Defense and Security

Defense Technology

  • Defense Technology
    Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
    Integrating nonlethal weapons (NLW) more widely into the U.S. Army and Marine Corps could have reduced damage, saved lives, and helped limit the widespread looting and sabotage that occurred after the cessation of major conflict in Iraq. So argues this report of a Council-sponsored independent Task Force led by Dr. Graham T. Allison, director of the Belfer Center for science and international affairs at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, General Paul X. Kelley, USMC (ret.), former commandant of the Marine Corps, and former military officers, business executives, academics, diplomats, and congressional staff. Incorporating NLW capabilities into the equipment, training, and doctrine of the armed services could substantially improve U.S. effectiveness in conflict, postconflict, and homeland defense. The Task Force report concludes that equipping U.S.-trained and -supported local forces in Afghanistan and Iraq with NLW would help reinforce authority and be more acceptable to local populations than conventionally armed troops. Nonlethal weapons have not received the priority they merit at the Pentagon. To expand the role of NLW, the report argues, the secretary of defense should create an office sufficiently funded to serve as the single focal point for all NLW activity. The existing Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate has a budget for fiscal year 2004 of $43.4 million—up from an annual $22 million or so for the past seven years—the report urges a sevenfold increase in funding, to $300 million annually, which is still less than $1 of every $1,000 spent on defense. A breakdown of expenses is included in the report. The report also advocates a four-pronged approach to further integrate nonlethal capabilities into the U.S. armed services: expand NLW deployment more widely in the Marine Corps and the Army infantry and ensure that the Navy and the Air Force have such capabilities adapted for their force-protection missions; extend the range of NLW payloads to 100 meters through precision delivery and fusing systems; complete development of the NLW system that can turn back an advancing adversary from hundreds of meters away by heating the skin of an individual without permanent injury; and advance the development of concepts such as the advanced tactical laser—which shows promise for use against equipment—along with the advent of nonlethal payloads that home in on a laser spot.
  • Defense Technology
    The Price of Dominance
    President George W. Bush made clear early in his first term his intention to deploy a national missile defense as soon as possible to counter the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Jan Lodal argues that much more sweeping changes must be made in U.S. policy to deal effectively with WMD. Lodal argues that, while the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States is over, WMD remain the most serious threat to the security of the United States. The Information Revolution has spread the knowledge needed to develop these weapons and driven the globalization of commerce that makes export controls on them increasingly harder to enforce. As a result, the risk grows that rogue states and terrorist organizations may use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to oppose the United States. At the same time, China and Russia, even though they are no longer U.S. enemies, retain large nuclear forces that pose a potential threat. The Price of Dominance identifies important changes that can be made in U.S. strategic policy to ameliorate the opposition of other powers to American-led efforts against WMD proliferation. Lodal proposes a strategic vision of strong deterrence coupled with open international cooperation around which President Bush could organize a U.S. policy toward WMD. Such an approach could develop wide support domestically and internationally. As a first step, the United States would modernize its nuclear doctrine by dropping "prompt retaliatory" war plans that, when combined with necessary future antiballistic missile systems, would give the United States a nuclear first strike capability. Dropping these plans would open up the possibility of a new approach to arms control and cooperation with Russia, China, France, and others in halting WMD proliferation. A Council on Foreign Relations Book
  • United States
    National Missile Defense: Test Failure and Technology Development
    September 8, 2000—Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the critical issue of National Missile Defense (NMD) technology development. I am honored to be in the company of those who have the challenging task of managing and overseeing this critical program. As you requested, I will focus my testimony only on the impact of test results to date and what they mean for the deployment of an NMD system. But as we all know, there are many other critical factors that will impact a deployment decision, and I would urge you and your colleagues to consider these factors at some future time.I commend the Subcommittee for holding this hearing because it is difficult for an executive agency to evaluate objectively a program which it is developing. Indeed, that is why Congress in the early 1980s established a separate Director of Operational Test & Evaluation within the Department of Defense (DOD).Before discussing the results of the tests, which have been conducted, it is important to be clear, first of all, of exactly what specific NMD system we are assessing. Too often, people engaged in the debate talk past one another because they are discussing different NMD systems, e.g., land or sea-based, or space-based, or some combination thereof, or different components of a particular system.The proposed NMD system, which we are assessing today, would use ground-based interceptors (GBI) deployed initially at one site and eventually at two sites, supported by an extensive network of ground-based sensors and space-based infrared sensors. This system will have five (5) key components.Space-based early warning satellites deployed in a geosynchronous orbit some 36,000 km above the earth. Their role is to detect an ICBM within a minute of launch and provide missile launch location and targeting information.Ground and space-based sensors which are the key to the effectiveness of the NMD because they track the warheads, as well as discriminate the warhead from any decoys. These sensors include band ground-based phased array radars (a prototype is in place in Kwajelein and is being used in the current testing of the NMD system); five large phased array radars (located in Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Greenland and Britain) which will be upgraded to track incoming warheads accurately enough to guide interceptors; and, a space-based missile tracking system known as SBIRS-LOW which will not be ready before the scheduled 2005 initial deployment.Command, Control and Communication Centers in Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado and at the interceptor basing sites. The Centers are supposed to determine when the interceptors will be launched and update the information to them during their flight.The Ground-Based (GBI) Interceptor, a three-stage rocket, which must be capable of accelerating the payload or weapon to speeds of 16 to 18 thousand miles per second.Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) is a 130-pound package of miniature rocket motors, computers and sensors which is to be released by the GBI and coast through space and search for its target and kill it by colliding with it at speeds of up to 34,000 miles per hour.All five components, to various degrees, are pushing technological frontiers and to state the obvious, in order to have an effective NMD, all five components of the NMD system must work all the time. For example, the July 7, 2000 test failed because the GBI did not function properly.The current plan calls for deploying by 2005, twenty interceptors in central Alaska, a new X band radar in Shemya in the western Aleutians, and an upgrade of the existing early warning radars in Alaska, California, Massachusetts and Britain. By 2007, the number of interceptors in central Alaska would grow to 100. The complete NMD system with some 200 missiles and the other components would be in place by 2010, if construction in Alaska begins in the spring of 2001.If the proposed system is to enhance United States security and be worth the tremendous monetary and diplomatic cost, it must work and work well. There will be no second chances. Unlike the Safeguard ABM system, which we deployed in 1974, the proposed system is single shot as opposed to a layered defense. Thus, if this NMD system fails to work the first time it is used against a deliberate attack by a rogue state or an accidental launch by another nuclear power, the nation will have wasted some $100 billion, and caused unspeakable damage to its populace.Many people argue that the United States has overcome difficult technological challenges in the past 50 years: the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb in the 1940s; the development of the ICBM in the 1950s; and, the Apollo program of the 1960s. There is no doubt that this nation has the technological capacity needed to build a homing kill vehicle that can hit a high-speed warhead traveling through outer space. And, given enough time and money, the Department of Defense could do this with a high degree of reliability on the test range, i.e., 85 percent effectiveness at a 95 percent confidence level against a small-scale missile attack.But, this is not what we are doing. In order to meet the initial deployment date of 2005, the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) is doing concurrent weapons development—researching, testing and building all at the same time. It is compressing the work of 12 - 16 years into eight. This has lead to what General Larry Welch’s panel aptly describes as a rush to failure. It is no wonder that two of the last three have been complete failures and one only a marginal success. The last major concurrent weapons development program undertaken by the Pentagon was the B-1 Bomber. In the early 1980s, the Department of Defense began production of the B-1 three years before its development testing was completed. This rushed development led to chronic problems with the aircraft’s electric system which persist 20 years later.Moreover, the current testing program does not simulate real world conditions, i.e., the type of countermeasures likely to be employed by an enemy with the capability to launch an ICBM thousands of miles. Rather, the three tests of the proposed system have been against cooperative targets and even under these less demanding requirements, two of three tests have failed. Remember that the Patriot anti-missile system had a perfect record (17 out of 17) in tests, but failed almost completely against Iraqui Scuds during the Persian Gulf War because of inadvertent Iraqui countermeasures (the missiles broke apart during reentry). Since the proposed system will have to hit its target in space, and since in the vacuum of space, both heavy and light objects travel on nearly identical trajectories, large numbers of cheap decoys most likely would be deployed along with the warhead by the attacking nation.To obtain a 95 confidence level that the kill probability will be 85 percent, the proposed system should be tested successfully in a development mode a minimum of 20 times against the type of countermeasures that could be used by an attacker. (By way of contrast, the Sentinel System was tested over 100 times and Safeguard 42 times.) If there are three failures in a test series, 47 tests would need to be successful in order to provide 95 percent confidence that there would be an 85 percent probability of a single shot kill probability.What is the record to date? Overall, since 1976, when research on hit-to-kill weapons began, attempts to destroy mock warheads have failed more than 70 percent of the time. Since last October, the proposed system has been tested on three occasions against limited countermeasures (one decoy rather than nine). Two of the tests have been outright failures: in January 2000, a leak of sensor coolant made the EKV miss the target altogether and in July 2000, the EKV failed to separate from the booster rocket. Even the one successful test in October 1999 raises doubts about the effectiveness of the system. The EKV drifted off course and actually was homing in on a large balloon (decoy) when the warhead drifted into its path.By any reasonable criteria, we have not come close to meeting the 95 percent confidence level that there is an 85 percent probability that this proposed system will be effective, and even the strongest proponents of NMD do not favor deploying this system. Some of these advocates are now recommending that we switch to a Boost-Phase system which would attempt to destroy an enemy missile soon after its launch, before its warhead deploys. But, this is easier said than done and involves developing a new, more advanced interceptor, as well as more sophisticated sensor, radar and command systems than now exist. In my view, this will take a minimum of seven years of vigorous research and development before we can make an informed deployment decision.Lawrence J. KorbVice President and Director of StudiesCouncil On Foreign Relations58 East 68th StreetNew York, NY 10065
  • Defense and Security
    Nonlethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects
    The U.S. approach to international conflict in the post–Cold War period—how we think about them and what actions we take—is enormously affected by America’s capabilities to quell conflicts by diplomatic, economic, and military means. To date, the United States has been trapped between classic diplomatic table-thumping and indiscriminate economic sanctions on the one hand, and major military intervention on the other hand. However, nonlethal weapons may offer an innovative and effective middle option that could lend weight to U.S. crisis diplomacy and offer new capabilities for pressuring adversaries or fighting wars with minimal loss of life. To explore this potential and its impact on policy, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored a second Independent Task Force on Nonlethal Technologies. Despite recommendations by a 1995 Council on Foreign Relations Task Force report for “prompt action by the United States to explore nonlethal weapons options,” this 1999 follow-up report responds to the fact that little movement has been made in that direction. Under the chairmanship of Council Senior Fellow Richard L. Garwin and Project Director W. Montague Winfield, it outlines the three major steps to introducing NLWs into U.S. policy, and urges President Clinton and his administration to take action. First, the executive administration must set guidelines on how to determine the positive and negative aspects of the use of NLWs; second, sufficient funding must be allocated to researching and developing NLWs; finally, the efficacy and coordination of military leadership must be on par with the project’s importance.
  • Americas
    Non-Lethal Technologies
    The U.S. approach to international conflicts in the post-Cold War period—how we think about them and what actions we take—is enormously affected by America's capabilities to quell them by diplomatic, economic, and military means. To date, the United States has been trapped between classic diplomatic table-thumping and indiscriminate economic sanctions on the one hand, and major military intervention on the other hand. But a new and effective middle option may emerge in the future, one that could lend weight to U.S. crisis diplomacy in situations such as the conflict in Kosovo and offer new capabilities for pressuring adversaries or fighting wars with minimal loss of life. This potential new option could come in the form of non-lethal warfare. To explore this potential and its impact on policy, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored this independent Task Force to assess the current status of non-lethal weapons development and policy. The Task Force found that while the military services have been examining non-lethal possibilities for years, weapons development and thinking usage has been very slow. This report recommends that the administration take three urgent steps: first, set clear guidelines for working through the pros and cons of when and how these weapons might be employed; second, provide substantial new funds for research and development; and third, ensure better leadership and coordination of this process within and among the military services. Until the administration is ahead on these fronts, and the Defense Department engages in a much more serious and systematic evaluation process, the Task Force judges that policy-makers will be in no position to determine just how useful non-lethal weapons might be and set policy accordingly.