Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament

Iran

Next Steps for U.S.-Iran Relations

Experts discuss U.S.-Iran relations in the aftermath of Iran's February parliamentary elections and as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program begins to come into effect.

Event with Philip H. Gordon, Suzanne Maloney and Michael Singh March 17, 2016
Global

Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism: A Conversation With Sam Nunn

Sam Nunn discusses preventing catastrophic nuclear terrorism.

Event with Sam Nunn and Mary Ann Peters March 17, 2016
Human Rights

“Closing that Internet Up”: The Rise of Cyber Repression

Brandon Valeriano is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, and author of Cyber War versus Cyber Realities on Oxford University Press. Allison Pytlak is a policy and advocacy specialist at Control Arms. Donald Trump calls for “closing that Internet up” due to the rise of Islamic extremism, Hillary Clinton says the same thing, just a bit more diplomatically, asking the great disrupters to go to work disrupting the so-called Islamic State. Given that it is impossible to shut down the Internet in the United States, even if Russian submarines were to cut transatlantic cables, this move by Trump to enter the arena of information security demonstrates one of the most pernicious challenges in our digital era: the rise of cyber repression. Even the New York Times is exploring challenging the First Amendment in the age of digital extremism, which suggests Trump’s ideas are not at all fringe. While the actions of the Islamic State and other malicious actors online pose security problems, especially in their ability help recruit and promote offensive ideologies, the rush to react to this threat may harm civil liberties, or as Trump says “oh freedom of speech, freedom of speech.” The great hope of the Internet as a path to digital freedom has quickly given way to the reality of the structural control imposed by states on activists in cyberspace. The danger posed by digital threats is not severe enough to warrant a challenge the freedoms and liberties inherent in Western political ideologies. There has been a precipitous rise in malicious hacking but it is not exhibited between states, rather it is from within them by governments seeking to maintain control over their populations. There is increasing utilization of cyber technology to silence dissent, often in direct contradiction with human rights law. The dramatic rise of digital control by the state is a development that has been relatively overlooked by both mainstream media and the United Nations compared to the concern exhibited for the as of yet mythical cyberwar. The latest Citizen Lab report exposes the efforts of an espionage team named Packrat to silence dissent in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Argentina. The group used malware, phishing and disinformation, even going so far as to threaten an investigator looking into their activities. The scope, funding, and targets suggest this group is either directed or serves as a proxy for state interests. The story of Hacking Team, which made headlines earlier this year, also illustrates the ability of governments to use malicious code to target activists. Based in Italy, Hacking Team is an information technology company that sells intrusion and surveillance capabilities to governments, law enforcement agencies, and corporations. While it claims to not sell to governments with poor human rights records, evidence from a counter hack points to the contrary. Hacking Team software was found on the office computers of Mamfakinch, an award-winning Moroccan news website that is critical of the Moroccan government. The Hacking Team’s products have also surfaced in Ethiopia, a country notorious for its repression and strict governmental control over all channels of communications, as well as in Sudan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Digital tools clearly have as much potential for harm as good because governments, with their many resources, can leverage these tools to suppress dissent as described. As well, the ability of social media to facilitate rapid organization or protest, or to share video or photo footage is tremendous but not foolproof. Governments have been known to respond to digitally organized protests with traditional weapons. For example, agents of the Thai government killed dozens of protesters after the Red Shirt uprising, which was coordinated largely via Twitter. There are similar examples from Iran and Belarus. This kind of digital repression may not seem as dire, dramatic, or tragic as other crimes that occur regularly against civilians, but it does constitute a human rights violation. This is largely based in Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” The question then is, what must be done to help activism flourish and protect civil liberties? The first step should be collect better data to obtain a realistic picture of how and when cyber repression happens. Valeriano and Maness catalog attacks between states but now the focus must shift towards collecting data on domestic attacks perpetrated by states and their proxies. Data collection should start with defining a list of actions that constitute cyber repression, the perpetrator, target, degree of severity, goal of operation, and method of attack. This goes beyond Freedom on the Net’s ranking of countries based on Internet openness or the former OpenNet Initiative’s measuring of information controls, instead we must catalog specific abuses and methods. Once this information is collected, like any human rights abuse, action can be taken. Parties cannot be credibly named and shamed without evidence. Repression by digital means deserves attention and action. Our future is not one of constant cyber war between countries, tracing dots as they bounce around the digital map between countries, but rather one of digital violence and repression directed at both internal and external enemies. To address digital repression, we first need better awareness of the extent of the problem, followed by actions seeking to end the harm. This is a call for a control over the digital arms of repressive regimes, and the need to construct a digital society that even Russia, China, and the United States could agree to.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Net Politics January 13, 2016 Net Politics

North Korea

The Logic of North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

Despite North Korea’s defiance of international censure and sanctions, revived diplomacy is the best path to curb its nuclear program, says CFR’s Amy J. Nelson.

Interview with Amy J. Nelson and CFR.org Editors January 12, 2016
North Korea

Time for a New Approach in U.S.-North Korea Relations

Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities LLC and Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. The opinions expressed in this piece are solely his own. He can be followed on Twitter at @jameslee004. As the United States has normalized relations with Cuba and signed the Iran nuclear deal and as Myanmar successfully held elections leading to a peaceful transfer of power, only North Korea remains a pariah state isolated from the outside world. Yet, the current U.S. policy of insisting on North Korea to take concrete steps toward denuclearization as a precondition for talks has been a failure. While talks with Pyongyang have been frozen, the Kim Jong-un regime has made significant progress in its nuclear and missile programs. It is high time for U.S. President Barack Obama, now in his last year in office, to try a new approach and reach out to Pyongyang, which, likewise, needs to adopt a new approach. Some may claim the futility of negotiating with North Korea, arguing that the Obama administration already reached out to Pyongyang more than once, including with the 2012 “leap day” agreement, only to be “burned” by the Kim regime’s failure to honor its part of the bargain. However, giving up on diplomacy after a few failures may be giving up too easily. If the United States had taken the same approach toward Iran and Cuba, the recent breakthroughs may never have happened. Success requires persistence and learning from repeated "failures" before factors align in the right configuration. Given its opacity, the North Korean regime might or might not be undergoing political or economic changes from within—factors that were absent during the previous rounds of negotiations. The United States will never find out unless it reaches out to North Korea, and Washington has nothing to lose from doing so. Moreover, improved relations with Pyongyang might even lead to reforms and openings in North Korea. North Korea, on its part, must realize that its nuclear and missile buildup accompanied by threats to strike the United States is dangerous. Given the current trajectory of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, Washington might one day come under pressure to pursue a radical approach—even military action—toward Pyongyang. For the United States, a saber-rattling North Korea getting closer to obtaining a nuclear second-strike capability against the U.S. homeland could potentially be an inflection point: Washington could let this happen or take action to prevent Pyongyang from achieving such a capability. Hence, if North Korea seeks to ensure regime survival, it must show a willingness to curb its nuclear and missile ambitions. Pyongyang should realize that denuclearization is necessary for improved relations with the United States, without which North Korea cannot hope to attract Western investment, reduce its dependence on China, and achieve satisfactory economic progress. Pyongyang needs to learn from Cuba, Iran, and Myanmar that doing business with the United States works and that greater opening to the outside world is in its own self-interest. At the practical level, a way out of the current impasse may be for both Pyongyang and Washington to return to the Six Party Talks, moribund since 2009, with more flexibility in negotiating stances. While Pyongyang’s denuclearization rightly should remain Washington’s top priority, the United States should consider restarting the talks without strict preconditions if North Korea signals more interest in denuclearization, even if Pyongyang does not explicitly commit to denuclearization. North Korea and the United States can signal their intentions to each other, either through official and direct or unofficial and indirect channels, in a mutually face-saving manner. In the recent example with Cuba, the Pope apparently played a behind-the-scenes role as the mediator. With the U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s, the ping-pong diplomacy and the secret behind-the-scenes work by Henry Kissinger and others played a role. Another reason for restarting talks with North Korea is that establishment of dialogue and channels of communication are critical in preventing and managing a crisis, if for no other reason than to avert miscalculation and unintended escalation. One reason the Cold War did not end with a nuclear calamity was because the United States and the Soviet Union, despite all their differences, kept channels of dialogue—including a hotline—open between each other. With U.S.-North Korea relations as well, channels of communication are necessary to prevent the two sides’ “mini-Cold War” from turning into a “hot” war. Time is rapidly running out for both the United States and North Korea to prevent the current situation from turning into a more severe crisis. Resolving the current standoff will probably become more difficult after Obama leaves office, as the next administration, no matter who wins the 2016 presidential election, is likely to be more hardline in its foreign and defense policy. North Korea should take advantage of the current window of opportunity by coming back to the negotiating table. At the same time, for pragmatic voices to eclipse the hardliners in Pyongyang, Washington needs to do more to assure the North Koreans of its peaceful intentions and its willingness to become a trusted partner in Pyongyang’s economic development so as to end this perilous confrontation.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound December 31, 2015 Asia Unbound
International Organizations

2016: Seven Summits to Watch

From the breakthrough at the Paris climate change conference to the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals at the UN General Assembly, summits in 2015 heralded major progress in international cooperation. As we ring in the New Year, it’s time to look at what lies ahead for global summitry. In the latest Council of Councils Global Memo, I preview the seven summits that deserve your attention in 2016: 1. The Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, DC, March 31–April 1) 2. UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (New York, April 19–21) 3. World Humanitarian Summit (Istanbul, May 23–24) 4. Group of Seven Summit (Shima, May 26–27) 5. Group of Twenty Summit (Hangzhou, September 4–5) 6. Habitat III (Quito, October 17–20) 7. Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Marrakech, November 7–18) To learn why these summits made the cut, check out the Global Memo.

Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick December 30, 2015 The Internationalist

Pakistan

Why a “Nuclear Deal” With Pakistan Is Not Realistic, Timely, or Wise

Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia Daniel S. Markey discussed the ramifications of a potential civil nuclear agreement with Pakistan. He concluded that pursuing a nuclear deal with Pakistan at this time is unrealistic, poorly timed, and unwise. Main Takeaways: Not only is the discussion surrounding a nuclear deal poorly timed, it would be more likely to prove counterproductive to other near term U.S. security interests. Pakistan is unlikely to agree to any deal that limits the future growth of its nuclear program, as there is nothing Washington can offer that would make Islamabad take steps it believes are contrary to vital national security interests. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has always been justified as a deterrent against Indian aggression, and there is no indication that Pakistan’s military leadership is inclined to place voluntary limits on the growth of its nuclear program. India, as a rising power, is expanding its military to compete not only with Islamabad but also with Beijing, and this triangular security dilemma between China, India, and Pakistan favors persistent competition, most of all by the weakest player. These more pressing, non-nuclear concerns for U.S. policymakers include the Pakistani military’s selective targeting of militant and terrorist groups, the Islamabad’s commitment to advancing any “reconciliation” process with the Afghan Taliban, continually troubled relations with India, and ongoing counterterror and counterinsurgency campaigns inside Pakistan.

Testimony by Daniel S. Markey December 9, 2015
North Korea

U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Weighing the Urgent, the Important, and the Feasible

It is easy to become frustrated as one reviews the inventory of seemingly failed or inadequate policy recommendations for how the United States might more effectively deal with North Korea. But frustration cannot be allowed to turn into fatalism, and important interests should not fester unattended until they metastasize into an even larger problem that will inevitably require even more dramatic, bold, and costly responses. North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons capabilities continue unchecked and complicate both military and diplomatic options for pursuing denuclearization. Michel Wallerstein showcases a clear inventory of North Korea’s continued efforts and the limited policy options for the United States, as do a range of papers for the Johns Hopkins University SAIS U.S.-Korea Institute’s nuclear futures project. The inventory of possible measures for dealing with North Korea at this stage fall into four main categories: 1) The squeezers, who hope that tougher sanctions will force North Korea to give up its nuclear capabilities. For instance, Sue Terry, writing for the National Bureau of Asian Research, recommends that the United States “double down on sanctions by enforcing against North Korea the kind of sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table.” This approach mirrors the intent of several sanctions bills under consideration in the U.S. Congress. 2) The China firsters, who anticipate that private Chinese expressions of disgust and frustration with North Korea can be integrated into China’s official policy and be leveraged to achieve a grand bargain that results in the elimination of the North Korean threat, either through Chinese acceptance of Korean unification or replacement of the Kim Jong-un regime with a North Korean leadership that respects the boundaries imposed by China’s strategic interests. For instance, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has advocated that Beijing and Washington reach strategic consensus on Korean reunification. There is a broad consensus on the need to work with China in the U.S. policy community, but there is disagreement on what could realistically be achieved with such an approach. 3) The saboteurs, who hope to take advantage of North Korea’s pursuit of provocations, nuclear tests, and human rights violations to undermine international and domestic support for the Kim regime. Harvard University’s Jieun Baek argues for a combination of covert information operations to collaborate with internal dissidents, strengthening of nongovernmental organizations that train North Korean refugees in information dissemination and business skills, and training of North Korean defectors in journalism, information technology, and social media. There is also the temptation to weaken North Korea’s legitimacy through naming and shaming regarding the country’s human rights failings as exposed by the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean human rights. 4) Re-engagers, who see continued dialogue with North Korea as an essential step in “probing North Korea’s intentions.” A variant of this view recognizes that in the face of the seemingly impossible dream of denuclearization, the United States should open up dialogue with North Korea on other issues where there is a chance of constructive dialogue. Doug Bandow at the Cato Institute wants the United States to withdraw and empower the South Koreans to take the lead in dealing with the North, while Adam Mount and Van Jackson support a U.S.-ROK alliance-backed “South Korea first” policy in pursuit of dialogue with North Korea. Most analysts pursue a combination strategy that employs all four levers to bring North Korea to denuclearize. In its policy of deterrence, pressure, and dialogue, the Barack Obama administration’s approach contains these elements, but thus far, not in a combination or weight that has been sufficient to make progress. My Policy Innovation Memorandum also seeks to strengthen both sanctions and engagement, but with a twist: why not take steps both to shape the environment so that North Korea recognizes that it must make a strategic choice and develop the benefits of such a choice with greater specificity, both through concrete studies of what North Korea can gain economically from integration and from development by the five parties in Six Party Talks (absent North Korea) of the tangible benefits that would accrue from a sincere return to the “action-for-action” approach that initially characterized the Six Party Process. Resuming Six Party Talks without North Korea would have two important effects. It would spell out publicly the tangible benefits that would accompany denuclearization so as to stimulate a more active debate over denuclearization among Pyongyang’s elites, and it would provide a benchmark by defining a reasonable consensus among North Korea’s neighbors on the benefits that should rightfully accrue from denuclearization. Some may argue that this proposal sounds like a last ditch strategy; others may prefer a different combination of the options outlined above. But one thing is sure: when North Korea’s nuclear weapons problem metastasizes from an important issue into an urgent issue, there will be even fewer feasible options available for consideration.

Blog Post by Scott A. Snyder November 19, 2015 Asia Unbound
North Korea

Addressing North Korea’s Nuclear Problem

Since defecting from Six Party negotiations on denuclearization in 2008, North Korea has pursued nuclear development unchecked by international constraints. Barack Obama's administration has demanded that Pyongyang make a strategic choice to denuclearize and tried to build a regional consensus opposing North Korea's nuclear efforts, but it has been unable to halt the country's nuclear weapons development. Instead, North Korea's continued nuclear and missile development is designed to force U.S. policymakers to make an undesirable choice: either acquiesce to the reality of a nuclear North Korea or mobilize international support for the destabilization of the North Korean regime. To stop the North Korean nuclear threat, the United States should take three steps. First, Washington should increase pressure on Pyongyang so that the regime recognizes its existential choice between survival and nuclear status. Second, the United States should pursue five-party talks (Six Party framework members minus North Korea) to develop a viable pathway for North Korea to survive and benefit from denuclearization. Such a regionally supported consensus on a route to denuclearization would seek to induce a debate inside North Korea regarding the costs and benefits of its pursuit of nuclear status. And third, the United States should encourage China and Russia to withdraw political support for and increase pressure on North Korea until the regime commits to denuclearization. North Korea's Rising International Threat Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, he has used nuclear weapons development—a legacy of his father's rule—as a pillar of the regime's national strategy. In addition to expanding its nuclear strike capabilities by conducting nuclear and missile tests, North Korea has also built a light-water nuclear reactor and uranium enrichment facility and restarted its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, enabling the country to slowly build its nuclear fuel stockpile. Recent estimates suggest that North Korea's nuclear weapons stockpile comprises ten to sixteen nuclear weapons, and could grow rapidly by 2020 to a low-end estimate of twenty weapons and a high-end estimate of 125 weapons. In the future, North Korea might also consider selling excess nuclear fuel or devices to earn money for its economic development, which would expand the risk of proliferation. North Korea has procured a mobile launch capability for its untested long-range (7,500 km) KN-08 missile, reducing time available to respond to a North Korean missile launch. In May, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile and to have mastered the miniaturization technologies needed to place a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense's 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review estimates that a North Korean Taepodong-2 rocket "could reach the United States with a nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]." The Costs of Continued Nuclear Development North Korea's nuclear development enhances its capacity to credibly threaten its neighbors and the United States with a nuclear strike, as well as to survive one. Although nuclear use would likely result in massive retaliation and the end of the regime, it complicates allied planning for conventional war, expands North Korea's capability to threaten both South Korea and Japan, and raises potential doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. The North Korean leadership has historically exploited geopolitical fault lines, blackmailing patrons to ensure regime survival. Acquiescence to North Korea as a nuclear weapons state will erode the credibility of the global nonproliferation regime. North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985 before it formally withdrew in 2003, when it publicly pursued nuclear weapons development. Hence, North Korea may serve as an example to other nuclear aspirants that it is possible to outwit and outwait the global commitment to nonproliferation. Most worrisome is that North Korea under Kim Jong-un has pursued a policy of diplomatic self-isolation while ramping up vituperative accusations and threats of preemption toward its neighbors, including U.S. ally South Korea. North Korea has distanced itself from China and rejected Russian invitations to participate in a May 2015 summit in Moscow. Pyongyang's nuclear development has reportedly emerged as a stumbling block in its diplomatic relations with both Beijing and Moscow. The absence of communication channels with Kim Jong-un raises the risk of North Korean miscalculation or false assumptions regarding the likely international response to North Korea's nuclear pursuits. These signals, combined with Pyongyang's growing capability to act on threats, have increased the need for coordinated action based on the international consensus that the potentially disruptive pariah state should be reined in. Recommendations To address the risk that a self-isolated and risk-tolerant North Korean leadership might follow through on its threats when it achieves these capabilities, the United States should redouble efforts to lead coordinated multilateral action to oppose North Korea's nuclear status, while still leaving a denuclearized North Korea a route for regime survival. A coordinated international effort should demonstrate that there are tangible prospects for regime survival in a denuclearized North Korea in order to prompt an internal debate among leadership in Pyongyang over the merits of its nuclear program. The United States should take the following measures to achieve this objective: The Obama administration should apply increased political and economic pressure on North Korea to convince its leaders that a nuclear North Korea is a dead-end option. The United States should work with its allies to expand sanctions to target businesses and banks that refuse to cease cooperation with North Korea. At the same time, the United States and its allies should emphasize to Pyongyang that expanded sanctions will be relieved if North Korea takes meaningful, concrete steps toward denuclearization, such as resuming cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by allowing the return of international inspectors to the country. The United States should also remind North Korea that military provocations risk escalation that could lead to the country's demise. Alongside these sanctions, the United States and South Korea should commission the World Bank to identify sectoral trade and investment opportunities best suited to yield concrete economic benefits that would accompany North Korea's integration into the region. The objective of such an approach would be to spell out the benefits to North Korea of denuclearization, integration, and peaceful coexistence in conjunction with strengthened sanctions. The U.S. and South Korean presidents should leverage an emerging debate within the Chinese government about North Korea's strategic value and press Chinese President Xi Jinping to strengthen Chinese sanctions on North Korea, even at the risk of inducing North Korean instability. To convince Beijing to take such a course, U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-hye should pledge that no U.S. troops would be permanently stationed north of the 38th parallel in the event of a North Korean collapse. At the same time, the two leaders should note that Korean reunification would allow for the reduction in the overall number of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula while affirming that the U.S.-South Korea alliance will remain strong even after unification. In return for Chinese cooperation to enhance pressure on North Korea, the United States should respond to China's long-standing calls for resumption of North Korea-focused diplomacy by working with the other five parties in the Six Party Talks to develop detailed measures to peacefully pursue a transformation of the North Korean regime. The parties should recognize that forcible regime change would be the only remaining means to achieve denuclearization if North Korea fails to accept these measures. The parties would spell out a detailed pathway to peaceful coexistence, denuclearization, diplomatic normalization, and improved internal governance. The purpose of this process would be twofold: to establish a coordination mechanism that enables the United States and its allies to address Chinese and Russian geopolitical concerns surrounding North Korea in exchange for increased pressure on the North Korean leadership, and to induce a policy debate among North Korean leaders regarding the value of its nuclear program. The United States and South Korea should strengthen deterrence against North Korean military provocations at the demilitarized zone and the Northern Limit Line by coming up with a detailed escalation ladder comprising tailored responses to match different types and levels of provocations. U.S. and South Korean forces should also design a clear protocol for officers on the ground to implement these responses swiftly, in consultation with senior officials. To counter North Korea's growing missile capabilities, the United States and South Korea should obtain appropriate defense mechanisms such as the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD). Conclusion A U.S. strategy designed to induce debates within the North Korean leadership over its current course represents possibly the last chance to redirect a self-isolated North Korea toward peaceful coexistence. If the West acquiesces to North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, the scope and magnitude of North Korean blackmail efforts toward its neighbors will likely intensify; alternatively, it will be necessary to use military force to bring about regime change in order to achieve denuclearization. Given China's interests in stability on the Korean peninsula and its growing reticence to support the regime under Kim Jong-un, pursuit of an internationally coordinated approach that spells out conditions for North Korean regime survival and economic stability should be attractive to Beijing. The risk that increased economic pressure on Pyongyang will induce instability or backlash is relatively small compared to the costs of military conflict, consequences of North Korean nuclear proliferation, or additional military preparations necessary to contain North Korea's nuclear capabilities. The risk of North Korea's increased proliferation by 2020 and its efforts to develop the capability to mount a direct nuclear strike on the United States means that failure to address these developments now will likely require the next U.S. administration to choose among far less palatable options in the face of an even more serious North Korean crisis.

Policy Innovation Memorandum by Scott A. Snyder November 19, 2015
Asia

Southern Asia’s Nuclear Powers

China, India, and Pakistan have relatively small but growing nuclear arms programs. This nuclear competition is raising concern because of long-simmering tensions and a lack of efforts at minimizing the risk posed by these weapons.

Backgrounder by Eleanor Albert November 9, 2015
Iran Nuclear Agreement

Tricky Path for Iran Sanctions

U.S. officials will have to consider the consequences of new sanctions as they weigh how to address Iran’s regional policies without derailing implementation of the nuclear accord, says expert Richard Nephew.

Interview with Richard Nephew and Zachary Laub September 22, 2015
Iran

Iran and the New Middle East in the Aftermath of the Nuclear Agreement

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Ray Takeyh argues that there is precedent for Congress turning down agreements until a better draft is negotiated as in the case of arms control deals between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given the role Congress plays in ensuring that the United States negotiates the best possible agreement, it should aim to do no less with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Takeaways: The Islamic Republic of Iran still behaves internationally as a revolutionary state. As such, ideology remains an important factor in Iranian foreign policy, which also serves a domestic identity. Given that the regime's ideology is religious, it is difficult for Iran to progress into a post-revolutionary state that other non-Western, revolutionary states such as China have managed to do. Today, the guardians of the Islamic Republic see a unique opportunity to project their power in a region beset by unpredictable transitions. The key actors defining Iran’s regional policy are not its urbane diplomats mingling with their Western counterparts in Europe, but the Revolutionary Guards, particularly the famed Quds Brigade. The struggle for supremacy started in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, but has now moved onto Syria. The survival and success of the Assad dynasty is now a central element of Iran’s foreign policy, particularly as hardliners see the attempt to dislodge Assad from power as really an effort to weaken Iran. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, Iran has embarked on a dramatic new mission to project its power into corners of the Middle East in ways that were never possible before. This marks a shift from their traditional foreign policy of sponsoring terrorism and supporting Palestinian rejectionist groups targeting Israel. This foreign policy shift is economically burdensome for Iran. Without an arms control agreement and the financial rewards it will bring—such as sanctions relief, the release of funds entrapped abroad, and new investments—Iran would find it difficult to subsidize this imperial surge. At the same time, Iran will invest a portion of the economic spoils on domestic needs. President Hassan Rouhani belongs to the wing of Iranian politicians that has long been attracted to the so-called China model, whereby a regime purchases domestic consent by providing a measure of economic opportunity to its stifled citizenry. While Iran's small, badly mismanaged economy may not be able to emulate China's authoritarian model successfully, Rouhani needs to ameliorate the misfortunes of some of the regime's constituents. The terms of the impending agreement with Iran offers the Iranian regime all that it wants. The accord would concede a vast enrichment capacity, as well as accepting both a heavy water plant and a well-fortified underground enrichment facility that the United States once vowed to shutter. It would permit an elaborate research and development program while relying on an inspection regime that falls short of indispensable "anytime, anywhere" access. In the meantime, the sanctions architecture will be diminished, and the notion of ever "snapping back" sanctions into place once they are lifted is delusional. And because the agreement itself would be term-limited, there would be no practical limits on Iran’s nuclear ambitions upon its expiration. The agreement will impede the United States' ability to contain Iran if it ultimately also wants to work with it; the notion of constraining Iran has no place in a policy that looks for areas of cooperation between the two states. Moreover, the United States may not have the necessary coercive power to push back against Iran in the wake of this nuclear deal. For future U.S. presidents, the option of applying economic sanctions on Iran as a form of punishment would be removed. Revolutionary regimes, such as Iran, that enter nuclear agreements tend to see them as pathways to asserting power. Today, the Islamic Republic looks upon the United States as a crestfallen imperial state seeking to dispense with its Arab inheritance. In Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's rhetoric, the United States is a declining power that needs an arms control agreement as a means of paving its exit from the Middle East. With Iran's actions and posture suggesting it is about to embark on its own expansive imperial mission, a hegemonic Iran may yet be the most consequential legacy of a nuclear accord. The United States should return to the negotiating table and revisit the agreement's most problematic aspects, including extending the sunset clause, limiting Iran to IR-1 centrifuges, instituting a more intrusive "anytime, anywhere" inspections regime, enforcing similar procedures on uranium and plutonium enrichment, and reducing Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal.

Testimony by Ray Takeyh August 13, 2015
Iran

Assessing the Nuclear Deal with Iran

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Philip Gordon argues that, while the Iran nuclear agreement is not a perfect deal, it is far better than any realistic alternative and Congress should support it. Takeaways: Without the JCPOA we would very quickly face the unpalatable choice between acquiescing to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability or using military force to temporarily stop it. A rejection would result not in Iran agreeing to all our demands or even a "better deal" but the continued expansion of its nuclear program. History suggests that continued economic pressure will not force Iran to agree to everything we might want. Despite harsh sanctions and isolation, North Korea still became a nuclear-weapons state. Crippling sanctions on Iraq still did not lead to Saddam relenting to U.S. demands—even under the threat of invasion. There is no guarantee that even powerful sanctions and the threat of force will lead Iran to eliminate all aspects of its nuclear program, and plenty of reason to think that it will not. It is a fair concern that Iran will use some of the assets it gains from sanctions relief to support its regional foreign policy agenda, which in many ways threatens U.S. partners and interests. But keeping all the current sanctions on Iran and getting a good nuclear deal at the same time was never a realistic option, and the concerns about lifting sanctions would be the same whether the deal allowed Iran to keep 5,000 centrifuges, or zero. Insisting on no sanctions relief would mean no nuclear deal. Through continued and increased military and intelligence support to partners in the region—who collectively spend many times more on defense than Iran does—the United States can continue to contain Iran, just as it did before the international sanctions were put in place. Iran continuing to develop its nuclear program is far more destabilizing to the region—especially if it becomes a nuclear-weapons state. The verification mechanisms in this agreement are extensive, including not just continued monitoring and daily access to declared enrichment facilities but the monitoring of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. To cheat successfully, Iran would have to somehow mine and mill uranium, convert it to gas at an industrial facility, enrich it to weapons grade at a different facility, and successfully develop a covert weaponization program—all without being detected by separate monitoring regimes. Many of the most important restrictions last for a very long time—until 2025 for number of centrifuges; until 2030 for the limited nuclear stockpile; until 2035 for centrifuge production; until 2040 for access to Iran's uranium mines and mills; and indefinitely for adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, and the application of the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which requires access by inspectors to any suspected sites. Iran must prove that its nuclear program is peaceful. If it fails to do so, with this deal the United States will have all of the tools it does now in the future.

Testimony by Philip H. Gordon August 5, 2015 Middle East Program
Iran

On the Iran Nuclear Agreement and its Consequences

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CFR President Richard N. Haass analyzes the nuclear deal with Iran and suggests that any vote by Congress to approve the pact should be linked to legislation or a White House statement that makes clear what the United States would do if there were Iranian non-compliance, what would be intolerable in the way of Iran's long-term nuclear growth, and what the U.S. was prepared to do to counter Iranian threats to U.S. interests and friends in the region. Takeaways: The agreement places significant limits on what Iran is permitted to do in the nuclear realm for the next ten to fifteen years. But these limits, even if respected in full, come at a steep price. The agreement almost certainly facilitates Iran's efforts to promote its national security objectives throughout the region (many of which are inconsistent with our own) over that same period. The agreement does not resolve the problems posed by Iran's actual and potential nuclear capabilities. Many of these problems will become greater as we approach the ten-year point when restrictions on the quantity and quality of centrifuges come to an end and its fifteen-year point, when restrictions pertaining to the quality and quantity of enriched uranium also end. There is understandable concern as to whether Iran will comply with the letter and spirit of the agreement. Compliance cannot be assumed given Iran’s history of misleading the [International Atomic Energy Agency] (IAEA), the lack of sufficient data provided as to Iran's nuclear past, the time permitted Iran to delay access to inspectors after site-specific concerns are raised, and the difficulty likely to be experienced in reintroducing sanctions. My own prediction is that Iran may be tempted to cut corners and engage in retail but not wholesale non-compliance lest it risk the reintroduction of sanctions and/or military attack. I should add that I come to this prediction in part because I believe that Iran benefits significantly from the accord and will likely see it in its own interest to mostly comply. Iran is an imperial power that seeks a major and possibly dominant role in the region. Sanctions relief will give it much greater means to pursue its goals, including helping minority and majority Shiite populations in neighboring countries, arming and funding proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, propping up the government in Damascus, and adding to sectarianism in Iraq by its unconditional support of the government and Shia militias. The agreement could well extend the Syrian civil war, as Iran will have new resources with which to back the Assad government. The United States needs to develop a policy for the region that can deal with a more capable, aggressive Iran. To be more precise, though, it is unrealistic to envision a single or comprehensive U.S. policy for a part of the world that is and will continue to be afflicted by multiple challenges. As I have written elsewhere, the Middle East is in the early throes of what appears to be a modern-day Thirty Years’ War in which politics and religion will fuel conflict within and across boundaries for decades, resulting in a Middle East that looks very different from the one the world has grown familiar with over the past century. The issue before the Congress is not whether the agreement is good or bad, but whether from this point on the United States is better or worse off with it. It needs to be recognized that passage of a resolution of disapproval (presumably overriding a presidential veto) entails several major drawbacks. It would allow Iran to resume nuclear activity in an unconstrained manner, increasing the odds the United States would be faced with a decision – possibly as soon as this year or next – as to whether to tolerate the emergence of a threshold or actual nuclear weapons state or use military force against it. By acting unilaterally at this point, the United States would make itself, rather than Iran, the issue. In this vein, imposing unilateral sanctions would hurt Iran but not enough to make it alter the basics of its nuclear program. Voting the agreement down and calling for a reopening of negotiations with the aim of producing a better agreement is not a real option as there would insufficient international support for so doing. Here, again, the United States would likely isolate itself, not Iran. Voting down the agreement would reinforce questions and doubts around the world as to American political divisions and dysfunction. Reliability and predictability are essential attributes for a great power that must at one and the same time both reassure and deter. The alternative to voting against the agreement is obviously to vote for it. The problem with a simple vote that defeats a resolution of disapproval and that expresses unconditional support of the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] (JCPOA) is that it does not address the serious problems the agreement either exacerbated or failed to resolve. What I would encourage members to explore is whether a vote for the pact (against a resolution of disapproval) could be associated or linked with policies designed to address and compensate for the weaknesses and likely adverse consequences of the agreement. I can imagine such assurances in the form of legislation voted on by the Congress and signed by the president or a communication from the president to the Congress, possibly followed up by a joint resolution. Whatever the form, it would have to deal with either what the United States would not tolerate or what the United States would do in the face of Iranian non-compliance with the recent agreement, Iran’s long-term nuclear growth, and Iranian regional activities.

Testimony by Richard Haass August 4, 2015
Iran Nuclear Agreement

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