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Introduction
Over the last several decades, governments have collectively pledged to slow global warming. But despite intensified diplomacy, the world is already facing the consequences of climate…
Japan Rearmed
The Politics of Military Power
Japan’s United States–imposed postwar constitution renounced the use of offensive military force, but, Sheila A. Smith shows, a nuclear North Korea and an increasingly assertive China have the Japanese rethinking that commitment—and their reliance on U.S. security.
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“Tokyo’s approach to military power”—restraining its own use of force and relying on the United States for security—“is being tested,” writes Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow for Japan Studies Sheila A. Smith. “The reliability of the United States, more than the military capabilities of its neighbors, will in the end decide the future of Japan’s approach to military power.”
“Deterring war rather than waging it has become the purpose of Japan’s military power,” explains Smith in her new book, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power. Japan’s pacifist postwar constitution renounced “the use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” and Japan’s military—the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)—“continues to be dedicated to an exclusively defensive mission.” Allying with the United States “has provided strategic protection for Japan, deterring its nuclear neighbors with America’s nuclear umbrella.”
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However, in response to calls from Washington for greater Japanese participation in collective security, “Japan’s military has come out of the domestic shadows and into the international spotlight, making it an increasingly cosmopolitan arm of the Japanese state,” writes Smith. “Whether under UN auspices or led by the United States, Japan’s military has gained experience in a variety of international coalition opportunities, including peacekeeping, postconflict reconstruction, disaster relief, and maritime coalition operations.”
Japanese leaders “understand that it is not in their best interest to limit their military as others invest in their own,” Smith writes, and “the growing military power of China and North Korea create pressures on Japan’s defenses.” With North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and China’s increasingly assertive maritime activities, Northeast Asia has become a more contested region where the SDF “now regularly runs up against the expanding armed forces of its neighbors.”
“As American political leaders openly debate their commitment to allied defenses, Japanese politicians are beginning to argue for greater military capabilities,” Smith writes, “including limited strike capability, to ensure potential adversaries do not miscalculate SDF readiness.” Smith identifies three crisis scenarios that could prompt Tokyo to move in this direction:
- A missile launch by North Korea. Such a launch could strike Japanese territory, “revealing the inability of [U.S.] ballistic missile defense to ensure Japanese security.”
- The U.S. abandonment of its longstanding maritime dominance in Asia, leaving Japan “open to greater Chinese pressure.”
- A failure of the U.S.-Japan alliance in a crisis, whereby “Washington might sit on the sidelines, or worse yet, advocate against Japanese interests.”
“Japanese leaders today value their military as an instrument of national policy and are far more willing to use this instrument as a means of Japan’s contribution to global security challenges than in the past,” Smith concludes.
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More From Sheila A. Smith
The Hanoi Setback and Tokyo’s North Korea Problem (Asia Unbound)
U.S. Policy in Asia Heads From Bad to Worse (East Asia Forum)
Stability in Tokyo, Disruption in Washington (Comparative Connections)