Boko Haram

  • Nigeria
    President Buhari Responds to Recent Military Setbacks
    On November 28, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari visited soldiers and a military hospital in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state and the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency. His visit was in conjunction with the 2018 chief of army staff’s annual conference. Speaking to the conference, Buhari commended the army’s efforts so far against Boko Haram, acknowledged their recent setbacks, such as at Metele earlier this month where many soldiers and their commander were killed, and encouraged them to do more as he promised that the army would get the resources it required. The conference was originally scheduled to take place in Benin, the capital of Edo state in the south, but it was moved north in light of the series of military defeats at the hands of Boko Haram.  Following the conference on November 29, Buhari is scheduled to meet with the leaders of Chad and Niger in N’Djamena to discuss Boko Haram’s apparent resurgence and proposals to strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of military assets from Cameroon, Chad, Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. Initially founded in 1994 to combat lawlessness near Nigeria’s porous and unregulated northeastern borders, it is now principally focused on defeating Boko Haram.  The move of the chief of army staff’s annual conference to Maiduguri was almost certainly at President Buhari’s initiative. The move, Buhari’s presence, and his associated visit to wounded troops in a hospital indicates that Buhari is taking seriously the increased tempo of Boko Haram activity. The president’s failure to destroy Boko Haram, as he promised to do in the 2015 presidential election campaign, is a major liability for his chances at reelection in 2019.
  • Nigeria
    Boko Haram Overruns Outgunned Nigerian Military Base
    On November 18, an army base in Metele in northeastern Nigeria was reportedly overrun by Boko Haram militants. It is estimated that over one hundred soldiers were killed and significant military materiel looted. Nigerian soldiers reportedly made a video allegedly showing and narrating the aftermath of the attack. Much about the incident remains uncertain or disputed.  The video, less than five minutes in length, shows destroyed tanks and other military equipment, which the narrator of the video claims is inadequate and outdated. He claims this is true of most of the military equipment provided to Nigerian soldiers. Agence France Presse carries a description of the video, Premium Times features an interview with an alleged survivor of the attack, and Sahara TV (the broadcast outlet of Sahara Reporters, an expatriate Nigerian media outlet based in New York) has posted online what appears to be the video in question, or something similar. In a statement, the Nigerian military headquarters refers to multiple videos and characterizes them as “doctored,” “fake news,” and spurious. Its spokesman is threatening legal action against those who disseminate them and calls for public support of the military. Among other things, the military claims that a much smaller number of soldiers were killed at the Metele base than the one hundred or so claimed by the video and other reports. For many Nigerians, military pronouncements have little credibility after years of prevarication and false statements. President Muhammadu Buhari has expressed “shock” over the Metele incident, and has summoned his service chiefs to discuss the matter. Claims that the Buhari administration and the Nigerian military are inadequately equipping soldiers for the fight against Boko Haram are reminiscent of similar charges made against the Goodluck Jonathan presidential administration at the height of the Boko Haram insurgency between 2014 and 2015. Then, as now, Nigeria faced upcoming presidential elections, which Buhari would go on to win. He campaigned on a platform of tackling corruption and restoring security, and central to his campaign was the defeat of Boko Haram.  The apparent revival of Boko Haram therefore constitutes for President Buhari an electoral liability as well as added danger now faced by ordinary Nigerians in the northeast. Furthermore, according to officials from Niger, the terrorist group recently kidnapped around eighteen girls from two villages near the border with Nigeria. The episode recalls the Boko Haram kidnapping of school girls from Chibok in 2014, though the large-scale kidnapping of school girls has become a common feature of the Boko Haram insurgency. The failure of the Jonathan administration to provide adequately for the military was widely ascribed to corruption. President Buhari has launched a high-profile initiative against corruption, though many Nigerians see it as ineffective. Hence, the revival of Boko Haram and claims that the military is ill-provisioned may call to mind earlier allegations of the Jonathan government’s fecklessness and corruption that Buhari campaigned against. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: November 17–23
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 17 to 23, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1543243995939'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   November 17: Boko Haram kidnapped fifty loggers in Ngala, Borno.  November 18–21: Boko Haram killed 118 Nigerian soldiers at army bases in Guzamala, Borno. November 19: Boko Haram killed nine farmers and abducted twelve in Maiduguri, Borno.  November 19: Gunmen abducted the Plateau monarch in Shendam, Plateau.  November 19: Armed robbers killed two policemen and two others in Ijero, Ekiti.  November 20: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Safana, Katsina.  November 21: The Nigerian army announced that, in operations taking place since October, they had killed fourteen bandits in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna.  November 22: Boko Haram killed eight at a French drilling camp in Toumour, Niger.  November 23: Boko Haram kidnapped fifteen girls in Toumour, Niger. November 23: Two policemen and four others were killed during an IPOB protest in Nnewi North, Anambra.  November 23: The Nigerian army announced that, in operations taking place over the last three weeks, they had killed seventeen militia men in Ukum, Katsina-Ala, and Vandeikya LGAs in Benue. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: November 10–16
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 10 to 16, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1542640317303'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, November 9: Nigerian soldiers killed two Boko Haram commanders in Damboa, Borno) November 10: Boko Haram attacked Maiduguri, Borno, but there were no casualties.  November 10: Boko Haram killed one in Jere, Borno.  November 11: Gunmen killed two in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  November 11: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Odukpani, Cross River.  November 12: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  November 12: Boko Haram killed sixteen in Monguno, Borno.  November 14: Boko Haram killed one in Maiduguri, Borno.  November 14: Boko Haram killed three Nigerian soldiers in Mobbar, Borno. November 15: Boko Haram abducted ten women and killed one man in Bama, Borno.  November 15: Nigerian jets killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: November 3–9
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 3 to 9, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1542126851814'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   November 5: Boko Haram killed "some" (estimated at five) soldiers in Kukawa, Borno.  November 5: The Civilian Joint Task Force killed eight Boko Haram militants in Gubio, Borno.  November 6: Gunmen kidnapped four Catholic priests in Ethiope East, Delta.  November 6: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Ngwuri Gana, Borno (LGA unknown).   November 7: Gunmen kidnapped the Ondo African Democratic Congress (ADC) chairman and four others in Akoko North-East, Ondo.  November 8: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack in Gujba, Yobe, killing "some" (estimated at five) militants.  November 8: Boko Haram killed one soldier and eight civilians in Ngala, Borno. November 9: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 27–November 2
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 27 to November 2, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1541434259370'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   October 27: Gunmen killed three in Lau, Taraba. October 27: Nigerian troops killed five Shiites in Gwagwalada, Abuja. October 27: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) Boko Haram militants when the militants attacked a military base in Mobbar, Borno; one soldier was also killed.  October 27: Pirates kidnapped eleven from a ship in Bonny, Rivers. October 28: A clash between rival groups resulted in eight deaths on Lagos Island, Lagos.  October 29: Nigerian security forces killed thirty-five Shiites in Abuja.  October 30: Nigerian security forces killed seven Shiites in Abuja.  October 31: Boko Haram killed fifteen in Konduga, Borno.  November 1: Gunmen abducted three health workers in Toto, Nasarawa. 
  • Human Rights
    Abusive Military Partners: What Can the U.S. Do About It?
    Allen Grane is a research associate for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, NY. Allen is also a civil affairs officer in the U.S. Army Reserves. Abuses committed by African militaries in the fight against Boko Haram have raised important questions about U.S. military involvement in the conflict, particularly the debate about U.S. military assistance and the role of the nearly 1,800 U.S. personnel across West and Central Africa. Commentators typically frame the situation as a choice between either promoting U.S. security interests by working with local armed forces to defeat extremists groups, or promoting human rights by ending military to military (mil-to-mil) relationships. In reality, the choice is not so clear cut. Without a doubt, the U.S. government must closely assess whether the military should partner with abusive security services. There are, indeed, times when the government should sever mil-to-mil relations. Security force abuses have the potential to push frustrated and marginalized populations toward violent extremism more than any ideology. However, by completely severing partnerships, the U.S. military loses the ability to influence the way in which African militaries conduct the fight against extremists. In most relationships, there are a variety of options short of completely severing ties that can help improve the proficiency, behavior, and methods of U.S. partners. The U.S. military’s security partnerships intend to advance U.S. interests, but they also serve to advance the interests of our partners. The approximately 1,800 American military personnel in West and Central Africa are there with the permission, and often at the request, of African partner nations. The presence and cooperation of U.S. military forces directly benefit the security goals of partner nation governments. While American forces are rarely in direct combat roles, they provide something even more important: intelligence, training, and equipment. The assets that the U.S. military deploys toward these goals allow partners to be exponentially more effective when undertaking security operations. The U.S. can therefore use these benefits as leverage. For example, to encourage partners to undertake serious investigations of human rights abuses, the U.S. government can withhold access to intelligence assets and equipment. This option should include reduced access to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and the cessation of foreign military sales, which AFRICOM and its subcommands help facilitate. In addition, the U.S. government can implement and enforce defense cooperation agreements that stipulate additional training on human rights, the law of war as dictated by the Geneva Conventions, and interaction with civilians in a combat environment. Finally, AFRICOM can make participation in regional training exercises contingent on a positive or improving human rights record. These exercises often train units deploying to UN missions as peacekeepers, and facilitate coordination among regional partners. Exclusion from these high-profile events can serve as a low cost method to rebuke governments for military abuses. These are some of the practical measures that the U.S. military can enact to improve the behavior and professionalism of its partners in the fight against violent extremism, short of completely severing ties. General Thomas D. Waldhauser, commander of AFRICOM, has clearly stated the problem of security force abuses, arguing in the 2018 AFRICOM posture statement that heavy-handed counter-insurgency techniques “increase regional fragility by undermining public trust and confidence in the state, but also produce the grievances that fuel support for the enemy.” AFRICOM, working with the Department of State through embassies’ foreign area officers and defense attachés, must determine if certain military partners undermine U.S. security interests more than they help. Until then, however, the U.S. military should use all of the tools at its disposal to encourage African partners to improve accountability and professionalism within their ranks.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 20–26
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 20 to October 26, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1540830327002'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   October 11–25 (estimated): Nigerian troops killed thirty-five criminals during a two-week operation across Nigeria (no location given); two soldiers were killed as well.  October 20: Boko Haram killed twelve in Maiduguri, Borno.  October 20: Boko Haram killed two in Konduga, Borno.  October 21: Nigerian troops killed thirteen Gana gang members in Ukum, Benue. October 21: Gunmen kidnapped seven in Zurmi, Zamfara. October 21: Sectarian violence led to twenty-three deaths in Kaduna South, Kaduna.  October 22: Boko Haram killed two in Chibok, Borno.  October 22: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Udu, Delta.  October 23: Sectarian violence led to "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of deaths in Lamurde, Adamawa.  October 23: The Nigerian Air Force destroyed a Boko Haram logistics base, killing "several" (estimated at five) militants in Abadam, Borno. October 24: Gunmen kidnapped ten in Akuku-Toru, Rivers.  October 24: Gunmen kidnapped seven in Ohaji/Egbema, Imo.  October 25: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno.  October 25: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Guma, Benue.  October 26: Gunmen kidnapped five Catholic nuns in Ika South, Delta. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 13–19
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 13 to October 19, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1540222798744'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   September 24–October 15 (estimated): A joint three-week operation between Niger and Nigeria resulted in the deaths of thirty bandits in Maradi, Niger. October 14: Boko Haram killed an International Committee of the Red Cross worker in an undisclosed location.  October 14: A cult clash led to the deaths of seventeen cultists and three civilians in Oredo, Edo.  October 14: A cult clash led to the deaths of two cultists and one civilian in Ogbia, Bayelsa. October 15: A militia attack killed five civilians in Demsa, Adamawa.  October 15: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Mobbar, Borno.  October 15: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Maiduguri, Borno.  October 15: Cultists killed a Rivers monarch and two others in Emohua, Rivers. October 16: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. October 17: Gunmen killed two policemen and one civilian in Chikun, Kaduna.  October 18: A militia attack killed one policeman and four others in Ukum, Benue. October 18: Sectarian violence led to fifty-five deaths in Kajuru, Kaduna. October 19: Gunmen kidnapped a traditional ruler and his wife, and killed one civilian in Kachia, Kaduna.   
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: October 6–12
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 6 to October 12, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1539612414053'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   October 8: Nigerian troops killed seventy-six Boko Haram militants and lost eighteen soldiers in Abadam, Borno.  October 9: Kidnappers killed one soldier and abducted one in Jos North, Plateau. October 9: Sectarian violence led to seventeen deaths in Bassa, Kogi.  October 10: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno. October 10: Chadian troops killed forty-eight Boko Haram militants and lost eight soldiers in Kukawa (LGA estimated), Borno.  October 12: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Mobbar, Borno. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: September 29–October 5
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 29 to October 5, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1539011092485'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, September 28: Gunmen killed eight in Ukum, Benue.) September 29: Gunmen killed six in Okpokwu, Benue. September 29: One person was killed during the APC governorship primary in Uruan, Akwa Ibom. September 30: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Jos South, Plateau. September 30: Suspected herdsmen killed one student in Jos South, Plateau. October 1: One person was killed during the APC primaries in Mbaitoli, Imo. October 2: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Jos South, Plateau. October 2: Sectarian violence led to fourteen deaths in Riyom, Plateau. October 3: Three people were killed during the APC primaries in Oshimili South, Delta. October 3: Herdsmen killed nineteen in Bassa, Plateau. October 3: Herdsmen killed six in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. October 3: One person was killed when APC factions clashed in Ezza South, Ebonyi. October 4: One person was killed during the APC primary in Epe, Lagos. October 4: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Bassa, Plateau. October 5: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Madagali, Borno. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: September 22–28
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 22 to September 28, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1538399900588'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   September 22: Police killed three robbers in Bali, Taraba. September 22: Pirates kidnapped twelve crew members of a Swiss ship off the coast of Port Harcourt, Rivers. September 22: Police killed three robbers in Obafemi Owode, Ogun. September 23: Bandits kidnapped seven in Bungudu, Zamfara. September 25: Sixteen miners were kidnapped in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. September 26: Boko Haram suffered "heavy casualties" (estimated at twenty) when they were repelled by Nigerian soldiers in Mobbar, Borno.  September 26: Boko Haram attacked a civilian convoy in Dikwa, Borno. There were no casualties.  September 28: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed twelve civilians and Nigerian soldiers killed five civilians in Jos North, Plateau. 
  • Cameroon
    America's Dilemma in Cameroon: Supporting an Abusive Military
    President Paul Biya, the authoritarian leader of Cameroon, has kept in office for thirty-six years through rigged elections and repression of actual or potential opposition, including the country’s English-speaking regions. (Cameroon is primarily Francophone and has a long and close relationship with France.) His government is largely unaccountable to its people—though his power is likely checked by the security services—and he has amassed a personal fortune of $200 million.  Biya now faces two major security threats. In the southwest, where the Anglophone minority predominates, there is an insurrection in response to decades of repression and marginalization by Biya’s government. His security forces are responding with exceptional brutality, which has at times been matched by separatist rebels. The Far North Region of Cameroon, predominately Muslim, is also disaffected from Biya’s ostensibly Christian regime. Boko Haram is active there, especially after being driven from much of the territory they once held in Nigeria. Operatives of the Islamist militant group move easily throughout the Lake Chad Basin, crossing the artificial borders of Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger, which were drawn by the British, French, and Germans. (Cameroon was the German colony of Kamerun; after World War I, it was then divided between Britain and France.) In the fight against Boko Haram in the north, Biya’s security forces are credibly accused of extensive human rights violations. Specifically, there are two horrific videos that have circulated on social media apparently showing Cameroonian forces executing civilians, one of two women and two small children, the other of twelve civilians. The Cameroonian government has since arrested seven Cameroonian soldiers and claims that an investigation is underway.  According to the Voice of America, the U.S. Department of Defense has three hundred personnel in Cameroon providing military training and teaching on human rights and the laws governing armed conflict. The United States also funds a program to train forty military legal advisers to promote human rights and accountability in the security services. A U.S. Department of Defense spokeswoman recently said that they are working with the Department of State to “ensure the government of Cameroon holds accountable any individuals found to be responsible” for human rights violations. Given the human rights track record of the Biya regime, it is unlikely that the Cameroonian investigation will actually result in significant change in the behavior of the security forces. The regime and the Cameroonian security services are actively involved in the struggle against Boko Haram. The Departments of Defense and State apparently judge that it is in the interests of the United States that Cameroonian involvement continue and be strengthened. So, while the Department of Defense has issued a statement calling on Cameroon to conduct a full investigation into the human rights violations captured on the videos, it has not taken steps to terminate its military relationship.  America’s dilemma is how to balance U.S. security interests with human rights concerns. This is an old song. After all, the United States partnered with Stalin’s Soviet Union against Nazi Germany during World War II. On the other hand, the increased use of videos and the rise of social media means that human rights abuses are harder to ignore now than then. They are more visceral and reach more people than the dry accounts of Stalin’s atrocities circulating at the time. And governments respond to aroused voters. General Thomas Waldhauser of the U.S. Africa Command has said, “We want to have a strong military relationship with Cameroon, but their actions will go a long way toward how that will play out in the future with regards to the transparency on some of these allegations.” It is to be hoped that the Departments of State and Defense are more forthright with their Cameroonian partners behind closed doors.
  • Nigeria
    Boko Haram Leader Shekau's Book Helps Explain Factional Rifts
    Jacob Zenn is an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a fellow on African and Eurasian affairs at the Jamestown Foundation. In June 2018, Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi, the leader of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), released a history of his jihadist movement. In 2017, the Ansaru leader, under the pseudonym Abu Usama al-Ansari, released his own history, while Abubakar Shekau released a book in the name of the Boko Haram faction he currently leads. Aymenn J. al-Tamimi has translated al-Barnawi’s and Shekau’s books, providing in English the perspectives of each of the authors. Shekau’s book sheds light on his theology and worldview and his relationship with the Islamic State. The book is called “The Message on the Meaning of Islam, Its Contrary, Taghut, and Western Schools.” Among other things, it reiterates Boko Haram’s belief that schools teaching Western-style education contradict Islam. Notable is Shekau’s apparent belief in the “multiplicity of imams”. This refers to a dispute among Muslim scholars about whether more than one leader can govern a Caliphate, as existed with Mamluk rule over the government and army, and Abbasid rule over theology in Egypt before the Ottoman conquest. This belief may explain why Shekau considered himself the imam presiding over Boko Haram–held territories in northeastern Nigeria, which he referred to as an Islamic state (specifically dawlat al-Islam in Arabic and daular musulunci in Hausa) or, in one instance, “a state within the Islamic States” (specifically dawla min dawal al-Islam). However, Shekau also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and its Caliph, Abubakar al-Baghdadi, in 2015, and has yet to formally renounce that pledge, despite falling out of favor with the group's leader.  As a new report released by the South Africa-based Center for the Study of Contemporary Islam details, the Islamic State removed Shekau from his leadership role in August 2016 after rival leaders raised their concerns to al-Baghdadi about him. AQIM had done the same in 2011. In letters between AQIM and Boko Haram that Aymenn J. al-Tamimi has also translated, the Boko Haram members who defected from Shekau to form Ansaru in 2012 submitted a litany of grievances to AQIM about Shekau, among them that Shekau forced fighters to refer to him as “the greatest imam.” AQIM had considered Shekau to be its representative, but when AQIM learned of Shekau’s “signs of deviation and extremism” it dropped him. There is no doubt Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi loathes Shekau, but Boko Haram factions have a history of splitting and reintegrating. Some ISWA members are now taking a more extreme turn while also engaging in a military offensive with seemingly improved tactics and new uniforms. Shekau could conceivably make another run at leading ISWA or some faction of it or try to merge Boko Haram with some of ISWA’s more extreme members. They apparently think Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi and  the Islamic State members who advised him are “suspect” and too lenient.  Judging from the translations of Shekau’s and al-Barnawi’s books, it appears that both factions are set on continued violent opposition, both to the Nigerian government and to each other. One wonders whether the Nigerian government might nonetheless be able to play these factions against each other to weaken them both.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: September 15–21
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 15 to September 21, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1537793925583'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   September 15: Herdsmen killed three in Lau, Taraba.  September 15: The Nigerian Air Force hit seven Boko Haram vehicles, neutralizing all occupants (estimated at twenty-five) in Mobbar and Guzamala LGAs in Borno. September 16: Boko Haram killed five Nigerian soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno.  September 16: Gunmen killed three in Jos South, Plateau.  September 16: Kidnappers abducted three lecturers in Makarfi, Kaduna.  September 17: Bandits killed one in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna.  September 17: Herdsmen killed a policeman in Oshimili South, Delta. September 19: Cultists killed ten students in Esan West, Edo.  September 19: Boko Haram killed nine in Konduga, Borno.  September 19: Hoodlums killed ten at an APC meeting in Osisioma, Abia.  September 20: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Toto, Nasarawa.  September 21: Gunmen killed five in Ukum, Benue.