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The United Nations General Assembly Votes to Remove Jews from Jerusalem's Old City

by Elliott Abrams September 19, 2024

The most recent UN General Assembly resolution on Israel and the Palestinians is a radical strike at Israel and would push Jews out of the Old City of Jerusalem. Read More

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Lebanon

What is the Role of UNIFIL?

This month the new head of UNIFIL took up his post. The new UNIFIL Force Commander and Head of Mission is Major General Stefano Del Col of Italy, and UNIFIL is the United National Interim Force in Lebanon, established in 1978. Its authorized strength is 15,000, and the actual number of troops is about 10,500. Its mission today is set in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006 to end the Israel/Hezbollah conflict. The Resolution, inter alia, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL…to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel; Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006)…for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon…. Resolution 2373, adopted in August 2017, extended the mandate. It also added that the Security Council recalls its authorization to UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind…. It is a reminder of the strange world of UN resolutions that 2373 does not mention Hezbollah at all. While the resolution condemns acts of intimidation meant to prevent UNIFIL from fulfilling its mission, it does not mention who is committing those acts. Resolution 1701 lists the specific things UNIFIL should be doing, all of which are meant to ensure that the Lebanese army moves into south Lebanon and is the only armed force there, and more generally that the government of Lebanon and not Hezbollah exercises sovereignty over and control of all Lebanese territory. Twelve years later, as a new UNIFIL commander takes over, we should be assessing how all of that is going. Is UNIFIL stronger, and has it helped the government of Lebanon push back against Hezbollah? Very clearly the answer is no. In the years since the 2006 war, Hezbollah has increased its strength and especially its weaponry despite UNIFIL’s existence. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, said this when resolution 2373 was adopted, according to the official UN account: Describing the status quo for UNIFIL as unacceptable, she said the resolution called on the Force to step up patrols and inspections to disrupt Hizbullah’s illicit activities. It also emphasized that UNIFIL could assist the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure the border and halt the flow of weapons, and required it to report where, when and why it could not see behind roadblocks. The resolution demanded that UNIFIL step up its efforts at a moment when Hizbullah was stepping up theirs.... Cynics, or realists, might well argue that UNIFIL provides Hezbollah with a multinational force of human shields. That is, because Hezbollah and UNIFIL troops are so close to each other physically it would be very difficult for Israel, in another war with Hezbollah, to attack without UNIFIL getting in the way. Moreover, one need not wait for another round of fighting to see the deleterious political effect of UNIFIL on the policies of contributor nations. Among the top ten troop contributors are France, Spain, Italy, China, Ireland, and China; other contributors include Austria, Finland, Germany, and Greece. Most of these governments are concerned above all about the safety of their troops, which means they do not want UNIFIL challenging Hezbollah. On the contrary they wish to achieve a modus vivendi with that terrorist organization. That is one reason for the complaint, sometimes heard in southern Lebanon, that UNIFIL hires mostly pro-Hezbollah people for their local support staff and as providers of other goods and services. That keeps the peace with Hezbollah, at the cost of subsidizing Hezbollah financially. What would happen in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL became more aggressive in enforcing UN resolutions? There would be some confrontations with Hezbollah supporters and perhaps even with heavily armed terrorist groups. Hezbollah does intimidate, block, and deter UNIFIL; there is no evidence that UNIFIL intimidates, blocks, or deters Hezbollah. The most recent incident occurred just a few weeks ago, in August, when “civilians” in a Hezbollah-controlled area stopped a UNIFIL patrol from advancing. Last year Hezbollah similarly let UNIFIL know who’s boss. AFP reported that “Groups of civilians attacked United Nations peacekeepers on patrol in two incidents in southern Lebanon on Friday, damaging their vehicles but causing no injuries, the mission said in a statement. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said two patrols…in south Lebanon were obstructed on Friday morning ‘by groups of aggressive men’.” UNIFIL stated that “Civilians attempted to block the way of UNIFIL patrols and attacked the peacekeepers,” and while no peacekeepers were injured in the incidents there was “severe damages” to UNIFIL vehicles. Just a friendly Hezbollah reminder. What is to be done? Israel’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Ron Prosor, commented that UNIFIL should push back: UNIFIL should “use the tools the force already has, like drones that can monitor Hezbollah’s activities and relay the footage to control rooms around the world, with almost zero risk for troops on the ground.” But that is not what troop contributor governments seek, so it is very unlikely to happen. Still, one may hope that General Del Col is somewhat tougher than his predecessor, the Irish General Michael Beary. It is almost impossible that he will be less tough. Del Col should, and perhaps he may, try to establish new limits to the ability of the terrorists to treat southern Lebanon as their domain. What would happen if UNIFIL folded, and the troops went home? Given that the presence of the UNIFIL forces is beneficial to residents of southern Lebanon—the troops can limit Hezbollah’s absolute sovereignty there, and they do spend money there as well—their departure would be unpopular and would be blamed on Hezbollah. Shia residents of south Lebanon, who are already unhappy with the sacrifices Hezbollah is forcing upon them in the war in Syria, would have another grievance against the Hezbollah leadership. That gives Gen. Del Col and UNIFIL some space to work, make demands, and stand up for themselves. Presumably both the Lebanese and Israeli governments prefer to have UNIFIL there as a sort of buffer, but at least in the Israeli case they would clearly like an active buffer that actually tries to do what Resolution 1701 requires of it. Del Col should test the limits. That will make Hezbollah angry, but if Hezbollah isn’t vexed by UNIFIL's presence then we are all wasting a lot of money--$500 million a year is the UNIFIL budget—and effort supporting that organization and making believe that it is enforcing resolution 1701.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams August 30, 2018 Pressure Points

United States

Scoop Jackson and John McCain

In the course of my career I've had the great privilege of working for Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson and knowing John McCain, two of the most consequential senators of the last seventy-five years. And these two men knew each other very well, because Jackson was a model and mentor for McCain. That story is very well told in a column in today's Washington Post by James Hohmann entitled "What John McCain learned from his Democratic mentor." Because this kind of contemporary history is so rare in newspapers today, Hohmann deserves great credit for understanding and reporting this extraordinary relationship. As Hohmann reports, McCain was the Navy liaison to the Senate for several years before being elected to the House and then the Senate. In those years, the late 1970s and early 1980s (before Scoop Jackson's very untimely death on 1983), Jackson and McCain traveled together and worked together often. What did McCain learn from Jackson? Hohmann has it right. Watching Jackson change U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, McCain learned that Congress had enormous power to affect U.S. foreign policy--and could use that power to fight for better policies. Watching Jackson take on administrations of both parties, he learned that foreign policy should be above partisan politics. Watching Jackson champion the Soviet dissidents and other oppressed groups, he learned that U.S. foreign policy should be built around a moral and ideological core that differentiates us from other countries. As Hohmann wrote, Even as he battled brain cancer, McCain still spoke fondly of Jackson as “the model of what an American statesman should be,” invoking him with reverence during impromptu hallway interviews and in speeches. He strove to emulate him as a globe-trotting avatar of American values, willing to take on his own party leaders and go toe-to-toe with presidents. In “Worth the Fighting For,” McCain identified half a dozen people who inspired him to get into politics. He devoted a full chapter to Jackson.... McCain wrote in 2002 that “Few presidents can claim to have served the Republic as ably, as faithfully as Scoop Jackson did.” As McCain put it, All these trips, all these speeches, op-eds, press statements, interviews, professing support for Ukrainians and Georgians and Estonians and Montenegrins, condemning [Vladimir] Putin, criticizing my own government. Did it change anything, improve anything? I hope so. But I know for certain it meant something to the people I meant to help because they’ve told me it has. It meant that there were Americans on their side, that we hear them, we acknowledge the justice of their cause, they aren’t forgotten. … It matters. Scoop Jackson taught me that. He taught a lot of us that, and then John McCain taught it to a new generation. In the Senate and in his service as chairman of the International Republican Institute, McCain upheld the principles he had shared with Jackson. I hope the senators attending his memorial service this weekend will reflect on what John McCain taught them and showed them, and will silently pledge to try to fill the enormous gap his passing has created. That is the tribute McCain would most have appreciated.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams August 28, 2018 Pressure Points

United Kingdom

Jeremy Corbyn's Cynical Anti-Semitism

There are about 260,000 to 280,000 Jews in the United Kingdom, and about 2.8 million Muslims--ten times as many, or more. So what? So this gives us a further insight into the anti-Semitism of Labor Party leader Jeremy Corbyn. Corbyn's appalling conduct is analyzed here in Foreign Policy and here in The New Yorker. Joan Ryan, a Labor Party Member of Parliament who chairs Labor Friends of Israel, wrote this on August 21st: [T]he last four weeks have been dominated by stories about our leader attending ceremonies at the graves of those behind the Munich massacre, presiding over Holocaust Memorial Day meetings where Israel was compared to Nazi Germany, and casting doubt on the guilt of Hamas terrorists. Consider the past week’s revelations alone. Jeremy Corbyn was photographed next to the leader of the PFLP, a month before they claimed responsibility for the 2014 axe murder of seven rabbis in a Jerusalem synagogue. He spoke at a conference in Doha in 2012 alongside Hamas terrorists and called their speeches “fascinating and electrifying”. And he enjoyed a takeaway dinner in 2010 with Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, who is on Britain’s terror sanctions list. Ryan also notes that Corbyn and his team are intent on not fixing this problem: "the party has had multiple opportunities since to tackle the scourge of antisemitism. It has missed every one of them." Now why would that be? The usual answer is that Corbyn and his associates at the top of the Labor Party believe in what they are doing. That is, they truly are anti-Semites. I agree with that explanation. But there is a second explanation, and it is found in the numbers I cited. Corbyn thinks he has a winner in hatred of Jews and Israel. He thinks the anger and fear of British Jews is good for him because it may attract Muslim voters. As Ed Husain (my former colleague at CFR and now writing from London) wrote in The Daily Telegraph, “There are at least 30 seats where the ‘Muslim vote’ can help Labour win.” So Corbyn’s refusal to back away from his anti-Jewish past is both ideological and deeply cynical dirty politics. Will it work? It certainly displays a low opinion of British Muslims, because it assumes that the best way to earn their votes is not through a positive program of any sort but is instead by suggesting that a vote for Labor is a vote against the Jews. I've been unable to find any poll data that tells us whether it is working--whether, that is, Corbyn's support from Muslim voters rises when he is criticized by British Jews or accused of anti-Semitism. Whether it works or not, it tells us a great deal about Corbyn. If you thought the anti-Semitism was bad enough, add to that a deep and unprincipled cynicism.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams August 23, 2018 Pressure Points

U.S. Foreign Policy

Pompeo Staffs Up

Today Secretary of State Pompeo announced the appointment of Steve Biegun to be Special Representative for North Korea. This follows the announcements of Brian Hook as Special Representative for Iran and Jim Jeffrey as Representative for Syria Engagement. These announcements deserve a few comments. The first is to congratulate Pompeo for attracting Jeffrey and Biegun to State and selecting them for top-level responsibilities, and for giving Hook this new task. I know both Biegun and Jeffrey as former colleagues in the Bush administration, and their records of public service are exemplary. Their many talents are impressive and we are all lucky they agreed to leave the private sector and serve yet again. They will join Hook, another former colleague, who has been Director of the Policy Planning Staff and a key figure in foreign policy since the administration took office. The selection of a top adviser to handle Iran shows how important Iran is for Secretary Pompeo and the administration. Jeffrey’s appointment is important for another reason: he signed one of the anti-Trump letters in 2016 and is I believe the first person to have done so who got an administration post. If this means that the blacklist is fraying, the president and the secretary of state will benefit greatly. They will have dozens more names to choose from in seeking top-notch advisers. It’s noteworthy, though, that Jeffrey is getting a non-confirmation post. Perhaps this represents a sort of compromise between Pompeo and the White House: he can select people who signed those letters, but a confirmation hearing could be embarrassing for the president. So hire them, but for “special” positions. As a former assistant secretary of state (in the Reagan administration), I notice something else here. Traditionally the heart of the Department is the regional bureaus. Typically, new secretaries of state arrive and immediately notice that too many people in special spots outside the bureaus are reporting to them. They then try to eliminate all the “special” roles and return to “regular order:” one deputy secretary, a few undersecretaries, and the assistant secretaries heading all the regional and functional bureaus. That way they reduce the number of people reporting directly to them and put responsibilities back in the bureaus created to handle them. Pompeo is not doing this but on the contrary is adding several new “special” envoys reporting directly to him. According to rumor a fourth will be announced in a week or two, for Afghanistan. Why? Presumably because he needs to staff up with first-rate people and cannot otherwise get them fast enough. Confirmation takes many months, with squabbles with Congress and congressional holds on nominees. Pompeo does not want to wait. He is correcting the error his predecessor made by failing to fill important posts fast. By going the “special” route he avoids those delays, gets the people he wants now, and has even been able to get someone who had been blacklisted. There is a price to pay, and it is the weakening of the regional bureaus. The Near East Bureau, for example, has in essence lost control of Syria to Jeffrey and of Iran to Hook—and had already lost the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relations with Israel to Jared Kushner and Jason Greenblatt in the White House. This runs the risk that coordination will suffer because all Near East matters do not go through the bureau. A similar problem will exist in Asia. The announcement of Steve Biegun says "As Special Representative, he will direct all U.S. policy on North Korea, lead negotiations, and spearhead our diplomatic efforts with our allies and partners." Missing entirely is a role for the East Asia bureau. Clearly this problem can be solved if all hands—for the Near East, that means Hook, Jeffrey, the assistant secretary when one is confirmed, and the under secretary-designate for political affairs (David Hale, a former ambassador to Lebanon and Pakistan)—meet often and keep each other fully informed about things that affect all of their bailiwicks. This won’t happen by itself and will require constant efforts, and the same is true of East Asia. Biegun has North Korea, but the bureau has Japan, Australia, and so on. Morale in the regional bureaus must also be a concern. If many of the most important activities in a region—East Asia, the Middle East, or any other—are happening outside the relevant regional bureau there is a risk that bureau personnel think they are in a backwater, are missing all the action, and do not have the secretary of state’s confidence. Again, this can be addressed if the “specials” use bureau personnel and link up closely to the relevant bureau offices. But this too won’t happen unless there is constant effort to ensure coordination and good morale. Secretary Pompeo is right to take this path forward, given the various constraints--and given the calendar. His department and the administration will be stronger if these critical issues are handled by highly capable officials—and given that the administration is already more than a year and half old, it’s about time. In the next couple of months he will be filling many more department and ambassadorial posts. The pace of nominations has risen and it remains for the Senate to act on those that are pending. If due to the elections in November, and perhaps to the results, the White House is increasingly entangled in political activities, more of the weight of foreign and national security affairs will fall on the State Department. So Pompeo’s efforts to get all the key personnel in place very soon are encouraging. The Senate should confirm his nominees quickly. And the White House personnel office should let him appoint the best people he can find for these special posts—and should also stop fighting him with purity tests never before imposed in a Republican administration on personnel below (and sometimes well below) the assistant secretary level.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams August 22, 2018 Pressure Points

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and Canada

Saudi Arabia has ordered its ambassador to Canada to come home and has expelled the Canadian ambassador, stopped Saudia flights to Canada, stated that all new commerce with Canada will now be reviewed, and told Saudi students there—there are 12,000—to study elsewhere. These are significant actions, not least for those 12,000 young Saudis who were just weeks away from the start of the new school year. How will they find new places to study in such a short time? The full Saudi statement is here. Here are excerpts: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been made aware of the statement by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian Embassy in the Kingdom, on the so-called civil society activists who have been detained, urging Saudi authorities to release them immediately. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed disbelief by this negative unfounded comment, which was not based in any accurate or true information…. The Ministry also affirmed that the Canadian statement is a blatant interference in the Kingdom’s domestic affairs, against basic international norms and all international protocols. It is a major, unacceptable affront to the Kingdom’s laws and judicial process, as well as a violation of the Kingdom’s sovereignty….It is quite unfortunate to see the phrase “immediate release” in the Canadian statement, which is a reprehensible and unacceptable use of language between sovereign states. Canada and all other nations need to know that they can’t claim to be more concerned than the Kingdom over its own citizens. Thereby, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recalls the Ambassador of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in Canada back to Riyadh for consultation and considers the Canadian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia as Persona-Non-Grata who must leave the Kingdom within the next 24 hours. The Kingdom will put on hold all new business and investment transactions with Canada while retaining its right to take further action. What was the Canadian action that led to this fierce reaction? A tweet from Canada’s foreign minister saying “Very alarmed to learn that Samar Badawi, Raif Badawi’s sister, has been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia,” and that “Canada stands together with the Badawi family in this difficult time, and we continue to strongly call for the release of both Raif and Samar Badawi.” And the following day a tweet from the foreign ministry saying “Canada is gravely concerned about additional arrests of civil society and women’s rights activists in #SaudiArabia, including Samar Badawi. We urge the Saudi authorities to immediately release them and all other peaceful #humanrights activists.” These are not harsh or shocking statements. The Raif Badawi case has long been a matter of international concern and comment. The United States commented in 2015 that “We are greatly concerned by reports that human rights activist Raif Badawi will start facing the inhumane punishment of a 1,000 lashes, in addition to serving a 10-year sentence in prison for exercising his rights to freedom of expression and religion. The United States Government calls on Saudi authorities to cancel this brutal punishment and to review Badawi’s case and sentence.” This is surely tougher than the Canadian comments. Moreover, the United States had no actual link to the case whereas Badawi’s wife and three children are now Canadian citizens. In addition, there has been plenty of comment about the current combination in Saudi Arabia of social and economic reform with the government’s absolute insistence on setting the pace of change—and punishing Saudis who seek to increase it. For example, just days before the kingdom allowed women to drive it punished women activists who had long sought that change. The Saudi position amounts to this: no government may comment on anything that happens in the kingdom. Any such comment is a violation of Saudi sovereignty. Thus the phrase in the Saudi statement that the Canadian comments were “against basic international norms and all international protocols.” That’s an untenable position in 2018. Remember Ronald Reagan calling the Soviet Union “totalitarian darkness” and an “evil empire?” Yet the Soviets did little more than protest verbally, while relations continued normally. That’s because over the decades—from the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the Helsinki Accords and the entire post-Cold War period—the practice of commenting on human rights issues around the globe has become a “basic international norm.” Governments do it all the time. The United States publishes an annual volume of human rights reports that have been extremely critical at times of Saudi Arabia. The executive summary of the most recent "Country Report" on Saudi Arabia says “The most significant human rights issues included unlawful killings, including execution for other than the most serious offenses and without requisite due process; torture; arbitrary arrest and detention, including of lawyers, human rights activists, and antigovernment reformists; political prisoners; arbitrary interference with privacy; restrictions on freedom of expression, including on the internet, and criminalization of libel; restrictions on freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, movement, and religion” and then gives substantial detail. Again, this is much tougher than anything the Canadians said. I suppose the Saudis are sending a message that such criticism will come at a high cost, or at least at a high cost unless you’re the United States. One can well imagine that numerous other countries will in fact be scared off, not wanting to pay the price the Canadians will. Perhaps one of those countries will be the United States. The reaction of the State Department to the whole affair was this: We are aware of Government of Saudi Arabia’s statement recalling the Saudi ambassador to Canada and expelling Canada’s ambassador. Canada and Saudi Arabia are both close allies of the United States. I refer you to the Canadian and Saudi Ministries of Foreign Affairs for further information. That’s an indefensibly weak response. I’m not suggesting a declaration of war, but what if State had said this: We are aware of Government of Saudi Arabia’s statement recalling the Saudi ambassador to Canada and expelling Canada’s ambassador. Canada and Saudi Arabia are both close allies of the United States, and we hope that their relationship quickly returns to normal. Support for human rights around the world is a policy of the United States Government and we do not believe that any nation should suffer when its officials express such support, especially in cases involving its citizens and their families. That would have been a mild brushback of the Saudi overreaction, and would have been a useful suggestion to the Saudis that they were going too far. I certainly hope we have told them so privately. I hope we have also told them that their overreaction has likely strengthened, not weakened, Prime Minister Trudeau and his government and made all Canadians far more aware of the Badawi case and others like it. I remain supportive of the social and economic reform efforts associated with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and wish him every success in them. They are critical to Saudi Arabia’s future. I can understand, even if I cannot always support, his efforts to control every aspect of the pace of change lest his experiment with modernizing so many parts of Saudi life evoke so much internal opposition that it fails. But there’s no way to defend what the Saudis have done here. Their foreign ministry should have issued a statement saying the Canadians should butt out, they have their facts wrong, we resent it, and so on, and had their ambassador angrily say the same to the foreign minister—and left it at that. What they have done is an unforced error. And while I’m at it, hat’s off to the Canadians for their concern about the family of a Canadian citizen and about human rights around the world. UPDATE: I am pleased to say that the State Department took a somewhat better line at today's press briefing. Spokesman Heather Nauert said this: We have a regular dialogue with the Government of Saudi Arabia on human rights and also other issues. This particular case regarding Canada, we have raised that with the Government of Saudi Arabia. They are friends, they are partners, as is Canada as well. Both sides need to diplomatically resolve this together. We can’t do it for them. They need to resolve it together. The United States respects – has respect for international recognized freedoms and also individual liberty. That certainly has not changed, and that’s basically where we stand today.... I can tell you that we have those conversations with the Government of Saudi Arabia. We have had conversations with them about this as it pertains to Canada. But we would encourage both governments to work out their issues together. It’s a diplomatic issue. Saudi Arabia and Canada can certainly stand to work it out together. We would encourage the Government of Saudi Arabia overall to address and respect due process and also publicize information on some of its legal cases.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams August 7, 2018 Pressure Points