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Latin America’s Moment

Latin America’s Moment analyzes economic, political, and social issues and trends throughout the Western Hemisphere.

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An illegal gold mining camp is discovered in Madre de Díos during a Peruvian military operation in 2019.
An illegal gold mining camp is discovered in Madre de Díos during a Peruvian military operation in 2019. Guadalupe Pardo/Reuters

Illegal Gold Finances Latin America’s Dictators & Cartels. The United States Must Lead the Fight Against It.

Four policy ideas to curb illegal gold mining in the Western Hemisphere.

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China
Infrastructure on Rousseff’s Agenda
This is a guest post by Emilie Sweigart, an intern here at the Council on Foreign Relations who works with me in the Latin America Studies program. Even as Brazil pushes forward austerity measures and entitlement reductions, the administration of President Dilma Rousseff is hoping to increase infrastructure investment. The recently announced Programa de Investimentos em Logística (PIL) would launch nearly R$200 billion (USD$64 billion) in concessions for rail (R$86.4 billion), roads (R$66.1 billion), ports (R$37.4 billion), and airports (R$8.5 billion). Roughly a third would be completed by 2018, when Rousseff will leave office. There is no question about the need. The World Economic Forum ranked Brazil’s infrastructure 120th out of 144 countries, alongside Mongolia (119th) and Zimbabwe (121st). With few railroads, coffee, sugar, soybeans, cotton, and other export bound commodities travel on run-down roads from the interior to the coast. Once there, trucks can line up for days at the port. Of the tens of billions spent for the 2014 World Cup and now the 2016 Olympics, much has gone to stadiums and sports venues, less to long-term transportation infrastructure. Airport terminal renovations in São Paulo and Curitiba and Rio’s promised subway extension and port expansion remain unfinished. Previous efforts to boost infrastructure spending haven’t turned out particularly well. Rousseff managed to invest just a fifth of the announced R$210 billion in the first phase of the PIL that was launched in 2012. Auctions for 14 railways and over 160 port terminals attracted no bidders, and the vaunted R$35 billion high-speed train linking São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro was shelved indefinitely. This time around, the government promises less regulation and less involvement from the national development bank, the BNDES, opening up more space for private capital. The Chinese in particular sound interested. During a May visit, Chinese premier Li Keqiang promised a joint 50 billion dollar infrastructure fund between Chinese and Brazilian banks for just such opportunities. And the Chinese have already signed onto the single biggest project in the PIL, a R$40 billion railway from Brazil’s Atlantic coast to Peru’s Pacific coast. Still, the political and business climate is difficult. Rousseff’s approval ratings continue to fall, now at just 10 percent. The construction industry remains under the Petrobras scandal cloud, and the recent arrests of Marcelo Odebrecht of Odebrecht SA and Otávio Azevedo of Andrade Gutierrez, the CEOs of Brazil’s largest construction firms, may scare potential international partners. Brazil’s lagging economy, stubbornly high inflation, and significant public debt levels combined with U.S. tapering expectations later in 2015 suggest the government can’t fund much of this ambitious project on its own. Against this backdrop, Rousseff arrives in New York on June 29 to woo the financial crowd before heading to Washington, DC, to meet with President Obama the next day. Most investors believe in her finance minister, Joaquim Levy. Rousseff’s challenge is to convince them about her support for a more market directed and friendly path for Brazil.  
Cuba
The Cuban Renaissance: The Good, the Bad, and the Necessary
This is a guest post by Valerie Wirtschafter, a research associate with the Women and Foreign Policy Program at the Council on Foreign Relations.   Since December 17, 2014, Raul Castro and Barack Obama’s efforts to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations have become a constant fixture in the media. Yet this diplomatic thaw represents a culmination of reforms on the island, which accelerated when Raul Castro officially took office in 2008. Opening up to the world is not without trade-offs, and reform has already brought a combination of good, bad, and necessary change to the island and its people. In a 2010 national address, Raul aptly stated, “We reform, or we sink.” As president, he downsized the number of state jobs, pushing more Cubans into the private sector. The government also privatized large plots of land in an attempt to increase domestic production. New laws now permit Cubans to rent out rooms in their homes as part of a growing informal tourism industry. Due to the rebirth of self-employment, many lined up to pay income taxes in 2013 for the first time in over fifty years. The impact of these reforms was on full display when I visited Cuba three weeks ago as part of a “people to people exchange,” a category of license established in 2000 and issued by the U.S. Treasury Department to build cross-cultural relations between Americans and Cubans. At first glance it may seem as though Cuba is a nation stuck in the 1950s. However, as I roamed the beautiful if dilapidated streets of Havana, it became clear that the vision of the island as a nation wholly cut off from the world is inaccurate – based only on clichéd photographs of old cars and crumbling infrastructure. The Cuban people we spoke to are highly informed about ongoing developments in their political system, and in the U.S. political climate. They are eager to talk about the new U.S.-Cuba policy changes, about which they express a mix of fear and anticipation. After asking where I was from, nearly every conversation turned to the policy shift. Locals from all walks of life candidly asked: “What will happen after Obama leaves office, if someone less open to diplomatic negotiations comes into power? Given political polarization in the United States, will the embargo ever be lifted?” Despite diplomatic barriers and limited and expensive Internet access, U.S. popular culture penetrates the island. Young adults are enthralled with the most recent seasons of Game of Thrones, the Voice, and Grey’s Anatomy. Taylor Swift and Sam Smith blare from the worn out radios of old Edsel cars driving down the streets. Airbnb lists over a thousand properties for rent in Havana alone. I was able to access almost every frivolous application on my iPhone over WiFi connections – which the government recently announced it would make available to more Cuban people at a lower cost. Raul’s reforms also have brought much-needed economic relief to an impoverished population. Many Cubans are still paid a paltry salary of approximately $500 Cuban pesos (CUP) a month (US$20). However, following the birth of a parallel currency pegged to the U.S. dollar and exclusively for foreigners in 2004, Cuban people can now live off of tourist money funneled into the private sector. Private businesses have blossomed due to the relaxation of limits on remittances from Cuban Americans to the island. Start-up funds from relatives in the United States bring in the necessary cash for Cuban families to build their own streams of revenue through self-employment. The paladar, or the private restaurant, is one of the most pervasive private industries in Cuba. Though paladares have existed since the 1990s, their numbers increased substantially after Raul took office. At the many paladares our group visited, we were often the only customers the owners saw that night. A full three-course meal provided enough money for a family to live on for months, or at least until the next tour group came rolling in. The government’s reform efforts have produced unintended consequences as well. Though private sector employment has helped some Cubans escape poverty, it also has increased inequality. The divide between the public and private sector workforce is opening up visible socioeconomic fissures in a country that once professed to have eliminated the class system all together. As Cuban Americans begin to buy properties in Havana and elsewhere in the coming years, they will further exacerbate these divisions. Cuba’s gradual opening has also impacted tourism, which is heavily monitored by the government. The hotel industry in particular – including the State run Hotel Nacional in Havana – seems to glorify the country’s gangster past, a violent history that partially spurred popular support for Fidel Castro’s Revolution. Equally bewildering, a number of reporters recently photographed Paris Hilton taking “selfies” with Fidel’s son at the Habana Libre, which used to be a Hilton Hotel before Castro nationalized it. Though Cuba is on an irreversible path, so far reform has meant creating space for the good, letting some of the bad return, and above all, implementing what is necessary to survive as a nation. I can only hope that future changes are deliberate enough to address the areas in need of dramatic overhaul without tarnishing what is enviable about the country. Cubans are among the most literate in the world, and their health system actually provides for the people. The island is one of the safest countries in the Western hemisphere, all the more impressive in a region plagued by gun violence and drug trafficking. While I cannot begin to take a guess as to what Cuba will look like the next time I visit, I know it will likely be dramatically different. I can’t wait until that day comes.  
Americas
IMF High-Level Conference on Latin America
Two weeks ago, I joined Ricardo Hausmann, director of the Center for International Development at Harvard University, Santiago Levy, vice president for sectors and knowledge at the Inter-American Development Bank, Andrés Velasco, professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and Jose Viñals, financial counselor and director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on an engaging panel at the IMF’s High-Level Conference on Latin America. Our discussion focused on the longer-term economic prospects for Latin America, ranging from the region’s dependency on commodities to economic diversification strategies; from the role of government policies to the consequences of poor institutions on growth. You can watch a webcast of the discussion here.
  • Americas
    Economic Clusters, Productivity, and Growth in Latin America
    This post was co-authored by Gilberto Garcia, research associate for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. How can countries boost productivity and economic competitiveness? Many economists and business leaders turn to economic clusters as an answer. English economist Alfred Marshall first wrote about clusters—the geographic grouping of firms in the same or similar industries—at the turn of the twentieth century. He saw numerous entrepreneurs drawn to particular locations due to physical endowments, and their parallel efforts leading to whole new industries—think California vineyards, Texas oil, or Maine lobster. Proliferation and proximity then brought other advantages: developing a pool of skilled workers, and attracting industry suppliers. As a cluster grew, firms would specialize on a particular step of the production process, increasing their productivity and profits. A century later Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter picked up the idea, envisioning clusters as a way for firms to become or stay competitive in the global economy. For him, the biggest advantage is that proximity enables cooperation. In addition to the workforce and supply chain benefits, firms are more likely to come together to form active business associations, to work with local governments to invest in infrastructure, and to partner with local universities to tailor coursework and research. In the United States, Silicon Valley is the most successful example—with the interaction between startups, large corporations, local governments, and world class universities creating trillions of dollars in wealth and redefining daily life through inventions including the smartphone (Apple), streaming home video (Netflix), and online social networking (Facebook). Many of Latin America’s most promising sectors came about through clustering as well. The aerospace industry in Queretaro, Mexico began with Canada’s Bombardier in 2006, initially attracted by low wages. The state and federal government then worked to attract other producers through tax incentives, cutting bureaucratic red tape, and new trade agreements. The government started a new Aeronautic University, and together with the companies, developed curriculum and shared tuition costs. More than a dozen aerospace companies now operate in the city, bringing in some $500 million in foreign direct investment over the last five years. In 2014 Mexico’s aerospace industry exported more than $6 billion, supporting 45,000 direct jobs and at least twice that number indirectly. In Chile, business and government came together to expand and transform the salmon farming industry. Like minded companies came together to form Salmonchile, a business association that established industry standards and sought out new markets, in particular the United States. The public-private Chile Foundation backed pioneer firms, funded R&D, and passed on best practices to other emerging producers. Over time, Chile’s salmon clusters acquired know-how and developed new technologies, increasing production. By 1992, Chile became the second-largest global salmon producer, and by 2014, exports topped $4 billion, second only to copper. Other Latin American efforts have failed. In the 1970s and 1980s as Brazil opened its markets, shoemakers in Rio Grande do Sul grew rapidly, making leather shoes for numerous large U.S. buyers. Supported mostly by their international clients, numerous Brazilian firms upped production and improved quality. Yet by the early 1990s, these same firms were undercut by cheaper Chinese shoes. With little inter-firm cooperation or support from the government, the potential cluster lost its edge, falling behind in output and never expanding into shoe design or branding. Can, and if so, how can nations create these dynamic ecosystems? Chile is trying with Start-Up Chile, a government program that gives $40,000 and a temporary one-year visa to foreign entrepreneurs to begin their ventures in the Southern Cone nation. Now five years old, it boasts few successes. The young companies are hindered by the short time horizon and limited local venture capital money (a few of the best can receive another $100,000 in financing). 80 percent of participants leave after completing the program, many headed to the United States. If history is a guide, successful clusters grow locally and organically. Still, there is a role for governments to play in nurturing economic constellations. To start, they can protect property rights and open markets through free trade agreements. They can invest in education—including creating higher educational institutions equal to those in other nations (today no Latin American university makes the world’s top 200 as measured by Times Higher Education). And they can boost infrastructure spending, now just half of the 5 percent of GDP the World Economic Forum recommends. State and local governments in particular can encourage and work with local business associations, invest in public works and supportive zoning, develop specialized educational curriculum and training, and fund research and development. In all these efforts policymakers need a long time horizon, as changes and benefits often appear slowly. Yet it is these local custom initiatives that can constitute “smart” industrial policy, and provide promise as Latin America’s nations insert themselves into global markets.
  • Mexico
    Mexico’s Midterm Elections
    Yesterday, Mexicans headed to the polls to vote for 500 federal deputies, 17 state legislatures, 9 governors, and more than 300 mayors. Corruption and security dominated many local discussions. And both new and old tactics emerged to influence votes. On the positive side, IMCO, a Mexican think tank led a 3 for 3 campaign, asking candidates to disclose their assets, potential conflicts of interests, and proof of paid taxes. While fewer than 400 of thousands of candidates participated, the effort and demand are a start toward greater transparency and accountability. Less encouraging, violence spiked in the lead up to elections. Several candidates and many campaign activists were murdered on the campaign trail. In the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca protestors—many led by the CNTE teacher union—stole, burned, or disappeared ballot boxes. And in the week before the elections the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)-led administration decided to make the final push from analog to digital television, handing out free TVs to potential voters. Still in the end, the National Electoral Institute (INE) and the special prosecutor for electoral crimes (FEPADE) found that less than one percent of polling sites had been disrupted. The biggest news was in Nuevo León, where independent candidate Jaime Rodríguez “El Bronco” beat out the PRI’s Ivonne Álvarez for governor, garnering half of all votes. El Bronco benefited from his colorful rhetoric, bad behavior on the part of the current PRI governor Rodrigo Medina and his family, and general dissatisfaction with the establishment parties. The PRI and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) split the governorships in violence-torn Michoacán and Guerrero, the former electing Silvano Aureoles (PRD) and the latter Héctor Astudillo (PRI) for six year terms. In Mexico’s capital, home to over twenty million citizens, preliminary results indicate the PRD took six of Mexico City’s delegations, one more than offshoot party Morena headed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The PRI won three delegations and the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) won two. Morena also beat out the PRD for control of Mexico City’s legislative assembly. At the federal level, the PRI and its Green and New Alliance party allies won somewhere between 246 and 263 seats, giving it a near to slight majority in the lower house. An internally divided PAN, the left’s split, and a recovering economy helped maintain the status quo. It is likely the coming days will bring numerous challenges to individual races, testing the somewhat new INE’s and the electoral court’s (TEPJF) ability to adjudicate fairly and strengthen their independence and authority. It is also unlikely that the PRI’s victories—assuming they hold—will jumpstart a government battered by corruption scandals, low approval ratings, and strong-armed by a teacher’s union. And the implementation of its many structural reforms—education, telecommunications, financial, antitrust, and energy among others—hang in the balance.