Is the United States Losing Ground to China in Southeast Asia?

Historically, Southeast Asian countries, with rare exceptions like the Philippines today, have tried their hardest not to side clearly with either of the two regional giants, China or the United States. But, there are increasing warning signs that the United States is losing influence to China in the region. These signs do not mean that Southeast Asian states would necessarily side with China if there were a military conflict over the South China Sea or determine how they would act if there were a war over Taiwan. It further does not mean that most Southeast Asian states are unperturbed by China’s increasing militarization of the South China Sea, claims on disputed areas that may have significant oil and gas deposits, or Beijing’s notably more aggressive and dangerous tactics toward boats from the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries in waters China claims as its own.

However, while the shift is subtle, there are increasing signs that China is gaining the upper hand in various ways in most Southeast Asian states, save the Philippines. Laos and Cambodia are already essentially Chinese satellite states because they have become dependent on China for aid, investment, diplomatic protection, and defense cooperation. Myanmar falls in this category to some extent, though the increasing success of the anti-junta opposition leaves China’s future relationship with Myanmar unclear.

Even in wealthier and more powerful Southeast Asian states, there are signs that China is making significant inroads. As The Economist recently noted, Southeast Asian leaders are angry that, for the second year in a row, U.S. President Joe Biden is skipping the East Asia Summit, the premier Asian summit and a place where many Asian states have used the chance to interact with the U.S. president to present agendas to him. There are also further worries in Southeast Asia that, despite Vice President Kamala Harris’s multiple visits to the region, her top advisors (which includes my former CFR colleague Philip Gordon) are Atlanticists who might be inclined to focus on trans-Atlantic ties first and foremost.

To be fair, the problem of top U.S. leaders not consistently showing up at major Asian summits and events, which Southeast Asian leaders view as critical to respecting the region—and come as a contrast to top Chinese officials who attend almost every event—is not unique to the Biden administration. The Trump administration often failed to attend these top summits, and the George W. Bush and Obama administrations received some of the same criticisms.

In addition, many Southeast Asian states, already massively dependent on China for trade (and sometimes aid and investment), have become frustrated with the lack of a coherent U.S. trade policy toward Asia over the past four years. While the region embarks on a rapid series of trade deals, some of which support and supplement each other, the United States is not a participant and has offered modest economic incentives through its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). IPEF falls well short of a real trade deal and has not been regarded highly by most Southeast Asian states. Of course, trade deals of any type are currently unpopular with the U.S. public, especially right before a presidential election. Yet Southeast Asian states are still disappointed by U.S. trade abdication in the region.

As The Economist also notes, the war in Gaza has added to U.S. unpopularity in the region’s Muslim-majority states, like Indonesia and Malaysia, where Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who has long ties to the United States, has been harshly critical of its role in the war. At the same time, Anwar has assiduously cultivated China, even to the point of seemingly doing little to defend Kuala Lumpur’s overlapping South China Sea claims with those of Beijing. Until there is some shift in the Gaza war or the regional conflict in the Middle East, it will be difficult for any U.S. leader to win back public support in Malaysia and Indonesia, where views of the United States have cratered.  

This growing discontent among Southeast Asians with the United States was reflected, most notably, in the annual survey conducted earlier this year by the Iseas Yusof-Ishak think-tank based in Singapore. Every year, the think-tank provides an invaluable survey of the state of Southeast Asian views on a wide range of topics, including their views of major regional external powers. (The survey is primarily limited to Southeast Asian elites but still captures widespread trends in the region.) This year’s survey, for the first time, reveals that “China continues to be seen as the most influential economic (59.5 percent) and political-strategic (43.9 percent) power in the region, outpacing the United States by significant margins in both domains.” It also revealed, most notably, that “China has edged past the United States to become the prevailing choice (50.5 percent) if the region were forced to align itself in the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry.” The United States dropped from being the first choice of 61.1 percent of respondents in the previous year to 49.5 percent of respondents this year. Close to half of the respondents (46.8 percent) believe that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressures from the two major powers. This year’s survey results are not promising for the United States in Southeast Asia.