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Kahn analyzes economic policies for an integrated world.

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Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions
Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

Have Sanctions Become the Swiss Army Knife of U.S. Foreign Policy?

The Congress takes an important, positive step to reinforce Russian sanctions, but are we at risk of overusing the sanctions tool?

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Economics
The Federal Reserve Tapers: In Search of Calmer Waters
Yesterday’s decision by the Federal Reserve’s policy committee to modestly reduce (“taper”) its purchases of U.S. Treasury and mortgage-backed securities was a turning point in a number of respects.  After a long period of public debate that roiled markets, the Federal Reserve has at last begun what is likely to be a gradual and well-telegraphed exit from its period of extraordinary stimulus.  Together, last week’s fiscal deal and the Federal Reserve’s taper decision appears to have marked the start of a period of relative calm where U.S. macro policy uncertainty will be far less of a driver of markets. That’s good news for the global economy. A few observations on the decision. The decision yesterday to cut purchases by $10 billion to $75 billion represents a very small reduction in stimulus–worth just a few basis points on the long-term interest rate—and was easily offset by a more dovish statement and forecast for the future path of policy (“forward guidance”).  Equity markets rose on the announcement and Treasuries held their ground.  The Volatility Index (VIX), a measure of market uncertainty, fell 15 percent on the news. The Federal Reserve may see the response as reflective of its credibility; maybe, but it also reflects that the decision was significantly priced into markets and underscores the value to markets to resolving uncertainty. The path outlined by the Federal Reserve yesterday, a steady and gradual reduction in purchases (likely ending sometime in mid-to-late 2014) followed by a “liftoff” in rates sometime in 2015-16, means that policy remains highly accommodating and will only incrementally tighten. Even after purchases end, the Federal Reserve’s large balance sheet means that policy remains easier than if they had simply stopped when interest rates hit zero.  Policy remains data dependent, but one month or two of good data will not change this bottom line. Global inflation pressures remain muted and, given the amount of slack globally, is likely to not be a problem for policymakers in the near term.   The Bank of Japan will likely have to do more next year to meet their 2 percent inflation target.  The Federal Reserve’s move turns up the heat on the ECB—I expect we will see quantitative easing (QE) in Europe next year.  While Bernanke rightly highlighted that there were transitory factors helping to constrain inflation that could be reversed, the more likely scenario is that central banks will continue to worry more about deflation.  That too will introduce “stickiness” to policy. Looking ahead, forward guidance will be a relatively more important tool of policy, and QE less important.  This parallels a shift among economists—inside and outside the Fed—in thinking about what is most effective at influencing financial conditions.  Simply put, successive rounds of QE were less effective, relative to the potential benefits to credibly committing to maintain low rates for a long period. Forward guidance will be data dependent and markets will continue to price in changing expectations about the future.  But the payoff to clear commitments will tend to make policy changes more cautious and, hopefully, well telegraphed and therefore less noisy for markets. The Federal Reserve yesterday needed to address its former guidance that an unemployment rate of 6.5 percent was a threshold for considering a rate hike, something it may regret having said as the unemployment rate has fallen faster than expected. Some expected a lowering of the threshold to 6 percent, but the Federal Reserve instead shifted to a qualitative commitment:  “that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal.”  This was a clever way to get the message out while softening the focus on the unemployment rate going forward. As we know from its minutes and speeches, the Federal Reserve Board has been sharply divided on the question of tapering.  It should come together now.  Certainly there will be disagreements over how much to taper at any individual meeting and how to communicate, but these differences seem small compared to the debate that has played out over the past year.  It often has felt that Federal Reserve communication reflected as much a negotiation in public among Fed members as it was forward guidance to the public.  If so, this decision will make Janet Yellen’s communication task easier, and would be another reason why the taper decision was well timed. Over the past few years, both monetary and fiscal policy has been an extraordinary source of uncertainty.  Last week’s fiscal package took one set of risks off the table, and while the debt limit extension could be noisy (an increase is expected to be needed in March but could be stretched till May/June) the incentives for another crisis seem low for both parties. Now we have a monetary policy framework that markets seem to understand and welcome.  Together, the reduction in uncertainty could be quite constructive for investment and growth.
Budget, Debt, and Deficits
U.S. Budget Deal: A Needed Step
I recently returned to the gym after a long hiatus. It was a nightmare to behold, and I ached for days. It’s easy to be critical for what I haven’t been doing, but it was good that I went. Something to build on. So too with last night’s fiscal package announced by Patty Murray and Paul Ryan. It is too easy to criticize the deal for what it did not do: this isn’t a grand bargain, and it doesn’t address our critical long term deficits—fiscal, education, infrastructure and the like. Critics on the right will dislike the new revenue, and the left will be dismayed that public workers have been hit again and that extended unemployment benefits lost its best vehicle for renewal. It doesn’t even take another shutdown off the table, though Chris Krueger of Guggenheim Securities reduces the odds of a shutdown in January to 15 percent.  He has a good discussion of the deal here and a summary of the deal is here and here. My ambition for the negotiations at the start was modest: do no harm, and give markets and the general public some breathing space.  Honestly, I didn’t expect agreement on funding levels till the January 15 deadline when the current continuing resolution expires.   Instead, we have a deal that increases spending this year by $45 billion and next year by nearly $20 billion, significantly more than I expected.  There are a few points worth noting. The deal freezes discretionary spending at slightly over $1 trillion for the next three years. Assuming we continue to have divided government, it is hard to see much change. The negative is that the burden of deficit reduction has fallen too heavily on discretionary spending.  The positive could be stability and an exit strategy from repeated crises. In real terms, this means fiscal policy will be a continuing, though diminishing drag on the economy in coming years. The added spending was partly paid for through having federal workers hired after December 31, 2013 pay more toward their retirement.  This approach, which differentiates future beneficiaries from current ones, isn’t formally an entitlement reform (the pension is the entitlement, not the premium), but it is close enough to give a sense of the discussion to come. Similarly, having businesses pay higher premiums to the federal government to guarantee their pension benefits, and reducing cost of living increases for those under age 62 who retired from the military, seem to cross formerly bright red lines. Both Murray and Ryan in their comments tried to change the terms of the taxes versus entitlement debate, with Ryan talking of success at addressing the recurring spending. Further, about half of the savings come from additional revenue, though both sides have agreed to call it "fees" and "contributions," not taxes. This looks like good politics, if it works. Next up is the debt limit, which is locked on February 7.  If Treasury fully uses a high cash balance and the extraordinary measures available to them, they should be able to extend the debt limit (the “X date”) to May or June, at which point Congress is likely to provide another short-term extension to beyond the mid-term elections. This deal is what governing looks like.  If approved, it provides breathing space for markets.  And it was done ahead of the absolute deadline, a rarity in DC. Something to build on.
Budget, Debt, and Deficits
Shadow of the Sequester
The news shows this weekend were filled with optimism from across the political spectrum that the congressional budget conference, which begins Wednesday, will produce a deal. I am skeptical. The aim of the conference will be to find agreement on spending for the remainder of FY14 at levels of spending above those that resulted from the 2011 Budget Control Act and the failure of the "super committee" (enforced by sequestration, or "the sequester"). All factions are united in their distaste for the sequester, which cuts too deep and too broadly across both defense and domestic areas. But there is little consensus on what to do about it, and no ideas about how to bridge the fundamental divide between Democratic calls for more revenue and Republican insistence that the focus be on entitlement reform. At this point, the most likely scenario is that a deal on spending will come in January, not December, and will be at (or very near) sequester levels of spending. Leaders on both sides have gone to lengths in past days to downplay the prospects of a grand bargain that includes both material new revenue (probably through tax reform) and entitlement reform. I would put only a small chance, less than 10 percent, that a deal along those lines can be agreed. Instead, the Committee’s efforts will focus on a more modest set of goals, a small deal that uses modest cost savings in the out years to ease the spending caps for the remainder of the fiscal year. This prospect—a bland bargain, in the words of Chris Krueger of Guggenheim Securities—provides a small upside risk for spending in the FY14 but is unlikely to move the needle in terms of the economy’s overall growth rate. Current law caps discretionary spending at $967 billion in FY14 and $991 billion in FY15, compared to $986 billion in the continuing resolution that was just approved and $1.058 trillion in the Senate bill. These numbers define the parameters of the debate. One area for potential savings will be in farm subsidies, and the need for a farm bill is likely to be the early focus of the talks. But the need to reconcile very different House and Senate bills for reauthorizing the nation’s farm and nutrition programs (about $35 billion apart in terms of food aid provided) should be highly contentious and may provide limited scope for additional spending outside that sector. Still, even a modest agreement may be outside the reach of Congress, and I put the odds of a bland bargain at only around 30 percent. Many House Republicans will oppose any increase in spending above the caps without entitlement concessions that Democrats are unlikely to make. Further, the pivot away from “Obamacare” as a focus for the negotiations will make many Republicans unwilling to sacrifice the spending cuts in the sequester. If agreement is not reached by December 13, the focus shifts to January 15, when current funding for the government ends. Republicans will want to avoid the political damage another shutdown would cause. I expect a deal by that time, which means that the sequester will never formally have to be evoked. At the same time, the shadow of the sequester will hang over the talks, and negotiations will start from that level of spending. Consequently, the most likely scenario, which I put at least 60 percent odds on, would be a failure to find common ground reflected not in a shutdown but in a continuing resolution for the remainder of FY14 that locks in the sequester level of spending, though perhaps allowing more flexibility on how the money is used.
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    When Is the Next X Date?
    In my post yesterday, I mentioned in passing the uncertainty about when we would again hit the debt limit (“X Date”).  The question is complicated. Yesterday’s agreement extends the debt limit until February 7, and it allows the U.S. government to replenish or repay the extraordinary measures that it took in order to finance the deficit from May until yesterday. Alec Phillips at Goldman Sachs suggests that the extraordinary measures this time might only get us to sometime in March, but it’s also possible to project a new X Date of May, June or July. Treasury revenue is highly volatile in the early months of the year—February and March are “bad” months, April a “good” month as tax payments come in. The deficit will be materially lower next year on spending restraint and higher revenue due to growth and a strong stock market. Extraordinary measures available depend on the time of year. In past years there were about $200 billion in extraordinary measures available in February (mainly from suspending investments in the federal employees investment fund, or G-Fund, and the Exchange Stabilization Fund). In contrast, the measures reached $300 billion in May 2013. The amount of extraordinary measures available also can be increased by deferring certain debt rollovers and interest payments normally due to government funds at end quarter, and by extending the length of the period for which special measures are used (the Debt Issuance Suspension Period, or DISP).  If Treasury is assuming a March X Date, it may mean that they are assuming a short DISP, but they can and likely would extend the DISP to gain more time. In addition, at some point Freddie Mac is expected to make a dividend payment to Treasury, perhaps on the order of $30 billion, which could add to the resources available to Treasury. The chart above shows the cumulative deficit of the U.S. government starting February for the last four years. (I took three-fourths of the reported monthly February deficit to approximate a February 7 start date.) It shows that 2013 looks a lot different from previous years, which reflects a falling deficit and also some of the effects of the fiscal cliff at end 2012. But if we assume that 2014 looks broadly like 2013, only with a smaller deficit, then you can see a story where the X Date is pushed off to April 15, and then until summer. When the debt limit hits could be important for both political and economic reasons, coming in the midst of primary campaigns for the 2014 midterm elections. Proximity to the X Date also would make it hard for the Fed to make decisions on tapering asset purchases, which some believe could be on the table at their March 19-20 monetary policy meeting. Perhaps the debt limit will be addressed in the December spending negotiations. I hope so. But if those negotiations fail, as have past efforts at grand bargains, then we may be facing another debt limit showdown in 2014. My intuition is that, to the extent Treasury is able to push back the X Date, it should do so. Using the debt limit as leverage for a political or economic agenda is dreadful at any time, but seems less likely to result in a cliff hanger the later in 2014 it is addressed.  
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    Celebrating Failure
    So it looks as if we will have a fiscal deal. The final bill will be the result of the Senate negotiations that concluded this morning: 1.     It will reopen the government and fund it at current levels ($986 billion) to January 15, 2014. 2.     The debt ceiling will be raised until February 7, and Treasury will be able to undo the extraordinary measures that it took to extend the debt limit from May until this week. This would seem to suggest that the next debt limit showdown is set for June/July 2014 (assuming the extraordinary measures get us till mid-April, after which the seasonal factors and a possible government-sponsored enterprise, or GSE, payment should make the next few months manageable). 3.     There will be a budget negotiation (Senate-House conference committee) with a deadline of December 13, but there does not seem to be any real bite if it fails to deliver. Expectations are low, though there will still be an effort to ease the sequester for FY14 offset by future cuts. 4.     Without a deal, sequestration in January would reduce spending by about $20 billion. 5.     In addition, the agreement gives flexibility to government agencies under sequester, provides retroactive pay for federal workers, and makes inconsequential changes to the Affordable Care Act. While overall markets have remained well anchored by the firm expectation that the United States would not default on its debt, the costs have mounted as measured by greater uncertainty and fragmentation of the money market. Still, markets want to be long, and we are seeing a solid rally on expectation of a deal. A shutdown in January may be less likely with the sequester already in place as a fallback option, and perhaps the debt limit debate will be settled more easily in summer 2014 with the midterm elections only a few months away.  (I am surprised more attention isn’t being paid to this timing issue.)  But I do remain concerned about the structural problem caused by an uncertain and soft deadline. Our policymakers can only address these issues at the last possible moment, and when there isn’t agreement on the last possible moment—October 17, November 1 or sometime later—mistakes can happen. In particular, the recent pressures on the money market would have forced extraordinary actions from the Fed or Treasury soon, leaving a question mark over how future showdowns will be handled. It is a win for the president and positive for markets in the sense that it’s better than no agreement, and longer in duration than some earlier proposals. But at the core, it’s a policy failure. It doesn’t address the underlying causes of the conflict, ensuring we will travel this road again.