Defense and Security

Military Operations

  • Niger
    U.S. Casualties in the Sahel Highlight Jihadi Persistence
    The American military presence in Niger is attracting increasing attention in the United States following an ambush that killed four American soldiers. The tone of President Donald Trump’s condolence call to the widow of one of the victims has become a major—if likely ephemeral—domestic political issue. Little appears to be known about the circumstances of the ambush. Senator John McCain, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has even threatened to hold up judicial nominees until he gets satisfactory answers from the Trump Administration. American officials have praised the response of the French military, who drove off the attackers, and the Department of Defense has sent a team to Niger to investigate. Despite the recent publicity, the U.S. military presence in the Sahel is relatively small, mostly comprising small units training local militaries.  As to the identity of the perpetrators, the usually well informed French media reported that the attack was likely carried out by the Islamic State of the Sahel, led by Adnan Abu Walid. Based on accounts by local witnesses, the attackers were light-skinned, spoke Arabic and Tamashek, and were unknown to local people. Tamashek is the language of the nomadic Tuareg people, who are also described as light-skinned. Adnan Abu Walid is a prime example of the fluidity of adherence to various radical movements in the Sahel. At one point, he was the chief spokesman for the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), one of the groups that attempted to establish a radical jihadi state in Mali in 2012, with links to al-Qaeda. After the French drove the jihadists out of northern Mali’s cities, MUJAO and its jihadi partners went underground, far from defeated. In 2013, Abu Walid merged MUJAO with Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his followers. The consolidated movement was called al-Mourabitoun. Belmokhtar is Algerian by birth, a smuggler who has become rich, not least through kidnapping Westerners and ransoming them. Notoriously he and his men took eight hundred hostages in 2013 at the Tigantourine Gas Facility in Algeria. They murdered thirty-nine of the captives before the Algerian military dislodged them. Belmokhtar’s operations and rhetoric indicate he continues to fight the Algerian state. He strategically married four Tuareg and Berber wives, thereby grounding himself among the local clans where he operates. Less is known about Abu Walid, including his nationality, but his rhetoric is directed at the destruction of the Kingdom of Morocco. Belmokhtar and Abu Walid appear to have split in 2015 when the latter swore allegiance to the Islamic State. There are reports, not verified, that Belmokhtar tried unsuccessfully to kill Abu Walid. Local security services periodically report, with little credibility, that they have killed Belmokhtar (much like the numerous times Nigerian security services reportedly killed Abubakar Shekau of Boko Haram). Jihadis in the western Sahel appear to shift their ideological identities quite easily. Most of those who are prominent appear to be first and foremost smugglers and kidnappers, in addition to ideologues. Though bitterly divided, adherents to al-Qaeda (Belmokhtar), the Islamic State (Abu Walid), and others all appear to be hostile to state authority of any kind and to support the establishment of an Islamic state. To a greater or lesser extent, the sub-Saharan states in which they operate—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—are weak and dominated by elites that are unresponsive to their populations. In many cases, government authority hardly exists outside cities. Hence, without improved governance and responsiveness, these groups are likely to be around for a long time. ‘Sahel’ is the Arabic word for ‘shore,’ reflecting the sense that the Sahara is like an ocean. Like the ocean, it can be crossed, and has been by caravans for millennia. The preoccupations of Abu Walid and Belmokhtar are examples where events in North Africa, across the ‘ocean,’ can be influential in sub-Saharan, West Africa.   
  • Niger
    Three Green Berets Killed in Niger
    Correction: After this blog was originally posted, it was confirmed that four, not three, Green Berets were killed in western Niger. The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has announced that three U.S. Army Special Forces, Green Berets, were killed while two were wounded in an ambush in western Niger. There were also five Nigerien casualties. AFRICOM says that the operation was a routine training mission, not a combat operation. The perpetrators are unknown and, thus far, no group has claimed responsibility. Groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (IS) operate in western Niger, as do numerous criminal gangs involved in smuggling and kidnapping, and whose allegiance is constantly shifting. According to the New York Times, these are the first U.S. casualties from hostile fire in Niger. Across the Sahel region, American casualties of any sort have been few and far between, in part because the U.S. presence is very small. As part of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, the U.S. military provides training to Sahelian militaries, including Niger’s, but this involves relatively few U.S. civilian and military personnel. The Sahel is not an area of American tourism, there are limited economic interests, and most victims of kidnapping are European. Thus, there is little reason for a large U.S. presence. France, on the other hand, has a much more robust security relationship with the Sahelian states, most of which are francophone, and French casualties from hostile fire are accordingly much higher. So, too, is the number of French civilian victims, reflecting greater French economic interests and a tradition of French tourism in the region.   Nevertheless, U.S. military personnel have now been killed and wounded in combat in the Sahel. It remains to be seen if there is a domestic U.S. reaction, and what impact that may have on AFRICOM’s mission. In the 1993 “Blackhawk Down” episode in Mogadishu, Somalia, eighteen U.S. uniformed personnel were killed, and a mob dragged some of their corpses through the streets. At the time, U.S. public opinion appeared to have little tolerance for U.S. causalities in African operations. In the aftermath of Blackhawk Down, the Clinton administration backed away from security engagement in Africa. As the New York Times observes, the Trump administration appears to be continuing the policy of his Democratic and Republican predecessors by providing training and equipment to indigenous militaries rather than deploying large numbers of U.S. military personnel. That policy, if sustained, will limit U.S. casualties in the region, which likely remain unacceptable to American public opinion.
  • Military Operations
    A Conversation with Senator Jack Reed
    Play
    Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) discusses the president's approach to dealing with North Korea and Russia; Iran's compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); and the U.S. military's state of preparedness.
  • Nigeria
    Biafra is Back
    Tension is rising in Nigeria over secessionist claims by “Biafran” organizations in southeast Nigeria. The Nigeria Security Tracker for the week of September 9 to 15 documents significant bloodshed in fighting between the security forces and alleged Biafran secessionist movements. The Nigerian army is currently conducting an exercise, called Operation Python Dance II, in the territory of the 1967-70 secessionist state of Biafra. Observers claim that the soldiers participating in the exercise are committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians, so much so that a human rights umbrella organization based in the region is preparing to “monitor” it. Meanwhile, the army and the security services, joined by the southern governors, have labeled the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), its leader Nnamdi Kanu, and other pro-Biafran groups as “terrorist.” Kanu and other’s associated with the IPOB have gone into hiding and the security services are seeking their arrest. His lawyer has not heard from him since September 14, and fears the worst. (Kanu is on trial for 'treasonable felony charges,' but was granted bail for health reasons.) Meanwhile, there is a swirl of charges and counter charges of ethnic and religious attacks across the country but tied in various ways to the southeast region. The security services claim the IPOB is securing weapons and uniforms and creating a “secret” army. The IPOB maintains that it is a peaceful movement for self-determination. However, an IPOB spokesman is warning that the movement might resort to violence. He said that the organization’s Directorate of State, headquartered in Germany, would meet soon “to vote on the vitality or otherwise of continuing our struggle in this non-violent manner.”  Another Biafra secessionist organization, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) denies that the security services and the southeast governors have the authority to declare organizations to be “terrorist,” a point also made by others, including Senate President Bukola Saraki. Members of parliament from the southeast are calling for the “de-escalation” of military operations. Human rights groups are saying that it is the police that should be concerned with maintaining internal order in the country, not the army. There are similarities between the current Biafra secessionist movement and the Biafra of the 1967-70 civil war, but the differences are perhaps more significant. The Biafra of the civil war was a territorial state. It inherited the administrative structures of one of the three regions that then made up Nigeria, and its army was led by officers who had defected from the Nigerian army. As it was a territorial state, the Nigerian federal forces defeated it by taking back the seceded territory, just as Union forces reoccupied formerly Confederate territory until little was left of the Confederacy in the American Civil War. The current movement for Biafra is more diffuse and administers no territory. The formal institutions of government in the region are opposed to secession, as has been made clear by the southern governors. Nor is it clear that the current movement has the widespread domestic support that Biafra enjoyed, at least during the early days of the civil war. The concern must be, however, that abuses by the security service and mismanagement by the federal authorities could fan the flames. The decision of the security services to designate Biafran secessionist organizations as “terrorists” does not help and is probably illegal.    
  • Israel
    Israel's Bombing of a Weapons Factory in Syria: What Comes Next?
    This week Israel bombed a site in Syria, from Lebanese air space. This was the so-called Scientific Studies and Researchers Center in Masyaf, a city in central Syria, and it was hit because it is a military site where chemical weapons and precision bombs are said to be produced. Israel had made clear in a series of statements in the last six months that such a facility in Syria producing such weapons for use by Hezbollah against Israel would not be tolerated. I was reminded of 2007 and 2008, when Israeli officials repeatedly told me and other American officials that the rocketing of Israel by Hamas in Gaza was intolerable. If it does not stop, they said, an operation is inevitable. They meant it, and the result was Operation Cast Lead, which began on December 27, 2008. We in the Bush administration had been given fair warning. Today again, Israel has given the United States fair warning that there are limits to what Israel will tolerate in Iranian conduct and the Iranian presence in Syria. Israel has long intervened, perhaps 100 times over the years, to stop advanced weaponry from being transferred by Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Those were moving targets: caravans of trucks carrying such weaponry. But this week there was a stationary target, and I imagine the decision to fire from Lebanese air space was also a message—to Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. On August 23, Prime Minister Netanyahu visited Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The goal, I believe, was to tell Putin certain actions by Iran in Syria would be intolerable, and to ask him to restrain Iran—his ally in Syria. Putin’s reply was negative. In effect, he told Netanyahu “I’m not restraining you and I’m not restraining them. Not my job. Take care of your own security.” Having learned that there would be no help from that quarter, the Israelis acted. The Russians seem not to object: Netanyahu is doing what he said he would do, and what Putin would do in a similar situation. Israel is also acting in part because the United States does not seem willing to restrain Iran in any serious way in Syria. We are doing less, not more, while the Assad regime’s forces and Iran’s gain ground. Some news stories have suggested that war between Hezbollah and Israel is very likely now. In my view, the chances may have risen but I do not see why it is in Hezbollah’s interest to start such a war now. They are deeply involved in Syria, and they—and Iran—appear to be gaining ground steadily. Why start a war that may well involve Syria as well, with unpredictable effects on the conflict there? Why not continue making gains in Syria, and consolidate those gains? Bottom line: Israel is protecting its security, exactly as it has been telling the world it would. Israel’s strategic situation has been seriously damaged in the last several years because there is now an Iranian presence in Syria. The Israelis are not going to go into Syria and try to drive Iran, the Shia militias, and Hezbollah out, but they are trying to establish some limits to acceptable Iranian behavior. In my view this ought to be part of U.S. policy in the region as well. We do appear to have taken control of the Bab el Mandab strait leading to the Suez Canal, making it clear that Iran would not be permitted to threaten shipping there (on the seas or via missiles supplied to Houthi rebels in Yemen). We have not stopped Iran from threatening our ships in the Gulf. Candidate Trump said a year ago that "by the way, with Iran, when they circle our beautiful destroyers with their little boats and they make gestures that our people -- that they shouldn't be allowed to make, they will be shot out of the water," but Iran has continued to do this after a brief pause right after Trump’s inauguration. And the administration has not clarified its policies in Iraq and Syria when it comes to limiting Iran’s provocative and aggressive behavior. What lies ahead is unclear because we cannot predict whether Iran will decide that the limits Israel is imposing are acceptable. Iran could well conclude that it does not absolutely need to have factories producing precision weapons in Syria. Iran can continue as it has for years producing such weapons in Iran and trying to move them to Hezbollah by land or sea. What would be useful at this point, it seems to me, is a statement by the United States that we approve of the action Israel took, and that in the event of a conflict Israel would have our support in defending itself—for example by allowing the Israelis to have access to the stocks of weapons that we store in Israel. This is the billion-dollar stockpile of ammunition, vehicles, and missiles in the “War Reserve Stockpile Ammunition-Israel.” Such a statement might, like the Israeli bombing of the weapons factory in Syria, help persuade Iran and Syria to observe the limits Israel is imposing, and might help avoid a wider conflict.
  • Global
    The World Next Week: August 17, 2017
    Podcast
    U.S. and South Korean forces hold war games on the Korean Peninsula and North Americans view a solar eclipse.
  • Canada
    Canada's Military Gets More Cyber, and the Headaches That Come With It
    Canada's new defense policy acknowledges for the first time that the Canadian Forces will develop an offensive cyber capability, a process fraught with challenges.
  • Afghanistan
    Did Killing Mullah Mansour Work?
    In May 2016, President Barack Obama authorized a U.S. military drone strike that killed Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour. A year later, we can judge whether this leadership “decapitation” strike achieved its intended political objectives.
  • Global
    The World’s Hotspots
    Play
    Experts discuss the most important flashpoints in international affairs for the current administration.
  • Military Operations
    How the Pentagon Announces Killing Terrorists Versus Civilians 
    This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Jennifer Wilson.  Last week, the U.S. military announced an accomplishment that has come to define progress in the war on terrorism—the death of yet another senior terrorist leader. These now-routine reports are touted by officials as bringing “justice” to terrorists, delivering a “significant blow” to their ability to maneuver and operate, and even "eradicating" the threats they pose. On Friday, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Colonel John Thomas, told reporters that special operations forces had killed “a close associate” of the leader of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This announcement came fifteen days after the ground raid that killed him on April 6—coincidentally, the same day as President Donald Trump’s cruise missile strike on an airfield in Homs, Syria. As the United States ramps up its airstrikes and targeted raids against the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, there has been a corresponding increase in reported civilian casualties. Airwars estimates that at least 3,111 civilians have been killed in U.S.-led coalition airstrikes since the anti-Islamic State air campaign began in August 2014. However, CENTCOM implausibly assess that “at least 229 civilians have been unintentionally killed” in all 19,607 strikes. CENTCOM publishes a monthly civilian casualty report including reported non-combatant casualties found credible (meaning a strike more likely than not resulted in the death or injury of a civilian), those found non-credible (meaning there is not sufficient information to determine whether a civilian was harmed), and ongoing investigations. There are currently forty-three open investigations, one of which has been going on for over a year. On average, it has taken CENTCOM ninety-five days to announce whether a coalition strike resulted in a civilian casualty over the past six months. Meanwhile, on average, it has taken just eleven days for the Pentagon to announce that a strike has resulted in the death of a “key leader” of a terrorist organization over the past year. (We averaged the time elapsed between the alleged incident and the U.S. military announcement of 115 cases of civilian casualties and 19 announcements of killed terrorists, after removing the highest and lowest number of days passed for both to avoid distorting the mean.) We can only speculate why there is such a vast disparity between the time it takes to investigate the death of a civilian versus the death of a terrorist. However, what this inconsistency demonstrates is that publicizing the deaths of terrorists is a higher priority for the U.S. military than determining the deaths of civilians. For example, last week, a coalition spokesperson, Colonel Joe Scrocca, even acknowledged “we don’t have any means of going and searching out people and, honestly, we don’t have the manpower” to conduct rigorous investigations of reported civilian casualties. The Pentagon claims that it “takes all reports of civilian casualties seriously and assesses all reports as thoroughly as possible.” If this were the case, though, then there would be sufficient surveillance and analytical resources dedicated to thoroughly and more quickly investigate reported civilian casualties. As the former U.S. Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, Lieutenant General Bob Otto (ret.), observed in October 2015, “If you inadvertently—legally—kill innocent men, women, and children, then there’s a backlash from that. And so we might kill three and create ten terrorists.” If Otto’s concerns are to be believed, then investigating claims of civilian harm, holding those in the chain of command responsible to account, and assuring that past errors are not repeated should be as high a priority as is killing yet another in the seemingly inexhaustible supply of senior terrorist operatives. Unfortunately, the military is more committed to boasting about killing alleged terrorists than determining when non-combatants are harmed in the process.
  • United States
    Military Perspectives in the White House
    Podcast
    CFR's Robert McMahon and former Undersecretary of the U.S. Navy Janine Davidson examine civil-military relations in the new administration.
  • United States
    Civil-Military Relations in the New Administration
    Play
    Experts discuss the role of civil-military relations in the development of military advice; evaluate early changes to the national security system under President Trump; and consider possible reforms to the presidential decision-making process.
  • United States
    U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the President
    The separation of powers has spawned a great deal of debate over the roles of the president and Congress in foreign affairs, as well as over the limits on their respective authorities, explains this Backgrounder.
  • Heads of State and Government
    The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power: Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama
    [Note: This post was updated to reflect additional strikes in Yemen on March 2, March 3, and March 6.] As a candidate, President Donald Trump was deeply misleading about the sorts of military operations that he would support. He claimed to have opposed the 2003 Iraq War when he actually backed it, and to have opposed the 2011 Libya intervention when he actually strongly endorsed it, including with U.S. ground troops. Yet, Trump and his loyalists consistently implied that he would be less supportive of costly and bloody foreign wars, especially when compared to President Obama, and by extension, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This might be true, but nonetheless the White House is considering deploying even more U.S. troops to Syria, loosening the rules of engagement for airstrikes, and increasing the amount of lethal assistance provided to Syrian rebel groups. By at least one measure at this point in his presidency, Trump has been more interventionist than Obama: in authorizing drone strikes and special operations raids in non-battlefield settings (namely, in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia). During President Obama’s two terms in office, he approved 542 such targeted strikes in 2,920 days—one every 5.4 days. From his inauguration through today, President Trump had approved at least 36 drone strikes or raids in 45 days—one every 1.25 days. These include three drone strikes in Yemen on January 20, 21, and 22; the January 28 Navy SEAL raid in Yemen; one reported strike in Pakistan on March 1; more than thirty strikes in Yemen on March 2 and 3; and at least one more on March 6. Thus, people who believed that Trump would be less interventionist than Obama are wrong, at least so far and at least when it comes to drone strikes. These dramatically increased lethal strikes demonstrate that U.S. leaders’ counterterrorism mindset and policies are bipartisan and transcend presidential administrations. As I have noted, U.S. counterterrorism ideology is virulent and extremist, characterized by tough-sounding clichés and wholly implausible objectives. There has never been any serious indication among elected politicians or appointed national security officials of any strategic learning or policy adjustments. We are now on our third post-9/11 administration pursuing many of the same policies that have failed to meaningfully reduce the number of jihadist extremist fighters, or their attractiveness among potential recruits or self-directed terrorists. The Global War on Terrorism remains broadly unquestioned within Washington, no matter who is in the White House.
  • Afghanistan
    Being Honest About U.S. Military Strategy in Afghanistan
    Today, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General John “Mic” Nicholson, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Though it remains the longest war in American history, the ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan received little attention during the presidential race and even less since President Trump entered office. You may recall that in December 2009, President Obama authorized the deployment of 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total to 97,000. The vast majority of those troops have returned home; there are 8,400 troops in country now (plus 26,000 military contractors, 9,474 of whom are U.S. citizens). Since Obama’s Afghan surge, the security situation has deteriorated markedly. Nearly 1,700 U.S. troops were killed while serving there, the annual number of civilians casualties (the majority of whom were killed or injured by the Taliban) increased from 7,162 (in 2010) to 11,418 (in 2016), the number of jihadist groups grew (including the creation of a satellite Islamic State outpost)—all while the Taliban expanded its control and influence over more territory than at any other point since 9/11. That last metric is especially revealing, given Obama’s vow that the additional forces would “reverse the Taliban’s momentum.” This has not happened. During today’s hearing, SASC Chairman John McCain asked Nicholson outright, “In your assessment, are we winning or losing?” Nicholson replied, “We’re in a stalemate.” Nicholson added that his command’s objective was to “destroy al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan, and that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were doing most of the direct fighting to accomplish this. However, he noted that he was a “few thousand” troops short of what was needed to adequately train and advise the ANSF. Though Nicholson did not say so explicitly, the implication was that just a few more troops could turn the tide. But it is hard to imagine how these additional forces would improve the security situation in any lasting way. The most telling moment in the SASC hearing came when Nicholson remarked that plans were being developed to “find success” in Afghanistan within the next four years. That would mark a full twenty years of direct U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Since the first Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary teams entered Afghanistan in November 2001, 2,350 servicemembers have given their lives and almost $900 billion in taxpayers’ money has been spent. Meanwhile, the country is less politically stable and less secure from all forms of insurgent and criminal predation. No one can say how or when this largely forgotten war will end, but “finding success” certainly should begin with some realism, honesty, and a corresponding adjustment in U.S. expectations and objectives.