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Macro and Markets

Kahn analyzes economic policies for an integrated world.

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Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions
Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

Have Sanctions Become the Swiss Army Knife of U.S. Foreign Policy?

The Congress takes an important, positive step to reinforce Russian sanctions, but are we at risk of overusing the sanctions tool? Read More

Europe
ECB and the Limits of QE
Markets were clearly underwhelmed by the European Central Bank’s (ECB) easing announcement yesterday, marginally cutting its (already negative) deposit rate and extending the duration of its asset purchase program (QE). I think the Financial Times had it about right. It would have been better to do more, but what they did was helpful and it retains the capacity for further action. Still, as Ted Liu and I argued yesterday, the main channel through which QE is going to boost activity in Europe (as the Federal Reserve normalizes) is through the exchange rate, which in the context of weak global demand and emerging market capital outflows may be a modest source of stimulus. The market reaction also underscores the challenge for a central bank to communicate its intentions when the governing council is divided and it is trying to be data dependent--i.e., it is hard to communicate what you don’t know. We also agree with the FT’s bottom line: at this time, monetary policy alone cannot be expected to carry forward a robust European recovery.  Fiscal and structural policies must do their part.
Europe
European Central Bank Rate Move, a Turning Point for Europe
At the governing council’s meeting today, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that it will cut benchmark deposit rate to -0.3 percent, extend its quantitative easing (QE) program to at least March 2017, and broaden the scope of assets purchased. On several occasions since October, ECB President Mario Draghi has hinted an easing was coming, stating that the central bank will do what they must to “raise inflation and inflation expectations as fast as possible.” There is a strong economic case for action: inflation has stalled at levels well below the ECB’s target inflation rate of below but close to 2 percent (headline inflation in October was 0.1 percent), growth remains weak, and unemployment rates are still sky high. But, as in the United States, there are growing doubts about how much a boost of QE will provide to the European economy. A few thoughts on why the ECB’s move still matters. First, as much discussed, the ECB’s further monetary easing will clearly begin a period of policy divergence with the Federal Reserve’s normalization of interest rates widely expected to begin this month. Given the different cyclical positions of the two economies, such divergence was inevitable, and I have previously argued that China-induced market volatility should not be a reason of indefinite inaction. Even after the Fed hikes, U.S. monetary policy will remain easy by any of a number of policy rules. Still, a divergence of this magnitude is likely to continue to exert appreciation pressure on the U.S. dollar against the euro. Euro depreciation now appears to be the primary channel through which QE will boost demand in the euro area through improved trade competitiveness. The other central transmission channel, through additional bank credit, appears more muted in Europe than in the United States (my sense is that much of the improvement in credit numbers in recent months reflects the natural healing of the European economy, though QE no doubt has played a role). More broadly, euro depreciation will add to the external pressures on emerging markets by reducing demand for their exports at a time of continuing financial outflows. Meanwhile, in the United States, the political implications of a stronger dollar could also be profound during the election cycle if the euro continues to depreciate. There is also a sense in which today’s decision represents a turning point, the end of a period when the ECB (like the Fed and the Bank of Japan) has been the dominant source of discretionary macroeconomic policy. This is not to say that the ECB is out of options—interest rates could be made more negative (though perhaps at a cost in terms of increased financial stability risks). Further, the proposal that some have made for the ECB to purchase equities and non-securitized debt is a bridge too far for now, but remains a “break glass” option. Still, it now appears that we are at a stage where further ECB options will have uncertain and potentially modest effect on activity, and where its decisions could become a source of greater unity or disunity in the euro area. For example, with the expansion of the program, ECB may soon run out of German or French bonds to buy, and have to resort to the bonds of bailed-out countries such as Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. This expansion could prove politically challenging, as fiscal disciplinarians (e.g., Germany) and populist governments (e.g., Finland) may argue against providing these former crisis countries with cheap financing. A lot has been asked of ECB, and today’s move will be closely watched within and beyond Europe. The decision will be an important step in determining whether the region will soon return to a more sustainable growth trajectory in the next year. Still, at a time of rising global risks, lackluster growth and bailout fatigue in the region, and economic populism is rising across creditor and debtor countries, fiscal policy and the continuing efforts to advance economic union in Europe now will need to become a more central focus.
International Organizations
China’s Symbolic Currency Win
Earlier today, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Board approved the inclusion of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) as a fifth currency in the special drawing rights (SDR), the IMF’s currency, as of October 2016.  The move was expected and IMF Board approval was never in doubt once the U.S. government signaled that it would not oppose the step. My read is that the Fund staff acted properly in arguing that the RMB now meets the test of being freely useable for international transactions by its members (though some have argued that the IMF was bending its rules for political reasons). Of course, Chinese financial markets remain significantly restricted for private investors, but the SDR’s current primary use is for transactions between members of the IMF (governments). From that narrow perspective the RMB can be judged to be widely used and widely traded because a country receiving RMB as a result of IMF transactions should be able to switch it to any other basket currency at low cost, at any time of the day or night, somewhere in the world. So too perhaps are more than a dozen other currencies freely useable by this measure, but the SDR is for now limited to the largest of those currencies by a separate (export share) measure. Consequently, next year the RMB goes into the basket with a weight of 10.9 percent (compared to today’s weights, most of China’s share comes from the U.S. dollar which will retain a 41.7 percent share; the other shares will be 30.9 percent for the euro, 8.3 percent for the yen, and 8.1 percent for the pound sterling). While some have argued that the move is a “significant” step for the international monetary system, it is more properly seen as a quite small and largely symbolic step in a long and gradual path of internationalization of the RMB, a reform process that is likely to slow following this summer’s market turmoil. Indeed, even prior to the crisis the IMF and others had warned that Chinese financial market liberalization needed to be cautious and sequenced, with a more urgent priority in bringing market discipline to large borrowers. Nonetheless, the announcement validates and perhaps reinforces the argument for expanding the RMB’s role in markets, and is consistent with measures from the Chinese in recent months to move in this direction. In this regard, the far more important announcement this week was the creation of a working group led by Michael Bloomberg aiming to provide a framework for RMB trading and clearing in the United States, as this could influence the private use of the RMB and SDR. The door for this initiative was opened during the recent state visit by Chinese President Xi, and operationally is independent of the IMF’s announcement though fueled by the same reform momentum. In the near term, the main economic impact of the inclusion of the RMB in the SDR is to raise the SDR interest rate (because Chinese interest rates are higher than rates on other currencies in the basket). Consequently, IMF borrowers will pay more, an amount that has been predicted by the IMF staff to be 27 basis points, but which could well average far more over the cycle. While this may seem small compared to normal swings in the interest rates of the major currencies during the process of normalization, it’s worth remembering that countries such as China in the process of convergence to industrial country levels of income are expected to have higher real rates than developed countries (i.e., interest rate differentials should not be expected to be offset by exchange rate moves). Conversely, if the RMB remains stable relative to the dollar, the exchange rate dynamics of the new SDR will be largely unchanged relative to the old basket. Finally, an important question will be the political impact in the United States, where Chinese and IMF-related legislation (such as IMF quota reform) already faces rough sledding.   FIGURE 1. SDR INTEREST RATE (IN PERCENT) Source: IMF "Review of the Method of Valuation of the SDR" 1/ Using proposed weighting formula
  • Economics
    APEC Summit Economics: the Case for Trade
    The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, tomorrow and Thursday, will no doubt see its trade and regional integration agenda overshadowed by new global threats. At this week’s Group of Twenty (G20) summit, the economic agenda rightly took a backseat to the horrific attacks in Paris. Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strong, sustainable, and balanced growth, and endorsed a range of initiatives underway from climate change to tax and financial reform. But few new economic initiatives were announced. A similar outcome is likely in Manila, though trade and investment deserve a central seat on the stage in the name of preserving global growth. On balance, the weight of academic work (e.g., here and here) supports the intuitive judgment that terrorism is a drag on growth, particularly through its effects on trade, investment and tourism. At a time of slowing global activity, this raises the risk of a global downturn that G20 leaders may need to respond quickly to in the future. In this regard, with fiscal positions already stretched or constrained by politics, and interest rates near zero in major economies, there is less scope than in the past for macroeconomic policies to meet new threats. Ambitions in this area have been scaled down. I am pleased that the U.S. government did not default on its debt and eased spending caps slightly last month, but as an example of global fiscal policy coordination the recent bipartisan budget agreement and the very modest fiscal easing likely in Europe seem unlikely to be a breakthrough meaningful enough to reach G20 growth targets. Terrorism also acts as a break on globalization by discouraging flows of workers and new cross-border investment. Increased trade can be a positive offset to these global headwinds, but here too the news is not all good. Trade has slowed sharply since the Great Recession. While macro drivers—growth, the end of a commodity boom, and rebalancing in China—explain much of the decline, it is also the case that increased protectionist measures in the industrial world are part of the problem. At the APEC Summit, President Obama will need to make the case for the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While far from a perfect agreement, TPP is an important step in establishing new rules and opening up trade, particularly in services where there is talk of a new initiative to expand trade in the sector. Passage looks uncertain in the Congress, and in any event may be a year or more away.  Still, the TPP agreement remains a centerpiece of U.S. government efforts to rebalance its economic ties toward Asia and strengthen regional cooperation. Building regional acceptance for TPP as a centerpiece for regional economic relations remains at the center of U.S. strategy in the region. Also on the economic agenda at APEC will be regional coordination of the multilateral financial institutions. While the United States and China appear to have healed wounds opened around the establishment of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) earlier this year, there are still questions to be addressed over the coordination of the new institution with the World Bank and Asian regional institutions.  Further, the meetings will reveal more about China’s regional economic aspirations following the domestic economic turmoil this summer.  Beyond that, there are a range of regional challenges that have a significant economic element, including cyber, climate change, maritime and the exploitation of common resources, and illicit financing. Maritime issues will of course hover over the summit, given recent disputes between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea, with the President likely to make the case for unimpeded lawful commerce and robust dispute settlement procedures. In all of these areas, expect serious discussion but little progress. Last week, I wrote that the value of these meetings lies primarily in developing the relationships and mechanisms for leading countries to respond to global crisis, when it occurs.  We may be closer to that moment this week.
  • China
    G20: Preparing for the Next Crisis
    The leaders of Group of Twenty (G20) meet this weekend in Antalya, Turkey. The agenda is long, the ambitions are modest, and it is easy to be cynical that the group has outlived its usefulness. Still, the meeting matters in a number of respects: strengthening relationships among leaders of the most important economies, providing momentum to ongoing reform initiatives, and pushing forward work on issues as diverse as climate change and tax avoidance. The most important task for the group though will be preparing for future crises, because it is at those times that G20 leadership is most critical. The G20 will have some satisfaction that serious economic shocks were weathered in 2015. In 2016, when China leads the G20, the story could be different. The headline for this year’s G20 summit is support for robust and inclusive growth, reflecting both frustration with the tepid pace of global activity and a rising global concern with income inequality. The question though is whether there is a collective will to find a solution that goes beyond what these countries are choosing to do already. That would involve countries with fiscal and current account surpluses stimulating demand at a time when deficit countries are tightening their belt.  This is an argument the U.S. government has made for a number of years, presumably aimed at China and Germany in particular. The odds of success on this count always were small, but with China focused on its own economic challenges and Germany (and its European partners) strained by the migration crisis, hope for any meaningful agreement on growth seems even more distant. The reform “deliverables” for the summit are similarly unambitious. The economic agenda includes a focus on expanding infrastructure, strengthening trade (through implementing a trade facilitation agreement stalled after objections from India) and pursuing development goals in low-income countries.  But little is expected to be achieved in these areas at this summit.  As noted by Matthew Goodman and Daniel Remler, the summit should deliver a Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) action plan, aimed at curbing tax avoidance by multinational corporations, and the group will give a strong push to the United Nations Climate Change Conference that begins later this month in Paris. Ongoing work on financial sector reform will be endorsed and encouraged.  But, at a time when the agenda of the G20 is becoming overloaded with a rapidly growing wish list of reforms, progress in this area is likely to disappoint all but the most dedicated G20 watchers. These summits, given the presence of world leaders, always provide an opportunity to discuss the political security issue of the moment, and this time is no exception.  Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan has signaled that he wants leaders to discuss the crises in Syria and Iraq, and that his government stands ready to take stronger steps in the region to resolve the current crisis. Following on earlier talks in Vienna, and with Turkey struggling to deal with the fallout from the continuing Syria crisis, this issue may well capture the headlines. When Chinese markets came under pressure in August, there was broad concern that we might be on the verge of a global crisis.  Those concerns have receded, based on signs of temporary stability in China and a belief that emerging markets are better prepared than in the past to weather a shock.  I am not so sure, and in any event the question for policymakers this week is how to respond to a crisis that begins in the emerging markets. In my monthly, I argue that we are not as well prepared as we need to be. If a crisis does emerge, the G20 will be looked to lead again, as they did in 2008-09.  From this perspective, the value of this week’s summit is in strengthening the relationships between leaders that will allow for a prompt and efficient response should the downside risks materialize.