India Between Superpowers: Strategic Autonomy in the Shadow of a Pacific Conflict

As tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific between the United States and China, India’s ability to maintain its long-standing policy of “strategic autonomy” faces an increasing challenge. Recent developments, ranging from China’s joint military cooperation with Russia to its increased aggressiveness in the South China Sea, have made the prospect of a conflict in the Pacific ever more plausible. Historically, India has strategically balanced relations with global powers, but as the Indo-Pacific region inches toward potential conflict, India’s diplomatic role will become more crucial—and more difficult to navigate.

India’s Strategic Autonomy: A Historical Perspective

India has long maintained a delicate balancing act. During the Cold War, India was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, seeking to avoid entanglement in the ideological battles between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite its neutral stance, India’s diplomatic relations with Moscow remained close, with the Soviet Union being one of its closest partners. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rise of a multipolar world presented India with opportunities to further diversify its international ties.

In the years following the Cold War, India managed to preserve this autonomy. However, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the global landscape has shifted. Russia’s increasing isolation, especially from the West, has unexpectedly strengthened India’s position. As Russia becomes more reliant on India for trade and diplomatic support, India’s leverage on the global stage has grown. For example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi played a significant role in ensuring Russian nuclear restraint in 2022. This shift has placed India in a unique position to influence global dynamics, especially as tensions between the United States and China grow more unpredictable.

India’s Role in the BRICS and Relations With China

One of the most significant developments in recent years has been the increasing prominence of BRICS (whose membership has grown from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to also include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates), the organization that some view as a potential alternative to the Group of Seven, commonly referred to as the G7. As a key member of BRICS, India plays a pivotal role in shaping its direction. The organization allows for better collaboration between emerging economies, and has been perceived as a counterbalance to the international order dominated for decades by the United States and its partners, though that order itself is staggering.  

India’s involvement in BRICS also creates an opportunity for collaboration with China, its primary geopolitical rival. While tensions between India and China remain high, especially over territorial disputes, BRICS provides India with an avenue to diplomatically engage with China. If India can successfully manage its relations with both China and the United States, it could become one of the few countries capable of maintaining strong ties with each major superpower. Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific has become the geoeconomic center of the world, and China’s prosperity is intrinsically linked to it. As a result, China has a vested interest in maintaining India’s non-alignment policy. This would give India an unprecedented ability to mediate in a future Pacific conflict, placing it in a strategically advantageous position.

The Quad: U.S.-India Cooperation

In addition to its role in BRICS, India has become a key partner in the United States’ strategy to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) consists of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The first Trump administration revived it as part of its broader strategy to counter China’s assertiveness. The Biden administration has continued this policy, seeking to strengthen the Quad as a pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy.

However, India’s role in the Quad has been a subject of debate. While it has participated in joint military exercises and diplomatic initiatives, India remains reticent about fully committing to the Quad and is unwilling to frame the grouping as a counterweight to China. India’s reluctance to take a more confrontational stance with China reduces the Quad’s effectiveness. For the United States to rely on India as a strategic partner in the event of a Pacific conflict, the Quad would have to expand its agenda and foster stronger partnerships.

The Challenges of Strategic Autonomy

India’s strategic autonomy, which has long been a cornerstone of its foreign policy, faces increasing strain. Economically, China and the United States are India’s two largest trading partners, and both are vital to India’s growth. However, as these two superpowers continue to move further apart, India finds itself caught in the middle. On the security front, India’s national interests are now directly threatened by China’s assertiveness, particularly along their shared border. Its diplomatic ties with Russia further complicate the situation, as Moscow’s increasing isolation has created an even more polarized international environment.

Unlike during the Cold War when India was not a priority in U.S. grand strategy, the relationship is now considered the “most consequential relationship of the 21st century.” This makes it increasingly difficult for India to maintain its non-alignment policy as the risk of being dragged into a larger conflict grows. At the same time, while India remains an important player in both global economic and diplomatic affairs, it lacks the leverage to serve as an effective mediator between the United States and China.

For the United States, this presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Strengthening the U.S.-India relationship through economic and political cooperation would provide India with the support it needs to grow its diplomatic capital. Lastly, by bolstering India’s capabilities to mediate between China and leading democracies, the United States could more effectively manage conflicts in the Indo-Pacific through diplomatic, rather than militaristic, avenues.