Defense Technology

The following is a guest post by Megan Roberts, associate director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program, and Kyle Evanoff, research associate, international economics and U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Autonomous weapons are on the agenda in Geneva this week. The Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, which has members and observers drawn from national governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, is holding its first meeting since it was established last year under the auspices of the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW. On the table for discussion are the technical, legal, military and ethical dimensions of machines capable of making battlefield decisions without human oversight. The stakes are high. Autonomous weapons have, in recent years, catapulted into the defense and security strategies of the world’s leading powers. Top-ranking officials in Russia, China and the United States, recognizing the military potential of advanced robotics and artificial intelligence, have invested billions into developing the technologies. That has led a growing ensemble of civil society actors to voice concerns that automated warfare will jeopardize human rights, international law and global security. A litany of groups and individuals, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Jody Williams, have advocated an international prohibition on autonomous weapons, pinning their hopes on the United Nations and the CCW. Can they succeed in their quest for a ban? You can find our thoughts in our World Politics Review article.

This post was coauthored with Sungtae (Jacky) Park, research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. South Korea is in turmoil, with President Park Geun-hye having been suspended from office by the South Korean national assembly after being implicated as an accomplice in the criminal investigation of her close friend, Choi Soon-sil. Consequently, the South Korean conservatives have lost popularity among the public, and the center-left Minjoo Party’s Moon Jae-in has emerged as the front-runner in South Korea’s looming presidential election, which must be held within sixty days if Park’s impeachment is upheld at the South Korean constitutional court. This situation has led many Korea-watchers to be concerned about how Seoul might reorient its foreign policy, with the South Korean progressives poised to retake the Blue House. Unlike the conservatives, the progressives tend to be more skeptical of the planned deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the Korean Peninsula, critical of the December 2015 comfort woman agreement with Japan, and have indicated desires to reengage in diplomacy with North Korea. But sometimes it is more useful to step back and examine the forest, rather than focusing on the trees. A careful evaluation of South Korea’s national interests, constraints, variables affecting its foreign policy, and strategic options, in a recent Council on Foreign Relations discussion paper, The Korean Pivot: Seoul’s Strategic Choices and Rising Rivalries in Northeast Asia, authored by Scott Snyder, Darcie Draudt, and Sungtae (Jacky) Park, reveals that South Korea’s future choices are constrained by many broader structural forces outside of Seoul’s control. To begin with, South Korea is dealing with an increasingly precarious regional environment. The reliability of the U.S.-Korea alliance has been thrown into question. Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development continues, and the country may be capable of mounting a nuclear warhead on its medium-range Nodong missiles to threaten Japan and South Korea. South Korea also faces the risk of being caught in conflicts involving the United States, China, and Japan, while South Korea’s trade-dependent economy means the country’s economic prospects rely on international market forces, limiting its own ability to manage economic affairs. These external variables will matter more in shaping Seoul’s strategic choices than policy positions taken by a newly-elected South Korean president, who must navigate these treacherous issues with limited margin for error. Given that Northeast Asia’s security environment is deteriorating, Seoul will no doubt continue to seek a strong alliance with Washington and is unlikely to pursue a foreign policy of neutrality, independence, or alignment with China. At the same time, South Korea will likely pursue a combination of hedging, regionalism, and networking to mitigate regional tensions and to avoid entrapment in great power conflicts, although Seoul could choose to balance against China at a later stage. Effective hedging would require South Korea to not only pursue friendly relations with China, but also make a clear assessment of issues critical to the maintenance of the U.S.-ROK alliance, those that affect U.S.-ROK relations but may not be critical, and decisions that can be deferred. Moreover, South Korea needs to pursue serious economic reforms to maintain its status as a middle power and improve relations with Japan. For its part, Washington should avoid overreacting to every South Korean move that seems to be “tilting toward Beijing”; South Korea is not about to become a Chinese tributary state. Moreover, a loosening of the alliance would undercut Seoul’s leverage with Beijing and is not in South Korea’s interest. South Korea is also unlikely to unilaterally call for the removal of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula under current conditions. The United States should recognize that a positive Sino-South Korean relationship, if it can be achieved, will contribute to stability in Northeast Asia by mitigating Chinese concerns that the U.S.-ROK alliance might be directed against China. South Korea ultimately shares with the United States an interest in the freedom of navigation and in maintaining the liberal world order. Given that the Korean Peninsula is geographically closer to China than to the United States or Japan, South Korea would be the first to suffer if the Chinese modify the regional order in their favor. In such a case, South Korea would naturally increase U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation and take a tougher stance against Chinese revisionism. Until then, Washington can afford to be patient. The United States should also support South Korea’s attempts at network diplomacy and the creation of regional security mechanisms. Seoul’s pursuit of such initiatives will not fundamentally alter the overall regional dynamics, but such initiatives could be tension-mitigating mechanisms that help to delay and manage crises. As a country sensitive to both U.S. and Chinese interests, South Korea could be in a good position to push regional mechanisms and network diplomacy with U.S. backing. Washington has yet to enthusiastically endorse Seoul’s initiatives such as the erstwhile Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), but Northeast Asian stability could benefit from better U.S.-ROK coordination on regionalism and networking. Despite the rising uncertainty that South Korea has to deal with, in the face of both its own domestic political crisis and the election of Donald Trump, the North Korean threat is becoming ever more dangerous and is a common challenge for both the United States and South Korea. Both countries also have to deal with an increasingly complex regional environment in Northeast Asia. Given the costs and stakes involved, no American president can afford to step away from the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea’s next president will inherit the same problems and constraints that the Park administration has faced in its efforts to solve what she termed the “Asian Paradox.” For more information on the themes discussed above, please download the CFR discussion paper, The Korean Pivot: Seoul’s Strategic Choices and Rising Rivalries in Northeast Asia.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Larry Hong, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. India kicks off state elections. Political contests in five Indian states over the next two months will offer insight into citizens’ attitudes toward Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s agenda. Last weekend, voters took to the polls in Goa and Punjab. Turnouts in the two states were unusually high with roughly 83 percent of eligible voters taking part in Goa, and 75 percent in Punjab. The relatively new Aam Aadmi party, which focuses on fighting corruption, is expected to excel in Punjab. Voting in Uttar Pradesh, which boasts a whopping 138 million registered voters, begins this weekend and will take place over the course of seven days this month and next. Elections are also being held in the states of Uttarakhand and Manipur. Among the hot campaign topics are unemployment rates and demonetization. The Modi government’s decision to ban 86 percent of all bills in circulation as part of  an effort to fight corruption produced considerable turmoil this fall, and could be a decisive issue for voters, particularly those in rural areas. Major wins for Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will demonstrate popular support for his initiatives, while losses could weaken the BJP government. The election results for all five states will be announced in March; until then expect a flurry of campaign rhetoric. 2. South Korean companies feel pinch over THAAD. Chinese displeasure with South Korea’s decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system has manifested recently in economic troubles for South Korean companies. While South Korean Finance Minister Yoo Il Ho has stated that China has not taken any retaliatory measures over THAAD that warrant official state action, companies like Hyundai are experiencing fallout from Beijing’s dissatisfaction. Hyundai Motor Company recently announced the deferment of the Chinese launch of its Sonata plug-in hybrid due to a recent revision of Chinese qualifications for government subsidies, which now conveniently exclude the Hyundai Sonata hybrid. Lotte’s construction on a theme park in Shenyang, China has also been postponed after Beijing took issue with procedural matters following a fire inspection. The company has also been subject to an increasing number of regulatory probes in China. South Korea’s popular culture and tourism sectors are also feeling the THAAD backlash; music concerts and other performances by South Korean artists have been mysteriously cancelled or postponed, while reports of increasing restrictions on Chinese tourism to South Korea during peak travel seasons have led to a slump in stocks reliant on Chinese tourism. 3. Six Red Cross workers killed in Afghanistan. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported on Wednesday that six of its employees were killed and two went missing in northern Afghanistan’s Jowzjan province while they were en route to deliver livestock materials to remote communities hit by avalanches. Lutfallah Azizi, the provincial governor, said that “unknown gunmen” carried out the attack and claimed they were affiliates of the Islamic State. Although the Taliban has carried out the greatest proportion of the violence in Afghanistan’s fifteen-year war, the group swiftly denied involvement in this particular incident. Peter Maurer, the president of ICRC, tweeted that he was “devastated by this news out of #Afghanistan. My deepest condolences to the families of those killed – and those still unaccounted for.” 4. Booming Chinese overseas deals still face obstacles. In 2016, Chinese acquisitions of foreign companies—about 16 percent of the worldwide total of cross-border deals—skyrocketed to more than twice their 2015 volume. But according to new figures, the amount in cancelled deals grew even faster. In the United States and Europe alone, overseas acquisitions worth $75 billion were scrapped because of regulatory issues, a sevenfold increase from 2015. Because of increased capital outflow controls that can block Chinese companies from making investments abroad, as well as regulatory scrutiny from government actors such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), thirty Chinese deals fell through. Some important acquisitions are still on the table for 2017, despite the opposition: Midea just completed its purchase of Kuka, a German robotics company, for $5 billion, and ChemChina will likely take over Swiss agribusiness giant Syngenta for $43 billion later this year. Despite the hurdles for Chinese investors, the sheer volume of their deal-making is an achievement in itself, given that a decade ago it amounted to less than $3 billion a year. 5. New terms for U.S. studios in China. Hollywood will soon be able to renegotiate the terms of agreement on film releases in China, amidst a slowdown in China’s box office growth. The current agreement was announced in February 2012, during a tour of the United States by Xi Jinping, then China’s vice president and now its president. The agreement raised the number of blockbusters permitted in the Chinese market and allowed foreign filmmakers to receive a larger share of box office revenues. The two countries also decided to renegotiate the agreement in five years. Hollywood has a high stake in seeking better business terms in the new negotiations as China is on track to surpass the United States as the world’s largest movie market. According to several executives, U.S. studios’ top priority in the talks is increasing their share of Chinese box-office receipts from the current 25 percent. While there have been some preliminary negotiations, many observers worry that President Donald J. Trump’s harsh rhetoric on China’s trade practices will have an adverse effect on future discussions. Geetha Ranganathan, an analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence, says that the Trump administration is “making everybody very, very nervous"; the renegotiation “could be a casualty if he really wants to come down hard on it.” It remains unclear whether President Trump’s phone call with President Xi will help smooth the process for these negotiations and others. Bonus: Abe tees off a new era of golf-course diplomacy. After visiting Washington, DC, this Friday, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will hitch a ride on Air Force One to spend an overnight at Mar a Lago, President Trump’s luxurious Florida resort. There, the two leaders will share meals and engage in a classic test of strategy and skill—the game of golf. At their first meeting, in November, Abe and Trump established their common interest in the game through an exchange of golf-themed gifts. This weekend’s encounter will echo an earlier moment in golf-course diplomacy, when, in 1957, then Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, Abe’s grandfather, played a round with then U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Trump has praised the game as a diplomatic tool, and once said that former U.S. President Barack Obama “should play with people who can help the country... if he played more with maybe foreign leaders, it would be a wonderful thing.” Will Chinese President Xi Jinping be next on the green?

I spoke with Matthew Fuhrmann, associate professor of political science at Texas A&M University, visiting associate professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and one of the  most innovative scholars of nuclear proliferation. We discussed Matt’s soon-to-be released book Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). The book was co-authored with University of Virginia associate professor of politics Todd Sechser, whom I spoke with earlier this year. Matt and I discussed his research on targeting and attacking nuclear programs, the risks of peaceful nuclear proliferation, and the effectiveness of arms control agreements. Matt also recently coauthored a fascinating article with Michael Horowitz and Sarah Kreps, “The Consequences of Drone Proliferation: Separating Fact from Fiction.” Hear Matt’s advice for young political science and international relations scholars, follow him @mcfuhrmann, and listen to my conversation with a policy-relevant international security scholar.

It is easy to become frustrated as one reviews the inventory of seemingly failed or inadequate policy recommendations for how the United States might more effectively deal with North Korea. But frustration cannot be allowed to turn into fatalism, and important interests should not fester unattended until they metastasize into an even larger problem that will inevitably require even more dramatic, bold, and costly responses. North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons capabilities continue unchecked and complicate both military and diplomatic options for pursuing denuclearization. Michel Wallerstein showcases a clear inventory of North Korea’s continued efforts and the limited policy options for the United States, as do a range of papers for the Johns Hopkins University SAIS U.S.-Korea Institute’s nuclear futures project. The inventory of possible measures for dealing with North Korea at this stage fall into four main categories: 1) The squeezers, who hope that tougher sanctions will force North Korea to give up its nuclear capabilities. For instance, Sue Terry, writing for the National Bureau of Asian Research, recommends that the United States “double down on sanctions by enforcing against North Korea the kind of sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table.” This approach mirrors the intent of several sanctions bills under consideration in the U.S. Congress. 2) The China firsters, who anticipate that private Chinese expressions of disgust and frustration with North Korea can be integrated into China’s official policy and be leveraged to achieve a grand bargain that results in the elimination of the North Korean threat, either through Chinese acceptance of Korean unification or replacement of the Kim Jong-un regime with a North Korean leadership that respects the boundaries imposed by China’s strategic interests. For instance, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has advocated that Beijing and Washington reach strategic consensus on Korean reunification. There is a broad consensus on the need to work with China in the U.S. policy community, but there is disagreement on what could realistically be achieved with such an approach. 3) The saboteurs, who hope to take advantage of North Korea’s pursuit of provocations, nuclear tests, and human rights violations to undermine international and domestic support for the Kim regime. Harvard University’s Jieun Baek argues for a combination of covert information operations to collaborate with internal dissidents, strengthening of nongovernmental organizations that train North Korean refugees in information dissemination and business skills, and training of North Korean defectors in journalism, information technology, and social media. There is also the temptation to weaken North Korea’s legitimacy through naming and shaming regarding the country’s human rights failings as exposed by the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean human rights. 4) Re-engagers, who see continued dialogue with North Korea as an essential step in “probing North Korea’s intentions.” A variant of this view recognizes that in the face of the seemingly impossible dream of denuclearization, the United States should open up dialogue with North Korea on other issues where there is a chance of constructive dialogue. Doug Bandow at the Cato Institute wants the United States to withdraw and empower the South Koreans to take the lead in dealing with the North, while Adam Mount and Van Jackson support a U.S.-ROK alliance-backed “South Korea first” policy in pursuit of dialogue with North Korea. Most analysts pursue a combination strategy that employs all four levers to bring North Korea to denuclearize. In its policy of deterrence, pressure, and dialogue, the Barack Obama administration’s approach contains these elements, but thus far, not in a combination or weight that has been sufficient to make progress. My Policy Innovation Memorandum also seeks to strengthen both sanctions and engagement, but with a twist: why not take steps both to shape the environment so that North Korea recognizes that it must make a strategic choice and develop the benefits of such a choice with greater specificity, both through concrete studies of what North Korea can gain economically from integration and from development by the five parties in Six Party Talks (absent North Korea) of the tangible benefits that would accrue from a sincere return to the “action-for-action” approach that initially characterized the Six Party Process. Resuming Six Party Talks without North Korea would have two important effects. It would spell out publicly the tangible benefits that would accompany denuclearization so as to stimulate a more active debate over denuclearization among Pyongyang’s elites, and it would provide a benchmark by defining a reasonable consensus among North Korea’s neighbors on the benefits that should rightfully accrue from denuclearization. Some may argue that this proposal sounds like a last ditch strategy; others may prefer a different combination of the options outlined above. But one thing is sure: when North Korea’s nuclear weapons problem metastasizes from an important issue into an urgent issue, there will be even fewer feasible options available for consideration.

  In an interview with the Family Research Council last week, Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) described what U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear-related facilities would entail: The president is trying to make you think it would be 150,000 heavy mechanized troops on the ground in the Middle East again as we saw in Iraq and that’s simply not the case. It would be something more along the lines of what President Clinton did in December 1998 during Operation Desert Fox: Several days air and naval bombing against Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities for exactly the same kind of behavior—for interfering with weapons inspectors and for disobeying Security Council resolutions. All we’re asking is that the president simply be as tough in the protection of America’s national security interest as Bill Clinton was. Several policymakers and analysts have correctly pointed out that Cotton vastly underestimates the costs and consequences involved with bombing Iran’s nuclear program. Beyond underselling the difficulty of such an attack, Cotton either misrepresents or misunderstands what really happened during the four-day U.S. and UK bombing of Iraq in December 1998. Though Operation Desert Fox is now routinely misremembered as such, in reality, it was not a bombing campaign intended to “take out” Iraq’s WMD program. Rather, it was designed and executed to punish the Saddam Hussein regime by degrading Iraq’s air defenses, killing Hussein’s security forces, and damaging missile and aircraft delivery systems for potential WMDs. It is essential to know that the Operation Desert Fox target list was not primarily WMD-related. In fact, when Secretary of Defense William Cohen briefed the press about the scope of targets, he did not mention WMD at all: • I want to stress that this military action is substantial. It is inflicting significant damage on the seven target categories that we have selected. These are as follows: • Iraq’s air defense system. • The command and control system that Saddam Hussein uses to direct his military and to repress his people. • The security forces and facilities to protect and hide his efforts to develop or maintain the deadly chemical and biological weapons. These are the forces that have worked to prevent the United Nations inspectors from doing their jobs. • The industrial base that Saddam Hussein uses to sustain and deliver his deadly weapons. • His military infrastructure, including the elite Republican Guard forces that pose the biggest threat to his neighbors and protect his weapons of mass destruction programs. • The airfields and refinery that produces oil products that Iraq smuggles in violation of economic sanctions. A conversation between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that took place one day into the 1998 Iraq bombing was just released by the Clinton Presidential Library. During the phone call, Clinton stated, “The first thing we try to take out is their integrated communications and air defense systems.” Similarly, any bombing of Iran’s known nuclear program would absolutely start with establishing air superiority with a broad-based series of cruise missile and airstrikes against Iran’s integrated air defense system. In reality, only 12 percent of Operation Desert Fox’s intended targets were related to Iraq’s possible WMD sites—several of which were under full-time United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) camera monitoring. The one-hundred planned targets included twelve WMD industry and production facilities, and eighteen WMD security sites (the barracks and headquarters for Hussein’s most elite military units that primarily protected regime leadership). The other non-WMD or -missile targets included thirty-four air defense installations, twenty command and control sites, nine Republic Guard barracks, six airfields, and one oil refinery. Moreover, degrading Iraq’s integrated air defense system and the regime’s command and control capabilities was easy since American and British pilots had been patrolling the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq for six years. The intelligence staffs for Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch had carefully mapped and continuously tracked every threatening air defense radar, anti-aircraft gun, and towed or mobile surface-to-air missile systems that Iraq possessed. In addition, the CIA had penetrated UNSCOM weapons inspection teams, including its communication relay towers, to collect information on Iraq’s military communications. The U.S. military and Intelligence Community (IC) had unique insights into Iraq in 1998, which they would not enjoy in Iran today. Though the target sets were well known and threat environment minimal, Operation Desert Fox was not a resounding military success. This, despite President Clinton, without prompting, increasing the number of authorized cruise missiles and air sorties initially proposed to him from 300 and 700, to 400 and 800, respectively, according to then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton. There were 275 aim-points (211 of which were partially or fully struck) amongst the one-hundred planned targets: forty-three targets were severely damaged or destroyed, thirty moderately damaged, twelve lightly, and thirteen untouched. Afterward, Gen. Anthony Zinni, commander-in-chief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), characterized the bombing as “74 percent successful.” Pentagon and CENTCOM officials wanted to restrike several of these targets, but the White House insisted that the bombing be completed by the start of Ramadan. Sen. Cotton would probably not tout Operation Desert Fox so glowingly if he knew it had lasted only four days out of concern for political sensitivities in the Muslim world. In total, Iraq’s ballistic missile production capabilities were set back about one to two years, and 1,400 of Hussein’s military and security forces were killed and wounded. Within just fourteen months, U.S. satellite imagery and intelligence reports revealed that Iraq had rebuilt several of the alleged WMD and missile facilities that were damaged. Worse, the IC lost what little direct access it had to these sites when UNSCOM inspectors were kicked out after the four-day bombing ceased. As the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence noted in its 2004 report on pre-war intelligence of Iraq, “Most of the intelligence community’s knowledge of Iraqi WMD programs was obtained from, in conjunction with, and in support of the UNSCOM inspections…When UN inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, the [IC] was left with a limited unilateral collection capability against Iraq’s WMD…The CIA did not have any WMD sources in Iraq after 1998.” After several media outlets questioned Sen. Cotton’s assertion last week, his communications director clarified his thinking: “We think Desert Fox is a very close comparison. It serves as an analogy of the intent, execution and objective for that type of operation [long-range strike to target weapons facilities].” Yet, Operation Desert Fox is a poor historical analogy for thinking about bombing Iran’s nuclear program. This is because the 1998 military operation had little to do with Iraq’s WMD program, and everything to do with punishing Saddam Hussein. If Cotton truly desires to (temporarily) punish and coerce the leadership in Tehran, and lose direct insights into Iran’s nuclear sites, then Operation Desert Fox is indeed a useful comparison.

The April 24, 1984, edition of the British defense publication Jane’s Defence Weekly informed its readers: “Iran is engaged in the production of an atomic bomb, likely to be ready within two years, according to press reports in the Persian Gulf last week.” Subsequent warnings from U.S. and foreign sources about Iran’s imminent acquisition of a nuclear weapon have been offered over the past four decades. These false guesses are worth bearing in mind as news from the P5+1 nuclear negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland emerges. More technical “breakout” estimates—the time it would take Iran to compile enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel one nuclear weapon—continue to be published, with slightly varying timelines. Setting aside logic, wisdom, and a huge range of assumptions, if you average these five estimates, Iran would require 89.8 days, or three months, if it made a hypothetical rush for one bombs-worth of HEU. • 1.9-2.2 months (Institute for Science and International Security, October 24, 2013) • 6 months (Arms Control, September 29, 2014) • 1.7 months (Iran Watch, February 24, 2015) • 45-87 days (Bipartisan Policy Center February 23, 2015) • 3 months (Washington Institute, March 28, 2015) It is essential to recognize that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapons program, nor does it possess a nuclear weapon. On February 26, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Ayatollah Khomenei, the supreme leader of Iran, ended his country’s nuclear weapons program in 2003 and “as far as we know, he’s not made the decision to go for a nuclear weapon.” This repeats the “high-confidence” judgement of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) that was first made in November 2007. Clapper added that Iran “wants to preserve options across the capabilities it would take to build [a nuclear weapon], but right now they don’t have one, and have not made that decision.” To repeat: Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapons program, nor does it possess a nuclear weapon. So when a politician, analyst, or pundit mentions an Iranian “nuclear weapons program” they are referring to a program that the IC is not aware of. Moreover, if possible, tell them to contact the Central Intelligence Agency through its “report threats” website to let the agency’s nonproliferation analysts know about whatever secret information they are basing their judgment upon. Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on July 1, 1968. Under the NPT, Iran agreed that it was a non-nuclear weapon state party, which prohibits Iran from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, like most other non-nuclear weapons, states parties to the treaty, Iran entered into a NPT Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which it did in May 1974.  The crux of the twelve-year dispute between Tehran and the IAEA is whether and to what extent Iran is in violation of its NPT obligations and UN Security Council resolution demands. As IAEA director generals have repeated, most recently last week by Yuki Amano, the inspection agency has never received adequate clarifying information about the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. While Iran has no bomb or nuclear weapons program, nine other countries do, including five that also signed the NPT. Under the treaty, the five signatories pledge to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating…to nuclear disarmament.” So while the world is focused on the nonproliferation requirements of a country with zero bombs, keep in mind the promises that remain unfulfilled from those countries with 9,835 of bombs, as well as the four countries that are nuclear outliers.

Media Availability with Secretary Hagel at Eglin AFB, Florida, U.S. Department of Defense, July 10, 2014. SEC. HAGEL: A lot of questions always come with any possibility or decision whether to take strikes or not. So those are all questions that are being asked and factors are being—are put into the process. And those are still options. Q: But what sorts of questions do you mean? SEC. HAGEL: Well, let’s start with the impact of strikes. What do you believe you can accomplish? Where would you strike? When would you strike? Who would you strike? Once you start strikes, are you prepared to sustain strikes over a long period of time or -- or short period of time? Those are just the first set of questions that have not only impact issues and questions, but long term implications. (3PA: Last week, I pointed out that while numerous U.S. officials have called for air strikes, these demands have not been matched by a clear justification or articulation of what they are intended to achieve.) Joshua Mitnick and Sara Toth Stub, “Gaza Death Toll Rises Sharply as Israel Escalates Attacks,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2014. The longest operation began in December 2008 and lasted 22 days, ending in a cease-fire and the deaths of at least 1,166 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, according to the Israeli human-rights group B’Tselem and the Israeli Foreign Ministry. A weeklong fight in 2012 left 167 Palestinians and six Israelis dead. (3PA: Since this article was published, an additional 18 Palestinians were reportedly killed. Therefore, only have 1,434 Palestinians and 19 Israelis have been killed since the Israeli-Gaza wars in 2008, but in the last two Israeli military operations, 55 percent and 52 percent of Palestinians killed were non-combatants.) Remarks by Secretary Hagel at a Troop Event, Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, U.S. Department of Defense, July 9, 2014. Make no mistake—and this country should not make any mistake on this, nor anyone in Congress—this is a threat to our country. This is a force that is sophisticated, it’s dynamic, it’s strong, it’s organized, it’s well-financed, it’s competent, ISIL. And it is a threat to our allies all over the Middle East. It’s a threat to Europe. It’s a threat to every stabilized country on Earth, and it’s a threat to us. So it is clearly in our interest—when I talk about protecting American lives in America, I also said protecting our interests. And ISIL may not appear to be an imminent threat to the United States. It is a threat to the United States. It is a threat, a clear threat to our partners in that area, and it is imminent. And I think you look further in that—in that area in the Middle East to see what’s going on, in Syria, in Lebanon, what’s going on in Israel today, the Gaza Strip, Libya, Egypt, there—there is hardly a stable country in that—in that area of the Middle East. Barbara Starr, “Pentagon considers how to target ISIS leader in drone strike,” CNN, July 9, 2014. The possibility comes as part of the U.S. military effort to gather intelligence on so-called "high value targets" in Iraq and continues to collect intelligence for targeting airstrikes in Iraq. The targets fall into three categories, the officials said. They include information for striking "high value targets" like al-Baghdadi; protection of key infrastructure such as the Haditha Dam; and blunting major ISIS offensives against Baghdad. Airstrikes by either drones or manned aircraft would have to be approved by the President. (3PA: Last week, I pointed out that while numerous U.S. officials have called for the deployment of drones, these demands have not been accompanied by justifications, and there is still no precise goal for the deployment.) Doug Cameron, “Cut Weapons Now, but Then What?” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2014. In peace time, the Navy fires around 100 a year for testing, though when conflicts arise that number shoots up quickly: almost 300 Tomahawks were fired during the Gulf War in 1991, and more than 150 during the 12-day campaign to oust Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi’s government in 2011. All told, 2,300 have been fired in combat. “Afghanistan Midyear Report 2014: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” United Nations, July 2014. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured). UNAMA attributed 74 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements, nine per cent to Pro-Government Forces (eight per cent to Afghan national security forces, one per cent to international military forces) and 12 per cent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces in which a civilian casualty could not be attributed to a specific party… UNAMA documented 1,901 civilian casualties (474 civilian deaths and 1,427 injured) from ground engagements alone. Of the 1,901 civilian casualties from ground engagements, UNAMA attributed 52 percent (270 civilian deaths and 718 injured for 988 civilian casualties) to Anti-Government Elements and 14 percent (74 civilian deaths and 200 injured for 274 civilian casualties) to Pro-Government Forces. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Anti-Government Elements – the second highest cause of civilian casualties – also killed and injured Afghan civilians at unprecedented levels. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 1,463 civilian casualties (463 civilian deaths and 1,000 injured, a seven per cent increase from the same period in 2013 and the highest recorded number of civilian deaths and injuries from IEDs since 2009. Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 428 civilian casualties (263 civilian deaths and 165 injured) from targeted and wilful killings (or attempts to kill), a 10 per cent decrease from the same period in 2013. (3PA: Revisit my blog post to see an analysis of the UN’s data on the 17,558 civilians killed in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2013, now rising to 22,411 when including data for the first six months of 2014.) Micah Zenko, “Foregoing Limited Force: The George W. Bush Administration’s Decision Not to Attack Ansar Al-Islam,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32:4, 2009, pp. 615-649. In the Zagros Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, a Kurdish terrorist organization—Ansar al-Islamwas running a training camp near the village of Khurmal, where it was reportedly producing cyanide gas, toxic poisons, and ricin for terrorist attacks by its affiliated cells in Britain, Germany, France, and Italy.2 The US military developed a combined air-ground operations option that anticipated striking the camp on 4 July 2002. That option was unanimously supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and proposed to the White House. According to General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the planned operation to destroy Khurmal ‘would have been challenging, but doable’.3 General John Keane, the US Army’s representative on the Joint Chiefs, recalled the proposed option as ‘very doable from a military perspective’.4 If there ever was a clear instance for the Bush administration to execute its post-9/11 national security policy, this was it. Yet, despite the alleged threat from Ansar al-Islam, and a reliable option to use preemptive force to defeat it, President Bush chose not to utilize limited force…(p. 616) Although largely overlooked or forgotten, the Bush administration’s claims in 2002 that WMD were being produced at Khurmal turned out to be highly accurate. An American sensitive-site exploitation team deployed to Khurmal uncovered chemical hazard suits, atropine injectors, and Arabic-language manuals on how to make chemical munitions. Tests also revealed traces of cyanide salts, ricin, and potassium chloride, all deadly toxins.107 An investigative report by the Los Angeles Times, which both examined documents and computer files seized at Khurmal and was informed by interviews with US and Kurdish intelligence operatives, found no evidence that Ansar al-Islam was connected to Hussein’s regime, but was able to prove that the group ‘was partly funded and armed from abroad; was experimenting with chemicals, including toxic agents and a cyanide-based body lotion; and had international aspirations.’ (p. 640) (3PA: It’s been reported that Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fighters located two suspected sites related to Saddam Hussein’s WMD program—one containing 40 kilograms of uranium, and another former chemical weapons complex, potentially containing mustard gas and sarin. Some analysts believe this is evidence of WMDs existing in Iraq before the invasion in March 2003. However, as I detailed in the case study on the decision not to bomb the Ansar al-Islam camp in Khurmal, there was an additional site where WMD-like toxins and poisons were being developed.) “‘International Terrorism’ Being Taught in OU Classroom,” ADA Evening News, May 5, 1977, p. 7C. Primarily, [Stephen] Sloan explains, more rigorous passport controls coupled with intelligence information on suspected terrorists is needed. “What do you have to do to get a passport?” Sloan asks. “You pay your two dollars and send your picture into a travel agency and you get a passport. Well, dammit, Atila the Hun could get a passport!”… And the role of media needs to be addressed, he says. Electronic communications make it possible for a small band of terrorists to demand “instant global publicity” for their causes. On this point, the study group recently held a seminar for Oklahoma newsmen and state and federal officials on how to work together when terrorism strikes. “Terrorism is traditionally the weapon of the weak,” he adds. “And it’s extremely cost effective in a modern technological age. For instance, it’s one thing for a band of insurgents to knock off a rural official, but it’s quite another when a small group can knock out the electronic grid of a large modern city.”