What a Harris-Walz Administration Would Mean for Southeast and South Asia

Earlier in the year, I outlined the possible impact of a Trump presidency on Southeast Asian countries. I argued that if former President Trump carried through his plans to drastically toughen the United States’ approach to China, it would potentially cause significant trade dislocations in Southeast Asia. Moreover, it could also force many Southeast Asian states who do not want to choose between the United States and China—and who have become more receptive to Chinese soft power, per a valuable new CSIS report—to make such a choice.

Trump and his running mate, Ohio Senator J.D. Vance, have lost some ground in the race since President Joe Biden stepped aside for the ticket of Vice President Kamala Harris and Minnesota Governor Tim Walz. However, the race remains extremely close, and South and Southeast Asia states need to prepare for potential GOP and Democratic administrations. What would be different about a Harris-Walz administration from a Trump-Vance one?

Despite some GOP claims to the contrary, Walz and Harris certainly would not be soft on China. Walz, who taught in China and has spent years there, knows China exceptionally well and has been widely praised by Chinese and Hong Kong activists for his strong support for human rights inside China, less brutal repression in Tibet, and an end to the crackdown in Hong Kong. As a Congressmember, Walz served on the Congressional-Executive Commission on China and co-sponsored the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2014, one of the most critical bills on China’s human rights record.

While continuing the Biden administration’s efforts at re-shoring, protecting critical chips and manufacturing, and bolstering defense ties in the Indo-Pacific, a Harris-Walz administration is unlikely to take the kind of economic measures that a Trump administration would. For example, Trump’s preference for high tariffs would cause substantial economic reverberations in South and Southeast Asia and worldwide.

A Harris-Walz administration would also be less likely to directly prod countries in the region to choose between the United States and China. They appear conscious that, were Washington to force a choice at this point, it might come up on the short end of the stick. During her four years on the job, Harris has spent considerable time in Southeast Asia and attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit. She is likely aware of the contentious high-wire act facing nearly every Southeast Asian state.

At the same time, any administration, whether Democratic or Republican, is likely to continue to upgrade ties to key Indo-Pacific partners, including the Philippines—which has cast itself on the side of the United States—Australia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and to some extent India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Unlike a Trump administration, Harris and Walz may be more rhetorically committed to supporting rights and democracy throughout the Indo-Pacific, which will complicate closer links with Vietnam, an increasingly politically regressive Indonesia and Thailand, and possibly even India, where Harris would seem to have natural opportunities to open doors and build ties through her heritage.

The Biden administration attempted this balance but was often caught off-guard by the intense democratic regression in South and Southeast Asia, from Bangladesh to Vietnam, and some rights advocates on Capitol Hill lacerated its approach. Harris and Walz will struggle to find this balance as well.

This post is a product of the Council on Foreign Relations’ China Strategy Initiative—an effort that seeks to answer the questions that go to the heart of American China strategy through fresh analysis, granular policy recommendations, and convenings with experts from around the world. For more on the China Strategy Initiative, visit cfr.org/china and follow the initiative on X @cfr_china.