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Energy, Security, and Climate

CFR experts examine the science and foreign policy surrounding climate change, energy, and nuclear security.

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REUTERS/Amit Dave
REUTERS/Amit Dave

Why We Still Need Innovation in Successful Clean Energy Technologies

Today is my last day at CFR. I’m joining ReNew Power, India’s largest renewable energy firm, as their CTO. I’m excited for a new adventure but sad to leave the Council, which has given me support and autonomy to study the innovations needed for global decarbonization. Read More

Technology and Innovation
An Energy Innovation Agenda for the Trump Administration
Democrats and Republicans are girding for battle over energy policy. The two parties are far apart on most issues, like the future of the Clean Power Plan and federal restrictions on oil and gas drilling. But with the Presidential election in the rearview mirror, Donald Trump and the 115th Congress have a chance to embrace a mainstream energy agenda with support from both sides of the aisle and deliver on campaign promises to create manufacturing jobs and boost exports. Innovation is central to this agenda. Today the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) published a report that I wrote with my colleagues Teryn Norris, Colin McCormick, and David Hart, laying out a blueprint for how to accelerate energy innovation. We believe this is a perspective that will resonate with the new administration. In fact, President-elect Trump’s choice for Secretary of State, Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson, has forcefully made the case for why energy innovation “will be vital in the decades ahead.” And former Texas Governor Rick Perry, tapped as Secretary of Energy, has remarked, “Energy innovation, it’s the quickest way to make our anemic economy very powerful.” This thesis has broad support among leaders in the private sector. Just yesterday, a group of wealthy investors led by Bill Gates unveiled Breakthrough Energy Ventures, a fund in excess of $1 billion to invest in early-stage clean energy technology companies. But it will take enabling public policies to unleash private sector investment in energy innovation. In our report, we urge the federal government to: Reform a sprawling set of institutions to increase the commercial impact of federal energy research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) and maximize taxpayer return on investment. These reforms should draw inspiration from experiences in other sectors, including life sciences, semiconductors, electronics, and agriculture, where breakthrough technologies have been successfully commercialized. We distill these lessons into five principles for institutional change that should be applied to key federal agencies, especially the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE): 1. Connect basic science with technology priorities; 2. Reorient the national labs to pursue commercially relevant RD&D; 3. Encourage more private investment in energy innovation; 4. Support demonstration projects; and 5. Complement “supply-push” policies with “demand-pull” policies. These reforms will help focus federal energy-innovation resources on urgent and coherent needs. We put forward six candidates for these “Technology Missions”: 1. Nuclear power; 2. Solar energy; 3. Energy storage; 4. Carbon capture, utilization, and storage; 5. Advanced cooling and thermal energy storage; and 6. Smart energy management and connected vehicles. To fund all of this, we recommend that the United States double its funding for energy RD&D, consistent with the Mission Innovation commitment that it and nineteen other major economies have made. Leading lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have expressed their support for boosting scientific research, so expanding doubling the budget for energy innovation to roughly $13 billion—a rounding error in the federal budget—is politically tractable. And we also offer avenues to supplement Congressional appropriations, for example by restructuring the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. In promoting energy innovation, we argue that “President-elect Trump has an opportunity to make good on his campaign promises to create well-paid advanced-manufacturing jobs, protect the environment, embrace a diverse energy mix that includes fossil fuels, and boost the flagging U.S. trade balance.” His administration and the next Congress should seize it. Read the full ITIF report here.
Energy and Climate Policy
Climate Change and U.S. Leadership Under President Trump
This guest post was written by Lindsay Iversen, associate director of climate and resources at the Council on Foreign Relations. In the week since Donald Trump’s election, the energy and environment community has struggled to come to grips with candidate Trump’s positions on climate change and energy policy—positions that were not deeply explored during the campaign or raised by the moderators in any of the debates. If enacted, the policies Trump has proposed will reverberate beyond American borders, with potentially serious ramifications for U.S. leadership in other foreign policy realms. President-Elect Trump has made clear that he does not believe climate change is a serious—or indeed even a real—phenomenon, calling it a “hoax,” a “very, very expensive form of tax,” and a “money-making industry.” His America-First Energy Plan reflects this belief. In it, he pledges to end U.S. participation in the Paris climate deal, cancel all U.S. payments to United Nations climate change programs, rescind the Clean Power Plan (President Barack Obama’s signature emissions reduction policy), shore up the U.S. coal industry, open federal lands to fossil fuel exploration, and back expansions of U.S. energy infrastructure, including authorizing the Keystone pipeline. Many of these policies were sufficiently important to the candidate to make their way into his plan for his first one hundred days in office. The United States has been the central actor in international climate diplomacy for the past thirty years. Where it has exercised leadership—in securing consensus around the 1987 Montreal Protocol controlling ozone-destroying gases, or the 2015 Paris climate accord—it has been easier to galvanize international cooperation. Where the United States has hung back—failing to ratify the Kyoto agreement, for example—entire accords have collapsed. It is far from clear that any other country could successfully assume the United States’ central position in climate policy. China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, has criticized Trump for threatening the Paris deal and signaled that it will seek a leadership role in international climate diplomacy. Next year’s Clean Energy and Mission Innovation Ministerials (Obama administration initiatives to convene major economies to ramp up investment in clean energy technologies) will take place in China.  And its intensive efforts to develop and deploy affordable solar and wind technologies put China in a strong position to lead by example. China’s willingness to step up abroad is at least in part a reflection of the intense domestic political pressure driving Beijing to clean up its heavily polluted air and water at home. But it is also a reflection of China’s careful but increasingly overt drive to expand its influence and diplomatic power to a level commensurate with its economic heft. It remains to be seen, however, how leadership in climate diplomacy would square with the other elements of China’s international agenda. Beijing has in recent years been criticized for its mercantilist relationships with natural resource suppliers in Africa, illegal island-building in the South China Sea, and territorial spats with several critical neighbors. It has also, Paris agreement aside, demonstrated that its main domestic goal remains economic growth and political stability; local officials have been caught falsifying air quality data in major Chinese cities to meet environmental standards without sacrificing economic performance. In other words, China may be willing to take the lead in international climate diplomacy, but that is no guarantee that other countries will follow. Mitigating carbon emissions, meanwhile, is only half the puzzle. Countries are already grappling with the need to adapt to climate change, and with how to pay for it. Small island states such as Kiribati command attention because of their near-existential plight, but abnormal climate conditions have caused serious damage from the Arctic to Louisiana and beyond. The agenda for the 2016 UN climate summit in Marrakech included, among other things, setting up a financing mechanism to help poor countries adapt to the expected effects of climate change in the next few decades. Many were already skeptical that countries would be able to mobilize the $100 billion per year of public and private funding they pledged in Paris. It does not seem likely that cash-strapped Europe will be willing or able to take up the slack if the United States ends its climate financing, as Trump has promised to do, or have the diplomatic clout to induce China, India, Brazil, or other major emerging economies to contribute. If that is the case, the assistance will simply not materialize, leaving millions of impoverished people to face their fate alone. Abdicating leadership in mitigation and adaptation, finally, will have ripple effects that extend far beyond international climate policy. If the United States demonstrates that it will not fulfill its commitments in one realm, countries will have little reason to trust its word in others—and indeed, Candidate Trump gave no indication that climate agreements would be the only ones under threat. The Iran nuclear deal, trade agreements, and even core military alliances could all be on the chopping block. Trust and leadership are fragile things. National reputations built over the course of generations can be demolished astonishingly quickly through careless and destructive stewardship. Will Trump pull back from his campaign rhetoric and maintain faith with the United States’ international partners? Climate change policy may prove to be the canary in the coal mine.
Diplomacy and International Institutions
Sustaining Fuel Subsidy Reform Should Be a Top U.S. Priority
Last week, I released a new CFR discussion paper entitled, "Sustaining Fuel Subsidy Reform," with my colleague Jennifer Harris. Over the last two years, governments around the world have taken advantage of the plunge in global oil prices to reduce or eliminate consumer subsidies for fuels like gasoline or natural gas. However, these reforms are often unpopular and crumble under political pressure despite their economic, security, and environmental benefits. In our paper, we identify strategies for governments to prevent backsliding on reforms, and we recommend ways for U.S. policymakers to help countries reinforce reforms. Check out the infographic below for a summary of our findings. For more, read our op-ed in Politico Magazine and the full discussion paper on CFR.org.  
  • Technology and Innovation
    Four Things I Learned from Visiting Argonne National Laboratory
    For seventy years, Argonne has hosted cutting-edge scientific research. The first national laboratory in the United States, Argonne was created in 1946 as an extension of the Manhattan Project to develop nuclear technology. Today, its research spans high-energy physics, supercomputing, and advanced materials, but I paid a visit to Argonne last month for one reason in particular: the Laboratory has established itself as a thriving hub for research on battery energy storage. To write his 2015 book, The Powerhouse: Inside the Invention of a Battery to Save the World, Quartz reporter Steve Levine spent two years embedded in Argonne’s battery laboratories, documenting a thrilling race to develop the next-generation lithium-ion battery. I was particularly fascinated by the central but confusing role that Argonne found itself. As a national laboratory, its core competency is basic science research and development, at which its scientists excel. But on top of that, the Lab has developed external partnerships with the private sector, for example, by licensing technology to General Motors to build the battery for its Volt electric vehicle (Argonne technology may soon emerge in next year’s 238-mile-range Chevy Bolt). And it found itself under intense pressure to deliver results after the Department of Energy designated it as the U.S. energy innovation hub for energy storage. Arguably, a transformative advance in energy storage is the most important clean energy technology need in the quest to confront climate change and secure energy independence. But Argonne, along with a swathe of Silicon Valley start-ups, has struggled to commercialize breakthrough battery technologies. Today, it remains unclear whether a credible challenger can unseat the formidable lithium-ion battery, which Asian firms (and more recently, Tesla) are churning out en masse. Still, on my visit I encountered healthy doses of optimism—tempered by experience with research dead-ends—and a trove of lessons for how to commercialize emerging technologies. Here are four of them: 1. Lithium-sulfur batteries are the best bet to succeed lithium-ion Researchers at Argonne’s Joint Center for Energy Storage Research (JCESR) are racing to deliver an electric-vehicle battery prototype that will pack more energy per pound, at a lower price point, than anything on the market. Lithium-ion batteries currently dominate energy storage, encompassing mobile phones, electric vehicles, and power grids, but their performance is approaching theoretical limits (figure 1). JCESR researchers—after chasing a dead-end in hyped but finicky lithium-air technology—now believe lithium-sulfur will enable cheaper and longer-range electric vehicles that strike the right balance between feasibility of commercialization and better performance. Still, the challenges facing an energy-dense, cost-effective lithium-sulfur battery are formidable. Making it will probably require replacing all of the major components of the lithium-ion battery. Scientists are struggling to prevent the sulfur in the positive electrode, or cathode, from dissolving. And making a required change to the negative electrode or anode—from graphite in lithium-ion batteries to solid lithium metal—has resulted in the electrode developing weird growths (“dendrites”) that can short circuit the battery. Furthermore, researchers are looking for solid materials with which to replace the liquid electrolyte that shuttles ions between the anode and cathode. Still, if they succeed, batteries could store more energy, discharge power more rapidly, and pose fewer safety risks (read: no more fires on planes). Figure 1: Energy densities of standard lithium-ion batteries. Source: Janek, J., and Zeier, W.G. Nature Energy 1 (2016). 2. R&D is needed not only to invent new materials, but also to scale up manufacturing processes Argonne’s Materials Engineering Research Facility (MERF) focuses on an often-overlooked aspect of battery innovation—figuring out how to manufacture new materials at commercial scale. Researchers explained to me their rigorous process flow, which includes vetting new materials to see if they can in theory be scaled up, and making larger and larger quantities of the materials. They might modify the chemical composition to synthesize a material invented in the lab to make it easier to manufacture, but if it fails to deliver the same performance on a large scale, researchers must go back to the drawing board. Importantly, researchers use industrial-scale equipment, which differs substantially from lab tools used to make very small quantities of new materials (figure 2). The logic behind MERF is sound and badly needed. Still, Argonne has a long way to go. So far, MERF has only focused on new materials for lithium-ion batteries, whereas brand new battery technologies are arguably even more in need of such a facility to make up for the industry’s apathy toward emerging battery architectures. And even within the lithium-ion battery space, MERF has struggled to produce a game-changing new material at a scale that battery manufacturers are willing to license. Still, MERF has had some limited examples of successful licensing arrangements. And I’m positive that it will take many more MERF-like facilities—scaling up the manufacturing of batteries as well as other clean energy technologies—to realize the potential of national laboratory discoveries. Figure 2: An industrial-scale reaction chamber (50 liters) for scaling up synthesis of new lithium-ion electrolyte materials (Varun Sivaram) 3. International R&D cooperation is about much more than technology development Recently, the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) was renewed for another five-year collaboration, and Argonne was chosen to lead the Clean Vehicle Consortium (CVC) from the U.S. side. I was struck by the CVC’s range of goals—over and above developing new technologies in the lab. The collaboration could be a vehicle (pun intended) for U.S. firms to bring advanced battery and vehicle technologies to the Chinese market. And it could offer a venue for senior U.S. and Chinese officials to meet with each other and discuss not only CERC’s progress but also completely unrelated diplomatic priorities. Amazingly, clean energy technology (along with climate change—though friction remains on aspects of climate negotiations) has emerged as the brightest spot in U.S.-China relations, uplifting a relationship that has been otherwise marred by tensions around the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and more. The downside may be that genuine technology development could become a casualty of the pressure on CERC to deliver on broader diplomatic goals. Joint patenting of technology with China has been rare, as U.S. companies in particular remain wary of China’s intellectual property protections. Still, I got the sense that CVC’s collaboration on driverless, networked vehicles is an effort where both the U.S. and Chinese sides are committed to jointly developing new technologies in a largely unexplored area. 4. National laboratories and entrepreneurs could be natural partners Building on a model pioneered at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory called “Cyclotron Road,” Argonne is preparing to kick off its own incubator for clean energy technology entrepreneurs to take advantage of the extensive resources at the Lab. Dubbed “Chain Reaction Innovations” (CRI), the program is about to announce its inaugural class of entrepreneurs, pairing them with veteran Argonne researchers to develop their technologies on campus. I’ve argued before that this model is crucial for entrepreneurs to get their start without venture capitalists hanging a Sword of Damocles over their heads by infusing their start-ups with capital but expecting speedy and lucrative payouts. Now, national labs around the country are looking into hosting their own classes of entrepreneurs, and it will likely take many such programs to boost clean energy technology in the wake of the start-up bubble collapse. But in this area as in others, I came away from my visit reassured that Argonne is looking ahead to play a vital role in bringing clean energy breakthroughs to market. I am very grateful to my hosts at Argonne National Laboratory, including Peter Littlewood, Greg Morin, Dave Hooper, Julie Wulf-Knoerzer, Don Hillebrand, Kris Pupek, Norm Peterson, Suresh Sunderajan, Andreas Roelofs, Kevin Gallagher, Brad Ullrick, and Devin Hodge.
  • Technology and Innovation
    Pairing Push and Pull Policies: A Heavy-Duty Model for Innovation
    This post is co-authored by Sagatom Saha, research associate for energy and U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. When policymakers mandate adoption of a particular technology, they run the risk that the technology may not yet exist or is too expensive for consumers. Similarly, when the government funds research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of new technologies, it can’t be sure that any advances it underwrites will get picked up by the private sector and successfully taken to market. Even if the government pursues both activities separately—“pulling” technologies into the market through mandates or standards and “pushing” the development of new technologies through RD&D funding—these risks don’t go away. But the strategy embodied in the Obama administration’s recent push to clean up emissions from large vehicles could address both of these risks in one fell swoop. Last month, the administration released new rules limiting emissions from heavy-duty vehicles like vans, trucks, tractors, and buses. Alongside the standards, it also announced $140 million in new funding for innovative technologies to improve the efficiency of both light and heavy vehicles. Pairing these pull- and push-policies has already proven effective at making sure the right technologies are developed to achieve ambitious standards. This strategy could work to commercialize other energy technologies as well. Indeed, tight coordination of push and pull policies is a staple in other fields, like defense and global health, and should be applied more broadly to energy innovation. That will be tougher politically, however, requiring institutions to cooperate in ways that weren’t envisioned when they were set up. Who’s A-Freight of Efficiency Standards? Under the recent Obama administration standards issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), heavy trucks must reduce their carbon emissions by 25 percent. Although these vehicles only account for 5 percent of vehicles on the highway, they guzzle 20 percent of the fuel. And because carbon emissions from the transportation sector recently overtook those from the power sector, curbing heavy truck emissions could be crucial to meeting U.S. obligations under the Paris Agreement to reduce its emissions by 26–28 percent by 2025. Although the administration can’t guarantee that manufacturers will be able to meet the mandate, it has strong evidence suggesting they will. Under the Supertruck I program from 2010 to 2015, the Department of Energy funded truck manufacturers and suppliers to improve trucks’ “freight efficiency,” or the amount of freight hauled per gallon of fuel used. All but one manufacturer successfully beat the target of a 50 percent increase in freight efficiency over that of 2009 trucks (the last firm is expected to meet the goal this year). Moving forward, the administration believes manufacturers can match the previous improvement so that the freight efficiency of trucks in 2021 is 100 percent higher than those in 2009. But not only is the administration betting that manufacturers are capable of meeting the new standards—they’re supplying resources to ensure they do. Along with pulling up vehicle performance through regulatory emission standards, the administration is pushing technology improvements through the newly announced Supertruck II program, which will spend $80 million on RD&D programs. The program will aim to build on its predecessor’s progress in commercializing technologies like lighter materials, more aerodynamic designs, and lower-resistance tires. Together, the standards and RD&D funding compose a coordinated push-pull approach that has a better chance of succeeding than either component alone. And we’ve seen examples of orphaned push or pull policies for clean energy before. For example, in 2007 Congress enacted the Renewable Fuels Standard, a pull policy that set mandates more than a decade into the future for the quantities of advanced biofuels that oil refineries would need to blend into gasoline. But few manufacturers have been able to make such advanced fuels, so the federal government is forced to relax the standards year after year. And a memorable example of a failed push policy is the notorious Synthetic Fuels Corporation, into which the federal government poured billions of dollars but cancelled when falling oil prices erased any market demand for oil substitutes. Together, these examples demonstrate that push without pull, or vice versa, can doom policies promoting technological change. Finally, a push-pull approach could overcome political barriers that obstruct pull approaches in particular. When it came time to create the heavy truck standards, the Obama administration had already provided RD&D funding to manufacturers and suppliers like Freightliner and Cummins; these firms were then willing participants in helping set ambitious but achievable efficiency standards. Contrast this collegiality to the simmering tensions between the administration and the auto industry as the two sides spar over the future of light-duty vehicle fuel economy (CAFE) standards. Perhaps a compromise to maintain stringent CAFE standards, paired with additional RD&D support for automakers to meet them, would be mutually acceptable. Extending the Pipeline In their book, Technological Change in Legacy Sectors, Chuck Weiss and Bill Bonvillian argue that the military has adeptly combined push and pull policies, creating an “extended pipeline” to fund innovation from basic research all the way through commercial deployment. For example, institutions like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded the development of drone prototypes and precision strike capabilities, and the military services later procured these technologies at the other end of the pipeline. Despite some bureaucratic wrinkles, this model worked well to identify a need, specify a desired technology, and acquire the resulting product to guarantee a market to private sector partners. More recently, the U.S. Navy collaborated with the DOE and the Department of Agriculture to create an extended pipeline for advanced biofuels to run military ships and planes--the partnership includes funding for biorefineries to produce military-spec fuels that (presumably) the Navy will then procure. Elsewhere in the global health field, coordination of push and pull policies is common. Indeed, Doctors Without Borders has expanded this paradigm to develop drugs to fight tuberculosis, coining a “Push, Pull, and Pool” model. As before, this model would provide RD&D “push” funding, and it would “pull” new drugs by offering a prize or advanced commitment to purchase a substantial quantity upon development of an effective and affordable drug. On top of this, to be eligible for funding or prizes, private firms would have to agree to submit their chemical discoveries into a pool to enable collaborative research and technology licensing. These models hold lessons for clean energy, and the Obama administration’s coordinated clean truck policies are a step in the right direction. But broadening this approach will require some heavy institutional lifting. Currently, energy R&D is funded in the United States largely by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the DOE. Demonstration—the middle of the extended pipeline—is funded somewhat haphazardly by DOE. And then deployment standards and support emanate from various other agencies (for example, the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) and EPA set light-duty vehicle fuel economy standards). Getting all of these organizations to coordinate with one another is a tall order, and in the long run an institutional reorganization akin to what the United Kingdom undertook in recent decades may be necessary. In the meantime, President Obama has left his successor with a modest but effective blueprint to push and pull energy innovation at the same time.