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Macro and Markets

Kahn analyzes economic policies for an integrated world.

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Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions
Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

Have Sanctions Become the Swiss Army Knife of U.S. Foreign Policy?

The Congress takes an important, positive step to reinforce Russian sanctions, but are we at risk of overusing the sanctions tool?

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Europe
Cyprus: Not Done Yet
European best practice in crisis management is on display again with a mass of leaked documents--primarily on Cyprus--ahead of today’s Eurogroup meeting.  I’d note a few things 1.  The financing gap is €5.5bn larger than previously indicated (€23bn, not €17.5bn).  The €10bn loan from EU/IMF was based on this larger number.  This isn’t a great surprise, but it further undermines the government’s credibility; we need to watch to see if there is a domestic public backlash. 2.   To fill the gap, a number of new measures are identified, including additional taxes, sale of CB gold and a “voluntary” refinancing of €1 billion in local law debt.  They seem to be hoping the ECB will open up ELA access to banks to finance this rollover, but if not we will be in a Greek situation (threat of law change may be used to force exchange, which likely would be a credit event). 3.  As of now, they are making €1.4 bn June external debt payment (EMTNs).  But the documents emphasize that this is the largest discrete, near term payment that they are still making, and I can’t help but think this is a contingency for the government should other funding fall through.  Plus the politics of paying this debt, when everyone else is being hit, aren’t great. 4.   This isn’t done yet: I see three distinct risks:  (a) Cyprus fails to pass the prior actions to get EU money (the government isn’t talking as if they have the votes wrapped up); (b) the funding/measures they have identified fail to come through at last minute; and (c) the gap widens quickly, requiring more measures, and so on, and so on.  The macro assumptions in the program still look far too rosy -- the real gap likely is much larger, setting up the program for failure.
Budget, Debt, and Deficits
U.S. Budget Policy: Problem Solved?
Long-term budget forecasts are more art than economics.  Small changes in assumptions and initial conditions, extrapolated over 25, 50 or 75 years, produce dramatically different outcomes.  Should one assume current law remains in effect, producing structural improvement in the deficit over time, or rather that Congress acts as in the past in extending temporary cuts, adjusting tax brackets, and easing spending constraints as new needs arise? Will the recent slowdown in the rate of increase in health care costs persist? Your answer to these questions can swing the budget in the long term from unsustainable deficit to surplus.  Still, these forecasts matter, as a statement of principle, as a description of philosophy, and in framing the debate. Thus its notable that the Administration’s long-term projection in the budget (the “Budget Policy Extended” scenario) shows government debt as a share of GDP stable till 2050 and then declining, a forecast dramatically different (and more optimistic) from that produced by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the independent commissions that have addressed the need for deficit reduction.  In fact, at the end of the 75 year period, the President’s forecast has the US Federal Government in a net creditor position equal to about 60 percent of GDP.  The result is driven by three assumptions: (1) Revenue will increase sharply over time as a share of GDP because of the tax code is not fully indexed for inflation.  Current tax law remains in effect over the whole period.  Because tax brackets are not fully indexed for inflation, over time the real burden of taxation tends to rise with rising incomes.  In OMB’s projections, Congress allows federal revenues as a share of GDP to rise to  24 percent of GDP from 19 percent currently.  In contrast the standard practice of CBO is to assume that the ratio of tax revenues to GDP tends to revert to its long-term average of about 18 percent of GDP. (2) Obamacare will bend the cost curve, reducing entitlement spending.  The cost controls build into the Affordable Care Act (ACA, or “Obamacare”) are assumed to work.  The ACA has a mechanism built in that is required to propose changes to Medicare and Medicaid programs if cost growth exceeds caps proposed in the law, and OMB projections assume that those caps hold over the entire projection period.  In contrast CBO assumes that healthcare costs continue to grow by more than general inflation. (3) Discretionary spending will fall as a share of GDP.  Discretionary spending growth is assumed to grow with inflation plus population growth, which is less than GDP growth due to improving productivity.  In the past, I believe that the standard assumption has been to assume that discretionary spending grows in line with GDP. While each of these assumptions is defensible, they could also be massively wrong, and in my judgment presents a risky case for doing nothing.  Future Congress could offset the bracket creep and raise spending caps, and medical costs may not come down (though, to be fair, they have risen more slowly in recent years than forecast and, if that trend continues, would be cause for a brighter long-term outlook than CBO has). There is no doubt that the deficit picture has improved.  The roughly $3.7 trillion in deficit reduction that we have achieved in recent years, including the sequester, is enough to reduce deficits sharply and stabilize our debt in the 70 percent range until the middle of the decade.  Near-term deficit reduction is, if anything, too rapid given the state of the recovery.  And it’s understandable that the Administration would want to argue that the additional deficit reduction proposals in the budget would be powerful.  But, in most forecasts by 2020 the longer term drivers of the debt–an aging population, and rising health care and interest costs--cause debt to rise again at an unsustainable rate.   If we are to address the long-term drivers of our deficit, it would be better to start now, so the changes could be backloaded and gradual, then to wait till the crisis hits.  Of course, our political process doesn’t work that way, and sadly the progress we have made appears to have reduced the heat on policymakers to address the long term drivers of the debt.  A grand bargain looks increasingly remote. In sum, these exercises remind us of the simple fact that long-term projections are highly sensitive to the assumptions made, and can support very different visions.  It would be unfortunate if the Administration’s approach feeds a growing narrative that we have done enough, and further reduces the political pressure to fix our budget for the longer term.
Economics
Why Abenomics Matters
Last week, I wrote on the ECB’s meeting and the case for easing credit conditions in the periphery (a recommendation that they didn’t heed, though pressure to act is building).  I ignored the upcoming Bank of Japan (BoJ) meeting.  My wife’s comment the next day summed it up well:  “you blogged on the wrong central bank.” For those that don’t follow central banking closely, it’s worth a moment of reflection on why what the BoJ did last week was so important. In his first meeting as central bank governor, Mr. Kuroda produced a package that easily meets an economic “Powell Doctrine” test–having exhausted all the other options, it brings overwhelming force to bear in order to change expectations for financial conditions, inflation, and growth in Japan. The Bank adopted a price stability target of 2 percent for the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years. To get there, it targeted a doubling of the monetary base (the previous target was the overnight interest rate), an annual increase of 60 to 70 trillion yen. It will double its holdings of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) as well as exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in two years (a net purchase of around ¥5 trillion per month), and more than double the average remaining maturity of JGB purchases.  The decision to purchase bonds of longer maturity gets the BoJ more bang for the yen then if they had stuck to the old practice of focusing on short-duration bonds. Scaled for the economy, this is not that much different from what the Fed has done and twice the current pace of Fed purchases. The Bank is committed to continue with its quantitative monetary easing as long as necessary to achieve these targets. At some level, this should look familiar as it in substance mirrors the non-conventional easing strategy followed by the Fed in recent years in its combination of purchases of longer-duration assets with a commitment to maintain such policies for longer than markets might otherwise expect.  In the presence of a liquidity trap, the key to making quantitative purchases effective is to credibly promise to raise inflation, and this effort goes in that direction.  Some also are comparing the action to Paul Volcker’s anti-inflation policy of 1979.  Like that experiment, the Bank of Japan recognizes the uncertainty in how the experiment will play out and, by shifting to a monetary base, signals its willingness to accept whatever rates are needed to reach their quantitative targets. It’s a major break with past policy, and that is the central point:  the new policy represents a fundamental shift in the paradigm that has guided Japan monetary policy for the last 25+ years.  Since the bubble of the late 1980s, economists have criticized the BoJ policy as too tight, too tentative, and too willing to tighten prematurely when green shoots of recovery appeared.  BoJ staff repeatedly justified their policies with the argument that deflation in Japan was structural, a function of demographics and the special characteristics of Japan’s economy, and thus outside the ability of the monetary policy to reverse.  Last week’s package of measures, adopted unanimously (some of the measures were rejected by an 8 to 1 vote last month), represents a repudiation of that view. The effect of the announcement on markets–a sharp decline in the yen from below 93 per dollar earlier this month to 98.9 currently, an increase in the Nikkei, and strength in a range of other currencies whose markets are expected to benefit from Japanese capital outflows–was dramatic and is likely to continue to percolate this week.  The IMF and key central bankers saluted the action, while others expressed concern about the yen’s depreciation.  Whether this is the green light to “currency wars” and capital controls that bubbled to the surface at last months’ G-20 meeting remains to be seen. What the Bank of Japan did last week is an important moment.  It also puts in sharp contrast the inadequacy of the ECB’s approach to ending deflation pressures in Europe.
  • Europe
    Cyprus: Hope Trumps Reality
    Cyprus has reached a tentative agreement with the IMF-EU-ECB team (Troika) on the economic program that will be backed by its €10 billion rescue package.  The IMF will put €1 billion, small in absolute terms and relative to the one-third share that it has had in most of its European programs but a very high share (563 percent) of Cyprus’ contribution, or quota.  The plan is for European political approval in coming days, followed by legislative approval where needed during the course of April, and IMF Board approval in early May.  If Cyprus passes all the prior actions required in the program, it could get the first drawing on the package in mid-May, well ahead of their early June debt maturities. The critical prior actions are fiscal.  On top of a 5 percent of GDP multi-year fiscal consolidation already underway, the government has committed to pass an additional 2 percent of GDP in new, permanent measures for this year as a condition for receiving its first drawing under the program.  In future years, 4 ½ percent of GDP in measures will be passed, and if performance falls short of targets, the government must stand ready to take additional measures (though presumably slippages due to a larger-than-expected recession, rather than incomplete policy implementation, may be excused).   The prior actions include significant increases in taxes on corporate income (from 10 to 12 ½ percent), interest income (from 15 to 30 percent), property, and banks, as well as higher fees for health care and government services. There are also a broad and ambitious set of structural reforms, including fiscal management, privatization/commercialization of state-owned agencies, and pension reform.  While not prior actions, it does look like they have to take substantial steps by the first review (presumably slated for this summer, though it could be delayed), and this is another reason to question how long the program can remain on track. Overall, it’s hard to take this program very seriously as a document of what can and will happen, rather than what creditors would like to see happen.  It further will play right into the hands of those who criticize Europe for ignoring the contractionary effects of excessive fiscal consolidation in the crisis.  The Fund anticipates this criticism:  “The second pillar entails an ambitious and well-paced fiscal adjustment that balances short-run cyclical concerns and long-run sustainability objectives, while protecting vulnerable groups.” However, against the backdrop of a frozen banking system that will need major further deleveraging and a sharp fall in economic activity already in train, it’s hard to square that judgment with the numbers. To put the fiscal point in context, a rough guess is that the fiscal drag in the program for this year alone will be on the order of 4 ½ percent of GDP.  The effect on the economy will be multiplied: the Fund’s work suggests a multiplier of 1.7 or so in a declining growth and low interest rate environment, resulting in a GDP hit of perhaps 7 ½ percentage points.  This doesn’t account for capital controls that make it even harder for individuals and firms to smooth or adjust to the effects of these new taxes, so this estimate may be low. It will be interesting to see if the government has trouble mobilizing support in parliament for this package.  The presumption of analysts wiser than me is that the hard decisions have been taken with the bank restructuring, and incentives in Cyprus and elsewhere in Europe are strongly supportive of getting this deal done.  The one caution in this regard comes from a recent survey that found that support for the euro outstripped opposition in all countries in the Eurozone…except Cyprus, where sentiment was balanced (see below).  If it goes down to the wire, we may find that Cyprus event risk isn’t over yet.   Source: Eurobarometer data
  • Europe
    ECB Policy for a Fragmented Financial Market
    The ECB meets tomorrow and is expected to remain on hold.  Of the 44 market participants surveyed by Bloomberg, only one thought that the ECB would lower interest rates at this week’s meeting.  Markets do seem to hope, and may be pricing in to some extent, a more dovish tone from Governor Draghi, but at a time when the Fed is continuing expansionary policies, and the Bank of Japan is set to join them, the unwillingness of the ECB to do more stands out. I see the case for a rate cut as powerful.  Weak activity indicators, deflationary pressures, and tightening financial conditions suggest that the euro area will continue to stagnate through 2013 and into 2014.  This lack of euro-area growth, if it persists, represents a bigger threat to the survival of the Eurozone than Greece, Cyprus or the next financing crisis.  A 50 basis point (bp) cut in rates would send a strong message regarding the ECB’s commitment to "do whatever it takes."  It is all the better if it brings about a necessary weakening of the euro. A threat that the ECB does acknowledge arises from the growing fragmentation of European financial markets.  A small-to-medium sized company in Spain or Italy, especially if it’s normally funded by a second tier bank, will find credit difficult to get and if available, they will pay up to 300 bp more than a similar company in Germany (see chart).  Some portion of the premium is justified by the higher risk of doing business in the periphery, and it’s worth remembering that excessive spread compression during the years following creation of the euro was central to the buildup of imbalances.  But another portion presumably is an “excessive” risk premium that would not exist if European banks and financial markets were functioning smoothly. For the ECB, this is a job for financial policy, not monetary policy--a separation principle that most major central banks would not see as appropriate in current conditions.  From this perspective a rate cut should not be chosen if the rate is already appropriate for some hyopothetical average.  That said, the case can be made that the first best policy response is a measure targeted directly at the market imperfection that threatens fianncial stability, which in this case is the financial intermediation channel in the periphery.  The question is then how best to create incentives for banks to lend to these firms.  Central banks are understandably skeptical of the directed credit schemes in normal times, but in stress periods such as the present they need to be considered. It’s worth noting we have two recent models on which the ECB can draw.  The first is the Bank of England’s (BoE) July 2012 Funding for Lending Scheme.  The BoE scheme provides lower cost funding for banks and building societies that increase lending to U.K. households and businesses.  For additional lending up to 5 percent of total loans, participating institutions can receive 0.25 percentage point loans, provided they have sufficient eligible collateral.  While evidence on the effectiveness of the scheme is mixed (we don’t know what lending would have been absent the scheme), the BOE sees the program as successful.  Gavyn Davies is among those recently advocating that this approach get a serious look from the ECB. When asked whether the ECB would consider such a scheme, Mario Draghi argued that the existence of long-term refinancing operations, or LTROs, coupled with an easing of collateral requirements late last year, in essence replicated the effects of Funding-for-Lending.  That’s true in a sense, but its hard to make the case in current conditions that there isn’t more that can be done.   A targeted easing of collateral requirements for financing for new loans in periphery (for banks in countries where spreads are above some level?) – combined with a new LTRO -- would be a better parallel. A second recent model is the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) that was created by the Fed in November 2008 to spur consumer lending by supporting the issuance of asset backed securities (ABS). The sharp decline in new ABS issuance in September 2008, coupled with sharply rising spreads, was the basis for the program.  The program extended loans on a non-recourse basis to holders of certain AAA-rated ABS backed by newly and recently originated consumer and small business loans. Though the borrower retained the first loss, the program was seen as effective in restarting the ABS market and keeping the flow of loans going. What both these approaches share is a targeted change in incentives to lend in the periphery.  My suspicion is, if not this week, then soon, the growing fragmentation of euro financial markets will call for a change in policy. It’s worth remembering we have models for what could come next.