What’s Next for the Democratic Republic of Congo?

The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is getting worse. In January, even before the Rwanda-backed M23 seized Goma and Bukavu, and before the collapse of much of the humanitarian aid delivery system, less than 13 percent of the eleven million people in need in the DRC were getting assistance. Now, the downward spiral for civilians is accelerating. The International Rescue Committee has cited a “catastrophic deterioration in health service and humanitarian conditions” in eastern Congo, including an alarming uptick in cholera as desperate Congolese find themselves without basic sanitation.  

The signals from the region are equally troubling. The Southern African Development Community opted to withdraw the stabilization mission they deployed over a year ago to assist the Congolese government, not because their objective was accomplished, but because Southern African leaders had no appetite for sustaining additional casualties on behalf of the clearly outmatched Congolese forces. The government in Kinshasa appears to be panicked, disorganized, fearful of a coup, and running out of options.

For a moment, it looked as though Angola’s decision to host direct talks between the DRC government and the M23 would present an important opportunity for de-escalation. Congolese President Tshisekedi had long resisted such talks, but apparently the increasingly unenthusiastic regional response to his appeals for support, along with whatever message U.S. Congressman Ronny Jackson, identified in Congolese media as President Trump’s envoy to the DRC, delivered on Sunday, prompted a change of heart. Despite the noise about a minerals for security assistance deal, it’s hard to imagine the U.S. choosing to get more deeply involved in the military conflict in the DRC or many U.S. companies being eager for exposure to the instability and corruption of the Congolese business climate.

Talks between the belligerents are essential, but it didn’t take long for optimism to fade, as the M23 reacted to European Union sanctions imposed on Rwanda by retracting their own commitment to attend the talks. Meanwhile, President of Rwanda Paul Kagame is on the offensive, attacking the latest sanctions against his country—part of an international effort to pressure Kigali to rein in the M23 and stop their seizure of Congolese territory—as “neo-colonial interference” and severing diplomatic relations with Belgium to emphasize his point.

The latest twist came in the form of a readout from talks between Kagame and Tshisekedi, mediated by Qatar, in which both heads of state recommitted to a ceasefire. It remains to be seen whether this will be any more meaningful than similar commitments made, and quickly ignored, in the past. The shenanigans that scuttled the planned Angolan meeting, and the absence of any details on ceasefire implementation and monitoring, do not inspire confidence. Rwanda will continue to calibrate how far it can go to pursue its ambitions, while the Congolese government focuses on regime survival.

It's difficult to escape the conclusion that the new era of statecraft ushered in by Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump—one in which humanitarian imperatives are summarily dismissed, territorial expansion is back in vogue, and security guarantees are offered not as a matter of principle, but in exchange for mineral rights—has turbocharged this latest iteration of eastern Congo’s crisis. But what solution does this new era offer to the longstanding problem of the DRC’s profoundly inadequate governance or to the suffering of its people? Neither the existing order, nor a Rwandan-imposed alternative, offer much promise for a better future.