President Yoon's Impeachment? The View From Seoul

Duyeon Kim is an adjunct senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security and a visiting professor at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. She is based in Seoul.

SMITH: After the attempt to impose martial law failed, the South Korean National Assembly sought to impeach President Yoon. But that too failed. Why?

KIM: The six opposition parties in the National Assembly entered an impeachment motion, which was their twenty-third motion during Yoon’s term. However, to succeed, they needed the ruling People Power Party (PPP) to vote with them. In other words, Yoon’s fate was in the hands of his own party members during the vote on December 7.

The impeachment vote was scrapped by the National Assembly because the PPP boycotted the vote, and thus, the National Assembly could not reach a quorum of two hundred members needed to impeach the president. It is quite common for political parties to boycott votes in the Assembly. I was told that the PPP decided to do this to prevent government paralysis and that the country had been scarred before by the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye. We can certainly assume they also want to maintain power as the ruling party.

The main opposition and progressive Democratic Party of Korea vowed to introduce impeachment motions on a rolling basis until it passes.

In a televised apology on December 7, Yoon said his martial law declaration was out of “desperation” and that he “entrusts” the country’s affairs to his party and the government.

SMITH: So, what does that mean? Who is leading the country and what happens next?

KIM: This seems to be a gray area that has prompted conflicting views among legal scholars. The leader of the PPP, Han Dong-hoon, says the Prime Minister will handle state affairs, but no one in the government is calling him “acting president.” The only legal way for the Prime Minister to serve as “acting” is if the presidency is vacant due to resignation, impeachment, or health problems.

The Defense Ministry says Yoon is still the commander-in-chief. He has reportedly continued to handle senior personnel decisions. So, it looks like Yoon is still the President legally, but in practice, the Prime Minister and the ruling party say they are working together to ensure that the country functions normally.

The Ministry of Justice has imposed a travel ban on Yoon pending an investigation into the opposition party’s accusation of treason for declaring martial law.

The PPP leader, Han, also promised that Yoon would “resign in an orderly” manner but has yet to explain what that looks like and when he might do so.

Conservative pundits are discussing three possible scenarios. First, Yoon resigns voluntarily. But the ruling party is against this because it would mean a snap presidential election in sixty days, which would be around February next year at the earliest. The ruling party is not prepared for a snap election because it does not have a leading candidate to replace Yoon. They also worry that the leader of the main opposition party, Lee Jae-myung, would automatically be off the hook for his ongoing trials—criminal charges including violating election laws, perjury, and bribery—and could win if the election is held earlier than expected. Lee has already skipped one of his court appearances since the martial law attempt.

Second, the ruling party could still vote in favor of impeachment. This is currently seen as unlikely for the reasons mentioned above. If the National Assembly were to vote in favor of impeachment, Yoon would be suspended from his presidential powers, and the Prime Minister would serve as acting President. South Korea’s Constitutional Court would then need to decide within six months whether he will be removed from office. But the Court is currently not functioning properly. There are only six out of nine justices on the bench, with three vacancies that need to be filled. South Korea’s law states that at least seven justices must preside over an impeachment case, and at least six votes are needed to uphold an impeachment motion. Even with a full bench, this would mean the earliest snap elections could be held would be around May or June next year.

Third, the National Assembly could vote to shorten Yoon’s presidential term by revising the constitution. This process would take up to ninety days involving a motion, announcement, National Assembly vote, public vote, and proclamation. The progressives have supported a constitutional amendment but are opposed to it now because they want Yoon to step down sooner than later.

The ruling party will want to buy as much time as possible before a presidential election is held. With Lee’s ongoing trials, they may hope that a guilty verdict would disqualify him from running in the next presidential election. But they still face considerable public pressure for Yoon’s departure sooner rather than later, so the PPP will need to find a formula to satisfy public calls for his removal and articulate it soon. Needless to say, the main opposition party will want to find ways for Lee to avoid trial and become their presidential candidate.

SMITH: During this current period of uncertainty, what is the future of South Korea on the world stage?

KIM: It doesn’t look good. Korean government officials are trying to maintain and project normalcy, especially in their diplomatic relations with foreign counterparts. This is in line with what Prime Minister Han Duck-soo pledged publicly. But senior officials I have spoken to from Europe and the Indo-Pacific see the situation here as protracted political instability in a country with a leader who is president by name only. Some have even described it to me as a “power vacuum” already. Seoul’s democratic friends overseas are already reluctant to engage South Korea at senior levels because they do not want to be perceived as providing any affirmation to Yoon personally, who is now seen as toxic. They are, however, comfortable engaging Seoul at the working level.

For example, what happens to the APEC summit that South Korea will host next year or the Yoon government’s aspirations to join the G7 during this period of political uncertainty? Who will be Trump’s counterpart for the next few months? North Korea has so far been silent, as expected. Pyongyang might think it can sit back and watch the show, hoping for an implosion of South Korea, especially its conservative government, and for a comeback of the progressives.

With Yoon’s days being numbered, I am told that many like-minded countries are already concerned that if a progressive South Korean president emerges from early elections, they will lose a key partner in defending the international rules-based order.

The irony is that Yoon took office championing liberal democratic values and pledging to restore democratic practices in South Korea, criticizing his progressive predecessor Moon Jae-in and his supporters democratic backsliding. Yoon’s attempt at martial law undermines his credibility at home and destroys efforts abroad to position South Korea as a model democratic country.

The biggest mystery is why Yoon would take such extreme measures and implement an apparently ill-conceived, unprepared plan that was destined to result in political suicide. He has handed the moral high ground to his opposition and jeopardized his presidency. He gave the opposition more ammunition to bring home its ongoing calls for impeachment and botched any chance of leaving behind a legacy of strengthened democracy in Korea and beyond. The truth of why he took this risk has yet to be revealed.

SMITH: Let’s go back to Yoon’s attempted martial law. Most observers are puzzled by the dynamics that led to President Yoon's decision to declare martial law. Can you shed any light on what led to this decision?

KIM: In his announcement of martial law, President Yoon claimed that opposition lawmakers were paralyzing the government and state affairs through “legislative dictatorship” and attempting to “overthrow the liberal democratic system.” Yoon said he needed to “protect the liberal democratic order.” His articulation of “anti-state forces” and “North Korean communist forces” basically refers to the far left, who are loosely called “progressives” in South Korea.

Yoon was clearly furious with the progressive opposition, which dominates the National Assembly, cutting essential budget allocations and submitting a series of impeachment motions against key government officials. The progressives were in the majority when Yoon took office, and in the April 2024 general elections, the ruling party secured only 108 out of 300 seats in the Assembly. This made governing extremely challenging for Yoon.

Yoon’s announcement of emergency martial law was both shocking and puzzling—shocking because he had been staking his political legacy on democratic values and puzzling because it was clear very early on that his announced plan would not succeed. The earliest indicator that this would be a losing gambit for Yoon was when live Korean TV news reported that the police, the first to arrive at the National Assembly, were allowing “only verified lawmakers” into the building. This raised questions as to whether it was really martial law or if the police did not get the memo. Plus, with the opposition controlling the Assembly, any vote would result in their favor and legally require Yoon to lift martial law.

Did Yoon act out of impulse? Did he not game out scenarios with his political advisors? It was originally reported that the defense minister was the only one who knew of Yoon’s plan, allegedly proposing the martial law idea. Recent reports have revealed that some ministers became aware at the last minute during a late-night cabinet meeting on December 3 before the declaration.

To accurately understand and make informed conclusions, it is essential to address several important questions. Instead of using the power of persuasion, why did Yoon opt to use a display of force and assertiveness? Did he really act within the provisions of the Constitution? Who were his advisors? Who wrote the martial law decree? What was the Korean military ordered to do exactly? Was this really treason, as the opposition claims? Why were troops reportedly at the National Election Commission (NEC) offices first—was the NEC his main focus for martial law? The former defense minister who advised Yoon on martial law reportedly said troops were sent to the NEC to “secure systems and facilities to assess the necessity of an investigation into alleged election fraud” during April’s general election. Did they secure decisive evidence?

SMITH: Once declared, there seemed to be a muddled reaction. What were Korean forces ordered to do, and why? What did legislators do? Was there any support for Yoon's extraordinary declaration in Korean society and what has been their reaction?

KIM: Based on the turn of events, it was unclear what the exact orders were for the Korean forces. According to the martial law decree, Yoon wanted them to lock down the National Assembly to prevent opposition lawmakers from performing their activities. But the police and soldiers allowed lawmakers into the building. We also saw real-time video footage of soldiers who, fortunately, were not as aggressive as you would expect during actual martial law and reportedly had empty guns.

There was clearly no support for Yoon’s decision across the board that night. His own ruling party publicly opposed his decision, with its head vowing to “block martial law.” The police and military soldiers were relatively passive, as mentioned earlier. The Korean media continued their reporting as usual, and civic groups continued to protest.

Many ordinary citizens I spoke to said they dismissed early alerts about an emergency martial law as spam. The average citizen could not imagine it to be true in 2024. Journalists and anchors on live TV were learning about martial law themselves as they were reporting the incident because it is a foreign concept to the current generation. Conservative papers have also expressed outrage in their editorials.

The majority of Korean citizens see Yoon’s decision as shocking and an embarrassment for their country overseas. Many of them, especially the younger generation not involved in politics or international relations, told me they viewed this as a brief, passing “happening” and quickly returned to their normal lives. However, they criticize Yoon for embarrassing their hard-won democracy and popularity in the world through K-culture. This would be their basis for supporting either impeachment or resignation.

The older generation that experienced real martial law in Korea told me that this one was child's play and an amateurish show, albeit expressing relief because no one got hurt. They pointed to what appeared to be the soldiers' inability, or perhaps even refusal, to lock down the National Assembly, and the command’s apparent lack of preparation and organization.

SMITH: The National Assembly voted to override the President's decision, and he had to back down. Help us understand the repercussions—among political parties, among the general public, and within the Yoon government itself?

KIM: The 190 lawmakers present at the National Assembly voted unanimously in favor of lifting martial law, which Yoon was legally required to follow and did. His presidency was immediately thrown into a crisis. Conservatives and even moderates would agree with Yoon’s criticism and assessment of progressive lawmakers outlined in his announcement and the need to deal with them, but many of them saw his method as the wrong move in the twenty-first century. In a meeting with the ruling party after backing down, Yoon claimed that martial law was necessary because of the main opposition party’s “reckless provocations.”

The ruling and opposition parties are engaged in a fierce political battle of discourse to frame narratives in their respective favor—with the opposition accusing Yoon of treason—to persuade the Korean public, as legal experts and law enforcement officials parse through details of the latest incident. It is now a battle of political power for each party, transcending one person’s miscalculation as they jockey for the ruling party position. That outcome will directly impact South Korea’s foreign policy and relations with the world. The conservatives and progressives have very different approaches to dealing with the US, North Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and global issues.

SMITH: What does the martial law incident say about the state or health of South Korea’s democracy? How has this or will this affect South Korea’s diplomacy and international security?

KIM: We saw the resilience and strength of South Korea’s democracy in action in the end. Both the fragility and strength of South Korea’s democracy were at play simultaneously during Yoon’s attempted martial law. Fragility was demonstrated by essentially two people (as initially reported) instigating martial law and the potential for a series of ensuing crises if Yoon did not reverse the order after the National Assembly vote. Strength came from democratic forces pushing back, namely his own ruling party, relatively passive police and military, normal media reporting, normal civic group protests, and politicians on both sides of the aisle voting normally to lift martial law.

However, Yoon’s decision has already tarnished his reputation overseas, and the future of his signature and forward-leaning foreign policies remains unclear. Seoul’s foreign counterparts, even its closest US ally, will be reluctant to continue cooperating on initiatives at senior levels out of concern that they might appear to be condoning Yoon’s action.

Regardless of Yoon’s fate, South Korea’s permanent bureaucracy will need to step up—as challenging as it may be for a country that operates in a top-down fashion—and continue to implement policies that are centered on positioning the country as a vibrant, liberal democracy and global contributor. There is a lot of important work to be done in the world, and a country does not equal one person in its highest office.

If a snap election is held and a progressive candidate wins, then Seoul’s foreign policies will likely shift drastically. In this scenario, Seoul’s ally and like-minded partners may lose a trusted partner to help defend the rules-based international order against aggressors like China, North Korea, and Russia.