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Macro and Markets

Kahn analyzes economic policies for an integrated world.

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Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions
Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

Have Sanctions Become the Swiss Army Knife of U.S. Foreign Policy?

The Congress takes an important, positive step to reinforce Russian sanctions, but are we at risk of overusing the sanctions tool?

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Budget, Debt, and Deficits
Fiscal Fiasco—This Time Is Different?
It now looks like the government will shut down this evening.   The Senate is likely to make one more effort to pass a clean continuing resolution (CR), but at this stage the Republican House seems unwilling to let go of its animus for Obamacare.  Perhaps they will settle for something symbolic–one idea is for Congress to forgo their insurance and go onto an exchange as part of the CR—but there is no evidence that discussions along these lines are taking place. Most analysts expect a short shutdown, but I think that underestimates the odds that our politicians have dug a hole from which it could take time–more than a week–to dig out. In a shutdown, the BLS and  Commerce Department will stop issuing data, so this Friday’s jobs report is off (but jobless claims will be released and the Federal Reserve will stay open for business). Of course, this is a prelude to the debate on the debt limit later this month.  The odds also are at least 60-40 that we will go past October 17, the date the administration has set as the debt limit deadline, without a deal to raise the debt limit, and it now seems likely that the U.S. government will have to delay some payments (though not interest payments on debt) or issue debt above the debt limit before a deal is reached. My prediction: a shutdown of around one week, a near-death experience on the debt limit with a short-term extension coming only around end October, and resolution in the form of a longer-term debt limit extension and full FY14 funding around the end of the year when the threat of sequestration forces the parties to talk to each other.  Spending next year will be at or very near the level given by the sequestration, ensuring a further substantial reduction in the deficit. This is so disappointing:  the decision to raise the debt ceiling has always been political, but there seems to be a greater willingness these days to try and use it for political ends without regard for the economic costs. Markets have begun to react, with the stock market declining slightly and the cost of insuring U.S. government debt increasing, but “market discipline” on our political leaders is likely to be too little, too late.  There is good reason for that: A short government shutdown will have a very limited effect on the economy. In virtually all scenarios, spending next year will be at or slightly above the level given by the sequester.   Thus, from a macroeconomic perspective, there is little uncertainty around fiscal policy absent a default on our debt. After several years where politicians took us to the cliff, then stepped back, markets understandably remain sanguine that a deal will be reached on the debt limit.  There is a feeling that we’ve been through this before, and that politicians will eventually get a deal done to kick the can.  The good news is that, so far, markets have remained reasonably calm.  The bad news is there isn’t market pressure on politicians to do a deal. Also, if we are wrong, markets will have to correct sharply. While markets are focused on whether or not the government pays on its debt, and sees default through that prism, any failure to pay on its obligations would be deeply unsettling. How long would it be politically or economically viable to pay the debt and not make other critical payments? Not long, I think. So in the end I expect our politicians will again disappoint us, but will find a way to kick the can at the last minute.  Call me an optimist.
United States
The Fed: No Taper and Little Clarity
The first move is the hardest. The Federal Reserve defied expectations and did not reduce, or taper, its purchases of Treasury and MBS securities today, leaving them at $85 billion per month.  The economic projections accompanying the statement suggest a significant divergence of views about the prospects for recovery and the outlook for interest rates.  It suggests little concern about a rapidly increasing balance sheet.  What comes next depends on the data, a message the Fed has been sending for some time.  Markets reacted sharply, with stocks and commodities spiking, while bond yields and the dollar fell on the news that policy would remain easy for longer.  Good for U.S. financial conditions, but if you were looking for clarity, today probably didn’t provide it. A few thoughts. 1. If not now, when?  With the economy growing despite significant fiscal drag, most of us expected the Fed to start the process of tapering, along with additional guidance about policy aimed at avoiding a further rise in market interest rates.  Indeed, the “broad contours” of the economy are evolving as the Fed expected, but rather than beginning the taper, they concluded that more evidence was needed.  That may come in the next few months, but with the additional noise of the fiscal cliff and a Fed transition, the bar for starting a taper may be elevated into 2014. So the doves have prevailed, and have done so without additional dissents. 2. Goldilocks in 2016?  In the run-up to the meeting, markets were focused on Fed member’s forecasts for 2016, which were published for the first time today.  The “dots” on the Fed’s forecast chart show interest rates averaging 2 percent, but with a wide divergence (0.5 percent to 4 ¼ percent).  This compares to a market expectation of around 2¼ percent (in the longer run, interest rates are expected to stabilize at around 4 percent).  Growth and unemployment expectations for 2016 are also widely disbursed, and several participants expect unemployment to be near its long-run level at that point.  This suggests substantial differences of view on the path for policy.  2016 is a long way off, but it’s still an anchor for market interest rates. 3. Inflation still matters (being too low).  Bernanke in his press conference reminded us that inflation “persistently” below their 2 percent target is a reason to delay tapering (though that’s not their forecast).  It’s not just the labor market that determines the path for policy.  We knew that already, but if pounding the table on the risks from low inflation comforts markets, it’s worth it.  Relatedly, an inflation floor wasn’t introduced today, as some had speculated, but Bernanke signaled it could be considered in the future. 4. Triggers and thresholds, a clarification.  Markets arguably are still confused by the Fed’s communication strategy, and in particular how tightening is linked to the unemployment rate.  We have been told in the past that purchases were expected to end when unemployment was 7 percent (a forecast), and that rate hikes would be considered when it fell to 6.5 percent (a threshold for considering a move, not a trigger forcing one, although many market participants still don’t understand the difference).  Bernanke today addressed the confusion by emphasizing that the rate could go well below 6.5 percent before they tightened.   I am not sure he cleared it all up. 5. Structural and cyclical unemployment.  Bernanke highlights that most of the decline in unemployment this year reflects job growth rather than a decline in the participation rate.  (Since December, the unemployment rate has fallen from 7.8 percent to 7.3 percent, while the labor force participation rate has fallen from 63.6 percent to 63.2 percent.)  I have previously blogged on the debate over whether the decline in the participation rate is structural or cyclical.  I believe that, on balance, the evidence suggests that the majority of the decline is structural, reflecting longer-term trends and long-term unemployed workers losing connection to the labor force.  But some is cyclical, and as long as monetary policy can help at all, and inflation is low, it adds to the case for sustaining an easy policy. 6. Time consistent policy?  If the economy is near full employment by 2016, why should rates still be only 2 percent?  In recent weeks, a number of economists have criticized the credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance.  Any precommitment to keep rates low for long—as the Fed is doing and as economic theory suggests is needed—may require them to hold rates down even when conditions could justify an increase.  The idea is that the precommitment stimulates demand now, offsetting the possible costs of higher than targeted inflation down the road.  (By the way, the same would be true with nominal income targeting, a policy some Fed participants may support.) Is it appropriate to tie their hands in this way, and is the commitment even credible?  The question is all the more interesting given the transition at the Fed and the likelihood that the Federal Open Market Committee will look very different in a few years’ time.  Today we heard that the policy is the right one—and is time consistent—as long as activity evolves as expected.  Interest rates should remain low, in line with their central forecast, even as we approach full employment as the repair from the financial crisis continues. All in all, even though there was little change in policy, that in itself made this a significant meeting.  
Budget, Debt, and Deficits
G20 to Emerging Markets: We Feel Your Pain
The G20 communique and action plan, along with loads of background documents on the G20 economic program, have been released, though it may have been easy to miss amid the avalanche of Syria news.  The economic agenda was laid out in my colleague Stewart Patrick’s scene setter earlier this week, and leaders appear to have stuck to the script.  There was appropriately strong emphasis on growth and concern about high levels of unemployment.  There was encouragement for further financial reform.  In terms of substantive deliverables, the focus was on agreement to move forward with the June G8 plan to reduce tax avoidance and evasion, modest measures to boost investment, and an extension of the commitment to avoid protectionism.  All positive news, even if not substantial enough to distract markets from today’s U.S. job numbers. But the central economic theme at the summit, beyond Syria, was one of concern about the global recovery.  First the good news--leaders welcomed signs of recovery in the industrial world, and pledged to growth-oriented policies going forward.  Advanced G20 countries agreed to keep fiscal policy flexible and agreed monetary policy should be “carefully calibrated and clearly communicated”.  This all makes sense, but sidesteps the ongoing debate over austerity and central bank exit from easy money policies.  That said, it is nice to see that for the first time in years the G20 was not in crisis mode regarding the eurozone.  Hints of green shoots in Europe, however fragile, were welcomed. In contrast, the leaders recognized downside risks from sharp capital outflows and deteriorating growth prospects in the emerging world.  G20 emerging markets–notably India and Brazil–reportedly sought commitments from the Federal Reserve regarding tapering, but the Fed wasn’t at the meeting, and commentary at Jackson Hole last month already made clear that EM concerns are unlikely to have much of an influence on Fed policy. The action plan states that “facing increased financial volatility, emerging markets agree to take the necessary actions to support growth and maintain stability, including efforts to improve fundamentals, increase resilience to external shocks and strengthen financial systems." So, it’s up to them to fix their own problems. Beyond that, the action plan appears to list previous policy commitments and generally endorses urgent action.  My concern regarding emerging markets going forward is that, rather than strengthening macro policies and letting exchange rates adjust, these countries would turn increasingly to capital controls and macro-prudential measures contributing to protectionism and further deleveraging.  The communique restates leader’s commitment to open markets and resisting protectionism, and the commitment to improving global tax governance is an important step  toward improving the long-term incentives for capital flows.  However, it will be interesting to see if the above commitments hold in practice if market turmoil intensifies.
  • International Organizations
    Jackson Hole: Future Worries
    This year’s Jackson Hole Federal Reserve conference was a decidedly low-key affair given Ben Bernanke’s absence (and Janet Yellen’s successful effort to not make news). Nonetheless, there look to have been a few takeaways of note. We’re ready, aren’t we?  Central bankers at the conference went to great length to convince markets (and themselves) that they were ready for the possible market turbulence that could follow the Fed reducing asset purchases (tapering). A few Fed governors did comment on the timing of tapering, repeating known positions.  Atlanta Fed president Dennis Lockhart said that he would support tapering in September if the expansion held up, while St. Louis Fed president James Bullard wants to see more data before making a decision. I personally am not convinced that small taper in September would unsettle markets (it’s mostly priced in) but until it happens the U.S. and global implications of the move will worry policymakers.  There were the usual calls for global coordination around the exit from these policies, but besides a paragraph in the upcoming G20 Communique I am hard pressed to think of how policy would change in practice. Have we lost confidence in asset purchases?  Not yet.  A paper by Arvind Krishnamurthy and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen on the effects of asset purchases and sales drew significant attention. They argued that asset purchases–specifically US Treasury purchases–are contributing relatively little to the current expansion (MBS purchases pack more punch).  In particular, positive effects on the economy from reducing interest rate premia in US Treasury markets are oversold when such risk premia are already negative.  Consequently, they argue, Treasury sales will have little effect on markets.  Their paper apparently drew a lot of pushback, on both analytic and empirical grounds, and doesn’t appear to have changed minds.  But it is consistent with a growing view that the effects of purchases alone are diminishing, and a greater focus on the importance of communication/forward guidance alone or in conjunction with purchases. Is this 1997?  Concerns about emerging markets were front and center.  After much complaint over the past few years about quantitative easing, the irony of emerging market central banks wringing their hands about what happens when the Fed exits was not lost on the conference.  It is right though to be concerned.  In a number of countries--notably India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil--large current account deficits and weak macro policies have created significant risks of deleveraging and capital outflows that are rattling emerging market investors and policymakers alike.  But are we on the cusp of a major emerging market crisis?  Some argued yes, notably Carmen Reinhart:  “It could get very ugly…Emerging markets had a capital flow bonanza lasting several years, the golden boom years, and the probability of a banking crisis, the probability of a currency crash, the probability of a default, all increase afterward.” This fear is prospective, not an assessment of events so far, a point made by New York Fed staffer Terrence Checki: “The sell-off, including renewed pressure in recent days, remains within the range of other sell-offs which the emerging markets have successfully weathered in recent years.” Central bankers from emerging markets called for more aggressive efforts to avoid crisis, but beyond IMF programs and macroprudential controls there didn’t seem to be any big ideas. The conference proved far less significant as a news maker and market mover than in past years, but as a barometer of policymaker’s concern and anxiety it still has something to tell us.  Given the range of global risks, political and economic, that we are likely to face this fall, they are right to be concerned.    
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    Argentina End Game
    In a clear and tough decision, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled against Argentina in its legal battle against holdout creditors.  A good analysis is here. A few initial takeaways: 1.  End-game for Argentina.  While the decision is stayed pending an ongoing Supreme Court appeal, the message seems clear:  If Argentina wants to pay other bondholders, it must pay the holdouts in full (ratable payments).  The contracts are clear and Argentina’s behavior has been unacceptable to the courts.  As Argentina has publicly committed to not paying the holdouts, it’s hard to see how they maintain payments on other debt.  A broad default would have potentially profound consequences for the Argentine economy.  Argentina’s debt prices were broadly stable after the ruling, presumably reflecting that payments can still be made pending the Supreme Court review.  I’m surprised, as the longer term outlook for the debt isn’t good. 2.  Legal risk for counterparties.  If a third party assists Argentina in evading this ruling, they are subject to legal action.  While they can explain themselves, it is hard to see why a bank would want to be a financial counterparty (e.g., a fiscal agent) and take on this kind of legal risk.  This has a chilling effect on Argentina’s ability to deal with international financial markets. 3.  A big deal for the broader market?  Much of the interest in this case has revolved around the ruling’s implications for future restructurings elsewhere.  Does this remedy, and this interpretation of the pari passu clause, encourage holdouts globally?  In this regard, the ruling goes to some length to stress the special circumstances at play here, including Argentina’s non-compliance with past court rulings, as well as the specific (and unusual) formulation of Argentina’s pari passu clause.  At the same time, the arguments here are already spilling over to other cases, as noted here.  Redrafting clauses going forward also doesn’t deal with the legacy of old debt, and in this regard collective action clauses on specific bonds aren’t a solution.  We will have to wait to hear from the lawyers, but at this point my bottom line is that the global implications appear modest.  Countries that are acting in good faith, and have better contracts, will still have holdouts (maybe more now) but can still get their restructurings done and achieve the needed financial relief.