Boko Haram

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 10 to 16, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1566228511850'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   August 11: Fifteen soldiers, eight ISWA (Boko Haram) militants, and three civilians were killed during a clash in Gubio, Borno. August 11: Gunmen abducted a chief imam's son and two others in Ogun Waterside, Ogun. August 11: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  August 12: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped thirteen in Batsari, Katsina.  August 12: Soldiers killed three civilians at a festival in Obafemi-Owode, Ogun. August 13: Suspected herdsmen killed two in Kabba/Bunu, Kogi. August 14: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and six others in Kaiga-Kindjiria, Chad. August 14: Kidnappers abducted a pastor and his son in Chikun, Kaduna. August 14: Boko Haram killed three soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno.  August 14: Gunmen killed ten in Khana, Rivers. August 15: Gunmen killed one in Obio/Akpor, Rivers.

The fishing town of Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad, has been devastated by both Boko Haram and the Nigerian army. It is currently controlled by the Boko Haram faction, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA). The group is led by Abu Abdallah al-Barnawi, and is separate from, and presumably a rival to, Abubakar Shekau’s faction. Obi Anyadike, a reporter, interviewed eight former residents of Baga who had fled to Maiduguri. He published a report based on his experience in the New Humanitarian, a news organization that was set up by the United Nations in 1995 but is now an independent non-profit. His reporting is hardly definitive about life under ISWA, but it parallels other accounts.  In 2016, following an internal rift, Boko Haram split into at least two factions. One was recognized as the Islamic State’s official branch in West Africa, and thus retained the affiliation. The other has continued to be referred to as Boko Haram, and is still led by Abubakar Shekau, the brutal leader of the group since its deadly reemergence in 2011. The fundamental difference between the two, and which ostensibly led to the split, is the treatment of civilians. ISWA tends to target the Nigerian military and others perceived as agents of the secular Nigerian government. Shekau’s faction apparently views any Muslims who do not follow him—civilian and military—as legitimate targets.  Anyadike’s reporting indicates that ISWA is serious about governing the people in the territory it occupies, creating a daulah, an Islamic state conducted according to Islamic law, that can rival Nigerian state government. In Baga, the daulah provides certain services, allows residents to leave upon the payment of a small tax, and does not interfere with farming. It also appears to treat women and girls better than Shekau’s faction, who forced all girls of marriageable age to marry. It digs wells, provides rudimentary health care, and imposes food price caps—all popular measures. Such a group, Anyadike points out, does indeed pose a different, perhaps more serious, challenge to the Nigerian secular state than Shekau’s. ISWA appears to be engaged in state building, while Shekau’s faction remains a millenarian (“end times”) movement that is deeply violent.  Anyadike raises the possibility that, some day, ISWA might evolve into a political party that supports Islamic law but participates in secular politics. Perhaps. But an ISWA commander he interviewed rejected any possible compromise with the Nigerian secular state; a former ISWA leader, Mamman Nur, was allegedly killed because of participating in back-channel talks with the Nigerian government (and misappropriating funds).

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 3 to 9, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1565624111653'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   August 4: Gunmen killed a pastor and kidnapped his wife in Kaduna South, Kaduna. August 5: Police killed three kidnappers in Emuoha, Rivers.  August 5: Gunmen killed a police officer in Akoko South-East, Ondo. August 5: Five civilians were killed during a clash between Nigerian troops and Boko Haram in Monguno, Borno.  August 6: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Mafa, Borno.  August 7: Nigerian soldiers killed three policemen and three civilians in Ibi, Taraba.  August 7: Gunmen kidnapped six in Ikwerre, Rivers.  August 8: Herdsmen killed one in Mkpat Enin, Akwa Ibom.  August 9: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. 

Nigeria’s challenges are multi-faceted, fundamental, and reach from one end of the country to the other. Over the past week, following another violent clash with the security services, the leader of a Shia movement was ordered to be granted bail; Borno state was hit with massive attacks by Boko Haram, taking the lives of scores of civilians and military personnel; and the leader of a small political party, who is also the editor of Sahara Reporters, was arrested shortly before planned protests could begin. Government responses to these crises appear so far to have been ineffective. Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, the leader of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and his wife have been in detention since 2015, when Nigerian army soldiers raided his headquarters and killed several hundred of his followers. At the time, el-Zakzaky and his wife were said to have been badly wounded. The Nigerian authorities have said that they have been receiving medical attention ever since they were taken into custody. There have been repeated IMN demonstrations, often bloody, calling for their release. The Kaduna State High Court has granted them bail to receive medical treatment in India, and the State Security Service has indicated that it will comply. The Buhari administration proscribed the IMN in late July following a recent deadly clash. However, were el-Zakzaky or his wife to die in prison in Nigeria, IMN reaction would be fierce and likely lead to more deadly confrontations with security services. It is unclear what advantage Abuja gains from Zakzaky’s continued detention. It would be wise for the federal government to allow them to go to India for medical treatment. To the northeast, the Multilateral Joint Task Force (MJTF) is denying reports that Boko Haram attacked a military base at Baga and killed dozens of soldiers. The MJTF spokesman is a Nigerian colonel. Unfortunately, Nigerian military spokesmen have little credibility. According to CFR’s Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update, there were an estimated 212 deaths—including soldiers, Boko Haram members, and civilians—associated with Boko Haram in Borno state between July 27 to August 2. Whatever happened at Baga, Boko Haram’s factions are on the upsurge. In Lagos, the commercial capital of the country and the heart of its modern economy, plans are underway for a mass demonstration tagged “Days of Rage” and calling for “Revolution Now” for a better Nigeria. The police have warned residents to stay away from the demonstration, attendance at which “amounts to felony and terrorism,” according to local media. The protest is being organized by the former presidential candidate of the African Action Congress (AAC), Omowole Sowore, who is probably best known for his online publication Sahara Reporters. The goals of the “Days of Rage” are vague. The AAC has said the protests will continue “until the country is put on the right path of honour where justice prevails,” according to local media.  With the country’s many brewing crises, a danger is overreaction by the security forces in Lagos, and, in the event that el-Zakzaky or his wife dies in government custody, to IMN protestors in Abuja. Overreaction could turn demonstrations into deadly confrontations, as has happened in Nigeria’s past. Meanwhile, government strategies have failed to destroy Boko Haram. In the face of these multiple challenges, the Buhari administration says that the security forces are working to address them and called on citizens to be patient. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 27 to August 2, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1565016448865'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, July 25: Gunmen killed twenty-two and abducted "many" (estimated at ten) in Kankara, Katsina.) July 27: Boko Haram killed sixty-five in Nganzai, Borno.  July 28: Bandits killed three traders in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. July 28: Bandits killed three and abducted six in Batsari, Katsina.  July 29: Twenty-five soldiers and forty-seven ISWAP (Boko Haram) militants were killed during a clash in Kukawa, Borno.  July 29: Gunmen killed three in Katsina, Benue.  July 29: Nigerian police killed four kidnappers in Bali, Taraba.  July 29: Boko Haram killed twenty-five soldiers in Kaga, Borno.  July 30: Boko Haram killed "many" (estimated at ten) in Konduga, Borno.  July 30: Sectarian violence led to eight deaths in Takum LGA and three more in Okpokwu LGA in Benue.  July 31: Bandits killed three and abducted two in Batsari, Katsina. August 1: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  August 1: Gunmen kidnapped five pastors in Ijebu-Ode, Ogun.  August 1: Ten bandits, two soldiers, and one civilian were killed during a clash in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  August 2: Five were killed during a cult clash in Idemili North, Anambra. 

From far away it is difficult to know what daily life is really like in an area controlled or occupied by Boko Haram. Chitra Nagarajan, a journalist and author who has written for the Guardian (UK), among other publications, recently spent time in Yobe State doing research on gender. She has gathered into a Twitter thread a summary of her conversations about life under Boko Haram, specifically, the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) faction. Chitra is a feminist who writes on women’s and queer issues around the world. She at present lives in Maiduguri, the city where Boko Haram began. Her reportage is anecdotal, but provides insights into daily life.  There are at least two factions of Boko Haram, one led by Abubakar Shekau and one by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi, the latter referred to as ISWA. They operate in the area around northeast Nigeria, though some of the factions are reportedly further afield.  Those Chitra spoke with in Yobe State said that ISWA targeted the military and the police rather than civilians, matching what she has heard from residents of Borno State. Still, the group threatened rich men and demanded protection money, which was often paid to avoid relocation. Farmers who crossed paths with ISWA members in the countryside were told they would not be hurt and to continue to go about their work, but some thought ISWA fighters, and by extension, such promises, were “unreliable.” While the Nigerian military sometimes closed down markets and banned fishing, hoping to rob ISWA of resources, ISWA apparently would come to preach in villages and offer financial incentives. According to Chitra, waging economic warfare on ISWA seemed only to generate more sympathy and support for it. Her interlocutors confirmed that banditry is widespread and takes advantage of the general lack of government in the area to rustle cattle. Some posited that some of the bandits were members of ISWA, but seemed to imply that rustling was not sanctioned by ISWA leadership, and that the bandits in question were punished. Should a man leave ISWA (or, presumably, Shekau’s faction) and then go through government rehabilitation (women do not apparently have the same access to such programs) they would often not be welcomed back to their communities and would be forced to relocate.  Chitra’s tweets are congruent with other reports that ISWA does not kill civilians to the same extent as the Shekau faction does, and ISWA’s apparent effort to win over the local population and provide a modicum of governance. She also highlights the relationship between cattle rustling and other criminality with Boko Haram factions. In at least some areas—in this case, where ISWA is predominantly active—Chitra’s tweets seem to imply that daily life goes on much as it did before Boko Haram arrived.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 20 to 26, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1564413724403'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   July 20: Four Turkish nationals were kidnapped in Edu, Kwara. July 20: Gunmen abducted eighteen traders in Rafi, Niger. July 21: Gunmen killed fifteen and kidnapped fourteen in Kankara, Katsina. July 22: Bandits killed two air force personnel in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. July 22: One policeman, one journalist, and thirteen Shiites were killed during a clash in Abuja.  July 22: Pirates killed two army officers in Ekeremor, Bayelsa. July 22: Kidnappers abducted three in Ovia North-East, Edo July 23: Two more were killed in the ongoing clash between police and Shiites in Abuja.  July 23: Bandits kidnapped three in Obafemi-Owode, Ogun. July 24: Kidnappers killed one and abducted two in Chikun, Kaduna. July 25: Boko Haram killed two at an IDP camp in Maiduguri, Borno. July 26: Armed men killed three farmers in Maiduguri, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 13 to 19, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1563803447996'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   July 13: Bandits killed ten in Safana, Katsina. July 13: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Abi, Cross River. July 13: Gunmen killed two in Obio/Akpor, Rivers. July 14: Herdsmen killed two in Bassa, Plateau. July 14: Three Zamfara officials were kidnapped and one killed in Kachia, Kaduna. July 15: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Ukum, Benue. July 16: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Odigbo, Ondo. July 16: Herdsmen killed one naval officer and kidnapped eight in Ovia North, Edo. July 17: Bandits killed thirty-seven in Goronyo, Sokoto. July 17: Boko Haram killed twenty-one soldiers in Damaturu, Yobe. July 17: Gunmen killed two soldiers and kidnapped one expatriate in Ukanafun, Akwa Ibom. July 17: Eleven Boko Haram militants and seven Nigerian soldiers were killed during a clash in Konduga, Borno.  July 17: Herdsmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau.  July 17: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Sagbama, Bayelsa. July 18: Boko Haram killed one aid worker and kidnapped six others in Mobbar, Borno.

“Nigeria is on the precipice and dangerously reaching a tipping point where it may no longer be possible to hold danger at bay,” said former President Olusegun Obasanjo in a letter to President Muhammadu Buhari on the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria. His focus in the letter is on Boko Haram and the “herdsmen/farmers crises,” and his sense of urgency is palpable. He writes, “When people are desperate and feel that they cannot have confidence in the ability of government to provide security for their lives and properties, they will take recourse to anything and everything that can guarantee their security individually and collectively.” The letter is reminiscent of Obasanjo’s December 2013 withering, eighteen-page critique he sent to then-President Goodluck Jonathan. However, there are interesting differences. First, Obasanjo’s language is more respectful in his letter to Buhari than it was in his letter to Jonathan. Buhari is of the same generation as Obasanjo, and both were army generals as well as heads of state. Hence, Obasanjo may respect Buhari more than he does Jonathan, a civilian with whom he broke over the latter’s incompetency. Second, the letter to Jonathan was ostensibly private and was only subsequently leaked to the public. (By whom is not clear.) This letter to Buhari is open “because the issue is very weighty and must be greatly worrisome to all concerned Nigerians and that means all right-thinking Nigerians and those resident in Nigeria.” Obasanjo’s letter reflects widespread Nigerian frustration over the persistence of Boko Haram, escalating farmer-herder conflict in the Middle Belt, and the current wave of kidnapping—all of which he mentions. But why did he write Buhari now? Some suggestions: First, he is, indeed, deeply concerned about the deterioration of security. Obasanjo is a Nigerian nationalist who devoted his life to nation-building, as he sees it. He may well be deeply concerned that his life’s work is in danger. Second, since he left office in 2007, he has assumed the mantle of an elder statesman. In that role he may well see an open warning letter to the sitting president as appropriate. Third, he may also be concerned about maintaining his relevance to the current political scene. He has now been out of office for a long time; some Nigerians openly say that he is no longer relevant. While this is speculation, the three are not mutually exclusive and are all likely to be true to an extent. The respectful tone of Obasanjo’s letter is in contrast with the polarizing responses attacking and supporting it. It is unclear what the practical consequence of Obasanjo’s letter will be. His call on Buhari to form a broad coalition to address Nigeria’s security crises is often heard in the context of a “sovereign national convention” that would look at the restructuring of Nigeria. However, there is no national consensus among the elites to undertake fundamental reforms.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 6 to 12, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1563208451105'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   July 6: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWAP (Boko Haram) militants in Bakassi, Borno.  July 7: Gunmen killed six in Kankara, Katsina.  July 8: Nigerian troops killed one bandit in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. July 9: Bandits killed five in Shiroro, Niger. July 9: Three were killed, including one policeman, when Shiites and police clashed in Abuja.  July 9: Kidnappers abducted sixteen travelers in Ikwerre, Rivers.  July 9: Nigerian police killed three in Obio/Akpor, Rivers. July 9: Gunmen killed four in Ardo-Kola, Taraba.  July 10: Kidnappers abducted the Adamawa permanent secretary in Yola North, Adamawa.  July 10: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Vandeikya, Benue.  July 12: Suspected herdsmen kidnapped one and killed one in Odigbo, Ondo. 

Western and Nigerian media are reporting that the principal Shiite movement in Nigeria, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), “stormed” the National Assembly in Abuja on July 7. In the resulting melee, two people may have been killed and eight injured. As is so often the case, there are few details, with claims and counter-claims. But, the episode is a reminder that Shiites are a force now to be reckoned with in Nigerian street politics.  Spokesmen for the group say that their delegation was seeking to enter the National Assembly peaceably to protest the continued detention of their leader, Sheik Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, who has been under arrest since 2015. The Shia are saying that the police killed two protestors. The police are saying that they used “minimum force,” and that two of their officers were shot in the leg and six others were hurt by clubs and stones. Nigerian media, apparently hostile to the Shia, is saying that the protestors killed two National Assembly guards, burned three vehicles, and “destroyed many others.” Neither the deaths claimed by the Shia nor the casualties claimed by the police have been independently verified. Nigeria’s Shia minority, some of whom are organized with the IMN, oppose the very existence of Nigeria’s secular government. They also claim to be peaceful, and their leadership does not advocate violence. Current Shia grievances focus on the continued detention of Zakzaky, who faces murder charges brought by Kaduna state. (If convicted, he would face the death penalty.) Complicating the issue of Zakzaky’s imprisonment is that he stands accused by the Kaduna state government of murder, but he is imprisoned by the Federal government. Federal spokesmen have said that he cannot be released until his case is disposed of by the Kaduna courts.  Since Zakzaky’s arrest, there have been regular Shia protests, some of which have been violent and with police over-reaction. In October 2018, IMN supporters clashed with police in and around the capital, and at least forty Shia marchers were killed. The Abuja melee on July 7 appears to fit that pattern. Iran, whose Shia-dominated government has assisted the Nigerian Shias, periodically protests Zakzaky’s continued confinement.  The murder charges stem from an incident in Zaria in December 2015. Federal and military spokesmen say that a Shiite mob led by Zakzaky attempted to assassinate Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai when they blocked his convoy. Buratai was not killed, but the formal charges against Zakzaky accuse him and his followers of killing at least one soldier by name. In the aftermath, the army attacked IMN facilities, killing hundreds of people, including members of Zakzaky’s family. Zakzaky and his wife were seriously wounded in the attack and arrested. The IMN vociferously denies that there was any assassination attempt.  Like Boko Haram, the IMN sees the secular state as evil and wants an Islamic state based on Islamic law. The group is hostile to any Western influence, including in education. It is also hostile to Nigeria’s traditional political and religious elite. For the IMN, its model is the post-revolutionary Iranian Islamic state. In turn, the traditional Nigerian Islamic establishment despises the Shia. Despite certain similarities, the IMN and Boko Haram are anathema to each other. The IMN is opposed to Boko Haram’s use of violence and Zakzaky has claimed, implausibly, that it is a creation of the “oil-hungry west.” As with other Sunni radical movements in the Middle East, Boko Haram is especially hostile to Shias. The extent of Iranian financial and other support for Nigerian Shias in general and IMN in particular is unknown. Nobody really knows the size of the Shiite population in Nigeria. Credible estimates that its numbers range between 2 and 3 percent of Nigeria’s population, which would amount to roughly four million. Zakzaky has claimed at different times to have followers ranging from a few hundred thousand to three million; not all Nigerian Shias are associated with IMN. Whatever IMN’s numbers, were Zakzaky to be tried, convicted, and executed—the worst-case scenario—Abuja could very well face the black swan of a Shiite insurrection. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 29 to July 5, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1562595564997'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 29: Bandits killed eleven and kidnapped six in Kankara, Katsina.  June 30: Sectarian violence led to twenty-five deaths in Agatu, Benue.  June 30: Nigerian troops killed ten bandits in Zurmi, Zamfara. July 1: Gunmen killed four police officers in Yenegoa, Bayelsa.  July 2: The Nigerian Air Force killed twenty bandits in Tsafe, Zamfara.  July 2: Nigerian troops killed ten bandits in Anka, Zamfara. July 3: Bandits killed eighteen in Kankara, Katsina.  July 3: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Nganzai, Borno.  July 3: Gunmen killed one police officer and kidnapped two Chinese nationals in Oredo, Edo.  July 4: A pipeline explosion caused by vandals killed three in Alimosho, Lagos.  July 4: Boko Haram killed five soldiers in Damboa, Borno.  July 5: One police officer and one kidnapper were killed during a gun battle in Dunukofia, Anambra. 

Nigeria is experiencing a wave of kidnappings. In the past, kidnapping has often had a political dimension. In the oil patch, for example, militants have long kidnapped oil company employees to advance a political agenda. Boko Haram in the northeast is notorious for kidnapping young girls, the most famous episode being the 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls. The current wave is different. It is nation-wide, rather than confined to a specific region. It appears to be purely mercenary; the goal is to extract the maximum ransom possible rather than advancing a political agenda. Kidnapping victims now include the entire social spectrum, rather than being confined to those with some money or property. Nobody is exempt. An inlaw of President Muhammadu Buhari was kidnapped in the northern city of Kano in early May; the police rescued him in a shoot-out only this week. In theory, but not in practice, the payment of ransom is illegal in Nigeria. However, the government itself pays ransoms in high-profile cases. So, too, do ordinary citizens. Because both kidnapping and ransom paying are illegal activities, there is little hard evidence about how many kidnappings are actually taking place. Indeed, the lack of transparency may lead to a popular exaggeration of the numbers. Nevertheless, Nigerians believe they are in the midst of a kidnapping wave and that the government is largely powerless to stop it. Fear of kidnapping appears to be a factor in middle-class emigration from Nigeria and the wealthy sending their families abroad. The BBC released a video on kidnapping that contains little that is new, but it certainly provides a human face to the victims of kidnapping. Suitably, it emphasizes the violence that can accompany kidnapping, such as the murder of victims even though a ransom has been paid, or the torturing of victims as families listen over the telephone. The video also highlights the dilemma faced by the security service. The video has a focus on one of Nigeria’s most senior policemen, Deputy Police Commissioner Abba Kyari, and his elite unit, the Intelligence Response Team, that is devoted to kidnapping crimes. Kyari, known to many as “Nigeria’s supercop,” is the youngest high-ranking official in the Nigerian police force.  Policing in Nigeria is underfunded, and policemen by and large are undertrained. They are notorious for human rights abuses and have been widely accused of extra-judicial killing. The BBC interviewer raises these human rights considerations with The Network on Police Reform in Nigeria. Kyari, predictably, denies that they take place, or asserts that when there are credible accusations, they are thoroughly investigated. He also realistically talks about the difficulty of law enforcement in Nigeria—the lack of investigative capacity and the violence of criminals against policemen. He does not let the viewer forget the horror that accompanies kidnapping.  Kidnapping along with the Boko Haram insurrection in the northeast; Delta militant activity in the oil patch; and conflict over land use, ethnicity, and religion in the middle belt are immediate stressors of Nigerian society. They are related to deeper challenges, notably the huge increase in population, rapid urbanization, and degradation of the environment related to climate change. However, with specific reference to kidnapping, reform of the police and the security services appears to be a pressing need. And here the foreign friends of Nigeria could help, perhaps through forensics assistance, provision of training, and facilitating exchanges.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 22 to 28, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1561989540772'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 22: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  June 22: Bandits killed three in Maradun, Zamfara. June 23: Gunmen killed three and abducted three in Danmusa, Katsina. June 23: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno.  June 24: Boko Haram killed twenty farmers in Mobbar, Borno.  June 24: Boko Haram killed nine in Guzamala, Borno.  June 24: Three Boko Haram militants, one soldier, and three civilians were killed during a Boko Haram attack in Mafa, Borno.  June 24: Nigerian troops killed eight bandits in Sabon-Gari, Sokoto.  June 25: Sectarian violence led to fifteen deaths in Wukari, Taraba.  June 25: Gunmen abducted eight travelers in Akure North, Ondo.   June 25: Herdsmen killed seven in Kontonkar, Kogi.  June 26: Nigerian troops killed "a number" (estimated at ten) of Boko Haram militants in Gujba, Yobe.  June 26: Nigerian troops killed fifteen bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  June 27: Two soldiers, one policeman, and twenty-nine bandits were killed during an attack in Shinkafi, Zamfara.  June 28: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bakassi, Borno. 

In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 female students gathered in Chibok to sit for high school examinations. The international community responded with outcry and condemnation. At the time of the abduction, female empowerment and education in the developing world was widely discussed in the United States. The story and efforts of a young charistmatic Pakistani activist, Malala Yousafzai, drove interest in the topic, and Chibok fed into those concerns. First Lady Michelle Obama joined many celebrities in an international “bring back our girls” campaign. In Nigeria, the Jonathan administration, at first, did not take action. The Nigerian first lady characterized the kidnapping as a hoax. But Nigerian civil society, led by former education minister Oby Ezekwesili, among others, successfully pressured the Jonathan administration to take action, though to little avail. In the five years since, some girls have escaped and some have been rescued by the Nigerian security services. But 112 remain in captivity. The kidnapping has largely disappeared from the western public’s attention. The five-year anniversary in April was marked by no celebrity tweets. Meanwhile, Boko Haram seems to be gaining strength in northwest Nigeria. How to account for the fading of international interest in Chibok? Part of it is compassion fatigue. Even though the girls were mostly Christian, the western churches are now largely silent, unlike their activism during the “lost boys of Sudan” episode in the late 1980s and 1990s, when celebrities kept their attention focused. By contrast, celebrity interest in Chibok has waned. It has not helped that the re-integration of rescued Chibok school girls has proved to be difficult and expensive. Further, the Nigerian government downplays Boko Haram and more or less continually claims that its destruction is at hand—assertions too often uncritically accepted outside Nigeria. Meanwhile, Boko Haram morphs into factions, some of which have links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State, and remains deadly. Nobody really knows how many have died in the fight between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram, though there are credible estimates of more than thirty thousand. And the killing continues.