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Macro and Markets

Kahn analyzes economic policies for an integrated world.

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Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions
Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

Have Sanctions Become the Swiss Army Knife of U.S. Foreign Policy?

The Congress takes an important, positive step to reinforce Russian sanctions, but are we at risk of overusing the sanctions tool? Read More

Monetary Policy
Get Ready for Lift Off
While markets are debating whether the Fed will raise interest rates in September, a more challenging question is how will they implement that policy change.  There is a new blog by Stephen Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz that cuts through the clutter and clearly lays out how the Federal Reserve will operate monetary policy once it lifts off from the zero lower bound. As they note, their paper draws on a valuable primer by Federal Reserve economists Ihrig, Meade, and Weinbach that was recently released on the topic. (For disclosure purposes, I am married to one of the authors of the Fed paper.) Both are well worth reading. Cecchetti and Schoenholtz note that the old system for policy tightening “is no longer functional, and will not be for some years to come, if ever.” They describe the new system as a corridor system, and trace out how that works with the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER) as the principal new tool for policy tightening, supplemented by additional instruments designed to absorb funds from banks and nonbanks. Their bottom line: “How well this new mechanism works will only become clear when the Fed actually tightens, so fasten your seatbelts and get ready for the ride.”  
Europe
The Fallacy of Euro-Area Discipline
Throughout the Greek crisis, policymakers have acted on the assumption that Greece’s best chance at sustainable growth is through the conditionality and discipline of an IMF-EU adjustment program. Already, the desire to stay in the eurozone and receive the promised rescue package of at least €86 billion has led to significant legislative measures, and the ESM and IMF programs under negotiation will be comprehensive in the scope of their structural reforms. In contrast, "Grexit" would be chaotic, and at least initially, make it difficult for any government to reach consensus on strong policies needed to restore durable growth. In that environment, the boost to growth from devaluation could prove short-lived. A recent article in the European Central Bank’s May Economic Bulletin provides a note of caution with this conclusion. It finds that, looking across Europe since 1999, there has been little economic convergence inside the Eurozone. Instead, the bulk of the convergence that has taken place has occurred in the non-euro area countries of Eastern Europe (see chart). Within the Eurozone, easy capital flows prior to the crisis and an incomplete economic and financial union prevented shocks from being adequately buffered, and has limited growth in periphery countries. They conclude policies matter: "An important lesson from the euro area sovereign debt crisis is that the need for sound economic policies does not end once a country has adopted the euro. There are no automatic mechanisms to ensure that the process of nominal convergence which occurs before adoption of the euro produces sustainable real convergence thereafter. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 has showed that some countries participating in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) had severe weaknesses in their structural and institutional set-up. This has resulted in a large and protracted fall in real per capita income levels in these countries since 2008." This is not an argument for Grexit. The reverse also holds: the need for sound policies does not end once a country has left the Eurozone. Rather, their work reinforces the notion that it is ownership of the reform process by the government and its population, rather than the discipline that comes from euro area membership, that is the single most important factor behind a successful adjustment effort.
Europe
Taking Stock of the Greece Crisis
Yesterday, John Taylor and I testified on the Greece crisis before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation.  A summary of my testimony is here (including a link to my written statement), and the full video of our discussion is here. I continue to see Grexit as the most likely outcome, as we are at the very early stage of a complex adjustment effort that will face serious economic and political headwinds in Greece, and will be extraordinarily difficult to sustain. But whether Greece is ultimately better off in or out of the euro, a competitive and growing Greece is an objective the United States shares with our European partners. A number of decisions concerning Greece will be made in the coming weeks that could be decisive in deciding Greece’s economic future. Specifically, I argued that (i) A European financing facility (ESM) on the order of €50 billion is needed to ensure that the IMF is not left with an unreasonably large financing gap; (ii) European creditors should give explicit commitments on debt relief (conditional on economic performance), in line with the recommendations of the IMF, and consideration be given to a "Paris Club" for Europe; and (iii) The recapitalization and restructuring of the banking system needs to be prioritized if growth is to be restarted.  I also noted that the challenges in Greece highlighted the need for a sufficiently large and flexible IMF that can respond pragmatically in the face of hard-to-quantify risks.  This makes it all the more important that the Congress rapidly pass IMF quota reform, and John and I discussed some ideas for getting this done.    
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    Ukraine Needs a Moratorium
    After months of standoff, the Ukraine government appears to be making halting progress towards an agreement restructuring its external private debt. On hopes of a deal, and ahead of an IMF Board meeting next week to review its program, the government reportedly has decided that it will make a $120 million payment to creditors due tomorrow. It is possible that decision to repay will be seen as a signal of good faith and create momentum towards an agreement, but I fear it’s more likely we have reached a point where continuing to pay has become counterproductive to a deal. Absent more material signs of progress in coming weeks, there is a strong case—on economic, political and strategic grounds—that a decision to halt payments and declare a moratorium gives Ukraine the best chance of achieving an agreement that creates the conditions for sustainable debt and a growing economy in the medium term. What’s at stake? The move to restructure followed the announcement earlier this year that the IMF had made a debt operation a condition of its lending. The IMF decision, as in Greece, was justified by reference to a debt sustainability analysis showing debt rising above 100 percent. A comprehensive restructuring, including a 40 percent haircut to the nominal value of the debt, was seen as needed to reduce debt to a sustainable level (a target of 71 percent). But the timing of the decision had more to do with financing, the result of inadequate bilateral assistance from Ukraine’s main partners that left a gap that was too large for the IMF to fill. The restructuring targets cash flow relief of $15.3 billion over the next four years. Since the spring, talks have moved forward in fits and starts, and while there have been a flurry of meetings this month, significant differences remain. Most contentious appears to be the call for upfront nominal principal haircuts. Creditors rightly note that, given the extraordinary unknowns associated with the war with Russia, the size of the relief needed is uncertain and there is a case for a two-stage approach, with cash flow relief now and a subsequent restructuring discussion when there is more certainty on the economic and political future of Ukraine.  Indeed, IMF research in recent years has made a compelling case for “reprofiling” when there is significant uncertainty, albeit in cases (unlike this one) where the good outcome does not require a subsequent restructuring. But the Ukraine government, and the international community more generally, are united in their belief that there are significant benefits to a comprehensive debt deal that includes haircuts. Among the benefits are assured financing and a strong political signal to the population that there is light at the end of the tunnel. If, however, creditors doubt their resolve, or hope for much smaller levels of haircuts, and creditors are receiving payments in the interim, the negotiation becomes a game of chicken, difficult to conclude. That seems to be where we are now. This morning, there were reports that the two sides would not meet as scheduled this week, allowing technical talks to continue but suggestive of a lack of progress in recent days.  A September amortization payment of $500 million appears to be a harder deadline for the negotiations, as the government has clearly stated that it has neither the will nor the resources to make that payment.  So unless a deal is concluded soon, a moratorium is likely, if not now, in September. To be clear, a moratorium cannot be an excuse to not reach an agreement.  The form of the agreement can vary--there have been suggestions that interest rates could step up after a period of time; that the government could provide extra payments if the economy grows (although GDP warrants traditionally haven’t performed well in markets raising questions whether the government will get good value for them); or that there could be a menu of choices that included different combinations of debt relief.  All these ideas deserve examination. Markets appear to be betting on a deal, or at least on there being sufficient progress toward a deal to justify continued payment (see chart). Prices this morning were steady at around $0.55 on the dollar, up around 6 cents on the month.   The case for a moratorium Debt policy is always trying to find a balance on the issue of default. There needs to be strong incentives for countries to try and repay their debt, even at times of stress; otherwise risk premium will soar and financing for essential development needs will be squeezed out in non-crisis periods. From this perspective, Ukraine was right to make an extraordinary effort up to this point to remain current on its debt. But, when a restructuring becomes necessary, it cannot be too hard to get it done, and there needs to be strong formal and informal mechanisms for collective action to ensure the broadest possible participation. Continuing to pay while negotiations proceed can be an act of good faith; but it can also allow reserves and fiscal resources to drain to unnecessarily low levels. In that context, paying until the last minute provides little additional benefit to market access and if continued payment is seen as coming at the expense of those who are restructuring later—could in fact complicate the negotiations. Far more important for the government is the reduced debt and financing uncertainty, ahead of fall elections and a difficult effort to raise new bilateral financing for 2016. The announcement of a moratorium will no doubt bring down prices, and it is often argued that it will delay Ukraine’s return to market.  Unfortunately, international bond market access is a distant hope for Ukraine in the current environment. Imposing a debt moratorium would imply a default (after a 10-day grace period) and trigger cross-default clauses on Ukraine’s other eurobonds.  But the default would be cured when the restructuring is completed. The IMF is scheduled to complete its first review of its Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement with Ukraine next week, following passage of legislation including banking and judicial reform. To complete the review, the Fund’s Board will need to waive the usual requirements of assured financing (as the restructuring is not complete) and that is more easily justified absent arrears. But that should not be a reason for delay, if Ukraine is acting in good faith and committed to negotiating a fair deal. The Fund should not be willing to lend indefinitely in the presence of arrears, but should be willing to do so now if it helps get a deal done. The government’s main concern with announcing a moratorium may be that anti-Ukrainian elements could seek to capitalize on the default, comparing Ukraine’s actions to the crisis in Greece for example. Any default can create domestic concerns about financial stability, and a bank run at this point would be damaging. Still, these concerns should be manageable. In this regard, the international community needs to provide a strong message of support for the government’s action, emphasizing the importance of an agreement and the significance of this step towards a solution, not an intensification, of the economic crisis facing Ukraine.  
  • Europe
    Greece: The Hardest Month
    Greek banks reopened today, but there isn’t much you can do at them. Capital controls and withdrawal limits remain in effect, money transfers are barred (except for tax, social security or a few other allowed domestic transactions) and new accounts or loans effectively ruled out. Greeks now will be able to deposit checks, access safety deposit boxes, and withdraw money without an ATM card. All good things, though I suspect that any political boost from the visuals relating to reopening will proved short-lived. Amidst concern that the financing needs will outstrip the three-year, €86 billion financing gap agreed last weekend, attention now turns to the €30-40 billion European rescue facility (ESM) that must be negotiated quickly. This occurs against an unsettled political backdrop—a second vote this Wednesday on justice and banking reforms should pass, but may see more defections from the government side than last week’s vote. With new elections now expected for September or October, there is a narrow window in which to get a financing agreement done. Meanwhile, industrial activity data show a continuing decline, and anecdotal evidence suggests a continuing, broad-based drop in activity. The €7.2 billion bridge loan released today will allow the government to meet ECB payments and eliminate arrears to the IMF and Greek central bank, stepping back from one cliff. But now the question of reactivating an economy that ground to a halt during the crisis moves to the fore, and the imposition of new taxes approved last week will not help in the near term. The banks will remain in this semi-frozen state pending an asset review and recapitalization (and bail in of unsecured creditors) expected by early 2016. Unrealistic expectations about a return to economic normalcy may represent the most immediate threat to the program in coming days. This is why I believe, like others (for example, here), that “Grexit” remains the most likely outcome. As the reality of the path the government has chosen sets in, the next month may prove the most difficult yet.