Kazakhstan Survives Among the Big Powers

Most of the narratives surrounding Kazakhstan since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 have either continued to place it under Russia’s sphere of influence or, more recently, put it under China’s reach, which, with the 2013 launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has continued to expand into Central Asia. Such a portrayal is, to a certain degree, understandable. Russia is a historically dominant power in Eurasia that remains highly influential in the contemporary era. It also shares deep cultural, historical, and linguistic ties with Kazakhstan, going back several centuries. On the other hand, China, the world’s second-largest economy, is on Kazakhstan’s eastern borders. Lest one forget that Chinese President Xi Jinping originally announced what later became known as the BRI during an official visit to the Central Asian nation in September 2013.  

In reality, Kazakhstani leaders have adopted a nuanced strategy since 1991 that prevents them from domination by either Moscow or Beijing. The core of this strategy is to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries besides Russia and China, even those well beyond its immediate borders, to preserve its autonomy. Thus far, Kazakhstan has managed its geopolitical juggling act rather well, tangoing with China, waltzing with Russia, and working well with the United States, European Union, Turkey, Iran, and other Central Asian states, among others.

The fact that China’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi in 2021 “pressured Astana (Kazakhstan’s capital) to deepen cooperation under the framework of the BRI” and “to better align Kazakhstan’s 2025 Development Plan with China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025)” suggests that Kazakhstan had not participated to the extent Beijing wanted it to in China’s westward overtures. On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s refusal to join the expansion of the informal grouping of emerging economies comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and beyond (BRICS+) in 2023, a decision that reportedly frustrated Russia, underscores Astana’s resistance to pressure from the other end of its territory. Russia’s subsequent restriction of Kazakhstani agricultural imports, ostensibly citing “safety concerns,” implies a retaliatory response. These events collectively illustrate Kazakhstan’s determination to assert its sovereignty and avoid subordination to China or Russia. Kazakhstani president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2021 essay “Independence Above All” has unapologetically reinforced this stance.

A recent paper analyzes Kazakhstan’s ability to protect its independent foreign policy through its trade performance. Some interesting trends are noteworthy. Firstly, Kazakhstan’s external trade has expanded, growing steadily in recent years while keeping the overall trade volume evenly spread across numerous partners and not letting any one country dominate bilateral trade. While China became Kazakhstan’s top trade partner in 2023, a more dispassionate reading of the trade data over the last two decades shows that trade dependence on China has been relatively stable, both in the pre and post-BRI era. More practically, the development of other trade partners like Russia and the EU, other post-Soviet states, South Korea, and Turkey has reduced Kazakhstan’s reliance on China. Indeed, Russia and the European Union have almost always shared the top spot. As the Chinese economy decelerates, it is not likely to occupy the top spot for a prolonged period. Given Kazakhstan’s trade performance over the years, a more plausible scenario is a future where China, Russia, and the EU share the number one position, with relatively small margins between them.

Secondly, in the years just before the BRI’s announcement, trade between Kazakhstan and China was predominantly centered on natural resources. However, it has since evolved into a more balanced exchange, including intermediate goods, raw materials, and consumer goods. There are several reasons behind this evolution. For one, in its early stages of development at least, there was relatively little Kazakhstan could offer to its trade partners (including China) apart from oil and gas. However, while generating competition for domestic producers of equivalent goods, the considerable influx of Chinese capital goods also opens opportunities for Kazakhstani firms to engage in other productive activities, ranging from reducing manufacturing costs, improving product quality, and developing more marketable product designs. There is also Kazakhstan’s emerging middle class. Market research indicates that its demography—half of Kazakhstan’s population is under twenty-nine years of age—is open to quality products and brand names from China and other foreign countries.

Third, and related to the previous point, China-Kazakhstan trade is simultaneously the cause and effect of an increasingly complex production network in Kazakhstan and the region. It would be naive to claim that Chinese firms have not captured critical parts of Kazakhstan’s supply chain and consumer market. Yet, it is just as plausible that their entrance has rejuvenated the local industrial system, resulting in a broad-based transformation in Kazakhstan’s economy that can hardly be observed through trade analysis alone. For example, the transnational rail freight transport from China to Europe has been pivotal in linking selected Chinese cities such as Chongqing and Chengdu to Central Asian and European destinations. This rail network has helped to catalyze commercial activities within Kazakhstani territory. One of the most direct impacts of such a rail freight project is the improvement of Kazakhstan’s cold chain logistics, which is especially important in facilitating the sales of perishable goods such as animal hides, meat, and grains to China.

Overall, Kazakhstan’s journey since gaining independence in 1991 reflects a carefully calibrated strategy to safeguard its sovereignty while navigating the competing influences of major powers like China and Russia. Kazakhstan has skillfully balanced historical ties to Russia with deepening economic engagement with China through its hedging foreign policy, particularly under the BRI. By diversifying trade partnerships and fostering economic ties beyond its immediate neighbors, Kazakhstan has reduced dependence on any single power, bolstering both its independence and economic growth. Despite ongoing challenges, Kazakhstan’s efforts to develop domestic industries and diversify exports—especially to China—highlight progress toward building a more resilient and self-sufficient economy that is not only dependent on oil and gas. Regional initiatives like the CERF have further strengthened connectivity while driving domestic economic transformation. These strategies underline Kazakhstan’s commitment to preserving its sovereignty while leveraging its strategic location to establish balanced, mutually beneficial partnerships.

Linda Tjia is an associate professor at the City University of Hong Kong. Guanie Lim is an associate professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Japan.