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CFR experts examine the science and foreign policy surrounding climate change, energy, and nuclear security.

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REUTERS/Amit Dave
REUTERS/Amit Dave

Why We Still Need Innovation in Successful Clean Energy Technologies

Today is my last day at CFR. I’m joining ReNew Power, India’s largest renewable energy firm, as their CTO. I’m excited for a new adventure but sad to leave the Council, which has given me support and autonomy to study the innovations needed for global decarbonization. Read More

Technology and Innovation
Why University Research Is More Important Than Ever
A dangerous ideological current is coursing through the intellectual circuit, a political conviction dressed up as an empirical theory. Its proponents argue that public funding of basic scientific research is, at best, a waste of money and, at worst, an actively counterproductive endeavor that crowds out the private sector’s innovative instincts. And the institutions in the crosshairs of these broadsides are U.S. research universities, the country’s most valuable assets in a global economy driven by innovation. A Backward Theory of Innovation Last week, Matt Ridley wrote in The Wall Journal that “the linear dogma so prevalent in the world of science and politics—that science drives innovation, which drives commerce—is mostly wrong. It misunderstands where innovation comes from. Indeed, it generally gets it backward.” He continues, “technological advances are driven by practical men who tinkered until they had better machines; abstract scientific rumination is the last thing they do.” That is, the private sector’s inventions drive research in basic science, not the other way around. Similarly, Lev Grossman’s Time Magazine cover article, an encomium to start-ups commercializing fusion reactors, quotes an entrepreneur disdainful of university research: “Fusion is in the end an application, right? The problem with fusion typically is that it’s driven by science, which means you take the small steps.”  Crystallizing this conception of methodically misguided public research seeking to understand basic science, Grossman asserts, “Understanding is all well and good, in an ideal world, but the real world is getting less ideal all the time. The real world needs clean power and lots of it.” This strain of virulent vitriol against basic scientific inquiry hit home over the weekend when I spoke with a champion of university research, Stanford University President John Hennessy. Mulling his legacy, President Hennessy glowed with pride, noting that Stanford can count more Nobel Laureates over his fifteen-year tenure than any other university. But he warned that uncertainty over future federal research support to universities poses a grave risk to the prolific advances that have helped Stanford fuel the Silicon Valley innovation engine. Indeed, as the figure below illustrates, federal spending on basic university research has declined in real terms since the one-time windfall of President Obama’s 2009 stimulus package. And depending on the outcome of the 2016 election, further cuts could loom large. Source: National Science Foundation Nonlinear ≠ Linear in Reverse! Writing a timely rejoinder to Ridley in The Guardian, Jack Stilgoe concurs that innovation is nonlinear. But he correctly calls out Ridley for making the leap that just because basic science does not linearly advance innovation, the reverse must be true: namely, that private innovation must therefore drive basic science. Reality is considerably more complicated, and Ridley’s fantasy world of basic research following in the wake of private inventions is as simplistic as the linear model he derides. Innovation is, in fact, nonlinear. The path from basic science to commercial product can span decades, traverse disciplinary boundaries, and meander back and forth between academia and industry. Nevertheless, the causal role of university research is indisputable: it provides a theoretical framework and a body of empirical observations that constrain an otherwise intractably vast option space for innovation. Here’s a concrete example. In my field—solar power—hordes of chemists and materials engineers tweak the chemical compositions and production processes of semiconductors, hoping to make a solar material that converts more sunlight into electricity. In Ridley’s universe, privately funded scientists would iterate and see what works, making an evolutionary series of tweaks that make more and more efficient solar panels. Later on, university scientists can tinker away, trying to figure out why what worked actually worked. This is a monumentally foolish idea and, frankly, one of the reasons why so many solar start-ups went bust. I’ve worked in companies under pressure from investors to deliver results, and I’ve witnessed scientists taking shortcuts to improve device performance without understanding the underlying physics—in fact, I was guilty of doing this myself. We would run experiments without a clear theoretical reason, and our new devices wouldn’t behave better or worse but simply, differently. Lost in an unending wilderness of data without the compass of prior scholarship, we would invariably retrace our steps and bemoan the wasted effort.[1] By contrast, university research is obsessed with questions that start with why and only occasionally apply the test of so what? Now, this can be problematic, and I’ve written before that scientific curiosity alone is not sufficient to develop real-world clean energy technologies. For example, most performance  records for emerging solar power technologies—including perovskites, quantum dots, organics, etc.—are held by publicly funded universities and research laboratories. Absent practical product development, at which industry excels, to complement fundamental scientific inquiry, these technologies may languish in laboratories. But eliminating university research will ensure that those solar materials never see the light of day, rejecting a necessary condition for innovation because of its insufficiency. I worry that support for science, and clean energy research in particular, could fall victim to complacent confidence in the autonomous advances of innovation.  Speaking out forcefully in favor of expanded public research and development funding for clean energy, Bill Gates recently pronounced, “We need an energy miracle.” To get there, he advocates tripling government funding for basic energy research to $18 billion per year. Doing the opposite—cutting public funding for university research to give the private sector running room—will make any energy miracle a pipe dream. [1] Academic scholarship from the early 20th century continues to guide innovation in solar technology today. Researchers still design experiments, craft mathematical models, and troubleshoot puzzling results by falling back on the quantum theory of solids, which Bloch, Peierls, and Wilson established by the mid- 1930s in European research universities.
Climate Change
An Opportunity to Help Indonesia Slash Deforestation – and a Model For Broader Progress on Climate Change
I have an op-ed in the international New York Times with Brent Harris and Jen Harris arguing that President Obama has a special opportunity to help Indonesia cut carbon emissions from deforestation. I encourage you to read the whole thing at this link. But I wanted to highlight one element here because I think it applies more broadly. Discussions of international climate politics typically frame the dynamic as one where countries pressure each other to cut emissions. This leads naturally to questions about what sort of leverage countries have, how to make international agreements binding, and so forth. But that isn’t the only way in which international interactions can drive down emissions. In the present case, Indonesia is facing a public health nightmare stemming from illegal forest burning. That burning happens to also release an enormous amount of carbon dioxide. (Sane estimates peg current emissions from Indonesian fires as higher than total emissions from the U.S. economy.) The ongoing fires have created domestic pressure on the Indonesian federal government to crack down on forest burning. This is not a place where U.S. pressure has a big role to play in getting Indonesia to cut emissions. There isn’t much one could imagine the United States doing that would create more pressure than what’s already been generated domestically in Indonesia. What the United States can do, though, is help Indonesians who want to cut fires and emissions actually follow through. That support is both technical and political – we go into it in some detail in the op-ed. This sort of international interaction, in which countries help each other deliver transformations that they both want but that are technically or politically difficult to accomplish, is fundamentally different from what many people usually think about when they think about climate change. Leverage becomes less important than capability; whether an international agreement is “binding” or not becomes less consequential. This model won’t replace the traditional one of leverage and pressure, but in many cases, it will be more effective. The more strategists think this way, the more that climate diplomacy will accomplish.
China
Big Oil Price Moves Reveal Less Than You May Think
What do the remarkable swings in oil prices over recent months tell us about the state of the oil production, consumption, and the global economy? One would think a lot: rising prices signal weakening production, growing demand from consumers, and a relatively healthy global economy; falling prices reveal robust output, slow consumer demand growth, and, more broadly, a faltering global economy. Take the August oil price collapse: many observers of the world economy took it as a sign that the Chinese economy was stumbling. The remarkable behavior of oil inventories, though, suggests that recent price moves tell us much more about market sentiment and beliefs about the future, and considerably less about fundamentals, than one might imagine. Economists typically argue that beliefs about the oil market, expressed through speculation, have no enduring impact on oil prices. If speculation drives oil prices above what current supply and demand fundamentals would imply, production will exceed consumption, and inventories will accumulate indefinitely. Conversely, if speculation drives oil prices below where they should be, inventories should draw down without end. Since we don’t typically see long, steady periods of inventory accumulation or depletion, speculation can’t do much to drive prices away from what production and consumption fundamentals imply. So here’s a fact that should make you stop and think: the past twenty months have seen steadier U.S. inventory accumulation than any other twenty month period in the last sixty years. (All inventory figures here are taken from the EIA.) Specifically, eighteen of the last twenty months have seen combined U.S. stocks of crude oil and petroleum products grow, the only time this has happened during the sixty year period for which monthly data are available. (EIA hasn’t reported monthly data for August or September yet; I’ve interpolated those numbers from weekly figures.) If you broaden the lens and look for twenty-month spans during which inventories increase in at least seventeen (rather than eighteen) months, you’ll find only one more, the period from April 1979 to November 1980, when the Iranian revolution drove hoarding. (For the statistically inclined, the odds of finding such a streak in a random series of normally distributed numbers with the same mean and standard deviation as the actual series of inventory changes is very small.) You can do an analogous exercise with weekly inventory changes; the recent pattern is again unusual. Similarly, if you narrow or widen the window from twenty months, the results don’t change much. One way to think about this is that, for most of the last couple years, the marginal buyer of oil has not been a consumer – it’s been someone who’s put the oil (or refined products derived from it) in storage with plans to sell or use it in the future. If that’s the case, changes in the oil price – even the spot oil price – tell us as much about what speculators think future supply and demand will look like as they do about what physical production and consumption look like now. For example, the best way to think about falling oil prices in August is probably that they told us that oil investors believed that future Chinese demand would be weaker than they’d previously expected, not that the price drop revealed anything about current Chinese consumption. There are, to be certain, a bunch of wrinkles here. In particular, I’ve looked at U.S. data because it’s readily available; global data might reveal a different pattern. One also finds different patterns if one looks at crude oil only rather than crude and petroleum products. The data also point to a basic puzzle: why have inventories accumulated steadily for so long when that’s rarely happened in the last sixty years? And, whatever the answer to that question is, what does it tell us about when the trend might reverse? That’s the likely subject for a future post.
  • Guest Post: Financing to Protect Forests: Will Carbon Markets Deliver?
    Carbon markets, once touted as a golden ticket for funding efforts to reduce deforestation, have yet to deliver on their promise. In this guest post, Brian Murray, research professor of environmental economics at Duke University’s Nicholas School of the Environment, explains why and proposes alternative financing options. For more on global efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation, see the report from CFR’s recent workshop on the subject, at which Dr. Murray was a speaker. Carbon markets, long seen as a promising vehicle for monetizing the environmental value of intact forests, have so far failed to deliver on that promise. Though there has been progress toward including forests in an agreement at the UN’s climate summit in Paris later this year, the use of carbon markets to pay for their protection faces substantial hurdles. The problem is a serious one.  Deforestation alone accounts for roughly 10-15 percent of global emissions, just a bit less than emissions from transportation. In addition to its effect on the climate system, deforestation harms biodiversity, watersheds, air quality and soils. It also reduces the availability of timber, fuelwood and non-timber forest products such as nuts, rubber, and bushmeat. Governmental efforts to fight deforestation have typically fallen into three categories: (1) land use restrictions, (2) economic incentives to reward or punish particular behaviors, and (3) direct management by the government.  In North America and Europe, where pressure on forests from agriculture and industry is relatively minor, these policies have worked fairly well to stabilize land use, forest area, and carbon stocks. In other regions, most notably the tropical forests of Central and South America, Southeast Asia and central Africa, pressure from agricultural development and logging continues to deplete forests at alarming rates.  Targeted regulation, trade restrictions on illegal logging and the establishment of protected areas have not been sufficient to forestall the clearing of about 13 million hectares (about 50,000 square miles) of forests worldwide each year, which emits more than 3 billion metric tons of CO2 - equivalent to the emissions of more than 600 million automobiles.   Even more CO2 is lost when forest degradation is factored in. The critical factor is that forested land is often more economically valuable to the landholder when cleared.  Population growth and rising incomes raise demand for food and fiber, both for local consumption and for global commodity markets. It is easy to understand the economic incentive for those who clear their land to achieve a better return. It also underscores what is necessary to stem the loss of forests: raising the economic return from keeping forests in place. This is where carbon markets could come in. From 2006-09, there was much momentum around the idea of a large global carbon market that would cap the emissions of developed countries. Developing countries could reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through a broad suite of approaches known as REDD+, and sell those reductions as offset credits, which developed countries could buy to help them comply with their emissions caps. These credit sales into the carbon market were expected to generate tens of billions of dollars per year in revenue for countries that reduced deforestation. This was seen by many as a substantial breakthrough in efforts to sustain forests, but complexities surfaced. First, the much anticipated 2009 global climate summit in Copenhagen failed to create a successor to the Kyoto Protocol or a global carbon market. Likewise, the United States’ plans for a national cap-and-trade program collapsed in 2010, including with it a very ambitious program for REDD+ credits for compliance use in the U.S. market. Since then, several countries, including many developing countries with the potential to sell REDD+ credits, have rebelled against the idea that these credits should be sold into markets where they would be used for compliance by developed countries in lieu of emission reductions they would otherwise have to make on their own. Moreover, concerns were expressed that market-based schemes would violate localized indigenous rights, would not ensure the equitable distribution of benefits, and otherwise lead to the commodification of nature. Many of those concerns would apply to any financial mechanism that paid for REDD+, but much of the antipathy was aimed at the carbon market. Diplomats have worked hard to reach agreement on those controversial governance issues, and an agreement has been reached in principle that forests will be included in some form in the Paris agreement. But regardless of the details hammered out in and after Paris, a unified global carbon market including REDD+ does not appear to be in the works. Any agreement in Paris is likely to be built “bottom up,” through national emissions reductions pledges (rather than “top down,” through a global set of targets). Many of the largest emitting countries will choose carbon markets to implement those actions. The EU is expected to continue its use of an emissions trading system. China has recently announced its plans to develop a national cap-and-trade program, and U.S. regulation of its largest emissions source (electric power plants) are slated to follow a “trading ready” approach at the discretion of the states. But each domestic system will individually decide whether REDD+ credits will tie in. So far, none of these systems have specified the use of REDD+ offsets. California’s cap-and-trade program has indicated its willingness to accept REDD+ credits under some circumstances, but this approach has not yet been formally adopted.  So while the possibility of large carbon market demand for REDD+ cannot be ruled out completely, the fragmented nature of emerging carbon markets and the lack of attention to REDD+ could spell weak demand for market-driven REDD+ for the immediate future. Despite this discouraging outlook for carbon markets in the UN talks, however, projects to preserve forests and reduce emissions from deforestation can be advanced through other means. Developing countries can seek official development assistance, loans, bonds and innovative “pay for performance” options where the financial return is determined by how much emissions are actually reduced.  The United States and other developed countries can help finance and guide these efforts as part of their own climate commitments. These approaches can also be joined with private sector initiatives such as supply chain requirements that prohibit the purchase of commodities from illegally deforested land, which have been utilized with some success in palm oil (Southeast Asia) and soybeans (South America).  And public or private investment in agricultural productivity can raise living standards for farmers and reduce pressure for forest clearing. So, while the future of REDD+ in carbon markets may be uncertain, the future of forests can nonetheless be improved. Thanks to Justine Huetteman of Duke, who provided research assistance, and Jonah Busch of the Center for Global Development, who provided comments on an earlier draft.
  • Economics
    What Big Data Can Tell Us About the Oil Price Crash
    The oil price collapse was supposed to boost the U.S. economy by prompting consumers to spend their savings on other goods and services. During the first half of this year, though, data seemed to suggest that they were saving the windfall instead, damaging economic growth. But new big data research from the newish JP Morgan Chase Institute appears to provide strong evidence that consumers did, indeed, spend most of their savings. It’s an intriguing energy result that also offers a glimpse into how changes in data availability and computational capacity are changing the sort of energy research that’s possible. The conventional wisdom until recently was that consumers had failed to spend a large part of their windfall from the oil price collapse. This first showed up in savings figures: as the oil prices fell, the personal savings rate rose, seeming to reveal that consumers were putting their oil money in the bank. It then appeared to be confirmed by consumer survey data. People took guesses as to what explained the phenomenon: Had a cold winter deterred consumption? Were consumers still skittish after the financial crisis? The big question wasn’t whether or not consumers were reaction timidly – it was whether they would eventually change course. Now the JPMC research concludes that consumers spent roughly eighty cents of every dollar they saved. They did this by using a database of transaction records from twenty five million credit cards that give them an extraordinary window into individual consumption patterns. They then applied some clever analysis to distinguish spending increases that were spurred by lower gas prices from ones that weren’t. This wouldn’t have been possible without the massive number of detailed records they had or the computational capacity to crunch through them. On its face, the result is good news: lower gasoline prices are stimulating the economy. But things aren’t quite so simple. Had consumers been hoarding their savings, we might have hoped that they’d eventually start spending them, boosting the economy as a result. The JPMC results suggest that that’s not a significant possibility. The research also implicitly raises questions about the reliability of consumer survey data. Researchers should also be left puzzling over why the savings rate jumped earlier this year. The new research is also a striking example of what big data analytics is making possible when it comes to energy research. We’ve seen a glimpse of that through companies that are studying behavioral responses to energy efficiency interventions. Now we have an application to an important macroeconomic question. One could imagine leveraging the kind of data that JPMC and other similar institutions have to understand more about how energy price volatility affects all sorts of consumer and business decisions; to gain insight into why American driving and gasoline consumption is rising again; to see how changes in drilling activity affect local economies; and, I’m sure, much more. The same is true for a whole host of economic questions that go well beyond energy. It’s worth staying tuned.