous sign would be the increase in exchanges of fire, now primarily occurring along the line of contact, to the uncontested border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such an incident occurred near Chinari on December 29, 2016, resulting in four military fatalities. This prompted a quick statement by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs that urged the conflicting parties to stabilize the situation and return human remains. Deliberate acts could be preceded or prompted by public declarations and other measures intended to generate domestic support, including complaints about the Minsk Group. Although Armenia’s formal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh would cross a political red line and cause Azerbaijan to withdraw from the peace process, other statements or symbolic political moves could signal its intent to provoke conflict. Already, opposition lawmakers have submitted a draft bill to the Armenian parliament to recognize the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” In November 2016, the speaker of Nagorno-Karabakh’s National Assembly announced that a draft constitution was under consideration that would rename the region the “Artsakh Republic” (its Armenian name) and delineate its boundaries. A referendum on this constitution could happen in the coming months. President Aliyev’s 2017 New Year’s message reiterated that the conflict can only be settled in line with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity; Armenia’s prime minister, in turn, declared he would not support territorial concessions for the sake of peace. Detectable signs of escalating tensions could include unusual Azerbaijani military movements and other preparations in anticipation of offensive operations. In contrast, Armenian threats to strike Azerbaijan’s energy sector would require less visible preparation. Yerevan conducted a military exercise in 2012 that possibly included a missile strike on oil facilities. In 2016, Russia provided Armenia with the Iskander mobile missile system, which could strike strategic targets deep in Azerbaijan. Moscow’s stance in the region merits close attention. Russia has a commitment to defend Armenia, provides this Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) partner weapons at a discount, and maintains a base in Gyumri with about five thousand military personnel. At the same time, Russia supplied over 80 percent of the armaments recently purchased by Azerbaijan. Moscow seeks a “strategic partnership” with the two nations and argues that it uses arms sales to maintain parity, both in absolute terms and in the quantity and quality of weapons systems. That parity, however, can be hard to measure and harder to achieve. Arms purchases or future planned acquisitions by either side could appear to offer a decisive advantage, indirectly sparking hostilities. Armenian protesters have criticized Russia for enhancing Azerbaijan’s offensive capabilities, indicating growing unease in Armenia about Russia’s loyalty and reliability as a defense partner. Azerbaijan could view with similar unease Russia’s sale of the sophisticated Iskander missiles to Armenia. In any case, that acquisition gave impetus for Azerbaijan to purchase Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system in December. Implications For U.S. Interests Extensive hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh jeopardize the considerable successes the United States has achieved over the past twenty-five years in promoting the independence and autonomy of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and supporting their political and economic development. Two U.S. imperatives—deterring Russian revanchism and establishing a new transportation network to deliver energy resources from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Western markets independent of Russia and Iran—could be imperiled. Furthermore, renewed warfare could exacerbate already problematic U.S. relations with Russia, Turkey, and Iran, each of which could become embroiled in the conflict. Large-scale combat could undermine democratic institutions and create unrest in Armenia and Azerbaijan as vital resources are diverted, infrastructure damaged, and civilian populations dislocated. The two countries already have difficulties meeting the regular needs of their people. Neighboring Georgia would be challenged to manage potential refugee flows should there be a protracted conflict. Even more troublesome for Tbilisi would be the economic troubles such warfare could bring. Georgia depends on Azerbaijan for energy, and its economy relies heavily on cross-regional trade, tourism, and revenue from pipelines; a shortfall or halt in natural gas deliveries could literally turn out the lights. The United States has made Georgia its leading regional partner, and Tbilisi would expect Washington’s political and economic support. Massive Western investments in the region’s energy sector, particularly the current $28 billion Southern Gas Corridor project, would also be threatened. Significant fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan could further complicate an already troubled U.S.-Russia relationship by providing opportunities to expand Russian political and military influence in the South Caucasus. Increased tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh already led Russia and Armenia to establish a long-planned joint defense force in November 2016. Russia could respond to warfare by enlarging its military contingent in Gyumri, deploying peacekeeping forces to quell hostilities, or becoming militarily involved in the conflict in fulfillment of its treaty and CSTO obligations. Renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh could also complicate U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran. During the April 2016 fighting, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed that his country would support Azerbaijan “to the end,” reflecting Turkey’s 2010 commitment to be a guarantor in case of an attack on Azerbaijan. According to both governments, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are characterized as “one nation, two states” (like Northern Cyprus). By contrast, Iran, which was struck by errant artillery rounds, offered its “good offices” to help facilitate a resolution. Tehran reiterated this proposal in December 2016 and February 2017. Current friction in U.S. relations with both Turkey and Iran makes significant independent involvement in the settlement process or on security issues by either party problematic and more likely to impede rather than advance long-term prospects for peace. Washington has, however, worked closely with Ankara and Yerevan to improve Turkish-Armenian relations by dealing with their shared past (e.g., the Armenian genocide question), expanding bilateral trade through lifting blockades, and normalizing diplomatic relations. Active warfare would hinder U.S. objectives. Least likely, but significant for U.S. interests, would be a full-scale conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that brought both Turkey and Russia into military action, potentially along with their corresponding alliance entanglements. Finally, this dispute was the first conflict-mediation effort undertaken by OSCE. Failure would hurt the institution’s credibility to mediate other conflicts. It would also reflect poorly upon the United States, which has played a significant role in the Minsk Group process from the beginning. Preventive Options The United States cannot unilaterally prevent renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It could, however, undertake or support a variety of diplomatic initiatives that might pressure the parties to become more involved in the peace process and attenuate prospects for renewed violence. Some of these measures would be effective in combination; others are mutually exclusive. Move to transfer mediation responsibility from OSCE to the United Nations. This action would necessitate support from Russia and France, as well as the concurrence of the other OSCE member states. This option would retain the influence of all three co-chair nations (as permanent, veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council), while allowing them to distance themselves from direct responsibility for mediation. The high-level attention that Washington and Paris have heretofore given to this dispute would likely dissipate, although Moscow’s involvement (as the dominant regional power) could become even more consequential. Azerbaijan would likely welcome such action. Armenia, however, has long regarded the United Nations as biased because of the Security Council’s early support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Threaten to withdraw from OSCE Minsk Group leadership. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have relied on U.S. involvement as a counterweight to Russian influence; U.S. withdrawal would upset that balance. This prospect could compel the conflicting parties to assume more forthcoming positions. If Armenia and Azerbaijan still refused to compromise, the United States could follow through on the threat, thereby reducing its exposure to being party to a failed conflict resolution effort. However, a withdrawal could enlarge Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Many policymakers in Russia and across Europe would view this action as Washington ceding the region to Moscow as the latter’s implicit “sphere of influence.” Additionally, this step could undermine U.S. and OSCE efforts to effect conflict resolution in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Invigorate the Minsk Group co-chairs to promote a resolution, rather than manage the conflict. As is the norm, the mediation process has not sought to impose a solution but to assist the conflicting parties in their own efforts to find a mutually acceptable peace settlement. The United States could, along with Russia and France, shift from a generally passive mediation approach to an assertive one, vigorously pushing for genuine compromise from each side. Such a united stance, backed by political leaders of the co-chairing nations, could raise the political cost of military action and improve prospects for a more serious dialogue toward peace. Insist that agreed-upon confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) be implemented. Two CSBMs advanced by the Minsk Group co-chairs were nominally accepted by Aliyev and Sargsyan last spring: increasing immediately the number of OSCE field observers (from six to fifteen) and creating an incidents investigation mechanism. Both efforts have been stalled. These steps and others like them could provide early warning of military action and help identify violators of the cease-fire. Azerbaijan has long opposed CSBMs, believing they only strengthen an intolerable status quo. Armenia has responded more positively. If Baku continues to block such measures, the co-chair nations could weigh an alternate mechanism (outside OSCE) that might assist with establishing such capabilities on the Armenian side of the border. Similarly, Minsk Group co-chairs could pressure both parties to uphold the risk reduction measures they agreed to under the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation framework, such as providing at least forty-two days’ advance notification of large-scale military exercises. Explore more significant CSBMs. Additional measures—such as greater separation between Armenian and Azerbaijani military forces, hotlines between their civilian and military leadership, and a meaningful surge in the number of international observers—could foster greater stability by increasing transparency and predictability of military action. The current OSCE observer contingent, even if supplemented by the minor increase now under consideration, is woefully inadequate to the task at hand. The mandate of the personal representative of the OSCE chairperson-in-office in the region, responsible for the limited monitoring now being carried out, could also be expanded. Actively exploring such steps could induce the parties to negotiate in good faith. Discourage economic support and private investment absent moves toward peace. The credit rating agency Moody’s has already given a negative credit outlook for the South Caucasus in 2017, identifying geopolitical conflicts as a negative influence and citing specifically the flare-up between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In this milieu, public statements of concern regarding risks due to the increased prospect of war could build leverage by warding off major investments. International financial institutions (IFIs) are particularly important in this regard; for example, in December 2016, the World Bank approved $800 million for loans to support the Southern Gas Corridor project. This option could highlight the cost of further conflict and the pressing need for progress toward resolving this dispute. In addition, the United States could exert additional pressure by curtailing Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation activities in the region. Foster an expanded dialogue between the Minsk Group co-chairs and Turkey. Ankara could play an instrumental role, supporting an eventual settlement and assisting with the subsequent economic integration of the South Caucasus. A more significant role for Turkey could boost peace efforts and help encourage Azerbaijani participation. This option could also help lessen the chance of military contact between Russia and Turkey should large-scale fighting invoke their alliance commitments. Mitigating Options The United States could employ a combination of measures to prevent further escalation should significant hostilities break out over Nagorno-Karabakh. The United States could immediately work to reestablish a cease-fire. A united front from the three co-chair nations in the past helped significantly. Supporting Russia’s lead on direct negotiations with military leadership from the warring parties has proven prudent and effective. The United States could promote a UN Security Council resolution condemning any major military action. A secondary option, if known, would be to name the instigator. Working with partners, the United States would penalize the party that initiates any major escalation—through public condemnation and potentially by withdrawing economic assistance or using sanctions. It could actively discourage economic support from IFIs and private investors. Recommendations The prospect of renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh presents both a challenge and a possible opportunity for the Donald J. Trump administration. President Trump’s desire to cultivate a new relationship with Russia has resonated positively with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but ignited strong criticism from influential members of Congress and the American foreign policy establishment given Moscow’s aggressive moves in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria—further compounded by Russian meddling in the U.S. presidential election. A critical question is how to initiate a rapprochement in such a contentious political setting. Nagorno-Karabakh could offer an answer. The Minsk Group represents the leading area of U.S.-Russian cooperation with both nations promoting common, uncontestable goals: minimizing warfare and advancing a peaceful settlement. The stakes at play here are important for the U.S. and its European partners, but not vital. More active involvement could serve as an early test of Moscow’s willingness to cooperate, with relatively low political cost. It could also showcase the Trump administration working constructively with two Muslim countries—Azerbaijan and Turkey. Collaborate With Russia to Energize the Minsk Group Peace Process A more active peace process would make it harder for either side to take steps that entailed or elicited large-scale military action. To date, the United States, Russia, and France have worked together to promote outcomes that the parties were tempted to embrace but did not because of domestic political concerns. The three co-chairs should increase political pressure on the parties to move toward a resolution, rather than continue the passive approach, which allows the conflicting parties to set the pace and course of action. To achieve this, the co-chairs should become more actively involved and perhaps make use of incentives and penalties. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s energy background could be a particularly valuable asset in this endeavor. Russia took the lead in facilitating the 2016 cease-fire; the United States should do the same to encourage a resolution. The United States should also facilitate Turkey’s inclusion in periodic discussions with the co-chairs regarding settlement efforts to accentuate the political and economic role Ankara can play. Moscow should support this action. Russian-Turkish relations, strained after Turkey downed a Russian warplane near the Syrian border in 2015, have rebounded as evidenced by Moscow’s invitation to Ankara (and Tehran) to participate in the December 2016 Syrian peace talks. There is also merit to the co-chairs developing a process to apprise Iran of developments in the region. The goal should be not to make Tehran a participant but an informed supporter of efforts to maintain stability and advance a settlement. A U.S.-Russia partnership on Nagorno-Karabakh should not be as controversial or complicated as other issues, such as Ukraine, Syria, and arms control, which are marked by sharp divisions in policy approaches and goals. By exhibiting the benefits of mutual collaboration, Nagorno-Karabakh could become a stepping stone for greater U.S.-Russia cooperation. Take Action to Prevent Conflict A troubling skirmish on the Armenian-Azerbaijan border in late 2016 resulted in almost daily cease-fire violations in January 2017. Given the high likelihood of renewed fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, all steps that might reduce the chances of conflict should be considered, such as implementing the agreed-upon CSBMs and more significant measures, as well as the potential opportunity created by the risks now posed to external economic support and private investment. Possible intelligence sharing between the United States and Russia regarding military developments in this region could be helpful, as could discussions about whether strategic parity is being maintained given the substantial arms flows into the region. The Trump administration should pay careful attention to developments related to Nagorno-Karabakh and act quickly to promote preventive measures to help avoid violence, deter military action, and engender support for this conflict’s peaceful resolution.
    Contingency Planning Memorandum by Carey Cavanaugh February 21, 2017 Center for Preventive Action
  • China
    Scarborough Shoal Games and Deals
    Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. In a matter of months, the Philippines’ controversial leader, Rodrigo Duterte, has managed to recalibrate his country’s foreign policy, potentially revive frayed ties with China, and seemingly reduce tensions in the South China Sea, at least for now. Under Duterte, the Philippines and China recently signed a whopping $24 billion in bilateral business deals and officially declared their relations as fully “normalized.” But Duterte’s greatest challenge vis-à-vis Beijing is the South China Sea dispute over the long run, with China’s occupation of the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal the biggest point of contention. Reports suggest that the two sides may have secured a rudimentary, short-term deal for the contested waters. Since Duterte’s high-profile visit to Beijing, the two neighbors have begun to implement what looks like a provisional joint fisheries arrangement in the South China Sea, specifically in the bitterly-contested Scarborough Shoal. In recent days, Philippine fishermen, for the first time in years, have been able to enter the contested shoal without harassment by Chinese Coast Guard vessels. China seems to have also relaxed its grip on the shoal by decreasing the number of vessels deployed to the area. To signal its commitment to protect Philippine sovereign rights, as affirmed by a landmark arbitration case earlier this year, the Duterte administration is also deploying Philippine Coast Guard vessels to the area. It is a strange mix of territorial assertiveness and accommodation on the part of the Philippines in the Shoal. The bigger picture suggests that Manila and Beijing are intent on rebuilding diplomatic ties and moving towards a bilateral economic renaissance after years of mutual acrimony and diplomatic flare-ups. But it is too early to say whether the Philippines has achieved a fair and lasting compromise in the South China Sea, one that will actually benefit Philippine interests over the long term. So far, there are no indications that the two sides are negotiating even a blueprint of a formal, binding agreement on disputed areas in the South China Sea---a formal deal that would make it harder for China to keep building in the Sea and taking other assertive measures. Absent a formal deal, China can renege on any informal understanding whenever it deems it convenient or justified. Satellite imageries suggest that China has been tightening its grip on the disputed shoal over the past few months, so the letup in recent days could be just a temporary, reversible maneuver to ease bilateral tensions. Even if the two parties find a mutually-satisfactory deal that is consistent with international law in the Scarborough Shoal, it is still far from certain whether they can ever find a compromise over the bulk of the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is claimed by China in contravention of international law. China and the Philippines have no overlapping EEZs, so China has no legal basis to occupy low-tide elevations such as the Mischief Reef or to block the Philippines from developing its resources in the Reed Bank. Most likely, what we are witnessing now are confidence-building measures that are designed to cement the re-normalization of bilateral ties without necessarily resolving the territorial disputes. Not to mention, this could be part of a broader divide-and-conquer strategy by China, undermining multilateral efforts to rein in Beijing’s maritime assertiveness in adjacent waters.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound November 4, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • India
    Pakistan, Terrorist Groups, and Credible Responses
    More than a week after the terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Uri, close to the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border between Pakistani and Indian-administered parts of Kashmir, on the Indian side, a familiar pattern has returned. Which is to say: a group of terrorists crossed the Line of Control, attacked and killed Indian soldiers, Indian officials cite specific evidence they believe links the terrorists to a group domiciled in Pakistan, and the Pakistani government then bristles that such an allegation would be made without a complete investigation. In this latest instance, within hours of the Uri attack, the Indian director general of military operations offered that he suspected the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) to be responsible. JeM was the group held responsible for a remarkably similar attack on the Indian army base in Pathankot, Punjab, on January 2, 2016. Later in the week, presumably based on further evidence, unnamed Indian security officials pinned the blame for Uri on Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). Pakistan has categorically rejected any blame for the attack. The Pakistani foreign office spokesperson, Nafees Zakaria, offered that “Pakistan has nothing to gain” and that it was India’s “habit” to accuse Pakistan of involvement after terrorist attacks. Such disavowals have no credibility at this point. While it is certainly true that Pakistani citizens have suffered enormously from terrorism, that does not excuse the fact that there is a long history of attacks in India that can be traced back to groups operating from Pakistan. What’s more, internationally proscribed terrorist leaders and organizations not only have safe haven on Pakistani soil, but in some cases are allowed to hold political rallies advocating violence in Kashmir, and openly with thousands of attendees. No reasonable observer could conclude this represents a fulsome effort to stem the terrorist tide within Pakistan, nor indeed meet Pakistan’s obligations under the UN Security Council Resolutions designating these Pakistani terrorist groups. Take just one example. The LeT and its leader, Hafiz Saeed, have been proscribed for years under both UN and U.S. terrorism designations. In 2012, the United States issued a $10 million Rewards for Justice request for information that could lead to Saeed’s arrest for his role in the Mumbai attacks, in which 166 people were murdered, including six Americans. Yet he has been given free rein in Pakistan. There’s almost nothing new to say about the outrage of his continued activities because it has been going on so brazenly for so long. In recent days, he led Eid prayers in Lahore in a huge public stadium, with a sermon focused on the sacrifices of Kashmiris. (Here’s the YouTube video this terrorist organization helpfully posted online.) He has no problem drawing crowds to his public jamborees, such as the “Kashmir Caravan” he organized in late July of this year that proceeded from Lahore to the country’s capital, Islamabad. Saeed was joined in his caravan by Sami ul-Haq, head of the Darul Uloom Haqqania in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, which has been called the “University of Jihad.” According to Pakistani press reports of the caravan, some 30,000 people joined. Saeed reportedly affirmed his group’s support for jihad in Kashmir, and threatened to “violate the LoC.” One can only conclude that Pakistani authorities do not seem to mind a major terrorist organization holding rallies to urge jihad in Kashmir. It certainly does not portray the country as one interested in preventing terrorism. It is also well known that the trial of the LeT terrorists accused of carrying out the Mumbai attack in 2008 has been slow-rolled to death. An arrest of an accused financier in August pointed to some progress (the first in years), but press reports suggest that the arrest has put the process “back to 2009” in terms of timeline. Once again, this does not portray a country acting decisively to bring to justice the perpetrators of one of the worst mass terrorist attacks of the past decade. And of course it is very well known that the Haqqani network remains in fighting form, attacking Afghan, U.S., and even Indian interests across the other border in Afghanistan. Last week General John W. Nicholson, commander of the U.S. force presence in Afghanistan, said in a press conference that there was “not adequate pressure” on the Haqqanis. This August the U.S. Department of Defense declined to certify that Pakistan was “taking adequate action” against the Haqqanis, which resulted in the withholding of $300 million in coalition support funds under U.S. law. * * * Let’s try to imagine a different outcome, one that would more credibly indicate an effort to end the terrorism that continually keeps this troubled region in the “tinderbox” category of concern. Here is an imagined scenario that illustrates how a very different response could be conceivable, and could catapult India-Pakistan ties into a better place: Scenario: A terrorist attack in India bears all the signs of LeT or JeM. Pakistani authorities, weary of the poor reputation their country has acquired around the world, act with dispatch. “We are alarmed by this attack” said the foreign office spokesperson, “It sets back our already-limited dialogue with India, and makes our country look like a supporter of terrorism.” Within days, a new counterterrorism task force identifies the planners of the attack, and arrests them based on copious evidence. Trials begin within six months. Pakistani officials continue to raise their concerns diplomatically about Kashmir, but adopt a zero-tolerance policy for terrorist organizations mobilizing on their soil. Pakistan’s zero-tolerance policy on terrorism allows a breakthrough in talks with India to take place; while neither side reaches agreement in the near-term, at least dialogue has reopened. Similarly, Pakistan’s ties with Afghanistan improve, as does the Afghan security situation, with Pakistan’s increased attention to counterterror efforts against all groups. I realize this scenario might appear far-fetched, but it is not completely impossible—and it indicates what a more credible response to the ongoing terrorism problem might resemble. The pattern of denial while designated terrorists openly exhort followers to jihad is simply not credible. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa) 
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres November 3, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • Russia
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of September 16, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Delhi battles major chikungunya outbreak. Over 1,000 people have fallen ill and at least twelve have died due to a major outbreak of chikungunya in Delhi. Chikungunya, a mosquito-borne virus similar to Zika and dengue, is typically not fatal, but can cause debilitating joint pain along with fever, fatigue, and nausea. Health minister J. P. Nadda has assured the Indian public that chikungunya did not cause the fatalities, but rather exacerbated deadly illnesses that were already ailing the elderly. Of greater concern is the toll chikungunya is taking on public services, as public-sector projects have missed major deadlines due to workers falling ill and migrant laborers returning to their villages. The greater incidence of the disease has been attributed to an unusually intense monsoon season, which, combined with numerous construction projects, has created standing pools of water for mosquitoes to breed. There is no vaccine for chikungunya, and Delhi’s government-operated health facility is receiving up to 1,000 people in its fever clinic on a daily basis. 2. Forty-five legislators expelled from China’s top legislature. Forty-five deputies from Liaoning province to the National People’s Congress (NPC)—nearly half of their province’s overall delegation—were expelled this week from the country’s top legislative body. The legislators’ election was invalidated after it was found that they had engaged in bribery and vote-buying during the 2013 election. They were removed by a special session of the NPC Standing Committee, and their ejection will have both national and provincial ramifications. Many of the legislators were members of the Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress, from which they were also removed. This left the group without enough members to function and an interim panel was put in place instead. Speculation swirled over why the legislators were expelled at this point in time; among the popular theories were that the move was intended to discourage electoral fraud going forward, or that it was simply a further step in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s broader anticorruption campaign. 3. Duterte’s blunt remarks unnerve Asian U.S. allies. Recent anti-American remarks from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte signal a possible future break in the longstanding U.S.-Philippines relationship and a potential setback in a U.S. “pivot to Asia.” Mr. Duterte’s antagonistic remarks toward the U.S. have generated unease among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region due to what appears to be an abrupt about-face from the Philippines in the face of China’s growing influence in the region. Beijing’s attempt to undercut the July ruling of an international tribunal against Chinese claims in the South China Sea have been bolstered by Mr. Duterte’s comments. Overt examples of inflammatory remarks include Mr. Duterte stating that the Philippines would stop patrolling the South China Sea with the U.S. Navy to avoid being part of any “hostile act” toward China; calling for the departure of U.S. military advisers; and stating the intent to buy armaments from Russia and China. Official response from China has been ambiguous, with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson denying any information of advantageous terms for future arms deals with the Philippines. 4. Countries step up South China Sea joint drills. China and Russia conducted naval exercises off the coast of Guangdong province this week, the first time the countries have held their annual joint naval drills in the South China Sea. The exercises, known as Joint Sea, included anti-submarine warfare, island defense, and island-seizing operations. While Russia maintains a neutral stance on South China Sea territorial disputes, its official position that it is “counter-productive” for external parties to get involved in the conflict meshes well with China’s stance. Meanwhile, Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada announced while in Washington, DC, on Thursday that the country intends to increase joint training operations with the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. 5. Japanese renewables lose steam. Before the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Japan derived nearly 30 percent of its total electricity from nuclear power. Now, after shuttering almost all of its nuclear plants, that number has fallen to 1 percent. Under most conditions, this gap would increase demand for alternative energy sources and potentially bolster the renewable energy sector. But renewables in Japan still face an uphill battle. In particular, low worldwide oil and gas prices have kept fossil fuel imports to Japan a viable alternative to expanding the renewables sector. Locations for large hydropower projects are limited, and the solar industry has faltered because of regulatory issues and frequent bankruptcies. And although Japan’s potential for geothermal power generation is among the largest in the world, the majority of geothermal resources are located in protected national parks. At least for the time being—barring a spike in fossil fuel prices or unexpected shift in the regulatory climate—Japan’s goal to double the share of renewables in its electricity mix by 2030 seems quite a ways away. Bonus: Carcinogenic mooncake kerfuffle in Macau. This year’ Mid-Autumn Festival brought with it an unusual health scare: carcinogenic mooncakes. These mooncakes, which came from Hong Kong’s Hang Heung bakery and were sold in a four-star hotel in Macau, were found to contain 8.43 micrograms per kilogram of aflatoxin B1, a chemical believed to be cancerous. A sample in Hong Kong was also found to have high aflatoxin B1 levels. The amounts of aflatoxin B1 found in the mooncakes exceeded the allowed level in Macau, but not in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, this isn’t the first time food safety concerns have tainted mooncakes: in 2014, concerns emerged that gutter oil had been used in the pastries sold by Maxim’s bakery in Hong Kong. Harmful ingredients aren’t the only health concern associated with these treats, either. As a columnist from the South China Morning Post aptly observed, it’s the calories, sugar, and fat in the cakes, not their carcinogens, that should be provoking worry.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound September 16, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of August 19, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Indonesia sinks illegal fishing boats. In a move intended to assert sovereignty over resource-rich waters surrounding the Natuna Islands off the Borneo coast, Indonesia sank sixty boats impounded for illegal fishing. While Indonesia has no official territorial disputes with China, the exponential increase in the Chinese fishing fleet (instigated by increasing domestic appetite and state subsidies) and the decreasing fish supply in Chinese coastal waters have resulted in heightened confrontations between Chinese fishing vessels and Indonesian coast guard vessels. Chinese activities in the Natuna Islands area has raised fears that Beijing is attempting to expand its influence through its fishing fleet rather than official naval vessels in the oil- and gas-rich area as a more cost-effective approach. Beijing has in the past described the area around the Natunas as a historical fishing ground, even though it lies almost 1,250 miles from the Chinese coastline and within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Not including the sixty ships scuttled this Wednesday, Indonesia has previously sunk more than 170 fishing vessels impounded for illegal fishing. Jakarta has emerged to take the hawkish lead on maritime security within the ASEAN regional community and has recently agreed to joint patrols with Malaysia and the Philippines. 2. China sees major uptick in cardiovascular disease.  A study published this week from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health shows that China is currently facing an epidemic of cardiovascular disease that is likely to worsen over the course of the next two decades due to increased incidence of high blood pressure and obesity. Data was collected from 26,000 people throughout nine provinces from 1991 through 2011, and the researchers attributed observed trends to changing lifestyles accompanying China’s rapid economic development. The authors note that in 1979, around the time the Chinese government began to open its economy, the prevalence of high blood pressure was 7.7 percent; by 2010, it had risen to 33.5 percent, a rate comparable to that of American adults. In fact, 44 percent of the 6.8 million deaths among Chinese above the age of 35 were related to heart disease. Contributing societal changes associated with China’s urbanization and industrialization include a major shift to “Western” diets—with greater consumption of red meat, sugary drinks, and salty foods—as well as decreased physical activity and high rates of smoking. 3. Japan plans new long-range missiles. After months of tension between Beijing and other Asia-Pacific states over disputed territorial claims, Japan has announced its intention to develop a new tactical ballistic missile. The new surface-to-ship missile will be the longest-range missile ever built by Japan, and is allegedly aimed at countering Chinese military strategy regarding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Persistent tensions between Beijing and Tokyo most recently made news when Tokyo lodged a diplomatic protest with Beijing over the exponential increase in Chinese coast guard vessels and fishing ships around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, in addition to another protest lodged last week. The new missile system, properly positioned in places such as the Okinawan island of Miyako, would work to discourage Chinese naval aggression due to its long-range (300 km) capability. Japan’s move to develop these new missiles is not unanticipated given the China-centric 2013 revisions to the National Defense Program Guidelines, which called for a bolstering of Japanese island defenses and a strengthening of domestic military equipment development process. An August 14th report stated that the new missile system has an expected deployment date of 2023. This announcement was made amidst reports that China, Japan, and South Korea are considering a meeting of their respective foreign ministers despite tensions between the countries. The meeting is projected to lay the foundation for a three-way summit that will discuss the resolution of regional issues, such as the threat posed by North Korea’s plutonium processing. 4. North Korea resumes plutonium production. On Wednesday, in its first-ever response to a foreign media inquiry, North Korea’s Atomic Energy Institute confirmed that the country had resumed plutonium production for nuclear arms. The plutonium is gathered from spent fuel from a reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, which Pyongyang shuttered in 2007 and restarted sometime before last year. The Institute also asserted that North Korea will not discontinue nuclear tests—the fourth of which took place in January—as long as perceived threats from the United States remain. A U.S. Department of State spokesman called the report “a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions which prohibit such activities,” and suggested that North Korea’s escalatory actions would only further steel international resolve to counter them. But given that the United Nations has already enacted its strongest sanctions yet against North Korea, it is unclear if any amount of pressure from international players, besides China, will have any hope of changing North Korea’s tack. 5. Beijing police permitted to use weapons to defend doctors. The Beijing municipal government announced this week that police there are now permitted to use weapons to defend medical professionals from attacks by patients. The new measure is part of a year-long campaign aimed at reducing hospital violence, a widespread occurrence in the country. Many patients, unsatisfied with their treatment, growing medical costs, overcrowding, or corruption in hospitals, have responded by attacking doctors; some attacks have even been fatal. According to one study, nearly 60 percent of Chinese medical staff have been verbally abused and 13 percent have suffered physical assault by patients. In 2014, Beijing hospitals made plans to recruit 1,500 “guardian angel” volunteers to mediate tense doctor-patient relations in order to prevent violence against staff. Sadly, it seems divine intervention was not enough to keep doctors safe. Bonus: Kurds struggle for acceptance in Japan. Refugee status has never been given to a Kurd living in Japan, but that has not deterred those seeking asylum. Approximately 1,200 Kurds live in two of Tokyo’s northern suburbs. While they are often not authorized for employment and on temporary six-month permits, many Kurds work in the construction industry, which is increasingly reliant on foreign labor. A number of Kurds have also assisted with earthquake-relief projects. However, gaining acceptance in Japan is challenging since the country is known for its reluctance to accept immigrants. In 2015 alone, over 7,500 people sought refugee status in Japan but just twenty-seven received it. Currently, non-Japanese make up a mere 2 percent of the country’s population, although demographic pressures may force the adoption of a more accommodating immigration stance. The country does have a burgeoning Muslim population, though, which is estimated to have grown from just over 5,000 in the mid-1980s to as large as 70,000 to 80,000 in recent years. Other tensions have trailed the Kurds as well, including clashes with Turks living in Japan during the 2015 Turkish elections.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound August 19, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • Russia
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of July 29, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Theresa Lou, and Gabriella Meltzer look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. China and Russia to hold “routine” naval exercises in the South China Sea. China’s Ministry of National Defense announced on Thursday that China and Russia have scheduled cooperative naval exercises in the South China Sea for September. While China also stated that the naval exercises will be aimed at strengthening Russian-Chinese cooperation and are not directed at any other country, the announcement comes at a time of intensified strain between China and other Asian nations due to rival claims in the South China Sea. Following an international arbitration ruling rejecting Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has encouraged bilateral talks between Beijing and Manila over the territorial dispute. Reportedly, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has recently indicated to Mr. Kerry that Beijing seeks to “move away from the public tensions and to turn the page” and resolve tensions through direct dialogue with the parties concerned. Despite this indication of Beijing’s interest in defusing regional tensions and Chinese statements that the drills are targeted at furthering Russian-Chinese strategic partnerships, it is likely that just like previously conducted joint naval exercises in the Sea of Japan, many will construe this as an effort to restrict the influence of the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. 2. Top Hong Kong anticorruption investigator removed. Following the resignation of Rebecca Li, the acting head of the Operations Department at Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), speculation has swirled as to the future of the ICAC’s neutrality. Li’s removal surprised many as she had spent thirty-two years at the commission, earning praise for her work and even becoming the first person from the agency to be sent to an FBI training program. While the nominal reason for her departure was non-political and related to her performance, some suspected that the change was due either to a lack of trust in her by Chinese officials or to her role in investigating a corruption case involving Leung Chun-ying, Hong Kong’s chief executive. Li had been leading the case investigating whether Leung had improperly taken funds from the Australian company UGL. The commissioner of the ICAC claims that the chief executive had no involvement in the decision to remove Li, but the fact that Leung selects the ICAC commissioner and the Chinese government approves the choice has fueled further suspicion. Li is expected to be replaced by Ricky Chu Man-kin. Her removal met much internal opposition and even caused the cancellation of the ICAC’s annual dinner since so many employees planned to boycott. While the ICAC is respected globally for its effectiveness and independence in addressing issues of graft, this turmoil could indicate weakening autonomy at a time when concern in Hong Kong is already mounting over the freedom from mainland Chinese interference in other media and educational institutions. 3. China’s strict condom policies make sex workers vulnerable to HIV. Asia Catalyst, a New York–based nonprofit that promotes civil society and health of marginalized groups in Asia, released a report this week that sheds light on China’s ineffective HIV prevention policies. China’s HIV prevalence is relatively low, with roughly 500,000 people reportedly living with HIV or AIDS at the end of 2014 out of a total population of 1.4 billion. The country’s epidemic is primarily concentrated among high-risk groups such as gay men and sex workers, with 92 percent of cases resulting from sexual intercourse. Sex work is illegal in China, and the Ministry of Public Security categorizes condoms as a “tool of offense” for prostitutes. Among suspected prostitutes, police authorities view condom possession as evidence of illegal activity and precedent for arrest or penalty. As a result, only 48 percent of surveyed prostitutes previously interrogated by police carry condoms, compared to 68 percent of those with no prior encounters with law enforcement. Asia Catalyst is encouraging the ministry to desist condom search and seizure and to decriminalize prostitution, instead working alongside the sex worker community to prevent HIV transmission. 4. Beijing tightens information control. The Chinese government took major steps forward in restricting news outlets that are not state-owned this week, enforcing regulations that ban original reporting by private media. The government shut down Sina, Sohu, and NetEase this past weekend for violating the rules. While the crackdown may have been a direct response to reporting of flooding in northern China that has killed dozens, it also fits into a general trend towards greater state control of the information space. Over the last two weeks, the Chinese government has increased scrutiny of online live-streaming platforms, accusing them of hosting “vulgar” content that “challenges the baseline morality of society.” This week, the Chinese Communist Party released an “informationization” strategy that aims to make the country a cyber superpower by mid-century. While its primary goals is to make China technologically self-reliant, it also has implications for China’s domestic media controls and international propaganda. Responding to reporters’ questions at a press conference announcing the policy document, Cyberspace Administration of China Vice Director Zhuang Rongwen said that the strategy encourages Chinese online media companies to expand their presence in Hong Kong, a move that seems aligned with or inspired by Chinese tech mogul Jack Ma’s purchase of Hong Kong’s leading English-language paper last year. 5. Chinese demolition work on Buddhist monastery sparks controversy. Larung Gar, a Buddhist monastery home to ten thousand monks, nuns, and laypeople located in the Tibetan county of Sertar in Sichuan province, is currently undergoing government-mandated demolition efforts that aim to eradicate quarters for all but five thousand residents by 2017. Two competing narratives are at play. The official purpose—“to build a Buddhism-practicing place that is more orderly, beautiful, safe and peaceful” and to “[accelerate] the urbanization… of Larung Town”—is in line with China’s overall urbanization campaign, which seeks to set the country on a more “human-centered and environmentally friendly path.” Government officials say that the current site posed serious health and safety concerns for its residents, citing nine fires at the institute that had apparently resulted in a loss of $340,000. Advocacy groups, on the other hand, claim that the move is just an attempt to tighten control over Tibetan culture and religious life. United States–based think tank Human Rights Watch points to a recent order that called for greater legal and ideological guidance in the community. While nothing suggests that the authorities consulted the Larung Gar leadership about the demolition, senior monastics are urging calm and discouraging residents from participating in protests. Bonus: New Zealand cracks down on predators. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key announced an ambitious conservation plan that calls for the extermination of non-native predators in the country by 2050. The government estimates that introduced pests cost New Zealand’s agricultural industry 3.3 billion New Zealand dollars (NZD) ($2.4 billion) and kill 25 million native birds annually—including the country’s iconic Kiwi—as well as prey on other local species. Key’s government is setting aside 28 million NZD ($20 million) to support a new joint venture that will develop pest control technologies, and has outlined four interim goals to be met by 2025. A potential sticking point in the plan, however, is New Zealanders’ love for cats, which kill billions of birds and small mammals yearly around the world. An avid cat-lover himself, Key (who owns a cat named “Moonbeam Smokey Fluffy Key”) said that while stray cats are on the government’s hit list, pet cats would be spared.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound July 29, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of July 22, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Justice Department announces action against 1MDB. The ongoing scandal surrounding Malaysian state investment fund 1MDB took a dramatic turn this week when the U.S. Justice Department announced plans to seize $1 billion in assets as part of an investigation into money laundering and funds improperly taken from 1MDB. While the fund was intended to boost Malaysia’s development, some of the money appears to have instead gone toward enriching Prime Minister Najib Razak, his stepson, and other associates. Among the activities undertaken with siphoned money are financing of the movie The Wolf of Wall Street and the purchase of a private jet as well as properties in New York, California, and London. Overall officials believe that more than $3.5 billion was stolen and this action is the largest pursued under the Justice Department’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative. Although Najib is only alluded to as “Malaysian Official 1,” this still marks the first time he has been officially linked to the case. He denies that the money was stolen and rather attributes the new wealth in his accounts to a personal donation given by the Saudi royal family. The Malaysian attorney general has previously said Najib did not obtain the funds through corruption, but Najib’s press secretary said Malaysia would participate in “any lawful investigation.” Other nations have also gotten involved with Switzerland seizing a Van Gogh and two Monet paintings and Singapore announcing that it had taken assets valued at $177 million. These actions against 1MDB come amidst a broader international debate about money laundering and ownership disclosure set off by the Panama Papers leak. 2. Beijing backs the Philippine’s grisly war on drugs. In a statement released on Tuesday by the Chinese embassy in Manila, Beijing professed its willingness to cooperate with the Philippines in its fight against drugs, calling narcotics a “common enemy of mankind.” Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, who has vowed to end crime within six months of taking office on June 30, has taken a brutal tack: “If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself,” he said in a speech earlier this month. Since May, more than two hundred suspected drug traffickers have been killed in confrontations with law enforcement officers, whom Duterte has offered to pardon if human rights advocates accuse them of abusing authority. He claims that many of the unclaimed bodies were Chinese nationals, and questioned why “most of the guys who come here [from China] do drugs.” Though China executes more drug offenders than any other country overall, drug cases most likely involve seizures and arrests rather than extrajudicial killings. Though the director-general of China’s Ministry of Public Security’s narcotics control bureau has stated that “we are willing to take all kinds of measures to combat drugs together,” just how far is China willing to go in its support of Duterte’s gruesome offensive? 3. Pakistani hotlines outdo hospitals in targeting dengue. A recent Science Advances study in Pakistan reveals that triage hotlines are far more effective than hospitals in forecasting outbreaks of infectious diseases such as dengue. Dengue, a mosquito-borne tropical virus, is typically found in urban and semi-urban areas and causes flu-like symptoms that occasionally lead to fatal complications, particularly among children. While there is no treatment, early detection and access to care reduces fatality rates to under 1 percent. The Pakistani researchers observed 300,000 calls to a health hotline in Lahore over a period of two years, where patients were asked to provide their symptoms and addresses. Using this information, epidemiologists were able to accurately predict dengue patient numbers in ten municipal sub-regions two to three weeks in advance of an outbreak. They then dispatched mosquito-control teams to targeted neighborhoods, rather than randomly dispersing them across the city of ten million people. This research will prove particularly helpful following a 2011 outbreak of dengue in Punjab that caused 21,000 infections and 350 deaths. 4. Bangladesh court charges forty-one in Rana Plaza case. Three years after a garment factory collapse in Dhaka that resulted in over 1,100 deaths, a court formally charged thirty-eight people with murder and three with helping the factory owner, and principal accused, escape after the incident. Bangladesh, the world’s second-largest garment exporter, relies on garments for about 80 percent of its exports and four million jobs. The collapse of the eight-story complex sparked demands for greater workplace safety across the globe and put pressure on foreign companies importing from Bangladesh to act. The industry has since recovered following a period of factory closures and reassessments, but the terrorist attack in Dhaka’s diplomatic enclave earlier this month has reignited concerns over the industry’s future. Questions also remain over the progress made to improve worker safety and rights. 5. Baidu again under investigation. Following an investigative report published last weekend, sponsored search results at Baidu, China’s largest search engine provider, have again come under scrutiny. According to the Beijing News, illegal ads for online gambling sites appear in Baidu search results late at night, but not during the day. The paper claims that Baidu has received nearly $45,000 in revenue for these ads, which were registered through third-party advertising agencies and spoofed real companies which do not provide gambling services, and are thus legally allowed to advertise online (gambling is illegal in China). China’s top internet regulator is investigating the incident and state media issued a flurry of articles condemning the company. Baidu has been under scrutiny since earlier this year, when it was revealed that ads on the service for a shady state-run medical clinic offering fake treatments played a role in the death of a college student. Bonus: KFC at center of dispute over disputing South China Sea dispute decision. As Chinese media ramped up criticism of last week’s decision on the status of South China Sea features by a United Nations tribunal and claimed the whole incident had been orchestrated by the United States, protests targeting Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) outlets as a symbol of the United States appeared in several Chinese cities this week. However, authorities were quick to shut down the demonstrations, arresting organizers, blocking the term “KFC” on social media, and ordering news outlets to “not hype… illegal rallies and demonstrations.” State media also criticized the protesters, calling them unpatriotic and pointing out that KFCs in China employ Chinese people. And the Communist Youth League urged patriotic youth to stay home and post anti-U.S. memes online rather than demonstrating in the streets.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound July 22, 2016 Asia Unbound