Security Alliances

On January 5, President Barack Obama initiated the Defense Strategy Review, identifying Asia as a priority in future U.S. military strategy. North Korea's nuclear proliferation and China's growing military capabilities suggest new challenges for Washington. But the United States is now in an era of fiscal austerity. The debt ceiling deal worked out last August requires that nearly $500 billion be cut from projected defense spending over the next decade. To succeed, U.S. strategy in Asia will by necessity depend heavily on its allies. None will matter more than Japan. Yet U.S. strategic dialogue with Japan remains underdeveloped. Although the two governments produced a set of Common Strategic Objectives in 2005 and again in 2011, plans to realign U.S. and Japanese forces remain unfinished due to political tensions surrounding one base, Futenma Marine Air Station, in Okinawa. Political change in Tokyo not only exacerbated contention over Futenma but also delayed Japan's own national defense planning process. U.S.-Japan military cooperation after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan demonstrated the strength of this alliance. However, a sustained and serious conversation between security planners in Washington and Tokyo about the changing Asian security environment is long overdue. The United States and Japan should now look ahead to consider how to leverage their capabilities. It would be a grave mistake to allow budget cuts to devolve into the tensions over "burden sharing" that plagued the U.S.-Japan alliance in the past. Washington and Tokyo cannot afford to sit back and allow fiscal constraints to dictate their alliance planning. In today's Asia, the strategic challenges are too compelling and complex. The time has come to set priorities for military missions and to invest in the capabilities needed to accomplish them. Given the repeated tensions in Northeast Asia, the United States and Japan should formalize mechanisms for crisis-management coordination. Finally, the alliance should have a long-term basing strategy that consolidates U.S. and Japanese facilities. A Mission-Oriented Assessment The United States and Japan should concentrate on recent defense and disaster threats as they consider alliance priorities. Last year, the U.S. and Japanese militaries deployed together for the first time in response to the earthquake and tsunami disasters. While the two forces performed well together, the opportunity for real-time mobilization revealed areas where greater integration of command and communications systems could benefit both allies. Even before last year's natural disaster struck, both countries recognized their defense readiness deserved greater attention in light of Northeast Asia's changing security environment. This region has had its share of crises of late, with the provocations on the Korean peninsula in 2010 and the tensions between Japan and China over the Chinese fishing trawler in waters close to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Japan's ability to manage the consequences of Pyongyang's missile and nuclear proliferation are again being tested with the upcoming missile launch. More broadly, the United States and Japan should have a better understanding of how China's maritime activities, especially in the East China Sea, affect the efficacy of alliance defense cooperation. Three alliance missions should be given priority in a U.S.-Japan strategic review. The first two derive from the changes ongoing in Northeast Asia and have direct consequences for Japan's defense: ballistic missile defense (BMD) and maritime security. Defense against North Korean provocations is already a priority for the alliance, and it should continue to be so. The BMD mission offers several benefits for better allied defense cooperation: it has realized the benefits of shared research and development, it has encouraged a considerable enhancement in Japan's capabilities, and it has prompted Japanese officials to seriously rethink their command requirements in the case of an attack. In 2005, Japan passed a law clarifying the civilian and uniformed roles in the command and control of BMD operations. In the spring of 2009, Japan's defense minister implemented these new rules of engagement by giving the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) commander final discretion to respond to the North Korean missile test. U.S. and Japanese militaries both performed well in this first BMD operation. April's satellite launch provides the opportunity for developing an alliance crisis response plan that could strengthen the performance of missile defense in the face of increasing North Korean conventional and nuclear capabilities. A second defense priority for the alliance is to clarify the division of labor for shared maritime security missions. China's growing maritime capabilities could ultimately deny the United States access to waters shared by Beijing and Tokyo, thereby impinging on Washington's ability to assist in Japan's defense. The East China Sea merits particular attention, and the September 2010 incident provides impetus for a deeper U.S.-Japan discussion of how military cooperation could be enhanced and respective missions clarified. Already, Japan's 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines identify intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as top priorities in response to conspicuous Chinese activities in Japan's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. But maritime cooperation between the United States and Japan extends far beyond the East China Sea. Maintaining open sea lanes is a critical need for Japan, and sea-lane defense out to one thousand nautical miles has long been a declared goal. China's expanding naval reach poses new challenges for Japan's Maritime SDF and other Asian nations. Tokyo and Washington should consider how they can work jointly with other partners in Southeast and South Asia to maintain freedom of navigation. Finally, as last year's SDF and U.S. military relief operations demonstrated, the U.S.-Japan alliance can offer the Asia-Pacific region significant humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) experience and capabilities. Asia suffers from a precarious ecology, and the SDF's disaster response expertise makes it a powerful regional asset. Likewise, the U.S. capacity to offer assistance quickly rests not only on its military capabilities, but also on its growing experience with HA/DR in the region. The December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami alerted many across the region of the need for greater attention to planning for these contingencies and developing coalitions that could work effectively. A "lessons learned" assessment of U.S.-Japan capabilities would enhance defense preparedness as well as identify opportunities for regional collaboration and cooperation. The experience of the 2004-2005 Core Group (United States, India, Japan, and Australia) in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami is a valuable reference. Base Integration as a Strategic Investment A future U.S.-Japan alliance strategy cannot stop at force posture adjustments. It should address the long-term sustainability of U.S. forces deployed in Japan. Protracted political tensions over U.S. military bases not only interfere with strategic cooperation; they are also costly. The alliance cannot afford another decade-and-a-half stalemate over relocating one base. Recent efforts to adjust the relocation plan for the U.S. Marines in Okinawa are a step in the right direction, but what is really needed is a plan that will fundamentally alter the basis of the U.S. military presence in Japan. The basing structure for U.S. forces in Japan no longer reflects contemporary political realities, and it is time to bring U.S. forward-deployed forces into twenty-first-century Asia. Almost sixty-seven years ago, U.S. forces arrived in Japan to occupy what were once Japanese Imperial military bases. Today, those American bases create an impression of extraterritoriality that weakens public support for the alliance. In Okinawa, especially, the public's tolerance for the concentrated presence of U.S. bases has declined visibly despite Tokyo's efforts to increase economic benefits to host communities. Dispersing U.S. forces to more locales on the main islands of Japan would go a long way to easing political pressures. The separation of U.S. and SDF forces no longer makes operational sense either. The U.S. government should explore with Japan how U.S. forces might collocate with their Japanese SDF partners, and how base consolidation for U.S. forces in Japan can be a process that includes consolidation options with SDF and when appropriate, civilian facilities. Japan's SDF today has broad public support and strong community relations, and the two militaries should become more integrated in order to work as partners in facing the new challenges of BMD and maritime cooperation. Three considerations should guide the U.S.-Japan base review: the degree of interoperability required for alliance missions, the amount of cost-cutting that can be accomplished, and how joint management of U.S.-SDF bases can be achieved. The U.S. experience in Europe, especially in Germany, and in domestic base consolidation plans that have emerged from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure effort offer a menu of precedent from which to consider more advantageous cost-sharing agreements. In addition to joint service management practices, civil-military use of airfields should be considered. The SDF already uses this model in Japan. Japan's regional airports are vastly underutilized, and could be beneficial as the two allies consider a more dispersed U.S. military presence. Japan in U.S.-Asia Strategy The U.S. emphasis on a renewed strategic commitment to Asia signals the opportunity to identify priorities and share resources with its allies. To succeed, U.S. strategy should do more than simply define the scope and size of forces deployed in the region. If the U.S.-Japan alliance is to play an effective role, Washington and Tokyo should have an honest dialogue on how to best develop alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. The SDF, along with other allied militaries, depend on the United States to assist in their nation's defense. Japan has much at stake, and thus should play an assertive role in the development of this new strategic vision. Washington and Tokyo need a practical, operational vision for their military cooperation. Tokyo will need to consider how it wants to organize its strategic planning to better incorporate the alliance, and Washington will need to articulate how Japan factors into its new Asia strategy. A more sophisticated strategic conversation between the United States and Japan is long overdue. The U.S.-Japan alliance should become a more effective instrument in shaping Asia's future.

Republic of Korea (ROK) president Lee Myung-bak arrived in Washington this week for a state visit with President Barack Obama. This U.S.-ROK summit meeting comes as the legislatures of both countries are in the final stages of approving the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS-FTA). The ratification of the KORUS-FTA takes on particular importance as an affirmation of the relationship in light of strategic challenges the U.S.-ROK alliance will face in 2012 and beyond. With presidential elections in Russia, Taiwan, the United States, and South Korea, as well as the leadership transitions taking place in China and North Korea, 2012 may bring unprecedented changes that seriously affect Northeast Asian security dynamics. With the threat of a double-dip global economic recession on the horizon, a strong, comprehensive, and future-oriented alliance is needed as the security linchpin for the region. One of President Obama's primary security objectives is to build stronger alliances with Asian and European countries, and he has made concrete progress with Seoul. The two sides have stepped up joint military drills and boosted the deterrent power Washington extends to its allies in the region. They have also agreed to postpone the date of the transfer of wartime operational control from 2012 to 2015. Strong U.S. support played a decisive role in South Korea becoming the host nation for the 2010 G20 Summit and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. The allies have collaborated as indispensable partners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world to further global peace and security. The U.S.-ROK alliance has grown beyond a traditional security relationship and now encompasses shared political, economic, and cultural values. However, the alliance still faces several significant challenges: North Korea, domestic politics, economics, and geopolitics. The North Korean threat continues to be the fundamental basis for the security relationship. Yet the growing unconventional nature of this threat (i.e., nuclear program, military provocations, and chemical/biological weapons) challenges efforts to find coordinated solutions to these problems. Even though the two governments have closely coordinated their policies toward North Korea in recent years, it is inevitable that one or the other is likely to be more hard-line vis-à-vis North Korea. The serious nature of the threat and the increasing frequency and severity of North Korean provocations make it even more necessary to build a stronger comprehensive security alliance, one that assures deterrence and can effectively deal with proliferation issues (i.e., North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Myanmar). The dilemma of strongly reacting to North Korean intransigence on the one hand and containing the possibility of conflict escalation on the other constitutes a particular challenge for U.S.-ROK alliance coordination. Another facet of the North Korea problem is the possibility of a "contingency" that may result from an implosion or some other case of serious instability there and require the intervention of outsiders. Given the combination of the North Korean arsenal that includes both nuclear weapons and missiles, and the possibility of a humanitarian disaster, the allies must prepare for a possible contingency situation in North Korea, including policy coordination regarding the necessity, feasibility, desirability, and nature of their intervention. This scenario will also require consultation, understanding, and coordination with other powers such as China, Russia, and Japan. A second challenge for the U.S.-ROK alliance is domestic politics. Even though support levels for the U.S.-ROK alliance have been climbing in both countries, some people/experts/parts of the public still have doubts about the need for the alliance, and the cost of maintaining it may be deemed too high. In South Korea, depending on various circumstances, anti-American and anti-alliance sentiments may flare up again. In the United States, the U.S.-ROK alliance could become the unintended victim of a budget squeeze and/or isolationist sentiments arising there. The third challenge is the budget problem that arises in an atmosphere of fiscal constraint. Both countries, but particularly the United States, are facing economic and financial difficulties. Belt-tightening military budgets are inevitable. This situation will force both sides to deal with issues of cost-sharing and securing resources for military hardware as well as financing the planned relocation of U.S. troops in South Korea. Finally, there is the geopolitical challenge posed by a "rising China." In the past, China saw a strong relationship between South Korea and the United States as desirable because it helped prevent a Japanese military buildup. But in recent years, China has exhibited misgivings over South Korea's close alliance with the United States, especially regarding naval exercises in the Yellow Sea and the augmentation of South Korean military capabilities. The Republic of Korea and the United States must convince China that their alliance will actually be in China's interest by promoting the security, stability, and prosperity of the region. Though China wants North Korea denuclearized and the Korean Peninsula free of military conflict, it would also like to keep the North Korean regime afloat. Its collapse, China believes, could mean instability on the Korean Peninsula, the outflow of North Korean refugees into northeastern China, and the loss of what China considers a buffer separating it from U.S.-friendly South Korea. China in recent years has been playing a dual role, shielding North Korea diplomatically and aiding it economically while restraining it from further provocative actions and inducing it to return to the Six Party Talks. The United States and South Korea must persuade China to apply greater pressure on North Korea to denuclearize and refrain from military provocations. In sum, to build a stronger alliance that will lay the cornerstone of peace and security in Northeast Asia in 2012 and beyond, President Lee and President Obama must tackle several difficult challenges. They should form working groups or initiate dialogues where solutions and specific steps for implementation can be formulated. Both sides must recognize and expand on their mutual interests, since shared values are as important as geopolitical interests in sustaining the alliance. Seoul and Washington should let shared values like democracy, prosperity, peace, and security—globally as well as regionally—serve as strong foundations for the further development of the alliance.