Paethongtarn Shinawatra, Thailand's New Prime Minister, Demonstrates the Excessive Power of the King and Royalist Elites
from Asia Unbound and Asia Program

Paethongtarn Shinawatra, Thailand's New Prime Minister, Demonstrates the Excessive Power of the King and Royalist Elites

Thailand’s new prime minister is a member of the Shinawatra political dynasty.
Thailand's Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra attends a press conference at the Pheu Thai party headquarters following a royal endorsement ceremony in Bangkok, Thailand, on August 18, 2024.
Thailand's Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra attends a press conference at the Pheu Thai party headquarters following a royal endorsement ceremony in Bangkok, Thailand, on August 18, 2024. Chalinee Thirasupa/Reuters

The latest member of the Shinawatra family recently rose to become head of the Thai government despite having virtually no government experience and a background in hotel management. Following the Constitutional Court’s recent verdict forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on the grounds that he appointed an illegitimate politician to his cabinet, the ruling Pheu Thai Party decided to nominate Paethongtarn Shinawatra, the youngest daughter of longtime power broker Thaksin Shinawatra, to take the helm.

Overwhelmingly winning the vote of Pheu Thai’s parliamentary coalition, Paethongtarn became the 31st prime minister of Thailand and the second female leader of the kingdom. The other woman was her aunt, Yingluck, who was Thaksin’s youngest sister. Yingluck served as prime minister in 2011 before being overthrown in a coup in 2014.

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The Shinawatra family has continued to resonate in the Thai political realm in the last two decades, demonstrating their lasting influence despite coups and other attempts to push them out of power. Dynastic politics has never gone out of fashion, whether here or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The leaders of neighboring states like Cambodia and the Philippines are also the children of former leaders. The son of the current Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, is also poised to become president after winning the vice presidency alongside president-elect Prabowo Subianto. Indonesia’s top court, run by the president’s uncle, lowered the age of the vice presidency so he could run. As in these other states, dynastic politics in Thailand has served to entrench the influence of political clans and sustain patron-client relationships in politics—and do little to promote real democracy.

In the Thai case, the return to political leadership by a Shinawatra family member is unlikely to foster democracy or guarantee stability, given the tumultuous experiences of Thaksin and Yingluck, both of whom were forced into exile overseas following coups. Thaksin was only able to return last year, cementing an apparent deal with conservative and royalist elites, thanks to the emergence of a new threat to the establishment—the pro-reform Move Forward Party (MFP), which is more progressive than Pheu Thai. In other words, the conservative elites viewed the MFP as a more severe threat to its interests than Thaksin. The conservative elites used him and Pheu Thai to undermine the MFP by having Thaksin’s party split from its supposed pro-democracy alliance with the MFP after last year’s election and instead form a government without it. Thaksin used the establishment’s fear of the MFP to return to the country and end his exile. The MFP, which won the most seats in the lower house of parliament in last year’s election, has been banned for ten years by Thailand’s top court, a typical move by the pro-establishment courts against parties that promote reform.

Politically inexperienced, Paethongtarn will likely either be a puppet of her father or the conservative elites. However, trust has remained a significant issue between them. Thaksin is still facing a pending lèse-majesté case, pointing to his uneasy relationship with King Vajiralongkorn, who remains the ultimate power broker in Thai politics even as many younger Thais would like the monarchy to become less influential and more like the genuinely constitutional ones in states like Japan and the United Kingdom. The king almost assuredly gave the final approval for Thaksin to return. Thailand’s conservative elites still defer to the king even though he is far more directly involved in politics than his father—or a true constitutional monarch—and yet does not have the charisma and popular support his father enjoyed over his six-decade-long reign. 

Thaksin has already started to become involved in politics despite an earlier statement saying he would retire and care for his grandchildren. He has visited numerous constituencies to reconnect with his supporters in far-flung regions. Earlier in August, he gave a talk at the “Dinner with Thaksin” event at an upscale locale, attended by many powerful Thais, including the Senior Chairman of Charoen Pokphand, one of the kingdom’s most influential companies. At this event, Thaksin showcased his vision of Thailand, mainly on the economic front, as if he were the current prime minister.

The survival of Paethongtarn will, therefore, depend on how she will comply with the needs of the conservative elites or whether she will follow her father’s advice, and these could come into conflict if the trust breaks down between the two. Again, either way, it does not paint a picture of an independent and capable prime minister who could make her own decisions. It suggests a prime ministership even less independent than that of Yingluck, who, despite her obvious links to Thaksin, did make some critical decisions, including trying a new direction toward the troubled southern region of Thailand, where Thaksin had overseen a brutal campaign against an insurgency. Thaksin, in some ways, is also a hostage in this same game where he became indebted to the conservative elites for giving him political freedom. Still, Thai elites also depend on him to keep Pheu Thai and his daughter afloat. Thus, Thaksin will likely tell his daughter to stay in line for their own survival.

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Having a prime minister as a mouthpiece of the conservative elites will also mean that the country will continue to avoid serious discussion of critical issues that propelled the MFP’s success and increasingly define younger Thais’ political views. It is unimaginable that Paethongtarn will touch upon sensitive topics, including the reform of Article 112, the most crucial lèse-majesté, which forbids criticism of the monarchy, or the reform of the monarchy, the army, and the judiciary. These are core problems Thailand is facing given that the monarchy has continued to de facto control Thai politics with the support of other state institutions like the judiciary, which engages in repeated ‘lawfare” against any actors who threaten the monarchy, its interests, and its allies in the military and other realms.  

For example, Thaksin refrained from mentioning these pressing issues during his Dinner Talk event. His talk was lackluster and failed to excite the younger generation. Paethongtarn will undoubtedly follow in her father’s footsteps by not ruffling the conservative elites’ feathers. Paethongtarn’s leadership will likely maintain the political status quo, which is unstable because neither side, the Shinawatras or the conservative elites, can trust the other.

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