Defense Technology

A view of the Bushehr main nuclear reactor south of Tehran, Iran on August 21, 2010 (Courtesy Reuters/Raheb Homavandi). The April 24, 1984, edition of the British defense magazine, Jane’s Defence Weekly, contained an unexpected and alarmist sentence: "Iran is engaged in the production of an atomic bomb, likely to be ready within two years, according to press reports in the Persian Gulf last week." The article based their estimate on the minimum time for West German engineering firms to complete one of two unfinished 1300-megawatt nuclear reactors—almost a decade in the making—at the Iranian coastal city of Bushehr. In response to the Jane’s article, Georges Delcoigne, then the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spokesperson, declared: "Claims of an imminent Iranian nuclear bomb are without foundation." The State Department released its own statement: "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr," which ’’are not particularly well-suited for a weapons program." However, the State Department further warned that “previous actions of the Government of Iran do not provide us with great assurance that it will always abide by its international commitments." Like every other estimated timetable—so far—speculating when Iran will achieve nuclear weapons capability, the Jane’s two-year claim was (apparently) wrong. The nuclear reactor at Bushehr would not be fully completed until March 2009, did not receive its final shipment of fuel from Russia until August 2010, and did not achieve criticality until May 2011. During the last two reported IAEA visits to Bushehr—in August and October of last year—the reactor was shut down for “technical reasons” and “routine maintenance.” Moreover, because Bushehr is subject to routine “physical inventory verifications,” it is virtually impossible that Iran could covertly make, divert, and reprocess spent fuel to make eight kilograms of plutonium, or the “special quantity” amount that the IAEA contends is required for one nuclear weapon. The U.S.-led effort to prevent the civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr from being repurposed to produce nuclear weapons-grade plutonium is an ongoing nonproliferation success story. However, the State Department’s warning in 1984 turned out to be wholly accurate in another sense: Iran did not abide by its international commitments, namely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Safeguards Agreement signed in May 1974.  As an IAEA report in November 2007 clarifies: “Iran was not able to acquire other nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad. As a result, according to Iran, a decision was made in the mid-1980s to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market.” The very same month that Jane’s printed its erroneous two-year atomic bomb estimate, Iran also made the strategic decision to pursue a covert uranium enrichment program. According to an IAEA internal working document, in April 1984, then president Ali Hoseyai Khamenei told senior Iranian political and military official that the supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had decided to restart the country’s nuclear program in order to defend the Islamic Revolution from external threats. Iran would only acknowledge its NPT violations after it was exposed by the sometimes-reliable National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group, in August 2002. Despite serial exaggerations by the Iranian government about its nuclear program, conventional military power, ballistic missile capabilities, and repeated claims by U.S. policymakers and policy analysts that an Iranian bomb is really no-kidding imminent, the core of the nuclear crisis with Iran is encapsulated by one sentence in the IAEA’s latest Iran report: “As Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” If the Obama administration decides to follow the advice of a growing chorus of hawks and authorizes a preventive attack against Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons facilities, eight questions must be addressed beforehand: Are its violations of the NPT, UN Security Council resolutions, and ongoing inadequate cooperation with the IAEA sufficient grounds for suspecting that Iran will soon achieve nuclear weapons capability? Last February, the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress, stating, “We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” But, “we do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” What new information has emerged that now confirms senior leaders in Iran have decided to pursue the bomb? It is unlikely that Iran would needlessly test a nuclear weapon, since it would not be required to verify that it worked, and would only rally further international opposition against them. What sort of credible information will the Obama administration declassify and make public that would justify a preventive attack on Iran? Does the Obama administration truly believe what Senator John McCain first said six years ago?: “There’s only one thing worse than the United States exercising a military option. That is a nuclear-armed Iran.” Iranian nuclear ambitions extend back thirty-five years. According to a CIA estimate in 1974: “If other countries have proceeded with [nuclear] weapons development, we have no doubt that Iran will follow suit.” Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta conceded in December that an attack “might postpone [Iran’s nuclear program] maybe one, possibly two years.” Are the costs of a preventive attack worth twelve to twenty-four months of peace of mind? What is the expected air and ground requirements, scope of targets, duration, and financial costs of an attack against Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons facilities?  What percentage of this burden would be met by partners and allies? What is the expected collateral damage and civilian casualties within Iran to such an attack? What is the desired endgame of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities? What is the plausible diplomatic and military plan for how this happens?

President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Highlights from the recently-released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974: Post-Moscow Summit Discussions and Issues, June–August 1972, Memorandum of Conversation (165). At this point Brezhnev [General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union] of the asked that no notes be taken, and proceeded to relate a story about a dog race in America. The dog’s owner was exhorting the dog to win, and the dog kept replying, “Don’t worry.” As he rounded the grandstand, running last, the owner shouted at him, but the dog merely replied, “Don’t worry.” Finally, the race ended and the irate owner asked the dog what happened, and the dog replied, “Well, it just didn’t work out.” Brezhnev continued that the dog made “every effort” but failed, and this was his point in relation to the discussion on nuclear weapons: We cannot just make “every effort.” Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger): Washington, March 16, 1973 (451). Kissinger: On China, I’m getting worried. I’m beginning to think that they [the Soviet Union] want to attack China. [unclear, Brezhnev?] took me hunting. He—you hunt there from a tower. You sit in a tower and shoot these poor bastards as they come by to feed. They put out the food. Well, when night fell, and he had killed about three boars and God knows what else—and that’s when it was dark—he unpacked a picnic dinner and said: “Look, I want to talk to you privately—nobody else, no notes.” And he said: “Look, you will be our partners, you andwe are going to run the world”— Nixon: Who’d he use as translator on that? Kissinger: Sukhodrev. And he said: “The President and I are the only ones who can handle things.” He said: “We have to prevent the Chinese from having a nuclear program at all costs.” I’ve got to get that information to the Chinese, and we’ve got to play a mean game here— Nixon: I know. Kissinger: —because I don’t think we can let the Russians jump the Chinese. Nixon: No. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) for the President’s File: San Clemente, June 23, 1973 (536). The President: How long until China becomes a major nuclear country? Brezhnev: In answer to your question, we must take into account various analyses. I believe that in the course of the next 15 years they will not reach a stage we will have then; but in ten years they will have weapons equal to what we have now. We have tactical weapons sufficient to deal with them now. But we must bring home to them that this cannot go on. We will adhere strictly to our agreements. But the Chinese will act in their fashion. In 1963, during our Party Congress, I remember how Mao said: “Let 400 million Chinese die, 300 million will be left.” Such is the psychology of this man. Afterwards, the people of the world became afraid, and a new phase started of the arms race. Then when Mao saw that his idea was not gaining support, he made a somersault, asking us to sign the principles of coexistence with him. Now Chinese people are saying they will never use nuclear weapons. I don’t believe them. They won’t sign any agreements. These people are ruthless. (3PA: Both Nixon and Breznev were way off. In 1973, the U.S. had 28,000 nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union had 16,000. According to NRDC, China today is only estimated to have 240 nuclear weapons.) Memorandum of Conversation: Moscow, October 22, 1973 (606). Dobrynin [Soviet Ambassador to the United States]: In Washington one of your colleagues told me that it’s hard to get people to learn foreign languages, therefore they need to provide incentives. He told me a joke about a cat and a mouse. The mouse is in his hole and the cat is trying to get him to come out. He goes, “Meow, meow.” But the mouse is too smart; he doesn’t come out. Then the cat goes, “Rowr, rowr.” The mouse thinks, “The dog has appeared. The cat has disappeared. And I know that the dog doesn’t bite the mouse. So it is safe.” So the mouse goes out, and the cat gets him. The moral of the story is, this is the advantage of knowing foreign languages. [Laughter] Memorandum of Conversation: Geneva, December 22, 1973 (633-634). Secretary Kissinger: I have never been in an Arab country and never had much dealings with them. I frankly thought I could get through my term of office and let someone else do it. To be honest. Now that I have started, I will finish it and with enthusiasm. Minister Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister]: It is an extremely complicated world. Secretary Kissinger: Extremely. And you can’t count on every word they say. [Laughter] Minister Gromyko: Should I comment or not? Secretary Kissinger: [Laughter] No. That is why we should communicate; otherwise the confusion will be total. Secretary Kissinger: Have you been in Africa? You might enjoy hunting there. Minister Gromyko: I have been in Arab Africa, not black Africa. Secretary Kissinger: In Algiers? Minister Gromyko: In passing. I passed through there to attend the Crimean Conference [in 1945]. Secretary Kissinger: I’ve always had respect for Stalin’s foreign policy. He had a long-range vision. Minister Gromyko: I agree. Secretary Kissinger: [Offers toast] To our cooperation. Minister Gromyko: To our cooperation. Memorandum by Secretary of State Kissinger for the President’s File: Washington, December 26, 1973 (649). The President interjected with a question: What was the Soviet intelligence on how long it would take the Chinese to catch up with the United States and the Soviet Union? We thought it was twenty years. Why did the Soviets think it was 10–15 years? Ambassador Dobrynin asked the President what the question was. Did he still think it would take twenty years? The President turned to Dr. Kissinger, who said that it was not a question of a Chinese capability comparable to that of the United States or Soviet Union, but a Chinese capability to do extreme damage. Ambassador Dobrynin emphasized the extreme demands of the Chinese in their border dispute. Memorandum of Conversation: Moscow, March 25, 1974 (724). Secretary Kissinger: But our impression is you do have nuclear weapons in socialist countries. General Secretary Brezhnev: We have no atomic weapons anywhere and don’t give atomic weapons to anyone. Secretary Kissinger: We don’t give them to anyone but these aircraft carriers are related to the situation in the Middle East. General Secretary Brezhnev: That would be tantamount to our giving surface-to-surface missiles to Egypt and Syria and saying… Secretary Kissinger: That is different, Mr. General Secretary. Aircraft carriers are under American control. General Secretary Brezhnev: Egypt and Syria would be only too happy to have surface-to-surface missiles. Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptians told us you gave them surface-to-surface missiles. And Arabs never tell an untruth. General Secretary Brezhnev: Sadat was offended at us for not allowing him to fire surface-to-surface missiles even without nuclear warheads. Secretary Kissinger: One [was fired] on the last day of the war. General Secretary Brezhnev: They were under our control the whole time. Secretary Kissinger: We thought it was a very constructive move. But we haven’t given surface-to-surface missiles to the Israelis. General Secretary Brezhnev: That may be true, but I am talking about the situation as it stands. Incidentally, Egypt tells you one thing and us another. Secretary Kissinger: I find it hard to believe Arabs wouldn’t tell you the exact truth. [Brezhnev and Gromyko smile; Kissinger laughs.] General Secretary Brezhnev: I think my smile says enough. Secretary Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I am sure some countries in the Middle East are telling you one thing and us another, and would like nothing better than to have us quarrel because of them. Relationships in that area are even more temporary than elsewhere. So we have no illusions. General Secretary Brezhnev: We have some information that Libya is about to unite with America. Or Libya wants America to join it, under the aegis of Qaddafi. Foreign Minister Gromyko: But you can’t have two Presidents! Memorandum of Conversation: Moscow, March 26, 1974 (779). There was a break from 7:05 to 7:30. Mr. Lodal [Director of Program Analysis, NSC] came in. Brezhnev roughed up Lodal’s hair and commented that he needed a haircut; Kissinger agreed. Dobrynin pointed out that Lodal’s hair was not long by American standards. On his way back to his seat, Brezhnev picked up Mr. Rodman’s [NSC Staff] case containing Dr. Kissinger’s briefing books and walked off into the next room. Mr. Rodman followed him. Brezhnev turned around and came back. Mr. Rodman retrieved the case. Mr. Gromyko affirmed that it was a joke. The meeting then resumed. Memorandum of Conversation: Geneva, April 29, 1974 (869). Staff. A friend said, “You’re crazy.” He said, “Is that a necessary qualification to be on the General Staff?” [Laughter] Kissinger: Our General Staff accuses you of betraying the countryif you agree to ban things they didn’t plan to do anyway.

Iran's Head of Atomic Energy Organization Abbasi-Davani speaks at the 55th IAEA General Conference in Vienna on September 19, 2011 (Herwig Prammer/Courtesy Reuters). For those who regularly read the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports from the Director General to the Board of Governors on Iran’s nuclear program, the report leaked yesterday was remarkable in scope and detail of its findings. In particular, the annex, “Possible Military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” listed every step required to make a highly enriched uranium nuclear explosive device and ballistic missile delivery system. An anonymous Obama administration official correctly stated: “It’s a very telltale sign of nuclear weapons work.” Yet, like the previous thirty-four IAEA Iran reports, this one does not answer the essential question of whether Iranian decision-makers have opted to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. That is an issue of intent, which is a judgment call that the Statute of the IAEA does not authorize the agency to attempt. The relevant statute authorizes the IAEA: “To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.” In the recent discussions over whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon and how the international community could respond, some history and perspective might be useful. Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on July 1, 1968. Under the NPT, Iran agreed that it was a non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty, which prohibits Iran from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, like most other non-nuclear weapons State Parties to the Treaty, Iran was required to enter into a NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which it did in May 1974. (As of June, fifteen non-nuclear weapons State Parties have not yet signed such a safeguard agreement with the IAEA.) The May 1974 NPT Safeguards Agreement has ninety-eight articles, which lay out in detail the rights and responsibilities between the IAEA and Iran as a signatory to the NPT. Articles I and II of that Safeguards Agreement are worth recreating in whole, because they are the crux of the ongoing eight-year dispute between Tehran and Vienna over whether Iran is living up to its NPT obligations: Article 1 The Government of Iran undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the [NPT] Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article 2 The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Iran, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying. To strengthen the authority and effectiveness of the IAEA at verifying that non-nuclear weapon State Parties—such as Iran—are not using their permitted civilian nuclear programs for prohibited military purposes, Tehran also signed an Additional Protocol of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in December 2003. Despite the headline-grabbing findings in the IAEA report’s annex, the crucial issue for the international community is found in one sentence: “As Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” Therefore, the issue of Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons activities is a function of whether a technical agency—classified as an "autonomous international organization” under an arrangement between the UN and the IAEA—can verify that a member state is complying with a thirty-seven year old mutual agreement. Since Iran first acknowledged in 2002 that it has pursued a covert uranium enrichment program since the mid-1980s, the answer has been no. The IAEA is mandated to continue working with Iran to assure that it complies with the non-proliferation agreements that they endorse. Again, this does not mean Iran’s decision-makers have decided to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, which many U.S. policymakers have assumed since at least January 1994, when then-Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis stated: “Iran’s actions leave little doubt that Tehran is intent upon developing a nuclear weapons capability. They are inconsistent with any rational civil nuclear program." Unfortunately, rationality is rarely the sole driving factor behind whether a government decides to become a nuclear weapons power.

A view of the street after a violent clashes between Libyan interim government forces and loyalists of Muammar Gaddafi in Sirte on October 18, 2011 (Esam Al-Fetori/Courtesy Reuters). I have a piece featured today on Foreignpolicy.com that contributes to the debate on the future of humanitarian intervention in the wake of the NATO-led intervention in Libya. Specifically, the debate participants all considered the effect of Qaddafi’s removal from power on the emerging concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). My contribution addressed an understudied, unintended consequence of the broadening international acceptance and demonstrable enforcement of R2P: given that nuclear weapons are the only reliable means of deterrence for a conventional military intervention targeting regime change, R2P could serve as an incentive for authoritarian regimes to pursue the bomb. Many proponents of R2P misuse the term as a catchall for actions by a sovereign nation that put its civilian population at risk. Some advocates go further and contend that R2P includes a binding legal requirement to militarily intervene in a country that intentionally harms its own people. In order to clear up any misconceptions, it is useful to quickly review the definition of R2P, and what that definition means and does not mean for the international community. The legal mandate and formal guidance for R2P is found in three core agreements and reports: - World Summit Outcome, September 15, 2005. “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.” - Report of the Secretary General, “Implementing the responsibility to protect,” January 12, 2009. - Report of the Secretary General, “Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect,” July 14, 2010. Of the three documents, the 2009 report outlines the main framework of the R2P and presents a three pillar strategy, with the caveat that “there is no set sequence to be followed from one pillar to another, nor is it assumed that one is more important than another.” “It is the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.” “It is the commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations…which could entail confidential or public suasion, education, training and/or assistance.” “It is the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.” This can include peaceful persuasion, targeted diplomatic and economic sanctions, and arms embargoes. In addition, “no strategy for fulfilling the responsibility to protect would be complete without the possibility of collective enforcement measures, including through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases.” It is important to understand that within the three pillar strategy, military force is only one of the “timely and decisive” tools at the disposal of the international community, which must be authorized by the Security Council. Moreover, the third pillar does not explicitly endorse regime change as the objective of military force in R2P interventions, but rather to protect populations from the four specified crimes and violations listed in the first pillar. My fellow debater, Gareth Evans, poses a thought provoking question on the future application of R2P: in the case of intervention to stop atrocities, is it all or nothing? Although sovereignty does not confer impunity on government to do whatever it wishes within its territory, R2P does not allow the international community free reign to use military force to implement and enforce the third pillar. Rather, force is only to be exercised as an option of last resort in “extreme cases” to protect the civilian population, not to remove the offending regime.

U.S. President Obama delivers speech in Hradcany Square in Prague on April 5, 2009 (Jason Reed/Courtesy Reuters). This is a guest post by CFR senior fellow Frank Klotz. President Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague won widespread acclaim for its commitment “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” It also laid out a fairly specific agenda for moving toward that goal. Several “concrete steps” were proposed, including the completion of three major treaties: a new strategic arms control agreement with Russia, a global ban on nuclear tests, and a new treaty to cut off production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The successful negotiation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia marked the first major accomplishment in this ambitious work plan. Almost immediately after its ratification by the Senate last December, senior Administration officials announced their intention to move out on the other steps outlined in the Prague speech, including pursuing even further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and, for the first time, limits on tactical and non-deployed nuclear weapons. Now, barely ten months later, several observers have taken the Obama Administration to task for supposedly making little progress on the Prague agenda. As The Atlantic recently reported, “many of those following weapons policy say Obama’s effort to begin reshaping the U.S.’s own massive nuclear arsenal in light of the zero goal has proceeded far more slowly than expected.” In fact, U.S. arms control officials have been remarkably active on a number of different fronts. That’s certainly the impression Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller conveyed last week in a speech to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. Her wide-ranging account of ongoing arms control efforts belies the notion that the U.S. Administration has put the Prague agenda on pause. With respect to further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, Gottemoeller noted that both the United States and NATO are currently examining their strategic requirements and options for the future. “While this work is proceeding,” she added, “the United States is ready for serious discussion with Russia of the conceptual, definitional and technical issues that will face us in the next phases of negotiation.” Gottemoeller also reaffirmed that the Obama Administration remains committed to U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which is key to the treaty entering into force on a global basis. The United States actually signed the CTBT during the Clinton Administration, but it has languished in political limbo ever since supporters failed to muster the necessary votes when the Senate considered it in 1999. Current Administration officials acknowledge that a renewed debate over CTBT will be “spirited, vigorous, and likely contentious,” and have not set a timeframe for a renewed bid for Senate ratification. For now, they are concentrating on laying the groundwork for a push when the time is right, emphasizing the non-proliferation merits of CTBT, as well as the steps taken to mitigate previously-expressed concerns about monitoring treaty compliance and ensuring the reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile without full-scale testing. Finally, Gottemoeller stated that the United States was eager to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which has been an objective of the arms control community for years. U.S. officials have made no secret of their frustration with lack of progress within the Conference on Disarmament – the 65-member forum with responsibility for multilateral arms control and disarmament. While continuing to profess that the CD is the proper venue for negotiations on cut off treaty, the United States has joined in discussions with the “P5” group of declared nuclear powers on ways to encourage CD action during 2012. Achieving a final agreement in any of these areas in the near term will be difficult. Fundamental differences remain between the United States and Russia on missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, and conventional global strike weapons. Additionally, the current, highly-charged political atmosphere in Washington would certainly mean tough sledding for any new nuclear arms control initiative requiring Congressional approval, especially with attention now riveted on impending budget cuts and the 2012 election campaign beginning to heat up. But, the reality is that arms control has almost always been a painstakingly slow process. The iconic nuclear arms control treaties of the Cold War era – SALT I, the INF Treaty, START I – took years to conclude, in some cases spanning more than one presidential term. Considerable effort and time were required to grind through countless arcane technical issues, and to satisfy disparate domestic constituencies. No one should ever expect quick results in the arms control business. Preparing the proverbial battlefield is an indispensable first step to success in any negotiation, and that takes a lot of hard work, persistence… and patience. Frank Klotz is a Senior Fellow for Strategic Studies and Arms Control at the Council on Foreign Relations, and the former commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. While serving on the National Security Council staff from 2001 to 2003, he participated in negotiations leading to the Moscow Treaty.

Did Pakistani government officials know Bin Laden was living in Abbottabad, and did they provide shelter to him and his support network?

At their meeting in Deauville May 25, Russian President Medvedev and U.S. President Obama remained stalled on missile defense cooperation and Russia’s bid to join the WTO, says CFR’s Stephen Sestanovich.

The Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review charts new positions on potential targets of U.S. atomic weapons, preventing proliferation, and developing new weapons, says CFR’s Michael Levi.

Following a post-Cold War erosion of senior level attention to nuclear weapons stewardship, the Air Force general charged with protecting the U.S. nuclear arsenal says his service is finally regaining its strategic focus.

The United States has pursued missile defense technologies for six decades, with mixed results. Changes under the Obama administration, including adjustments to planned defenses in Europe, could portend a new direction.

CFR Fellow Micah Zenko says U.S. air strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas are ineffective as a counterinsurgency tool. He recommends that Washington create oversight mechanisms for its covert operations in the tribal areas and develop a comprehensive national strategy toward Pakistan.

Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent defense analyst in Moscow, is pessimistic about a Russia-U.S. rapprochement in part because of enduring concerns about U.S. missile defense system plans.

U.S. missile defense in the twenty-first century is focused on emerging threats from North Korea and Iran, but critics say these systems are too costly and largely unproven.