Boko Haram

  • Nigeria
    Recent Flare Up in Violence Across Northwestern Nigeria
    Some five hundred "bandits" attacked a village (or perhaps several villages) in Katsina State in northwest Nigeria over May 30 and 31. They made off with "thousands" of livestock, presumably cattle, and killed eighteen villagers and a local headman. The bandits (as the Nigerian police are calling them) were mounted on motorcycles and armed with "sophisticated" weapons, including assault rifles.  This episode seems to be part of a slew of attacks across Nigeria’s northwest region, which is made up of Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara states. While levels of violence in Zamfara have long been high, it appears that violence is spreading throughout the region. Across the northwest, an employee of the well-regarded International Crisis Group estimated that about 550 people, comprising villagers, bandits, and police were killed in such violence in May. From 2011 to 2020, the Nigeria Security Tracker recorded 8,500 deaths related to political violence across those seven states. Crisis Group reports similar numbers. Thousands have fled their homes.  Questions abound about this and other attacks. How did bandits mount such a large operation? If they indeed numbered five hundred, their attacking force would be far larger than almost any mounted by Boko Haram to date. How did bandits procure so many motorcycles? Where did the "sophisticated" weapons come from? If this was only a cattle-rustling operation (now common in the northwest and the middle belt), it appears to have been exceptionally well-resourced and organized. Finally, who exactly is responsible for the many recent attacks? Possibilities include criminal syndicates, jihadi militants, aggrieved farmers or herders, or perhaps some combination. Conflict between farmers and herders over water and land has been intensifying in Katsina and the northwest during Nigeria's coronavirus lockdown. Perhaps this particular episode was a farmer revenge attack on herdsmen, or vice versa? In Katsina, conflicts over water and land do not usually have a religious dimension; the populations is mostly Muslim, except for the minority that live in the Sabon Gari, or "strangers quarters," neighborhoods and towns. Hence there is less media attention than in the middle belt, where conflict often has an ethnic or religious dimension and grabs the attention of the mostly southern and mostly Christian media. Whatever the answers to these questions, the northwest seems to have become almost as insecure as the northeast, where Boko Haram has been active for a decade.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 23–29
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 23 to 29, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1591025961002'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 23: Communal violence resulted in one death in Afikpo, Ebonyi.  May 23: Four cultists were killed in Ifako/Ijaye, Lagos.  May 24: Nigerian troops killed twelve Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  May 26: Nigerian troops killed thirty bandits around Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  May 26: Five Boko Haram militants and two Cameroonian soldiers were killed during a clash in Soueram, Cameroon.  May 27: Communal violence resulted in one death in Awka North, Anambra.  May 27: Bandits killed seventy-four in Sabon Birni, Sokoto.   May 28: Bandits killed thirteen in Faskari LGA and two in Sabuwa LGA in Katsina.  May 28: Gunmen killed five in Bassa, Plateau.  May 29: Kidnappers abducted four in Ika North East, Delta.  May 29: Communal violence resulted in three deaths in Awka North, Anambra.  
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 16–22
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 16 to 22, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1590503351929'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 16: Gunmen kidnapped three people from Ado and Makurdi LGAs in Benue. May 17: Boko Haram killed twenty in Nganzai, Borno.   May 17: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  May 17: Gunmen abducted a naval officer and two others in Akoko South-East, Ondo.  May 17: Bandits killed five in Shiroro, Niger state.  May 18: Twelve Nigerien soldiers and seven Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack in Diffa, Niger.  May 18: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Bursari, Yobe.  May 18: Bandits killed eight in Wukari, Taraba.  May 18: Two Nigerian soldiers and three Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Gujba, Yobe.  May 19: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Biase, Cross River.  May 19: Bandits killed ten in Tsafe, Zamfara.  May 20: Communal violence led to twp deaths in Ishielu, Ebonyi.  May 21: Police officers killed eight kidnappers in Bali, Taraba.   May 22: Police killed two bandits in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. May 22: Gunmen killed twenty in Kajuru, Katsina.  May 20–22: Nigerian troops killed 135 bandits in Jiba and Dan Musa LGAs in Katsina and Birnin Magaji and Zurmi LGAs in Zamfara. 
  • Mozambique
    Preventing the Next Boko Haram in Northern Mozambique
    James Blake is an advisor, analyst, and journalist who focuses on conflict, humanitarian crises, and refugee issues. He is a member of the International Crisis Group's ambassadorial council.  As the world’s attention is fixed on the global COVID-19 pandemic, a brewing conflict in northern Mozambique is threatening to plunge the region into chaos. The conflict, which broke out in Cabo Delgado province in the fall of 2017, has since resulted in more than 1,000 deaths and forced 100,000 people to flee their homes. The details remain murky—not least because the government has banned researchers and journalists from covering it—but it is becoming clear that the so-called Islamic State is trying to capitalize on the insurgency. Along with the rising death toll, growing humanitarian needs, and brutal human rights abuses, there is concern among analysts that the conflict could spread into neighboring countries across southern and eastern Africa, not unlike the spread of jihadi violence in the Sahel.   Northern Mozambique has long suffered from high levels of illiteracy, poverty, child malnutrition, and alleged government discrimination. The region is primarily Muslim and features multiple languages, while the rest of the country is predominantly Christian. Cabo Delgado province in particular has long practiced Sufism, a mystical form of Islam. In recent years, new forms of Islam have been introduced to the region. In 2008, heavily influenced ideologically by Islamists in East Africa, a sect called Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ) (“adherents of the prophetic tradition”) formed. Its primary sponsors were followers of Sheikh Rogo, who was sanctioned by the United States and UN in 2012 for providing support to al-Shabab. According to an ITCT report [PDF], following Rogo’s death, several of his followers moved to northern Mozambique.  Three mosques in Mocimboa da Praia, a district in Cabo Delgado province, adopted Rogo’s interpretation of Islam, which advocates for the formation of an Islamic State. Although the authorities have subsequently shut them down, many who studied at these three mosques as children eventually joined militias and recruited others to join their cause. Some who became members of ASWJ had been given money [PDF], which was likely the result of illicit economic activity, to attend madrassas in places such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan.  The majority of ASWJ are from the Kimwani tribe, which has suffered particular economic and social marginalization. In approximately mid-2015, the group adopted the name al-Shabab (“youth”), like the Somali-based insurgency, though it is also still called ASWJ. According to a local study [PDF], friends and marriages of members, and also the promise of monthly wages, helped ASWJ grow further.  The first registered attack took place two years later in Mocimboa da Praia in October 2017, when militants attacked a police station. ASWJ gradually increased its presence in the region and attacks continued sporadically through 2018. During this time and beyond, Human Rights Watch has documented the group beheading victims, burning entire villages to the ground, attacking schools, ports, and mosques, and raiding food supplies. By mid-August 2018, the World Food Programme started to distribute aid to the thousands of people who fled their homes and now live in IDP camps.  By summer 2019, the so-called Islamic State had announced that the group was part of its franchise, an affiliate of its Central Africa Province. It remains unclear exactly how much control IS has over the group. There are some indications of a connection; for instance, during some attacks the group has carried the black flag of Islamic State. Further, Jasmine Opperman, a security analyst, suggested the idea of temporarily occupying and looting towns, but not holding them, fits IS tactics. Recent journalistic reports suggest the group is recruiting and gaining weapons across the porous borders with neighboring countries, such as Tanzania and Congo. For its part, the Mozambique military lacks the necessary equipment and the language skills to implement a robust counter-insurgency strategy, though the African Union has offered to provide training and equipment. The number of attacks has risen significantly over the first quarter of this year. On March 23, ASWJ briefly took control of a transport hub close to one of Africa’s most significant gas projects. The fear among the business community, which includes large multinational organizations such as Total and ExxonMobil, is that the group will soon look to disrupt the gas projects and target foreign nationals for kidnapping. The government’s response has won few plaudits. Human rights agencies have accused them of detaining people without trial and arresting journalists for reporting on the conflict. In response to the growing atrocities, the government enlisted the shadowy Wagner Group, a Russian private security company with links to the Kremlin. It is currently operating in the Central African Republic and other war-torn countries Already, there are rising humanitarian needs and too little humanitarian support. The number of displaced persons has risen from 1,000 in March 2019, to more than 115,000 a year later. More than two million people are already in need of humanitarian support [PDF], according to ECHO. Such support should aim to address growing needs, boosting outcomes such as lowering malnutrition rates, and providing programs that result in more opportunities for education, and clamping down on government corruption. Northern Mozambique requires urgent international assistance to stem growing violence, armed attacks, and the likelihood of a more coordinated and lethal insurgency that is likely to outlast the coronavirus pandemic.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 9–15
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 9 to 15, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589832552098'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 9: Gunmen killed two police officers and one civilian in Okpe, Delta.  May 9: Herdsmen killed two in Guma, Benue.  May 9: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  May 10: Communal violence led to eight deaths in Bali, Taraba.  May 11: Nigerian and Nigerien troops killed twenty-five Boko Haram militants in Diffa, Niger.  May 11: Nigerian and Nigerien troops killed fifty Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  May 12: Gunmen killed seventeen in Kajuru, Kaduna.  May 12: Herdsmen killed two civilians while the Nigerian army killed four of the herdsmen in Guma, Benue.  May 12: Herdsmen killed two in Numan, Adamawa.  May 12: Kidnappers abducted an Army captain and three others in Akoko North-East, Ondo.  May 12: Herdsmen killed four in Guma, Benue.  May 12: A communal clash resulted in three deaths in Biase, Cross River.  May 13: Herdsmen killed eight in Kajuru, Kaduna.  May 13: Nine Boko Haram militants and five Nigerian soldiers were killed during a clash in Kaga, Borno.  May 13: Gunmen killed eleven in Safana LGA, one in Batsari LGA, two in Dutsinma LGA, and three in Faskari LGA in Katsina.  May 14: Nigerian troops killed twenty-seven bandits along the Katsina/Zamfara border (Birnin-Magaji LGA in Zamfara, estimated).  May 14: Gunmen killed three in Dekina, Kogi.  May 15: Communal violence led to forty-eight deaths in Lamurde, Adamawa.  May 15: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. 
  • Chad
    After Lake Chad Offensive, April One of Deadliest Months in Boko Haram Conflict
    Asch Harwood is a research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker. Previously at UNICEF and Reboot, he is the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  April is now one of the deadliest months in the Boko Haram conflict, according to data from the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), which now features geographic data from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589298856898'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='590px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='590px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The NST has documented 1,491 deaths linked to the Boko Haram conflict in April. Casualties have only been higher in two previous months—March 2014 and February 2015—since the NST began in May 2011. These previously higher death tolls were reported during the height of the Boko Haram conflict.  So what accounts for such a dramatic spike in violence? The escalation culminating on April 8 is the result of a roughly two-week assault by Chadian forces on alleged Boko Haram operating around Lake Chad.  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589293529471'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Chad’s military claimed it killed one thousand “jihadists,” and lost fifty-two soldiers. It launched the assault, called Operation Bohoma Anger, in response to an attack on Chadian troops by Boko Haram near Lake Chad that left nearly one hundred dead over March 23 and 24. Chad’s military reportedly attacked positions all around Lake Chad, including in Nigeria and Niger. Borders in the region are largely nonexistent. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589293735896'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Despite these claims of “victory,” there remain unanswered questions. Jacob Zenn, a frequent contributor here, has pointed out that the effort was probably more of a public relations campaign than a military victory. He points to the presence of Chadian President Idriss Deby and his son in the region during the offensive. He also argues that the Chadian military is likely exaggerating how many alleged Boko Haram were killed while downplaying the number of military casualties. Zenn also notes that the operation largely targeted the ISWA sect of Boko Haram, even though it was its rival, Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), that attacked the Chadian military over March 23 and 24. Then there are questions regarding human rights violations. For example, there have been credible allegations that suspected Boko Haram captured during Bohoma Anger were poisoned after being denied food and water while in prison.  The International Crisis Group points out in a recent report on the conflict, “Jihadist groups pose a very serious danger to civilians and soldiers in the four countries bordering Lake Chad.” Daniel Eizenga, writing for the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, goes a step further, arguing, “Boko Haram’s ability to accomplish such a devastating attack, along with the preceding increase in militant Islamist group activity in Chad’s Lac Province, however, raises the prospect that Boko Haram and ISWA have gained momentum and now pose a greater threat to Chad and stability in the wider region.” Still, for the moment, the spike in violence does not necessarily reflect a return to 2014–2015.  
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 2–8
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 2 to 8, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589217805477'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 2: Nigerian troops killed seventy-eight Boko Haram militants in the "Timbuktu Triangle," in Borno. May 2: Nigerian soldiers killed fifty-six Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno.  May 2: Nigerian soldiers killed four civilians while enforcing the lockdown in Karim Lamido, Taraba.  May 3: Gunmen killed two in Teungo, Adamawa.  May 3: Communal violence led to three deaths in Apa, Benue.  May 3: Gunmen killed seven in Bassa, Plateau.  May 4: Bandits kidnapped fifteen and killed one in Chikun, Kaduna.   May 5: Suspected kidnappers killed four and kidnapped two in Toto, Nassarawa.  May 5: Herdsmen killed one and abducted one police officer in Egbado North, Ogun.  May 5: Bandits killed one and kidnapped nine in Rafi, Niger.  May 5: Communal violence led to twenty deaths in Donga, Taraba.  May 6: Herdsmen killed two vigilantes in Oshimili North, Delta.  May 6: Gunmen killed five and kidnapped two in Sabuwa, Katsina.  May 7: Sectarian violence led to "several" (estimated at ten) deaths and fifty kidnapped in Ayamelum, Anambra. May 7: Boko Haram killed 2 in Madagali, Adamawa.  May 8: Suspected hoodlums killed 1 police officer in Etsako West, Edo. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 25–May 1
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 25 to May 1, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1588608302264'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 25: The twin children of an Islamic cleric were kidnapped in Ibadan, Oyo.  April 25: Police killed three bandits in Gurara, Niger state.  April 25: Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 26: Bandits killed two in Shiroro, Niger state.  April 26: Herdsmen kidnapped four in Oshimili North, Delta.  April 26: Bandits killed three and kidnapped twelve in Kajuru, Kaduna.  April 27: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  April 27: Bandits killed a police inspector and one other, and kidnapped six in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna.  April 30: A policeman killed a soldier in Bomadi, Delta.  April 30: Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  May 1: Pirates kidnapped ten off the coast of Lagos.  May 1: Bandits killed three in Kankara, Katsina.  May 1: Bandits killed four vigilantes in Chikun, Kaduna.  May 1: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Donga, Taraba. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 18–24
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 18 to 24, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1587996266029'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 18: Bandits killed fourteen people in Danmusa LGA, ten in Dutsinma LGA, and twenty-three in Safana LGA in Katsina.  April 18: Nigerian soldiers killed 105 Boko Haram militants in Gujba, Yobe.  April 19: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Rafi, Niger state.   April 19: Herdsmen killed five in Kauru, Kaduna.  April 19: Bandits killed three in Faskari, Katsina.  April 20: Bandits abducted forty people in Faskari, Katsina.  April 20: Four soldiers and thirty bandits were killed in a clash in Zurmi, Zamfara.  April 20: Gunmen killed eight in Rafi, Niger state.   April 20: Communal violence led to four deaths and one kidnapping in Anambra West, Anambra.  April 20: Nigerian troops killed thirteen Boko Haram militants in Geidam, Yobe.  April 21: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  April 22: Nigerian troops killed three militia in Ukum, Benue.  April 22: Herdsmen killed two in Aniocha North, Delta.  April 23: Bandits killed seven and kidnapped one in Chikun, Kaduna.  April 24: Nigerian troops killed eighty-nine bandits in Zurmi, Zamfara.  April 24: Boko Haram killed three policemen and two others in Konduga, Borno.   
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 11–17
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 11 to 17, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1587391501288'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 11: Nigerian troops killed nine bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  April 12: Bandits killed eleven in Kankara, Katsina.  April 12: Boko Haram killed eight and kidnapped seven in Konduga, Borno.  April 13: Communal violence led to twenty-five deaths in Lau, Taraba.  April 13: Herdsmen killed two in Agatu, Benue.  April 14: Suspected herdsmen killed nine in Bassa, Plateau.  April 14: Five security personnel and "several" (estimated at five) insurgents were killed during a clash in Maiduguri, Borno.  April 14: Gunmen kidnapped three in Giwa, Kaduna.  April 14: Suspected herdsmen killed two in Ovia Northeast, Edo.   April 14: Cultists killed four in Oredo, Edo.  April 15: Bandits killed five in Shiroro LGA and one in Rafi LGA in Niger state.  April 15: Nigerian police killed two during a lockdown protest in Idemili North, Anambra.  April 16: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  April 16: The Nigerian Air Force accidentally bombed civilians in Damboa, Borno, killing seventeen. April 16: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Toto, Nassarawa. April 17: Gunmen kidnapped the Edo commissioner and killed a police orderly in Uhunmwonde, Edo.  April 17: Herdsmen kidnapped five in Aniocha North, Delta.  
  • Nigeria
    Boko Haram's Shekau Labels Anti-COVID-19 Measures an Attack on Islam in Nigeria
    Abubakar Shekau, a Boko Haram faction leader, kidnapper-in-chief of the Chibok school girls, notorious for his grisly videos and brutal implementation of punishments of seventh century, Middle Eastern origin, this week issued an audio recording on the coronavirus after a long period of radio silence.  In it, he characterizes international measures to address the coronavirus pandemic as part of the war on Islam by evil forces. He denounces especially social distancing, the suspension of pilgrimages to Mecca, and the likely modification of certain Ramadan observances. “Just look at it, they stopped you from Umrah and Hajj, even the fasting they are telling you that corona season needs a lot of drinking water.” He asserts that “Muslims,” by whom he means exclusively the followers of his extreme brand of Salafi Islam, are protected from the virus. “We pray five times a day, we pray Jummu’a, we sleep with our families, we hug, we shake hands, we are fine, fine fine,” he said on the recording. “We have anti-virus while you are infected with the coronavirus, we have anti-coronavirus; it is the Allah we worship. We pray, we slash fornicators, we cut hands.” (“Cut hands,” according to the translator of the recording, means amputating the hands of thieves.) He comes close to saying that COVID-19 is Allah's punishment on the ungodly. As he has many times before, he is contemptuous of secular leaders: “In the times of infidels like Trump, Idris Derby [sic] with the goat eye, Buhari, Muhammad Issoufu, the dog of the hands of France. Children of pigs and monkeys. If you don’t repent you will be finished.” Idris Deby is the president of Chad, Muhammed Issoufu is the president of Niger, and Muhammadu Buhari is the president of Nigeria. All three are allied against Boko Haram. Deby and Issoufu lead former French colonies, and have close ties with France; all three are Muslim but hold secular office, which Boko Haram regards as evil. The public health measures force a major change in how Muslims normally practice their religion. At mosque, those praying are shoulder-to-shoulder, contrary to social distancing; during the Ramadan fast, many northern Nigerian Muslims drink no water sunrise to sundown; and the Hajj, subject to the travel ban, is regarded as a sacred obligation. While mainstream Islamic figures have endorsed the government’s public health measures, their credibility among many of the marginalized in the north is low. Shekau’s attacks may resonate specifically with these marginalized people. The audio does not, apparently call for accelerated attacks on government targets. So far, at least, Shekau's last audio has not attracted the same level of attention that he enjoyed in the past, even as Boko Haram continues to be highly active. Part of the explanation may be the greater awareness that Boko Haram is a bundle of factions rather than a unified movement under Shekau, which was the perception of some years ago. He is also one of many in a long list of terror groups around the world issuing their “response” to the coronavirus pandemic.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 4–10
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 4 to 10, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1586786037403'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 5: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and ten others in Amchide, Cameroon.  April 6: Nigerian troops killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 6: Nigerian police killed six in a clash over the lockdown in Kaduna South, Kaduna.   April 7: Suspected herdsmen killed one in Oshimili North, Delta.  April 7: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  April 7: Gunmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau.  April 7: Nigerien and Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 7: A military officer and three kidnappers were killed during a shootout in Okene, Kogi.  April 7: Boko Haram killed three in Askira/Uba, Borno.  April 8: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Ukum, Benue.  April 8: Bandits killed one and kidnapped sixteen in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  April 8: Gunmen abducted nine in Chikun, Kaduna.   April 8: The Chadian army said that military operations over the past month had resulted in the deaths of one thousand Boko Haram militants and fifty-two Chadian soldiers in the Lake Chad area.  April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed a pastor in Oshimili North, Delta. 
  • Nigeria
    Case Not Quite Closed on the Assassination of Nigerian Salafi Scholar Shaikh Jaafar Adam
    Jacob Zenn is a fellow on African affairs at The Jamestown Foundation and an assistant adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His book, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, is being published in April 2020.  While at prayer on April 13, 2007—thirteen years ago—the prominent Salafi scholar, Shaikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam, was assassinated at his mosque in Kano. At the time, the murder made a deep impression on mainstream Muslims, many of whom revered Adam. The murder took place in the final days before the 2007 presidential elections, and many observers, including those at the U.S. embassy, thought that the murder was somehow related. But it now seems more likely that Adam was assassinated by a vengeful former member of the Nigerian Taliban. His murder was an early manifestation of the deadly battles among Boko Haram’s competing factions that continue up to the present. When Adam was assassinated, there were three suspects: Sufis who resented his anti-Sufi preaching; Kano politicians who resented his condemning cronyism; and Boko Haram. Nigerian Sufis have virtually no precedent for engaging in such violence, let alone the ability to conduct targeted assassinations, and no evidence has since come to light that substantiates their involvement.  So that leaves either politicians or Boko Haram, or both. For Boko Haram, it has long been clear that the group has never been a monolithic entity; factions existed well before Abubakar Shekau announced the jihad in 2010. At the time of Adam’s assassination, “Boko Haram” was made up of the principal group, led by the charismatic preacher Muhammed Yusuf, whose deputy was then Shekau, and a subgroup comprising former members of the Nigerian Taliban, which was originally led by Muhammad Ali until his death in 2004. Other factions, like Ansaru and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), did not materialize until 2012 and 2015, respectively.  In his 2018 book, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Muhammed Yusuf’s son, asserted that it was not Yusuf, but the “Kanama Taliban,” another name for the Nigerian Taliban, that had assassinated Adam. Muhammed Ali, its original leader, was a Nigerian university campus leader who traveled to Sudan in the mid-1990s and returned to Nigeria to found and lead this now notorious group. Based in Kanama, Yobe State, in 2003, it counted among its members former students of Adam and especially then current students of Yusuf.   Further, in his capacity as Boko Haram’s official spokesman and liaison to the Islamic State, but before he deposed Shekau to become ISWA leader in 2016, al-Barnawi explicitly denied claims that his father was behind Adam’s murder. In communiques to an Islamic State media activist in 2014, for example, al-Barnawi (or his media team colleagues) wrote that Boko Haram under his father’s leadership denounced Adam’s “religion of democracy,” but said that it was a “lie” that Yusuf’s followers assassinated Adam.  But can al-Barnawi’s claims be trusted? Given Adam’s popularity and ISWA avoiding killing Islamic scholars after al-Barnawi became leader, it may be self-serving for al-Barnawi’s self-described "hearts and minds" approach to insurgency to deflect blame for the widely condemned assassination. Nevertheless, given that Yusuf was once considered Adam’s “likely heir” in the 1990s before breaking with Adam after the 1999 restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria, there was an element of ambiguity in their relationship. Yusuf believed Adam engaged in shirk, or polytheism, by accepting Nigerian democracy, but Yusuf still attended Adam’s funeral as a sign of respect. Although Adam’s followers castigated him and suspected he plotted Adam’s assassination, unless Yusuf was supremely duplicitous, he would not have gone so far as to pay condolences to Adam’s wives while having secretly ordered their husband’s assassination. Moreover, up to that point in 2007, Yusuf had no history of ordering attacks or assassinations, even though other factions in his following, especially late Muhammed Ali’s followers from the Nigerian Taliban, were prone to violence. The Nigerian Taliban had a much clearer reason than Yusuf for wanting Adam dead: he had supported the government crackdown on them in Kanama in December 2003. The effort ultimately led to Ali’s death at the hands of pro-government vigilantes in Borno State weeks later. Yusuf, who fled to Saudi Arabia shortly before the crackdown, had already been declared an infidel by Ali because Yusuf advocated a more patient approach to jihad than Ali. Ali’s followers even attempted to kill Yusuf, which, in addition to pilgrimage, prompted his flight to Saudi Arabia. According to an interview with a former companion of Ali in 2019, Ali’s students had also declared Adam a murtad (apostate) for condoning the crackdown and disavowing his former students in the group. Yusuf, meanwhile, returned to Nigeria from Saudi Arabia in 2004 and successfully reintegrated Ali’s supporters into his own following. One credible Boko Haram “insider,” who is known for releasing deceased commanders’ photos and revealing the group’s secrets, has gone so far as to proffer the alias of Adam’s assassin, Ibrahim Uquba al-Muhajir. After the crackdown in Kanama, which left the Nigerian Taliban in disarray, al-Muhajir was among several members who fled to join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel. According to the insider, al-Muhajir then returned to Nigeria to assassinate Adam on April 13, 2007. He benefited from confusion surrounding Nigeria’s April 14 elections and two surprise Nigerian Taliban attacks in Kano that same week, including one claimed retrospectively by ISWA in 2015. Al-Muhajir was killed years later in a Boko Haram attack in Bama and eulogized in a Boko Haram video in 2019. It featured an image of him that the Boko Haram insider already released one year earlier. There are still mysteries about Adam’s assassination. For example, what exactly did Adam imply in his final sermon before his assassination, when he mentioned that three years earlier Yusuf returned from Saudi Arabia to Nigeria without his bags checked at the airport? Was there, for example, some secret deal made between Yusuf’s contacts in Saudi Arabia, Nigerian officials, and Yusuf himself when several Nigerian officials visited him in Saudi Arabia and then facilitated his return? Adam further promised to “disclose those things…when their time will come.” Who or what would Adam have exposed will never be known, but it was likely related to Yusuf’s stint in Saudi Arabia in 2004, where Adam also met Yusuf and urged him to return to Nigeria. Yusuf did not trust Adam, however, and only returned after some form of safe passage back to Nigeria was guaranteed. In addition, what did another prominent Nigerian Salafi scholar, Muhammed Auwal “Albani,” mean when he once asserted Adam was killed because “a few international organizations to build mosques and schools [and] a few politicians…brought some problems for him” and noted that an “Algeria group” brought weapons into Nigeria and Yusuf’s followers were “prime suspects”? Could any Islamic organizations or politicians in Kano who were close to Nigerian Taliban members have collaborated with, or even ordered, al-Muhajir to assassinate Adam?  Albani can no longer expound on his theory because he, too, was assassinated by Boko Haram in 2014. Shekau bombastically lauded his death in a video and, according to the Boko Haram insider, Shekau later killed Albani’s assassin, who was Albani’s former student. Shekau must know the group’s secrets about Adam’s murder. Although Shekau has rarely alluded to the murder, in February 2020, he warned Salafi scholar and Nigerian minister of communications, Isa Ali Pantami, that he would suffer Adam’s same fate. The episode surrounding Adam’s assassination drives home the point that Boko Haram has never been a monolithic entity. Factions and internecine warfare existed well before the jihad began in 2010. Perhaps more importantly, it suggests that revenge has always been one of Boko Haram’s motives. Adam’s assassination not only caused great mourning in Nigeria, but, in killing a former Yusuf ally and relative Salafi moderate, it was also a harbinger of more violence to come, especially against Salafis whom Boko Haram viewed as betraying the pursuit of an Islamic state in Nigeria.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: March 28–April 3
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 28 to April 3, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1586187432849'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 28: ISWA militants killed five in Konduga, Borno.  March 28: Nigerian troops killed nine bandits in Bungudu, Zamfara.  March 28: Gunmen killed one and abducted three in Suleja, Niger State.  March 28: Boko Haram killed six in Maiduguri, Borno.  March 29: Cultists killed a police inspector and two others in Sagamu, Ogun.  March 30: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 30: Gunmen killed six in Chikun, Kaduna.  March 31: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) bandits in Rafi, Niger.  March 31: Suspected herdsmen killed thirteen in Bassa, Plateau.   March 31: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Ose, Ondo.  March 31: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 31: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.   March 31: Bandits killed three in Igabi, Kaduna.  April 1: Prison guards killed eight inmates of Kaduna Prison in Kaduna, Kaduna. April 1: Bandits killed twenty-two in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. April 3: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno. 
  • COVID-19
    How Jihadi Groups in Africa Will Exploit COVID-19
    Bulama Bukarti is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, based in London, and a PhD candidate at SOAS, University of London. As the COVID-19 outbreak begins to spread in earnest in Africa, we can expect so-called jihadi groups on the continent to try to take advantage of the crisis to unleash violence and recruit members. We are already seeing indications that this has started happening. Governments, development workers, and aid agencies need to be made aware of this threat and take steps to deny these brutal militias more room to operate.    Over the past two weeks, Africa has seen a dramatic rise in the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, with recorded cases climbing from 1,017 on March 20, to over 7,177 on April 3, with at least 293 deaths and reaching fifty African states. If the spread of COVID-19 across Africa reaches anywhere near the levels of China, Europe, or the United States, panic, chaos, and confusion will ensue. Already stretched resources currently earmarked for state security forces fighting violent extremists and the provision of healthcare and humanitarian supplies to communities in need may have to be diverted to deal with a widespread outbreak. Based on past experience, if this happens, we can expect jihadi groups to exploit the situation in both their narratives and operations. Jihadi groups everywhere are opportunistic, adept at exploiting confusion and chaos to further their ideological goals. In Africa this is no different. For instance, al-Shabaab’s emergence in East Africa came amidst a power vacuum and turmoil from years of civil war in Somalia. Similarly, Ansarul Dine, a group wreaking havoc in the Sahel under the banner of Jama’a Nasr al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (Group to Aid Islam and Muslims), hijacked confusion caused by the 2012 coup to establish its version of an Islamic state in northern Mali.     Ideologically, there are two ways in which violent Islamist groups may seek to exploit the situation. If the pandemic spreads in Muslim-majority areas, they will peddle conspiracy theories about its origins, blaming the West, Jews, and Zionists, all of whom they lump together as the “enemies of Islam.” If the spread of the pandemic is controlled and does not reach Muslim-majority areas, particularly those controlled by jihadi groups, they will frame it as divine punishment against those areas. Either way, groups claiming to fight for Islam in Africa will use the virus outbreak to recruit and radicalize fighters and justify their narratives of hate, division, and enmity. We have already seen examples of this from ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates in other parts of the world in their coronavirus messaging.  Operationally, violent groups will try to capitalize on the situation to wreak more havoc. Many African states are already vulnerable to jihadi violence and struggling to muster the military capacity to counter extremist efforts. On March 24, Islamist extremists suspected to be part of the Islamic State in Central Africa took over a strategic port in Mozambique and hoisted their flag in what may herald the establishment of a new outpost for the so-called caliphate. On the same day, the faction of Boko Haram led by Abubakar Shekau killed ninety-two Chadian soldiers in an ambush around the Lake Chad area, and at least forty-seven Nigerian soldiers died in northeastern Nigeria in an ambush by Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) fighters. Similarly, jihadists affiliated to al-Qaeda killed twenty-nine soldiers in Mali on March 19. As COVID-19 hits and governments re-task their military capacity to support the public health response, countries will be even more vulnerable to attacks.  To complicate matters further, this pandemic will delay the deployment of an additional 250 British troops scheduled to join the effort against violent extremists in the Sahel later this year. The British and U.S. militaries in Africa have already been reported as needing to retreat due to the health crisis. COVID-19 has pushed the effort to counter extremism down the list of priorities of Western countries, at least for the moment. This will certainly affect the war against extremist factions and allow them more space to operate. Strategically, jihadi groups could increase their efforts to exploit humanitarian vacuums likely created by a widespread outbreak. Credible studies have found that jihadi groups in Africa seek to deliver governance services such as health and infrastructure to recruit members and build credibility with sympathizers even in normal times. In the current climate, these groups might increase service provision, stepping in where the state is failing in medical, water, and food provisions, to build popular support for their cause and proto-states.  African governments already face a tall task in responding to COVID-19, but they should remain hyper vigilant of the now greater threat posed by Islamic extremist groups.