Mahsa Amini, Media, and the Saudi-Iranian Détente
from Women Around the World
from Women Around the World

Mahsa Amini, Media, and the Saudi-Iranian Détente

Newspapers, with a cover picture of Mahsa Amini, a woman who died after being arrested by the Islamic republic's "morality police" are seen in Tehran, Iran September 18, 2022.
Newspapers, with a cover picture of Mahsa Amini, a woman who died after being arrested by the Islamic republic's "morality police" are seen in Tehran, Iran September 18, 2022. Majid Asgaripour/WANA

The Mahsa Amini protests gave Riyadh leverage over Tehran and the Kingdom's media capabilities proved to be a tool capable of advancing the countries’ new mutual goal: preempting a women-led second Arab Spring

July 11, 2023 10:22 am (EST)

Newspapers, with a cover picture of Mahsa Amini, a woman who died after being arrested by the Islamic republic's "morality police" are seen in Tehran, Iran September 18, 2022.
Newspapers, with a cover picture of Mahsa Amini, a woman who died after being arrested by the Islamic republic's "morality police" are seen in Tehran, Iran September 18, 2022. Majid Asgaripour/WANA
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Fierce proxy wars, accelerating nuclear programs, and threats to the global oil supply have defined the last seven years without formal Saudi-Iranian relations. So, when the two countries announced that they had restored ties through a Chinese-brokered agreement, analysts were quick to cite those security and economic concerns as the underlying motivations for the rapprochement. While those factors did encourage episodic talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran that began in 2021, Iran’s “woman, life, freedom” protests were far from an afterthought in Iran and Saudi Arabia’s calculi this spring and, in fact, may have created new incentives for both countries to finally seal the deal in March. The protests gave Saudi Arabia significant leverage over Iran for the first time in recent history and the Kingdom's media capabilities proved to be a potent tool capable of advancing the two countries’ new mutual goal: preempting a women-led second Arab Spring.

Even though conditions were already bleak in Iran this September, with an economy stunted at pre-2012 levels, a third of Iranians living in poverty, and fading hopes for a new nuclear deal with much-wanted sanctions relief, the regime had managed to contain potential domestic dissent. That changed on September 16, with the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody after she was detained and beaten for allegedly violating Iran’s headscarf laws. Immediately following her passing, protests erupted across the country, uniting Iranians across ethnic, class, and geographic lines not only in calls for “woman, life, freedom,” but also for an end to the theocratic regime itself. The West quickly compounded the government’s woes. Countries announced sweeping sanctions and travel bans for Iranian security force members; the United States announced that it was no longer pursuing talks to revive the 2015 nuclear accord; and the UN Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution to remove Iran from the Commission on the Status of Women.  

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In the face of severe diplomatic isolation, Iranian officials accused Saudi Arabia of acting like Iran’s Western enemies by fomenting the women’s protests through the Saudi-funded news network, Iran International. Starting in the fall, the network began daily coverage encouraging the protests, sharply criticizing the regime, and publicly debunking the government’s narrative on Amini’s death and its treatment of protesters. In November, at the height of the protests, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander openly warned, “the Al Saud regime, which has propaganda media that only promote mischief and are openly seeking to provoke our youth, to be careful with your behavior and control these media.” Iran’s intelligence minister made it clear which Saudi “propaganda media” the IRGC commander was referring to by announcing that he was designating Iran International, a Persian-language satellite news network based in London, as a terrorist organization. Despite public denials, British corporate records reveal that individuals connected to the Saudi monarchy both funded and helped launch Iran International in 2017. Since then, the channel has amassed a following within Iran itself and among the Iranian diaspora with 24-hour broadcasts.  

The Iranian government viewed Iran International’s coverage of the Mahsa Amini protests as so threatening that it resorted to physical intimidation of the network’s staff before specifically asking that the Saudi government moderate the channel’s content as part of the March agreement. When the protests escalated in the fall, the Iranian government intensified its threats against the network’s staff. After British police warned two network journalists of credible state-backed threats to their lives, Iran International was forced to suspend its U.K. operations and move its headquarters to Washington, DC. But the network’s high-impact, critical coverage of the Iranian regime continued, giving the Saudi government meaningful leverage over the Iranian government. Iran International’s ability to promote the Mahsa Amini protests helped force the Iranian government to the negotiating table, where it found itself compelled to offer major concessions before the Kingdom agreed to stop fomenting further tensions through the network. That commitment became especially important to the Iranian regime when, just weeks before the détente was announced, news broke that hundreds of Iranian school girls had been poisoned, which could have led to a resurgence of the Mahsa Amini protests.  

Saudi Arabia clearly benefited from an agreement that weakened Iran, particularly as it continues to battle Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and Iran forges ahead with its nuclear program. But the Saudi monarchy had a less obvious stake in dampening support for Iran’s “woman, life, freedom” protests. Even though Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has made public overtures to feminist causes, most famously lifting Saudi Arabia’s diving ban for women, these moves have been deeply unpopular with key conservative constituencies throughout the country. Accordingly, these liberalization efforts have been paired with strict limits on dissent. While bin Salman benefited from the pressure that the Mahsa Amini protests put on the Iranian government, he was also keenly aware that the ideology underlying the “woman, life, freedom” movement could catalyze greater activism in the Kingdom and ultimately threaten his rule. As Saudi-funded Iran International fanned the flames of the Mahsa Amini protests, the Saudi government worked to limit the protest’ spillover effects into the Kingdom. Consequently, it was relatively quiet about the protests, even before it reached an agreement with the beleaguered Iranian regime. Despite deep historical divisions, both countries now find themselves confronting the same challenge of managing domestic instability. A muted Iran International relieves pressure on Iran’s regime and helps prevent potential challenges to the Saudi monarchy’s rule. But in the process, the women of Iran now find themselves without a once powerful mobilizing asset. Examining the role of Iranian women in this remarkable détente not only helps explain the rationale behind it, but also offers a vision of what Saudi-Iranian cooperation may look like in practice. 

More on:

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Demonstrations and Protests

Women and Women's Rights

Middle East

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