Washington Woos Angola

Recent reports that President Biden plans to travel to Angola in the months ahead suggest that the White House is sensitive to the perception that it has been insufficiently engaged on Africa policy matters. If true, presumably, the trip is intended as a signal of U.S. commitment, and an opportunity to highlight Washington’s investment in the Lobito corridor, a transnational infrastructure project intended to link mineral-rich regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to Angola’s Lobito port. It would be a capstone to the charm offensive that included the first ever visit of an American secretary of defense to Angola, and an Oval Office meeting with Angolan President João Lourenço. It’s an effort that the White House characterizes as a deepening relationship with a strategic partner.  

That Angola’s future is consequential is undeniable. Its position on Africa’s Atlantic coast, a geography where China has been actively seeking a naval base, along with its capable military make its security choices influential. The country also has diplomatic heft—Angola has been a central player in efforts to defuse tensions between the DRC and Rwanda—giving it influence. Working with Angola where we share interests makes good sense.  

But it is equally undeniable that Angola’s present is deeply troubled. The predominantly young population is struggling with high rates of unemployment, and polling shows that less than 40 percent of young people approve of the way the president and members of parliament are performing. Young Angolans have good reasons to be deeply cynical about their own government and its “democratic” credentials; the country scores twenty-eight out of a possible one-hundred points in Freedom House’s latest Freedom in the World report. President Lourenço’s government has reacted to popular protests with new laws that restrict media freedoms and threaten protesters, or anyone documenting the security forces’ response to protests, with long prison terms. Grand scale corruption and jarring inequality continue to characterize the country’s political economy.  

A deeper, sustainable relationship with Angola will remain out of reach if the United States ignores these uncomfortable realities. A visit from President Biden will be interpreted as an embrace of Angola’s unpopular government. For Angola’s deeply dissatisfied population, that means the United States will be on the hook to show that partnership with Washington has something meaningful to offer Angolans far more accustomed to close relations with Russia and China. On social media, Angolans are already asking questions about how this will affect their lives. But making a difference without addressing repression and corruption is a tall order. For the Lobito corridor to attract the kind of investment that would create more jobs, Angola would need to clean up its business climate. If this bilateral relationship is to bear fruit, the symbolism must come with real substance.