Pressure Points

As the Biden administration enters its second month in power, two very large questions about its Iran policy remain unanswered. The first relates to nuclear negotiations. At the State Department press briefing on February 22, Department Spokesman Ned Price reiterated clearly the administration’s position: [W]e are prepared to meet with the Iranians in the context of the P5+1 to start to undertake this diplomacy, to start to undertake these talks, to move forward with the proposition that has been on the table for some time now, a proposition that predates this administration when then-candidate Biden made clear the deal of compliance for compliance: If Iran returns to full compliance with the Iran deal, the United States would be prepared to do the same. We would then use the JCPOA as a basis for a longer and stronger agreement and negotiate follow-on agreements to cover other areas of concern, including Iran’s ballistic missile program. This position raises a question the Administration has never answered. A return to the JCPOA would mean the lifting of the most significant economic sanctions on Iran. Once they are lifted—for example, sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, and on oil sales—how will the Administration force or induce Iran to negotiate a new agreement that is “longer and stronger,” much less then “negotiate follow-on agreements to cover other areas of concern, including Iran’s ballistic missile program?”  Iran obviously does not want to do so and will agree only under enormous pressure, but the Administration says its goal is to relieve that pressure in return for Iran going back to the JCPOA. The point is simple; the problem is obvious; the Administration’s answer is absent. The second question relates to Iran’s use of lethal force against Americans in Iraq. Here is what Mr. Price said: We’ve seen the reports of the rocket fire today. We have – as you heard us say in the aftermath of the tragic attack in Erbil, we are outraged by the recent attacks. And the attack in Erbil, of course, harmed civilians and coalition forces, including an American service member….When it comes to the attack in Erbil, I would just add that we are still determining precise attribution. But we have stated before that we will hold Iran responsible for the actions of its proxies that attack Americans. It is – it – I can add that the rockets fired in recent attacks on the coalition and citizens of Iraq, including this attack I referenced, are Iranian-made and Iranian-supplied. When it comes to our response, we will respond in a way that’s calculated, within our own timetable, and using a mix of tools at a time and place of our choosing, as you’ve heard me say before. What we will not do is lash out and risk an escalation that plays into the hands of Iran and contributes to their attempts to further destabilize Iraq.  Iran continues to attack U.S. forces in Iraq, and the Administration to its credit dismisses the excuse that these attacks come from Iraqi Shia militias rather than Iran. Mr. Price correctly stated that “the rockets fired in recent attacks on the coalition and citizens of Iraq, including this attack I referenced, are Iranian-made and Iranian-supplied.” It is also true, as he did not say, that Iran has shown its ability to turn these attacks on and off. What will the Biden Administration do? If the attacks continue, the law of averages suggests that sooner or later an American will be killed, sharpening the Administration’s dilemma. It cannot let the killing of Americans go unpunished (or in any event, will be harshly criticized for doing so); it apparently does not wish to “lash out,” whatever that means; it does not want to “risk an escalation that plays into the hands of Iran and contributes to their attempts to further destabilize Iraq;” and presumably it does not want to kill the JCPOA negotiations that are supposed to begin soon, hosted by the EU. This is worth unpacking. If Iran kills Americans and the President does not retaliate in some effective manner, he will be criticized for weakness—and rightly so. The reference to “lashing out” is, sad to say, a political rather than diplomatic comment by Mr. Price, presumably meant to contrast the sober and responsible Biden Administration with its predecessor. But its predecessor did not lash out; instead it conducted an effective campaign of deterrence. If the reference to “lashing out” is Mr. Price’s comment on the killing of Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani, he should say so. Then we can have a debate over that killing, and hear from the Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, and President Biden about that. But Mr. Price should understand that that was a considered decision involving much planning and had been discussed over many months. As to “risking an escalation,” Mr. Price is on dangerous territory indeed. He has a point about destabilizing Iraq; one can well imagine some forms of U.S.-Iran confrontation that might result in the fall of the Kadhimi government or expulsion of U.S. troops from Iraq. But it is very dangerous for the United States to appear to fear “escalation.” Mr. Price’s comment will be read around the world. In the Middle East and with regard to Iran, we have clear escalation dominance; Iran has a great deal to lose from escalating a confrontation with the United States. If Iran appears fearless and the Biden Administration by contrast fearful, there will be a price to pay for the United States. Mr. Price’s phrasing gives Iran every incentive to escalate its attacks on Americans in Iraq. And then there is the JCPOA. Is the Administration holding back from punishing—and thereby deterring—Iran because its real goal is getting the JCPOA talks started fast? If so, it would be falling into exactly the error of the Obama administration: having a JCPOA policy instead of an Iran policy. It may be unfair to say the new Administration should have answers to these questions so soon, and with so many key posts unfilled. And as to the sanctions question I posed above, there is time. It seems clear that the JCPOA talks will be complex and lengthy. Fortunately the Administration has not lifted any sanctions yet, and I hope it will not do so. But the second question cannot await confirmation hearings in March or April, because Iran is attacking Americans every week and may kill someone in the next attack. Moreover, to take the position that only killing an American is an unacceptable Iranian move is tantamount to saying that endless harassment and smaller attacks are acceptable. This was a problem into which the Trump administration fell.  Mr. Price should be less proud of not “lashing out” and more worried about how to stop Iranian attacks on Americans in Iraq. Those attacks could produce this Administration’s first real crisis.

As part of the broad economic sanctions against the Maduro regime in Venezuela and especially the petroleum sector, the Trump administration barred swaps of Venezuelan crude oil for gasoline and diesel. There has been a debate over this step. The humanitarian argument against barring diesel swaps was simple: trucks that use diesel are critical in the food and agricultural sector, so a shortage of diesel will eventually affect the food supply. Why is a shortage of diesel predicted? The Maduro regime has through corruption and incompetence destroyed Venezuela’s oil sector, including its refining capacity. The country has a refining capacity of about 1.3 million barrels per day, but is actually refining at most 10% of that. Thus far, it is hard to demonstrate that barring diesel swaps (and gasoline swaps) has led to shortages but advocates of allowing the diesel swaps suggest real shortages are coming. It’s worth noting that the Maduro regime gives thousands of barrels of diesel per day to Cuba, suggesting that the commodity is still available in Venezuela. The humanitarian argument—that many Venezuelans are hungry already, so we should not do anything that may interfere with food supplies—comes up against a stark fact: many Venezuelans are hungry yet the vicious regime refuses to allow the World Food Program (WFP) to operate there.  Why not? Simple. The regime uses access to food as a weapon of social and political control, for example requiring citizens who seek food to show their membership card in the ruling party to get it. Consider this from the July 2019 report of OCHCR, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, on Venezuela: The Government has not demonstrated that it has used all resources at its disposal to ensure the progressive realization of the right to food, nor that it has unsuccessfully sought international assistance to address gaps…. On 13 May 2016, the Government declared a “state of exception and economic emergency” and created the Local Committees for Supply and Food Distribution (CLAP) as part of the local structure of “community councils”…. OHCHR received accounts of people, who despite not having adequate access to food, were not included in the distribution lists of the CLAP boxes because they were not Government supporters….The list of beneficiaries of these [social] programmes is managed by the local structures of the governing parties, as opposed to Government institutions. Interviewees reported that members of these local structures monitor beneficiaries’ political activity….As the economic crisis deepened, the authorities began using social programmes in a discriminatory manner, based on political grounds, and as an instrument of social control…. While Venezuelans go hungry, the regime has blocked WFP because WFP’s principles—political neutrality, distribution of food on the basis of need—would undermine the regime’s use of food as a weapon. Today, there are serious efforts to negotiate the WFP’s entry into Venezuela. And that gives us an answer to the diesel swap question. The Biden administration should condition permitting diesel swaps on permission for the WFP to work in Venezuela. It’s logical: if the diesel swaps are meant to help the food situation, then let’s demand that the regime allow serious and direct help to Venezuelans in need. Let’s not permit the brutal Maduro regime to shed crocodile tears about diesel while continuing to block WFP. That way, the true beneficiaries will be the people of Venezuela.