Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament

The New Year's Eve Ball in New York City (Mike Segar/Courtesy Reuters). “Summit fatigue” may be widespread, but demands on the world’s leaders just keep growing. Here are a half a dozen major meetings on the global agenda slated for 2012. The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit From March 26 to 27, 2012, President Obama will join more than fifty heads of state and international organizations in Seoul, South Korea to discuss nuclear security—the first follow up to his historic Washington summit of April 2010. The specter of instability in North Korea, and the need to protect its nuclear arsenal will top the agenda, but the threat posed by unsecured nuclear weapons and fissile material is a far broader one. Fissile material needed to create a nuclear weapon is stored in dozens of countries, and has been stolen or lost at least eighteen times. And once a terrorist acquires such material, it “isn’t difficult” to build a nuclear weapon similar to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, according to Harvard Associate Professor Matthew Bunn. Nations will look to bolster three pillars of cooperation: combating the threat of nuclear terrorism, protecting nuclear materials and related facilities, and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. While the focus will remain on nuclear security, the meeting also offers a forum to discuss the safety of nuclear facilities, in the wake of last year’s disaster at the Japanese Fukushima nuclear facility. The G8 Summit Later in the spring, Chicago hosts back-to-back summits of the G8 and NATO from May 19-20 and 20-21. As the city gears up for this logistical and security nightmare, leaders from two of the world’s older multilateral groups will meet to reassess their relevance in an evolving world. Although the G8 was given up for dead after the G20 was designated the world’s “premier forum” for global economic cooperation, last year’s Deauville summit proved there was life in ye ole body yet—and that a small group of advanced market democracies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) could play a unique role in addressing sensitive political and even security matters. This year, G8 leaders will again be preoccupied with ongoing—and faltering—reform efforts in the Arab world. In 2011 the G8 pledged almost $80 billion to help Arab countries manage the transition to democracy, but much of the aid has stalled—thanks partly to uncertain political reform prospects in the region, particularly in Egypt. As radical Islamist parties seek to exploit democratic openings, al-Qaeda exploits turbulence in Yemen, and the crackdown in Syria persists, G8 leaders may need to reassess strategies and lower expectations. The NATO Summit Chicago will also host the Atlantic alliance, amid growing doubts of its relevance in today’s security environment. In a farewell address last June in Brussels, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates blasted U.S. allies for cutbacks in defense expenditures and “caveats” placed on national contingents deployed in NATO military operations. He warned that the organization faced “a dim if not dismal future” if it did not correct shortcomings in military spending and political will. To be sure, the NATO storyline is not entirely glum. The victorious if protracted aerial campaign in Libya restored some luster to the alliance, while reinforcing the value of multilateral force projection in an age of national budgetary constraints. But it also exposed critical capability gaps, as U.S. allies began running out of bombs just weeks into the campaign. NATO has recently adopted a new Strategic Concept, promising to adapt to new threats like cyber war, energy insecurity, and protracted insurgency. Whether the alliance is the right instrument to respond to these contingencies—or whether its members are ready to invest in traditional capacities that inspire confidence in Washington—remains to be seen. In Chicago, look for the alliance to make a rhetorical commitment to stay “engaged” in Afghanistan after the scheduled 2014 withdrawal of U.S. troops, and to offer new forms of partnerships with Libya and other countries emerging from the Arab Spring. The G20 The G20 Summit of the world’s twenty major economies will take place in Los Cabos, Mexico, from June 18 to 19, 2012, and will be the first such summit to occur in Latin America. The G20 is responsible for the mammoth task of managing global finance as the world continues its rocky economic recovery. Its 2012 agenda priorities include stabilizing the world economy, strengthening financial systems, and improving financial architecture to prevent economic turmoil like the 2008 banking crisis. Other issues, like commodity price stability and development are also on its books.  Still, Mexico’s G20 Sherpa, Lourdes Aranda, has pledged to keep the summit focused, and avoid the “mission creep” that historically afflicted the G8. One gauge of success in Los Cabos will be whether G20 members follow through on their pledge to give the IMF robust surveillance authority to monitor their performance under the agreed Mutual Assessment Process. Another is whether the G20 agrees to give the Financial Stability Board the tools it needs to serve as a global financial watchdog. Unfortunately, as I noted in an earlier blog about the November Cannes Summit, for political reasons neither China nor the United States is likely to make credible commitments to compromise on two of the largest items on the G20 agenda—exchange rate flexibility and macroeconomic rebalancing. The pending leadership transition in Beijing makes bold Chinese concessions on the value of the renminbi implausible, while the approaching U.S. presidential elections means Obama will be unlikely to compromise on this political sensitivity. Rio+20 From June 20 to 22 the world gathers in Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. The gathering marks the twentieth anniversary of the first “Earth Summit” in Rio. Hailed as a “landmark” in global environmental governance, the 1992 conference generated a set of ambitious commitments designed to promote poverty reduction and social development while protecting the world’s atmosphere, biodiversity, and fragile ecosystems. Two decades later, with the planet under unprecedented environmental stress, leaders will gather to assess the world’s uneven progress towards these commitments and their follow up pledges at the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. But they will also grapple with a huge range of “new and emerging challenges,” encompassing the global food and energy crises, water scarcity and desertification, mass migration, health security, climate security, natural disasters, and biodiversity and ecosystem loss. Beyond assessing progress on past commitments, the Rio+20 agenda envisions reaching agreement on “principles for a green economy” that can deliver both sustainable development and poverty eradication. Unfortunately, as the organizers concede, “There is as of yet no agreed definition of what constitutes a green economy”—much less how to achieve one on a global or national scale. Given the large number of outside “stakeholders” invited to participate—including multilateral agencies, civil society groups, corporations and nongovernmental organizations—a cacophony of ideas could drive out sensible ones. Rio’s most controversial agenda item, however, may be the aspiration to reform “the system of global governance for sustainable development.” Proposals for global institutional reform range from the incremental—reforming and upgrading the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) or strengthening the Commission on Sustainable Development—to the unrealistically grandiose—like establishing a fully-fledged World Environmental Organization (WEO), something France has previously championed. Whether one mega-conference can possibly do justice to all these issues seems doubtful.  COP 18 The eighteenth Conference of Parties (COP 18) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) will take place from November 26 to 27, 2012 in Qatar. The UNFCCC faces similar political challenges as the Rio+20 summit, as evidenced by uneven success at the recent meeting in Durban, South Africa. At COP 18, leaders from the United Nations’ 193 countries will meet to discuss numerous issues—many of which COP 17 decided to punt for a year. These include extracting firm  funding commitments for the Green Climate Fund, which was established in Cancun in 2010 and further clarified at Durban, but has not actually been implemented yet; clarifying what the successor treaty to the Kyoto protocol will look like, and spelling out what the pledge to give it “legal force” actually means; and finally whether to extend the current Kyoto Protocol to 2017 or 2020, pending progress on a new universal emissions reduction accord. Canada’s bold move to formally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, just barely after the ink dried on the COP 17 Durban Enhanced Platform for Action, will add a fresh layer of complexity to COP 18 and may increase pressure on UNFCCC parties to reach a consensus. Delegations from the United States, China, and India may also find themselves sweating not just from the weather in Qatar, but from growing international criticism over their ongoing refusal to accept binding emissions reduction targets. Deferring real action on climate change to a future COP 19 may seem like a good short term fix, but could prove disastrous for the international climate change regime. In the end, the biggest item on the 2012 global governance calendar might be a national event—the U.S. presidential elections in November. As James Traub notes in the January/February issue of the Washington Monthly, the top Republican candidates are uniformly skeptical of multilateral cooperation and traditional U.S. allies—suggesting that under a GOP president the United States “may be more certain where it stands than it is today; but it will stand alone.” President Obama, in contrast, has accepted that the UN and other international institutions tend, for all their limitations, to be force multipliers for U.S. power.

Kim Jong-il’s death has prompted discussion about the future of the isolated country and its nuclear weapons program. Experts cited in this CFR Backgrounder believe a post-Kim regime in North Korea would remain a tough nuclear negotiator.

An Iranian military base is seen near the town of Bid Kaneh in this satellite image taken on September 9, 2011. (GeoEye via Google Earth/ISIS/courtesy Reuters) Above the Fold. The political debate over Iran is heating up. Much of that has to do with the presidential campaign here at home. Accusing the incumbent president or his political heir of not being tough enough is a tried and tested political strategy in American politics. JFK beat up Richard Nixon over the “missile gap,” Ronald Reagan hammered Jimmy Carter over détente and the Iranian hostage crisis, Bill Clinton badgered George H.W. Bush about the “butchers of Beijing,” and Barack Obama blamed George W. Bush for ignoring the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. So it’s hardly surprising that Republican presidential candidates are charging Obama with being soft on Iran. But it’s not just partisan politics that explains concerns about Iran. Earlier this week Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States, told a Persian Gulf security forum that if Iran went nuclear, Saudi Arabia might have to follow suit. That sort of talk gives U.S. policymakers nightmares; hence, another reason to keep Iran a non-nuclear state. The problem is how to do it. So-called crippling sanctions may be not be painful enough to change Tehran’s thinking, and in any event it may be impossible to persuade other countries to impose them. Military strikes could trigger unpredictable and grave consequences, and they may only delay and not halt Iran’s nuclear program. That takes the discussion back to containing and deterring a nuclear Iran. As new report out this week from the American Enterprise Institute notes, however, the fact that Iran might be contained and deterred “does not make it a low-risk or low cost choice.” In all, Iran poses difficult decisions and lousy choices. But don’t expect the political campaign to acknowledge that basic fact. CFR Event of the Week. Representative Kay Granger (R-TX), chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, and Michael Mosettig, senior producer for foreign affairs and defense at PBS NewsHour, came to CFR to discuss the changing environment in the Middle East, as well as Israel’s future relations with Egypt and its other neighbors. To learn more, watch the video below, or download the audio to go. http://youtu.be/v9JJmJkVkYc Click here to watch this video on YouTube. Read of the Week. Richard Betts, director of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia University and adjunct senior fellow for national security studies at CFR, has just released a new book: American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security. It’s a great collection of essays that take a skeptical look at the U.S. use of military force in the post-Cold War era. It’s worth reading whether you are a dyed-in-wool non-interventionist or the most gung-ho neoconservative. Dick poses tough questions and highlights the challenges that inevitably arise in trying to find good answers when it comes to decisions about using military force. Blog Post of the Week. The French writer Jean de la Fontaine wrote long ago, “Beware, so long as you live, of judging men by their outward appearance.” Robert Danin reminds us that de la Fontaine’s advice applies to the modern Middle East. Poll Question of the Week. What do Israelis think about attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities? The Israeli daily Haaretz commissioned a poll to ask just that question. It turns out that Israelis are split—41 percent support an attack and 39 percent oppose it. Twenty percent were undecided. The Israelis are struggling with the same questions that U.S. policymakers are: Can sanctions deter Iran from going nuclear? How much would a military strike set back Iran’s nuclear activities? How might Iran respond, and what would the consequences be for the region? To repeat, tough questions with no easy answers. Chart of the Week. Sometimes you come across charts that just make you say, “Wow!” That was my reaction to seeing a chart that The Economist prepared on the number of prison inmates per capita in the United States compared with other major countries. The United States is exceptional, and not in a good way. The incarceration rate in the United States is more than three times that of Iran, six times that of China, and ten times that of Japan. Like I said, “Wow!” Chart source: The Economist. Too Good Not to Note. Steven Cook asks us to have a little perspective on the Egyptian elections. Isobel Coleman looks at the effort to transform USAID. Scott Snyder asks when Hillary Clinton will visit Pyongyang. Kaysie Brown writes that the Kimberly Process has not severed the links between diamonds and violence. Jim Kitfeld explains why Israel plays such a big role in U.S. presidential races. John Cassidy asks if we are seeing a “new Newt” Gingrich. Josh Keating looks at Jerusalem in his weekly Election 2012 Report. Mike Moran offers his thoughts on how the Defense Department should adapt to inevitable spending cuts. Steve Coll reports on the campaign of targeted assassinations against Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. Simon Schama argues that Americans should care about the collapse of European unity. Uri Dadush and William Shaw think that the United States will end up paying for the euro crisis one way or another. Joe Nye assesses Obama’s Pacific pivot. David Kramer wants Obama to read Vladimir Putin the riot act on Russia’s rigged parliamentary elections. Perils of Prediction. "Ours has been the first, and will doubtless be the last, party of whites to visit this profitless locality. It seems intended by nature that the Colorado River, along the greater portion of its lonely and majestic way, shall be unvisited and undisturbed." Lt. Joseph Ives, after visiting the Grand Canyon in 1861. More than 4 million people visit Grand Canyon National Park every year. Quote to Ponder. “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.” John Milton, Areopagitica. The author of Paradise Lost was born on this day in 1608. A Reason to Smile. Turning 19. Or turning 14. Happy Birthday, Ian and Malcolm.

Iran's Head of Atomic Energy Organization Fereyoun Abbasi-Davani attends the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna in June 2011. (Herwig Prammer/Courtesy Reuters) On Tuesday, the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report that Iran’s nuclear program included evidence of Iran’s intent to build nuclear weapons. As news of the report splashed across newspapers’ front pages, analysts noted the importance of the international consensus on Iran’s program. Because the report drew from ten nations’ intelligence and was vetted for months by an international group of experts, accusations of political motivations ring hollow. Now, if the United States goes to the United Nations to push for a new round of sanctions against Iran, Russia and China cannot hide behind dismissing the report as a unilateral U.S. political gambit. Furthermore, countries on the fence like Brazil, which voted against enhanced sanctions in June 2010, can no longer deny Iran’s intention to build nuclear weapons. The multilateral IAEA has imbued U.S. efforts with heightened credibility, and underscores the importance of the international institution to U.S. foreign policy priorities. And yet, the IAEA is handicapped by limited authority and resources. Though the IAEA is tasked with supervising nations’ nuclear security and protection of nuclear stockpiles (to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists), its mandate is limited to assessing nuclear security measures only when asked to do so. (This applies to inspection of stockpiles as opposed to compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; under Article V of the NPT, nations must permit IAEA inspection of their reactors to determine whether technology is being developed for future use in nuclear weapons.) Furthermore, the agency “has seen its infrastructure and personnel resources atrophy” explains the Canadian Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). Reduced resources force the agency to choose between its two mandates: international oversight of nuclear nonproliferation and security, and assisting states who wish to develop nuclear capabilities to provide energy. Competing priorities between developing and developed nations hinder efforts to bolster the IAEA’s independence and authority. Developing nations maintain that the IAEA focuses on nuclear security at the expense of helping developing nations cultivate and improve peaceful nuclear energy programs. As Jack Boureston and Tanya Ogilvie-White explain in Seeking Nuclear Security Through Greater International Coordination, this debate obstructs efforts to bolster the IAEA’s supervisory capacity. In light of this dispute over the IAEA’s priorities, the authors argue, “Those backing more robust norms in the evolving nuclear security regime” need to engage in more sophisticated diplomacy to build consensus, particularly in engaging what they call “fence-sitter states.” A critical part of such a package deal would involve providing greater support for IAEA technical cooperation programs. In return for this concession, states could demand an “expansion of IAEA authority” to police compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran’s clandestine activities have thrown into stark relief both the need for a robust nuclear security regime and the IAEA’s shortcomings, as currently empowered, to ensure state compliance with treaty obligations. Strengthening the IAEA will require Washington and other nuclear powers to persuade emerging economies that the battle against proliferation will not jeopardize peaceful access to nuclear energy.

The UN nuclear agency’s latest report contains no "gotcha" disclosures about Iran’s nuclear capability but creates a clear impression of a weapons program in the works, says expert Mark Hibbs.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A93UZVtuqFY Electoral violence in a number of sub-Sahara countries has prompted some Africa watchers to question whether the United States and other Western countries should be prioritizing “free, fair and credible” elections when the process so often polarizes a country rather than unifying it around democratic institutions and practices. Nevertheless, I believe the United States and other westerners should continue to do what they can to support Africans working to build free, fair, and peaceful democracies, not least because Africans themselves want elections, and there are no good alternatives. Asch Harwood and I co-authored a piece published today by the CFR Civil Society, Democracy, and Markets program in which we lay out why we should continue to support African democracy despite the electoral potential for polarization. I also did a Youtube video (posted above), where I make the same argument, as well as a short discussion about the importance of arms control in Africa. H/T – Asch Harwood

The longstanding U.S.-South Korea alliance, created as a bulwark against a communist North Korea, has expanded to include tighter trade ties and cooperation on global issues from climate change to international development.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (L) waves after meeting with India's Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao (R) upon her arrival into New Delhi India in July, 2011. (B Mathur/Courtesy Reuters) Over the past decade relations between India and the United States—the world’s two largest democracies—have utterly transformed. Carefully nurtured, this bilateral relationship should become one of the world’s strategic pivots and improve prospects for global peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century. But this transition will require psychological adjustments from both nations. India must shed outdated mindsets that still dominate much of its foreign policy elite and accept the obligations of its surging power. And the United States must accept a more collective form of global leadership, in which others shape the terms and conditions of multilateral cooperation. If New Delhi and Washington can make this transition, their partnership has a limitless future. This is the central insight of a joint study group report released today by CFR and Aspen Institute India (AII), The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future. The high-level study group, including luminaries from both countries, was co-chaired by Robert Blackwill, former U.S. ambassador to India, and Naresh Chandra, chairman of India’s national security advisory board. As the report makes clear, the two countries share a slew of interests. Both seek: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fissile material and related technology; to combat Islamic radicalism and jihadi terrorism—particularly emanating from Pakistan— and stabilize the dangerous neighborhood of South and Central Asia; to promote a stable balance of power in Asia, as a hedge against a rising China; to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean, through which fifty percent of container shipping and seventy percent of oil shipments transit; to encourage an open, rule-bound international economy, with reduced barriers to trade and investment;  to pursue joint energy security and developing clean technologies to combat climate change; and to promote their shared vision of stable, democratic governance within diverse, multicultural societies. In sum, from Washington’s perspective, India “is a force for stability, prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law in a very dangerous neighborhood.” No surprise then, that, the United States and India have recently moved from their historic estrangement to deep engagement. The biggest breakthrough, of course, was the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal signed during the administration of George W. Bush. Though controversial, the arrangement has helped to normalize India’s nuclear status, despite its non-membership of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.  President Obama has built on the deal by supporting India’s gradual entry into four major multilateral export control regimes (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenar Arrangement). Washington and New Delhi view each other as indispensable partners in stabilizing the balance of power in Asia. The U.S. military now conducts regular maneuvers with India’s expanding armed forces, which now boasts the world’s third largest army, fourth largest air force, and fifth largest navy. Washington has also encouraged India’s “look east” policy towards Southeast Asia, its membership in the East Asia Summit, and its growing links with fellow democracies Japan, South Korea, and Australia. In short, India is emerging as a U.S. military ally in all but name. It should be treated accordingly, starting with the elimination of outdated export control restrictions. India has also emerged as one of the staunchest U.S. allies in the global campaign against terrorism. The victim of multiple devastating attacks, including in Mumbai in November 2008, India shares Washington’s interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and ending Pakistan’s distinction as the world’s leading exporter of jihadi terrorism. The abject failure of billions of U.S. aid dollars to persuade Pakistan to take firm steps against Islamic extremism has left both the United States and India in the cross-hairs—and compels them to deepen intelligence and law enforcement cooperation to prevent further attacks and secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal if the state collapses. The U.S.-India strategic partnership is also driven by economic imperatives. India’s recent economic performance has been impressive, averaging 7.6 percent annual growth over the past decade. After weathering the global economic crisis, India grew by an astonishing 10.4 percent in 2010. India’s booming economy, led by an English-speaking elite and middle class, offers huge opportunities for U.S. trade and investment. Bilateral trade has quadrupled in the past decade but remains lower than it could be, due to remaining commercial barriers. Given the moribund state of the Doha round—partly as a result of Indian agricultural protection—the United States should aim for a more piecemeal bilateral trade agreement with India (along the lines of the one the EU is negotiating). India’s modernization will only increase its demand for infrastructure, transportation networks, energy production, and defense systems. Pending a bilateral investment treaty—which should be a priority—U.S. firms will be well positioned to help meet these needs.  There is also ample opportunity for joint investment in clean energy technology, as well as cooperation on forest conservation. Nevertheless, two frictions continue to stress relations.  From a U.S. perspective, India at times seems trapped in a post-colonial mindset that privileges developing world solidarity over other values, including human rights and democracy, complicating U.S. policy goals from Burma to Zimbabwe. India also maintains a strongly noninterventionist stance within the United Nations, generally opposing the use of coercive instruments. It usually opposes sanctions or the use of force to enforce UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, whether the challenge is restraining Iranian nuclear ambitions or ending Qaddafi’s brutality. Such attitudes give pause to U.S. officials and outside experts who worry about India’s likely behavior as a permanent member of the UNSC, notwithstanding President Obama’s declaration of support. Will India take a global view of its responsibilities, or cling to a more parochial role? Second, India has not yet formulated a clear vision of its role in the world—nor signaled its readiness to assume the burdens of shared global leadership its emerging great power status implies. Within India, strategic thinking remains immature. This is partly a function of India’s under-developed diplomatic “software,” as my colleague Dan Markey observes. But it also reflects India’s fractious domestic politics. Currents of anti-Americanism and suspicion of U.S. imperialist agendas remain strong within India’s main political parties, and nearly derailed the historic U.S.-India nuclear deal, to cite one example. Perhaps more importantly, India confronts daunting internal development challenges. India remains desperately poor—with some 37 percent of the population under the poverty line, and with 400 million people lacking electricity. This combination of unclear vision, volatile internal politics, and pressing domestic priorities makes one wonder just how much India can—and will be willing—to contribute to global public goods. In view of these internal constraints, the Indian government will be sorely tempted to free ride on the contributions of others, even as it insists on entrée and voice in the world’s leading forums of global governance, from the UNSC to the Group of 20 to the World Bank and IMF. Given Bob Blackwill’s leadership in spearheading the transformation of U.S.-India relations during the administration of George W. Bush, it is no surprise that the CFR-AII study group is bullish on the future of this strategic partnership. But realizing this vision—and its limitless potential—will require a modern India committed to responsible global leadership, and willing to shoulder burdens for world order.

A member of the Australian Navy searches a ship playing the role of a vessel carrying suspected materials during a naval drill of the Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise (PSI) at Yokosuka port, south of Tokyo, October 14, 2007. Japan, the U.S., Australia, France, New Zealand and Singapore took part in the three-day naval drill to improve their capability to prevent possible transport of weapons of mass destruction by sea (Kim Kyung-Hoon/ Reuters). John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and conservative firebrand, is rarely labeled a “multilateralist.” But as godfather of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), created in 2003, he deserves credit for expanding the boundaries of multilateral security cooperation. This week, CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) program released a groundbreaking Working Paper on the PSI written by Emma Belcher, former CFR Stanton fellow and now program officer at the MacArthur Foundation. The Proliferation Security Initiative: Lessons for Using Non-Binding Agreements depicts the PSI as an innovative and flexible response to an urgent global challenge—and a model of collective action that can be replicated in other realms where formal institutions are absent (or found wanting). As Belcher explains, the PSI is not a formal organization but rather a voluntary, non-binding pledge among participating countries to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technology in land, sea, and air. President George W. Bush established the initiative in May 2003. At the time, anxiety over illicit WMD trafficking by state and non-state actors was growing, and officials recognized that existing legal rules and international organizations were not up to the task of counter-proliferation. Interdiction of WMD material in particular was not adequately covered in international law, and could not be ignored after the November 2002 So San incident. Partly because there were insufficient legal grounds for seizure, that North Korean vessel was allowed to proceed after authorities discovered it was carrying missiles to Yemen. Revelations of the illicit black market network in nuclear technology created by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan further sharpened these proliferation and interdiction concerns. To address this lacuna, Bolton, then undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, crafted a novel approach. Rather than engage in cumbersome efforts to change international law or negotiate a new treaty among all 192 UN member states, the United States invited a small group of like-minded countries to pledge to collaborate in interdicting WMD and related materials, and to adhere to a common set of interdiction principles. Having secured the participation of a “Core Group” of fellow democracies, (initially, the UK, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain) the United States gradually extended participation to a wider array of countries willing to adopt the established norms. PSI operations remain classified, rendering objective evaluations impossible, but U.S. officials credit the PSI with more than two dozen interdictions. Additionally, they claim it has had a strong deterrent effect on would-be proliferators. Early on, some Bush administration critics worried the PSI would undermine the treaty-based nonproliferation regime. Such fears were unwarranted, Belcher suggests. By 2011, the number of PSI adherents had grown from eleven members to more than ninety-five countries, and the PSI was generally considered compatible with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Moreover, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which was passed in April 2004, implicitly endorsed the PSI’s principles. Concerned that the PSI lacked sufficient transparency and international legitimacy, President Obama in April 2009 proposed turning it into a more “durable international institution.” But the administration has since backtracked. It appears to have learned to appreciate the flexibility of an informal arrangement. So what are the lessons of the PSI experience, according to Belcher? First, non-binding agreements are useful complements to existing treaty arrangements, particularly when it comes to urgent problems where international law is either lacking or underdeveloped. Compared to treaties, such arrangements, are easier to negotiate, faster to implement, and easier to adapt. They also protect U.S. sovereignty more, since they are ultimately voluntary. Second, non-binding agreements can pave the way for stronger and complementary agreements, hybrid arrangements, and subsequent legal developments. The PSI, for instance, helped inspire UNSC Resolution 1540. And it has been bolstered by a series of binding bilateral agreements between the United States and PSI members, creating in effect a hybrid counterproliferation regime. Finally, despite its “non-binding” nature, the PSI experience suggests that voluntary arrangements can still exert a compliance pull on members. To be sure, the PSI isn’t perfect. Several major countries, including maritime states like China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Egypt, remain outside. But the PSI model has proven its utility—and been replicated in such efforts as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and President Obama’s own Nuclear Security Summit of April 2010. And for this we have John Bolton, multilateralist, to thank.