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Latin America’s Moment

Latin America’s Moment analyzes economic, political, and social issues and trends throughout the Western Hemisphere.

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An illegal gold mining camp is discovered in Madre de Díos during a Peruvian military operation in 2019.
An illegal gold mining camp is discovered in Madre de Díos during a Peruvian military operation in 2019. Guadalupe Pardo/Reuters

Illegal Gold Finances Latin America’s Dictators & Cartels. The United States Must Lead the Fight Against It.

Four policy ideas to curb illegal gold mining in the Western Hemisphere.

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United States
Panama Twenty-Five Years Later
December 20 marks the 25th anniversary of Operation Just Cause, better remembered as the U.S. invasion of Panama. Set off by the death of an off-duty Marine lieutenant by Panamanian security forces, the invasion represented the final step in a deteriorating relationship between the United States and Manuel Noriega—once a CIA informant and close ally, later a defiant dictator, undone by the winding down of the Cold War and his own brazen corruption. The lopsided confrontation ended by early January of 1990, when Noriega surrendered to U.S. authorities. He was then extradited, tried, convicted, and eventually sentenced to twenty years in U.S. federal prison for drug-trafficking, racketeering, and money-laundering. Noriega left a devastated economy and society. During his last years the nation defaulted on its debt and fell into a deep recession, with GDP plummeting 13 percent. Panamanians living on just $2 a day rose to nearly a third of the population. Under the new democratic government led by Guillermo Endara—who most thought won the nulled 1989 presidential elections—Panama began to improve. After the United States lifted its sanctions foreign direct investment returned, especially into the country’s services sector. The U.S. military, always a strong presence due to the canal, as well as others, could again visit, boosting consumption.  Panama’s economy, and in particular its middle class, began to recover. 1999 represented an economic turning point for the country, as the United States returned the canal to Panamanian ownership and control. Today, upwards of 13,000 ships pass through the canal’s locks each year, paying on average roughly $250,000 a trip (which they wire to the canal a couple days before entering the line). This direct influx of money (netting the federal government some three million dollars a day) is complemented by a huge supporting transportation and logistics service sector that, combined, have helped Panama grow an average of nearly  7 percent a year since it gained control of the passageway—faster than any other Latin American country during this time period. Still, while the country as a whole has gotten richer, not everyone has benefited. Panama’s middle class remains small and inequality high. The sleek skyscrapers that fill the cityscape sit alongside neglected cinder-block apartments. Outside Panama’s urban areas, over 40 percent of the population lives in poverty. Panama’s richest 20 percent of the population controls nearly 60 percent of the nation’s income—a disparity that rivals neighboring countries such as the Dominican Republic and Honduras. With an expanded canal set to open in early 2016, commerce will only increase (capacity is set to double). While bringing in greater revenues, as well as likely investment, this growth will further tax Panama’s already overburdened infrastructure, including bridges, roads, and even sewer systems. The challenge will be to make its economic growth sustainable and inclusive, finding more ways for average Panamanians, and especially those in areas far away from the canal, to share in the benefits from their country’s continuing economic boom.
United States
Spillovers From Falling Oil Prices: Risks to Mexico and the United States
Geopolitically, U.S. policymakers generally see high oil prices as bad and low oil prices as good for national interests. In a CFR Working Paper I coauthored with Michael Levi and Alexandra Mahler-Haug we find a sustained drop in oil prices will affect at least one of the United States’ closest trading partners and geopolitical allies negatively: Mexico. Modeling the vulnerability of the Mexican federal budget to a range of oil price declines and assessing the different ways the government might react, we found that severe and sustained declines would force major adjustments in taxes, spending, and debt. Here are some major findings from the paper: In response to falling oil prices, Mexico will usually prefer to raise debt rather than boost revenues or cut spending, but will likely not rely only on one tool. A one-year price drop should be straightforward for the Mexican government to cover with new debt—even if oil prices fall by fifty percent or more. Oil prices need to fall below $70 a barrel for an extended period of time for the Mexican budget to come under severe stress. A summary of the paper can be found here, and the full text here: Spillovers From Falling Oil Prices: Risks to Mexico and the United States.  
China
Guest Post: Latin America, Energy Matrices, and the Future of Climate Change
This is a guest post by Matthew Michaelides, an intern here at the Council on Foreign Relations who works with me in the Latin America program. This week world leaders meet in Lima, Peru to discuss the framework for a new UN climate change agreement. The big issues for discussion include financing clean energy projects and implementing cap-and-trade policies, building on the release of a new report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a landmark climate change accord between the United States and China. As the home to some six hundred million people and the source of 10 percent of the world’s GDP, Latin America’s path forward will influence the success or failure of the global climate change movement. The region has traditionally led the world in lower carbon emissions, in large part because of its diverse energy matrices. Yet, without a concerted push toward renewables, recent trends threaten this climate-friendly mix. The first is economic development. As Latin American nations grow, they consume more fossil fuels. From 1995 to 2011, fossil fuels dependence grew by 10 plus percent in four countries in the region—Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—increasing their carbon footprints. As a consequence, usage rates of nonrenewables across the region are converging on the wrong end of the spectrum.   World Bank, "World Development Indicators," 2014.   Fossil fuel production matters as well. Well known producers such as Trinidad and Tobago (natural gas) or Venezuela (oil) have always depended more heavily on hydrocarbons for their energy. But over the last fifteen years, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina all made substantial new oil and gas discoveries, and Colombia and Bolivia boosted production on known oil and natural gas reserves. These increases threaten future carbon emissions declines. In Brazil, hydropower’s contribution to electricity generation fell from 82 percent in 2011, to 71 percent in 2013—replaced almost wholly by fossil fuel powered sources. These trends look to continue, as domestic political pressures have halted plans to build four to eight new nuclear reactors by 2030 and slowed several new hydroelectric dam projects. In Mexico, for all the publicity the country received for progressive 2012 climate change legislation, hydrocarbon consumption continues apace, and the recent energy reform may incentivize a further turn toward fossil fuels.   World Bank, "World Development Indicators," 2014.   Some nations have improved their carbon footprints or are taking positive steps to do so. Costa Rica decreased its fossil fuel consumption by over 10 percent from 1995 to 2011 and plans to be carbon-neutral as soon as 2021. And despite its recent uptick in hydrocarbon usage, Brazil remains the second largest producer of both ethanol and hydroelectric power in the world. Nicaragua meets 21 percent of its energy needs through wind sources and plans to increase its use of renewables to 90 percent of its energy needs. And El Salvador hopes to increase geothermal energy production to 40 percent from 24 percent through public-private partnerships. As in other regions of the world, Latin American countries face a trade-off between money and development today, and environmental sustainability and diversity tomorrow. If oil prices continue to fall and shale gas technology continues to improve, the challenge to maintain environmentally sustainable energy matrices will only grow. This week’s discussions in Lima on making renewables usage financially feasible are a positive step, but they must be followed up with concrete action.  
  • Mexico
    Taking on Mexico’s Corruption
    Nearly two months ago, forty-three student teachers were murdered in Iguala, Guerrero, Mexico. It was later discovered that the city’s corrupt mayor had had the students arrested and then turned over to a local criminal organization. In this piece published last week in Spanish in El Financiero, I lay out what the federal government can and should do to tackle corruption. You can read the piece in English below:  The news in Mexico is moving from bad to worse. The search for forty-three missing student teachers in Iguala, Guerrero ended tragically, with a few remains found in garbage bags dumped in a nearby river. During the desperate search investigators discovered no fewer than eleven other mass graves, holding dozens of poor unnamed souls, many likely subject to the same ruthless lawlessness, as well as the negligence of if not direct abuse by local and state political powers. As potentially worrisome are the allegations over the “White House,” a seven million dollar abode seemingly controlled by the Peña Nietos, but not claimed by the president when he released a list of his assets during the electoral campaign. The house is legally owned by Grupo Higa, whose owner Juan Armando Hinojosa Cantu is close with the president and a beneficiary of a recently awarded—and then quickly cancelled—$3.6 billion contract to build a high speed train between Mexico City and Queretaro, home of Mexico’s expanding aerospace industry. The only way to quell the rising dissatisfaction and unrest in Mexico is to take on, finally, corruption. If the opacity, silence, and fear that enables these abuses continues, Mexico’s economic and global potential will falter and fade. Until these last weeks, government officials seemed to believe that their economic transformation could occur without a more fundamental shift in underlying incentives and practices. That is no longer the case. So what can the federal government do? First, it needs to pass stronger anti-corruption legislation. Tackling corruption was part of the original 2012 political pact between the three main parties. Yet in the press to successfully pass education, telecom, financial, antitrust, and energy reforms, addressing deep-seated governmental dysfunction got lost. Also undone are necessary changes to the juicio de amparo law, which has become a means for the suspected wealthy to ward off charges rather than a protection from true state overreach. Next, the federal and local governments need to invest in earnest in the transition to the new justice system. The initial 2008 reforms gave the government until 2016 to implement the sweeping changes, which introduce oral trials, alter the roles of judges, prosecuting attorneys and defense lawyers, and strengthen due process among other measures. So far, change has been excruciatingly slow. Only in March did the federal government pass a new penal code, setting the ground rules to which Mexico’s thirty-one states now need to conform. A functioning new system that protects the innocent and convicts the guilty will likely require billions of dollars to retrain the nearly forty-thousand current court officials, to revamp the law school curriculums guiding the next generation of lawyers and judges, and to build forensic labs to examine evidence and court rooms to try cases. As Mexico’s citizens await a new anti-corruption agency and a new justice system, they need immediate concrete actions. The attorney general’s office must try and convict prominent wrongdoers. This can start with just a handful of cases, and Mexico’s reporters and other independent investigators have valiantly provided numerous options. Using Mexico’s decade old freedom of information law along with other tools, the press has exposed alleged bad behavior by governors from all three parties, business leaders, union heads, among many others, any of which could be pursued. The government does not have to try and convict them all—a tall order for a transitioning attorney general’s office and justice system more generally. But it does need to demonstrate that those within the Hermes ties and scarf wearing set can end up behind bars: that malfeasance can carry real costs. Finally, the Mexican government needs to engage directly with citizens. In every recent case of progress against crime and violence—Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana among them—the involvement of local organizations has made the difference. Business owners, social leaders, heads of victims and human rights groups, along with others, partnered with federal authorities, and at times local ones, to demand and create change. And as these cases show, local governments do respond to federal authorities’ lead. A national level openness to cooperation with civil society groups will be as, if not more, important in places such as Guerrero, due to the already weaker economic and social fabric upon which to begin stitching together a functioning rule of law. This Mexican government has yet to do these things, and in particular, to engage directly and extensively with society, creating watchdog organizations and other accountability mechanisms to tie its own, others, and future hands from corrupt acts. But that is what is needed for a different Mexico. This article appears in full on CFR.org by permission of its original publisher.  You can read the piece as it appeared in Spanish on El Financiero here.   
  • Mexico
    Social Mobility in Mexico
    Earlier this month, the Espinosa Yglesias Research Centre (CEEY) launched the English version of its most recent report on social mobility in Mexico. Creating a measure that combines 2011 household assets and occupational status, they find both good and bad news for aspiring Mexicans. For those in the middle, chances of moving up (or down) are somewhat encouraging, as only a quarter will end up in the same economic group as their parents. But on the richer and poorer ends, the chances of intergenerational change are much lower—only one out of every two individuals will lead an economically different life. Espinosa Yglesias Research Centre, “Report on Social Mobility in Mexico: Imagine Your Future,” 2014. Educational mobility is more positive. In fact, Mexico is quite close to the United States, Switzerland, and Ireland in the likelihood that children will go further in school than their parents. Here, Mexico bests Latin American peers such as Colombia, Chile, and Brazil. Espinosa Yglesias Research Centre, “Report on Social Mobility in Mexico: Imagine Your Future,” 2014. The survey also finds significant gender disparities. Overall, women are more mobile than men. But this movement in part reflects workforce discrimination, as women born wealthy are more likely than men to lose their socioeconomic position, hitting the proverbial glass ceiling. Women who begin life at the lowest income levels are less likely to move up compared to their male counterparts. The study shows that educational mobility has increased more quickly than economic mobility. This suggests that the quality of education lags, especially for those starting at an economic disadvantage. Schooling has yet to become the “great equalizer,” as the chances of completing an undergraduate degree are much higher for private school students. Expectations also matter, not unlike the story in the United States, where qualified lower income students often don’t apply, much less finish, degrees at competitive colleges and universities. What can Mexico—and by extension other countries—do? More equitable and effective public education is an important start. Affirmative action and other policies for women, minorities, and the socioeconomically disadvantaged would help as well. More generally, a broader social safety net could counterbalance the intergenerational effects of poverty. The survey shows Mexico has indeed made some progress, but also illuminates how far it has to go.