A Second Trump Term: How Will Each Southeast Asian State Respond? Part 2

In a recent Japan Times piece, I wrote about how a second Trump term might affect Southeast Asian countries. Most importantly, former President Trump would likely force Southeast Asian governments to choose between China and the United States, a decision most of them, save possibly the Philippines, do not want to make. Yet Trump’s more rigid approach to China—and China’s tougher response to the United States—may make the long-standing Southeast Asian practice of balancing between the superpowers no longer possible. This delicate balance involves deriving increasing trade and investment from China while often still building security ties with the United States. To most Southeast Asian states, this scenario is a nightmare. Southeast Asian officials I have spoken with already seem wracked with worry about the U.S.-China bilateral trajectory and whether Southeast Asia’s balancing act will finally have to end.

However, how would specific Southeast Asian states respond to a second Trump administration that could be much tougher on China and lead to heightened competition over Southeast Asian allegiances? Here is a brief summary of how each country would respond. (I exclude Brunei and Timor-Leste, the two Southeast Asian microstates, from this analysis.) This is the second part of the series; the first five of nine countries were discussed in a prior blog post.

Thailand: Of all the six large Southeast Asian economies, Thailand has long been the country with the closest formal and informal ties to China. Chinese migrants were better assimilated into Thailand in the twentieth century than in most other Southeast Asian countries, like Indonesia, where massive bloodletting in the 1960s and 1990s targeted Indonesian Chinese, for instance. The Thai public generally has warm views of China, the Thai business community is much more intertwined with Chinese firms than companies in many other Southeast Asian states—and the Thai military is increasingly willing to depend more on China for training and gear. Although Thailand is technically a U.S. treaty ally, the United States’ (relatively mild) condemnation of the 2014 coup and Thailand’s unfree and unfair 2019 election have aggravated subsequent Thai governments. If ultimately forced to choose, despite being a U.S. treaty ally, Thailand will likely side with China.  

Malaysia: Although Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has enjoyed warm relations with the United States and lived and worked there for a time when he was essentially in exile, his government has not enjoyed any honeymoon with Washington. Seeking to keep Muslim religious conservatives in his political camp, Anwar has done little to stop the spread of policies that could prioritize Muslims in some ways and reduce the rights of the Chinese and Indian communities. He has not fought corruption in the way that many U.S. leaders believed he would, and he has assiduously courted China.

In addition, after the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, he has been by far the most outspoken leader in Southeast Asia, slamming Israel and the United States’ activities related to the war. Anwar has maintained ties with Hamas, angering the United States, and recently met with Hamas representatives in Qatar. As the Malaysian population, composed of majority Malay Muslims, becomes more conservative, it is increasingly less enamored of the United States. Another Malaysian leader other than Anwar would likely push the country even farther in the direction of China, especially if forced to choose. Malaysia has also had a trade surplus with the United States for many years, which could anger a second Trump administration.  

Indonesia: Indonesia is a genuine wild card. President-elect Prabowo Subianto has historically had a poor relationship with the United States due to past alleged rights abuses, but he worked well with the Pentagon in the early 2020s. He is, more than current President Joko Widodo, much more focused on international affairs and has a strong desire for Indonesia to be taken seriously as a major middle power with significant sway in international institutions, regional security, the global economy, and whatever new international order emerges in the coming years.

On the other hand, like Jokowi, he knows that Indonesia heavily depends on infrastructure investment from China. Further, Indonesia’s claims in the South China Sea do not conflict as dramatically with those of China as do, for example, the claims of the Philippines and Vietnam. Indonesia has strived to be nonaligned since its beginning as an independent country. Still, if it intends to be a significant middle power, it will need more clear partners.

The Indonesian defense and elite security establishment would probably prefer a closer partnership with the United States and other closer partnerships that help Jakarta rise to middle power status. However, the ramifications of China could be massive. Still, Indonesia remains an uncertain actor in a future of more intense U.S.-China competition, partly because Prabowo himself is notoriously mercurial, and it is hardly out of the question that he could form a close personal relationship with President Trump.  

Singapore: Singapore is, perhaps of all the Southeast Asian major economies, in the most brutal bind if U.S.-China relations continue to deteriorate. Singapore is so heavily dependent on global trade that a stepped-up U.S.-China trade conflict would do massive harm to the Singaporean economy at a time when it is changing leadership, and the ruling party will also have to go to the polls, facing more vigorous opposition than in the past. In addition, as I have noted in prior blog posts, the Singaporean political and defense elite still tilt to the United States and have discreet but fairly close defense ties to Taiwan. Yet the Singaporean public is growing warmer to China in general. It is increasingly consumed by domestic issues facing the city-state, like an aging population, income inequality, high prices for many items, and other issues. Singapore is the most diplomatically skilled state in Southeast Asia. If anyone can maintain a balance between the giants in a second Trump administration, it would be the city-state. But I’m still not sure that is possible, depending on how dramatic the pressure the White House puts on Southeast Asian countries.