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Amy Myers Jaffe delves into the underlying forces shaping global energy.

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U.S. President Donald Trump appears before workers at Cameron LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) Export Facility in Hackberry, Louisiana, U.S., May 14, 2019.
U.S. President Donald Trump appears before workers at Cameron LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) Export Facility in Hackberry, Louisiana, U.S., May 14, 2019. REUTERS/Leah Millis

U.S. Natural Gas: Once Full of Promise, Now in Retreat

This is a guest post by Gabriela Hasaj, Research Associate to the Military Fellowship Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Tessa Schreiber, intern for Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, contributed to this blog post. Read More

Technology and Innovation
What 5G Means for Energy
This is a guest post by Chris Bronk, assistant professor of computer and information systems and associate director of the Center for Information Security Research and Education at the University of Houston. In the development of new information technology (IT) there exists a degree of irrational exuberance. Indeed, consultancy Gartner has described the innovation to adoption process of IT as a “hype cycle,” in which the peak of our inflated expectations is soon followed by a trough of disillusionment and an eventual plateau of productivity in which a technology becomes suitably mature. 5G, the Fifth Generation of mobile wireless technologies, is somewhere in the hype cycle. There has been much conversation about 5G, and it will produce some novel capabilities, but a lingering question exists about how much energy it will consume vis-a-viz prior wireless mobile networks. Before 5G’s energy consumption issues are discussed (along with some interesting energy features), it’s useful to know some of what will make it a significant improvement on the current, Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems that our smartphones and other cellular wireless devices use today.  The main event is that 5G will be faster, perhaps as much as twenty times as fast as current LTE networks. It will also be very low latency, which means that the speed at which 5G signals are sent and received will be effectively imperceptible. How fast? Researchers at Deutsche Telekom have reported latency figures of 3 milliseconds (ms). Consider that the amount of time it takes for visual stimuli to travel from the eye to the brain is about 10 ms (LTE latency is about 50 ms). This low latency means that applications in which instantaneous communication is necessary become more possible – think self-driving cars whose processing is faster than the human brain sharing the road via distributed computer control. Such systems could allow traffic flows to be fully automated. No more traffic lights! So what makes 5G different? The transformative nature of 5G will largely be achieved in how radio frequency is allocated and employed. Current U.S. mobile devices “talk” to the network at frequencies from 700 megahertz to 6 gigahertz. This service will continue because base stations (i.e. cell phone towers) at these bands allow for the transmission of data by radio over significant distance. What’s new is in the millimeter wave bands – 24-86 GHz. This slice of radio spectrum can carry large amounts of data, but not nearly as far. That’s where considering energy usage comes in. A lot more equipment needs to be installed and potentially more data needs to be processed. Additionally, energy efficiency needs to be a core design principle. First of all, however, it is important to note that millimeter wave communications are prone to interference. For example, radio at above 20 GHz doesn’t go through walls well. It doesn’t go through leaves well. It doesn’t play nicely with rain. What does this mean? Many, many more antennas. Suddenly 5G starts sounding like WiFi or maybe some evolution of WiMax technologies. In other words, interference means different infrastructure. A number of significant differences exist between LTE and 5G when considering energy usage. First, because of the new millimeter band pieces of spectrum used, there will likely be a densification of existing cellular networks with the massive addition of small cells and a provision for peer-to-peer (P2P) communication. In 5G, simultaneous transmission and reception will be possible, which likely necessitates new investment in fiber optics to move the data. Some wireless functions will move to cloud processing and much more of the infrastructure will be virtual in nature. So what’s the energy angle? Computers use electricity. But how much? This is a question my colleague Krishna Palem and I worked on answering about a decade ago. The problem then was that computer microprocessors had developed a heat problem due to the high frequencies of electric current involved (upwards of 2GHz). Device consumption numbers were increasing, which led to wondering if computer energy utilization was going to rise rapidly and begin rapidly gobbling up much more electricity. At the time we did the work, we assumed that about 3 percent of global energy use was in the IT sector, but some things were hard to measure – like energy usage in cell phone networks. We developed a term for pushing innovation in energy efficiency – a sustainability innovation quotient (SIQ). No, it didn’t take off like wildfire, but efficiency innovation is now widely considered when building new computing hardware. We moved on. What about power consumption in networks? Someone else picked up the ball of calculating energy usage for IT networks. Now this is not a piece about Huawei, but it turns out that the person doing academic research in the same energy analysis vein as we were is a Swedish academic – Dr. Anders Andrae – an employee of Huawei. Because Huawei ships a large amount of networking hardware, it is able to produce solid estimates on electricity demand. Measuring networking power consumption requires the capacity to determine how much energy wired and wireless networks consume. These amount to fairly big numbers of devices and power draw. According to Huawei’s Andrae, fixed access networks consumed about 167 TWh of electricity in 2015 while wireless networks consumed roughly 50 TWh. That’s a big number – 1 TWh is a trillion watts/hour. For perspective the average American household consumes 7,200 kWh of electricity per year, but remember the networking numbers are global figures. Because energy efficiency has become a priority, an efficiency measure, the number of bits transmitted per Joule of energy expended, has become a standard. Having an efficiency metric to work with is useful especially as electricity costs in providing mobile phone/data service represent about 70 percent of the bill. However, a common concern is that if 5G offers much greater speed, say twenty times as much, a similar rise in energy consumption could follow. “A general concern is that higher data rates can only be achieved by consuming more energy; if the EE [energy efficiency] is constant, then 100× higher data rate in 5G is associated with a 100× higher energy consumption.” This is where headlines like, “Tsunami of data could consume 1/5 of global data by 2025,” come from. The data in R&D on this topic are not nearly as discouraging. Today’s cellular site delivering 28Mbit/sec has an energy consumption of 1.35kW, leading to an EE of 20 kbit/Joule. Recent papers report EE numbers in the order of 10Mbit/Joule in 5G systems. So, it’s pretty clearly understood that just allowing unabated increases in power consumption is impossible and the aim for industry is to push energy utilization down, significantly. To the Future! In addition to transmitting or harvesting data, energy can also be moved in 5G networks. With 5G, one of the novel technologies being considered is Radio Frequency (RF) harvesting; converting energy in transmitted radio waves to user devices or even wireless infrastructure (microcells, antenna arrays, etc.). Since RF signals can carry both energy and information, theoretically RF energy harvesting and information reception can be performed from the same RF input signal. This scheme is referred to as the simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT). The hardware to support this doesn’t exist yet, but it has promise. However, since the operating power of the energy-harvesting component is much higher than that of the information decoding component, the energy harvesting zone is smaller than the information transmission zone. The Data Center Blues Unfortunately, another energy problem afoot. Although efficiency is now one of the elements incorporated into designing the next generation of mobile telecommunications infrastructure, the vast proliferation of devices, including those labeled the Internet of Things (IoT), will add up to additional energy consumption. Our biggest area of concern, however, is in data centers. Radoslav Danilak asserts that data centers will consume exponentially larger amounts of electricity, arguing, “consumption will double every four years.” While powering data centers with renewable sources is an aspirational goal of the IT industry, of equal importance is increasing energy efficiency. Yale’s Environment 360 program noted, “Insanely, most of the world’s largest centers are in hot or temperate climates, where vast amounts of energy are used to keep them from overheating.” Placement matters in keeping cooling costs down, but designing energy efficient processors and other components for servers is also important. Global data processing does not appear anywhere near a, and 5G will add to the global energy bill of both telecommunications firms and those that conduct computing in the cloud. So what’s the bottom line?  A lot of hyperbole surrounds 5G. The energy consumption issue is being addressed by all of the major equipment manufacturers. Carriers can’t afford massive, new power costs and will not deploy technology they can’t afford to operate. The deployment time for large and complete 5G networks will not be overnight and what constitutes 5G isn’t fully sorted out, but out of control energy consumption growth is not in the cards. That there could be innovation in how energy is harnessed and transmitted is a potentially important area for innovation. Our assumptions can and will change.
South Africa
South Africa’s Blackouts Demonstrate Need for Distributed Energy Resources
This is a guest post by Benjamin Silliman, research associate for Energy Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations and Payce Madden, researcher in African development. South Africa’s 2019 elections are over and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) kept its majority, but by its smallest margins yet. Political graft and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises like Eskom, the indebted utility which supplies over 90 percent of South Africa’s power, is likely behind some voters’ disillusionment with the ANC. In the months before the elections, major blackouts were rolling across the country leading to an estimated loss of 1.1 percent of economic growth for the year. Although Eskom was eventually able to stem the blackouts before Election Day, underlying technical, financial, and management problems will continue to plague the governing ANC party as it struggles to show South Africans that it can sustain economic growth. At the root of Eskom’s recent service problems are technical faults in South Africa’s Kusile and Medupi power stations, which led to the loss of nearly 17,000 megawatts (MW) of generation capacity. At the same time, electricity imports from Mozambique were stopped by Cyclone Idai, creating another loss of 1,100 MW of electricity that Eskom relies on to power its grid. These faults forced Eskom to begin load-shedding — the deliberate interruption of electricity supply — to prevent putting more demand on the grid than it could supply. At the height of the crisis, South Africans had their power interrupted twelve times in a four-day period for two hours at a time affecting commercial, industrial, and residential entities. To manage blackouts, many South African businesses and individuals have backup diesel generators. However, due to Cyclone Idai’s disruption to diesel imports, the cost of using diesel generation rose as a result of the fuel shortage and higher demand. Even without disruptions, diesel generators are rarely an efficient solution to supply electricity: in many African countries where backup generators are used to supplement or support unreliable electricity grids, the cost of electricity can be up to three times higher than it would be if the grid were reliable due to individual fuel and maintenance costs for the generator. A severe lack of financing options for Eskom has many worried that the Kusile and Medupi power plants could be offline for more than a year. The government, looking for quick options to resolve the crisis, has suggested it will restructure the utility by breaking it into three separate entities. However, this solution would do little to manage Eskom’s massive debt of nearly thirty billion dollars, which is continuing to increase as the utility undertakes repairs on the down power plants. Restructuring also does little to address some of the most basic issues facing the county’s electric system: severe lack of financing, poor planning, and negligent maintenance of central generating units. For a growing nation, access to a reliable power supply is essential. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), South Africa’s electricity generation grew by 51 percent between 1990 and 2016. 82 percent of this growth came from centralized coal power plants, while nuclear power accounted for 8 percent of the growth, wind energy 4 percent, and solar photovoltaic energy only 3 percent. In total, wind and solar power only account for 2.5 percent of South Africa’s electricity sources. Increasing electricity generation will be vital for South Africa’s continued economic growth and development. Already, South Africa has the highest electricity consumption per capita of any African country, and demand is likely to increase: although population growth is only slightly above the world average, South Africa, like much of the continent, is rapidly urbanizing. Johannesburg alone is projected to host more than ten million inhabitants by 2030. South Africa’s reliance on coal power to fuel its electricity capacity growth is problematic since the country faces poor financing options for large capital to build centralized power plants. Investment from development banks, including the African Development Bank’s New Deal on Energy in Africa, remains insufficient to meet energy financing needs. While financing for electric power has risen globally, investment in sub-Saharan Africa’s electrification decreased from 2013-2014 to 2015-2016. About a quarter of global investment in 2015 and 2016, or eight billion dollars per year, was for grid-connected fossil fuel plants, with China providing a fifth of this fossil fuel expansion financing. In South Africa, China has previously provided loans to Eskom to finish construction of the Kusile power plant. The exact terms of these loans have been kept secret, but the additional debt burden could have major implications for South Africa, which is already at risk of reaching a threshold level of debt-to-GDP. Despite these risks, Chinese lending remains an attractive — and, in some cases, the only — option to fill the financing gaps left by development banks and other major lenders. Distributed energy sources could offer South Africa a distinct advantage when building up their generation capacity, as they do not require single large loans, but rather an aggregation of smaller sources of capital, many of which may already exist around the country. Eskom currently supports interconnection, with energy export credits for high-voltage industrial power consumers. By owning their own generation capacity, industrial consumers would not only not only reduce the risk of loss of production due to power failure, but may also reduce their normal energy expenses by providing power to the grid when the plant is not operating at full capacity in exchange for credits. Bringing micro-grids to these power-heavy industries should be top priority for South African policymakers who are looking to better balance the demand for electricity and expand current renewable energy programs. Eskom currently does not support net metering for lower-voltage residential and commercial markets, reducing the incentive for residences and small businesses to provide their own power. Despite this, rooftop solar has gained some traction in South Africa with the Mall of Africa unveiling its new solar roof, the tenth largest in the world. A primary motivation for the installation was to reduce power demand on South Africa’s central grid system. This move mirrors a trend in developed countries around the world where policymakers are analyzing the potential for buildings to provide some of their own power, and at times even act as power plants. In the United States, power produced from buildings has already been relied upon during hot days when abnormal consumption put excessive demand on the grid. Both California and New York have begun implementing plans for energy-producing buildings, while the EU and Japan have issued goals to promote zero — or close to zero — energy buildings. Large residential and commercial buildings have one thing in common: they are often well-financed and have the incentive to pursue distributed energy options, especially given the long-term unreliability of South Africa’s energy infrastructure. To motivate more widespread development, South African policymakers should consider pushing Eskom to develop a policy on lower voltage net metering. Reducing demand or even supplying power to the grid could vastly ease the country’s growing pains. South Africa already has a robust policy model for renewable energy integration for dedicated power producers that it can use as a model for future development. South Africa maintains a target of 17,800 MW of low carbon capacity by 2030. In 2011, South Africa started its major policy initiative to promote low carbon sources, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP.) The REIPPPP holds competitive auctions for renewable energy sources, capped at certain capacities depending on the source type. Winners of the auction are given a twenty-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with the utility and a feed-in tariff to improve economic competitiveness. According to the World Bank, as of 2014, fourteen billion dollars were already committed to the program. Prices for renewable energy have dropped significantly since the beginning of this program, with solar falling 68 percent and wind falling 42 percent. In the midst of an energy crisis, the government should consider expanding upon this central program to not only offer PPAs to dedicated power producers but also shorter-term contracts with large commercial or industrial entities or real estate developers. To reduce the utility’s massive infrastructure costs, an interconnection fee could be negotiated as part of the PPA. Capacity ceilings for the REIPPPP should also be expanded to more rapidly grow energy capacity and to encourage more companies to become involved. This solution is not technically easy to implement. Integrating distributed energy systems is a challenge for even robust electric utilities, but software and hardware solutions have become available to ease integration of intermittent, distributed energy sources into the grid. For example, better forecasting systems have allowed utilities to model demand with much more granularity, allowing the utility to better plan around consumer power production, and smart meters can accurately provide detailed two-way electric exchanges between a building and the grid. Battery storage technology to reduce the strain of intermittence has also become much more available, with prices continuing to decline. Given the immense challenge of securing financing to build and repair large central power generation, money spent on grid modernization efforts may be more fruitful. The greatest challenge, however, may be managing Eskom’s finances. The utility will not benefit from the departure of some of its largest customers as they reduce their dependence on the grid. This could potentially create two dangers: that Eskom could develop revenue problems limiting the growth needed to repay debts, and that many infrastructure, operating, and financing costs could be passed off to those who cannot afford alternate energy sources in the form of higher electricity prices. The process of promoting distributed energy must be well managed by the government to ensure that the electricity system does not break down as heavy consumers reduce their reliance on the grid. South Africa could explore more options for state financial support, with, for example, tiered electricity prices based on consumption to keep electricity costs low for less affluent consumers. They could also explore interconnection service fees where a percentage of energy savings for those off the grid are paid back to the utility for infrastructure costs, as is being tried in the state of New York. While South Africa will not be able to build sufficient distributed capacity fast enough to avoid the repairs needed for the two offline power plants, it may reduce the need for Eskom to invest in future centralized power plants. Avoiding the construction of more costly central power plants could provide Eskom some relief in the future given the limitations of current financing from development banks and other major lenders and the risks of accruing debt from lenders such as China. Already a leader in renewable energy policy in the continent, South Africa could prove to be an important model for how to integrate distributed energy resources in countries around the world. However, until significant changes are made, many South Africans may continue to stay in the dark.
Saudi Arabia
Oil Sabotage Might Seem Like Small Potatoes, But Underlying Geopolitical Problems Are Not
The United States keeps signaling that it has hard power. Most recently, the United States made known that it was deploying additional ships, the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Arlington, to the Middle East. The USS Abraham Lincoln is now said to be in the Red Sea. This deployment follows a similar U.S. movement in the South China Sea. There appears to be a lot of hard power on display these days since China and Russia have also been moving military assets around the globe in a similarly transparent, public manner. You would think that all this bravado of big military hardware would be minimizing risky actions by small players. But, ironically, all this symbolism isn’t achieving much where oil security is concerned. That’s because state and non-state actors alike have learned that “sabotage” is hard to react to. But just because these acts of sabotage to date have seemed minor, it doesn’t mean that they are not geopolitically significant. Taken en masse, they are a symptom of an increasingly unstable setting at a time when spare oil production capacity in and outside OPEC is quite limited. The point is that as tensions rise among large and mid-size global powers, the list of recent and unusual oil sabotage acts is growing, and they could eventually add up to a major problem for oil markets. First, there was the mysterious contamination of Russia crude shipments to Belarus. That “sabotage,” now reportedly under investigation by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), will reduce the availability of the physical storage tanks for some refineries along the Druzhba pipeline since removing the tainted oil by slowly diluting it in small amounts into clean oil will take months. The explanation of corruption should give little comfort. If the Kremlin cannot control its local corruption problems, or if it so wanted to teach a lesson to Belarus that it was willing to disrupt the reputation of its own oil exports, or if some technical production and collection problem was hard to solve, it’s not good news for European oil consumers. The Russian problem was followed by this week’s “sabotage” in the Persian Gulf which seemed to traders similarly penny-ante. First, a handful of ships near the port of Fujairah appeared to be bashed in with a sharp object like a limpet mine or ramming by another vessel or weapon on Sunday. Oil traders joked on twitter that the attack was not aimed to be serious since it is hard to move oil prices on a Sunday. Still, the location of the attack was significant because the United Arab Emirates has been investing to capitalize on the port’s location outside the Strait of Hormuz to expand crude oil storage facilities. Fujairah is also the location Arab countries held floating storage of over 70 million barrels of crude oil back in the mid-2010s as a precaution against oil disruptions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iranian statements threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. The head of Iran’s Parliament’s national security committee tweeted that that “explosions” of Fujairah showed that the security of the south of the Persian Gulf is “like glass.”  Initial rumors that Saudi oil tankers were on fire or that the Fujairah port was on fire turned out to be fake news. A day later on Monday, Saudi Arabia confirmed that a drone attack had damaged two pumping stations on its East-West pipeline that carries oil from large eastern Saudi oil fields to the kingdom’s west coast where it can be exported to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia also has export-oriented refineries on its west coast that typically serve Europe and utilize crude oil shipments from the East-West pipeline. Saudi Aramco had recently announced plans to expand the East-West pipeline and keeps chemical drag reduction agents on hand at the pipeline that mean the pipeline could handle up to 6.5 million barrels per day (b/d) of exports of crude oil via the Red Sea in an emergency, thereby bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Last year, over 2 million b/d of oil were sent along the pipeline as part of normal logistical operations. To date, the oil market has reacted with a relative yawn to all these various sabotage reports. But the breakdown in norms across the globe – whether those norms are the free and clear operations of sea lanes, respected guarantees of oil quality, or most importantly, the safety and security of citizens, workers and vital energy infrastructure inside national borders-- is bad news for an internationally traded commodity like oil. A typical trader response is that the U.S. trade war with China takes precedence over these small sabotage events, given that trade conflict’s long run potential to harm global economic growth. However, analysts say China may be willing to add to its stimulus plans at least for now and so far, few are predicting a U.S. recession any time soon. By contrast, oil analysts from Wall Street firms such as Cornerstone Macro and Citi caution that the number of recent geopolitical events with implications for oil markets are running unusually high. The idea that U.S. production exists as a safety net seems equally spurious, even under the best of circumstances. U.S. output growth in any given month faces real limitations. Optimistic predictions for the Permian Basin that it could someday reach 8 million b/d might be possible, but for now, U.S. crude oil production is less than 15 percent of total global supply. Trump administration officials hint that Washington is prepared to use the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and Washington-watchers figure the White House might ultimately be slow to turn any screws intended to stop China from buying Iranian oil. But as internal pressures on a wide variety of petro-regimes from around the world mounts, it might become harder and harder to stave off an upward march for oil prices this summer as small scale “sabotage” takes its toll on oil facilities in multiple locations at the same time internal conflicts continue to loom in major producing countries like Venezuela and Libya. The White House shouldn’t take great comfort in the fact that oil traders are relaxed. They (and their algorithms) could be simply wrong.
  • Climate Change
    A Federalist U.S. Approach to Remaining in the Paris Climate Accord
    A version of this blog was originally published at The Hill website. Guest blogger Daniel Scheitrum, assistant professor, Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of Arizona, contributed as co-author to this blog in collaboration with CFR David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment Amy Myers Jaffe.    Last week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill requiring the Trump administration to find a way to remain in the global Paris climate accords. The bill is not expected to find approval in the U.S. Senate.  However, it does reflect a subtle shift in U.S. elective politics. Even among Republican politicians, recognizing the popularity of renewable energy and other climate friendly goals is becoming politically expedient. Members of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense, and corporate leaders are calling for a stronger legislative response to climate change with increased regularity. There is also growing concern on both sides of the aisle that the United States needs to be more proactive in countering China’s embrace of advanced clean tech and artificial intelligence assisted energy and transport systems as a major plank of Beijing’s aggressive China 2025 industrial policy.  Energy innovation is a vital U.S. national interest. It is a pivotal factor to ensuring the U.S. military and space program maintain a critical technological edge over geopolitical rivals. Moreover, energy innovation supports U.S. global competitiveness by spurring new industries and successful technology companies and by boosting manufacturing productivity. Sadly, as U.S. federal spending on energy research and development has shrunk, many American innovation companies have turned to China as a source of more patient capital instead of tapping limited U.S. venture capital markets. The Trump administration would like to address this exodus of jobs and technology in its trade war with China but misses the boat by ignoring the link between U.S. energy innovation and the vast future market for goods and services related to climate change mitigation and adaptation that will come to dominate global export trade in the coming years.  By dropping out of the Paris agreement, the United States runs the risk that China or the European Union could use the U.S. absence from official global climate working groups to set energy standards and other carbon-related rules that could harm U.S. exports and the U.S. economy. It might seem counter intuitive, but progress made in global climate talks at Katowice, Poland, laid the groundwork for the U.S. to stick with the Paris accord framework. That’s because countries attending the talks, including the United States, which cannot formally withdraw from the accord until 2020, agreed upon uniform rules for measuring and tracking their own performance in cutting emissions. Climate negotiators also agreed to continue intensive discussions this year in Chile on how to connect emissions reductions efforts across regions, countries and sub-national entities so that regions can exchange credits for emissions reductions. The finalization of such rules offers an opportunity for the U.S. to rethink its posture on the Paris Accords and to take better advantage of economic opportunities to participate in international carbon credit markets where they exist. The U.S. economy can generate roughly 65 percent of the emissions reductions required to meet the 2015 U.S. Paris pledge from existing regulations and market trends. To make up the remainder, Congress should authorize the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue a national call for states and localities to volunteer projects that will cut the emissions of heat-trapping gases. Such a federalist voluntary national tender would create a coalition of the willing while avoiding a legal fight with the few remaining states that oppose participating in clean energy programs. The most successful voluntary programs could prove out policies that might someday be passed as more broadly mandated regulations.  The Paris Agreement requires nationally verified processes, and the proposed national voluntary tender system would accomplish that. It would also facilitate exchange of credits already taking place on the sub-national level. A federal system for promoting and tracking voluntary contributions would allow the United States to use local initiatives that have proved popular around many parts of the country to bring the country back into the Paris accord. This proposed tender program could be administered by the EPA, which has the authority to regulate carbon pollution. A national tender would let states and localities decide whether they want to volunteer contributions to the Paris Agreement. The United States would in turn get the general national benefits of remaining in the Paris Agreement without burdening voters in states and cities that do not wish to take part. Aggressive climate policies such as renewable portfolio standards are popular in many sections of the country, including states that initially opposed the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) and the Paris Agreement: for example, Texas is home to some of the country’s largest wind farms and ranks third in the nation for new solar capacity. Other states that opposed the CPP—like Georgia, and Michigan—are now embracing renewable energy, given its popularity among corporations and cities: New Jersey originally joined the group of states suing the EPA to stop the CPP in 2015, but it has now rejoined the U.S. East Coast carbon market. In U.S. midterm elections, several newly elected governors—in Colorado, Connecticut, Nevada, Maine, Oregon, and Wisconsin—pledged to pursue 100 percent renewable energy state mandates, mirroring policies recently passed in California and Hawaii. The Math of Verifiable U.S. Contributions to the Paris Pledge Under the Paris Agreement, the United States pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions over the coming decade by 26 to 28 percent of 2005 levels. This equates to a reduction of 1,737 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon-dioxide equivalent (CDE). Achieving this reduction target via federal policies was daunting even for the Barack Obama administration, which proposed the Clean Power Plan (CPP) as a pillar of its climate initiatives. That plan would have regulated the U.S. power sector and required each state to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions significantly by 2030. The Trump administration is repealing the CPP. In August the administration unveiled its vision for a new rule, Affordable Clean Energy (ACE), that will focus greenhouse gas policies more narrowly in each state’s power sector on individual facility–level emissions rather than more ambitious state-wide comprehensive approaches. Based on official U.S. government statistics, modeling, and methods (as would also be the federal government’s basis), the United States could reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions by 1,150 MMT of CDE by 2025, or roughly 65 percent of what the U.S. Paris pledge requires, based on market trends and current policies. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) projects in its 2018 “high-resource scenario” -- which assumes falling U.S. prices for natural gas and solar energy -- that market forces and existing localized clean energy legislation will generate roughly 805 MMT of CDE reduction in the power sector by 2025. This projection represents a greater reduction than the 670 MMT of CDE that the Obama administration projected in 2015 that the CPP would achieve by 2025, according to the Federal Register. Official EPA calculations for emissions trends by 2025 under the proposed ACE mirror many of the assumptions of the DOE’s high-resource scenario. Market uncertainties and projected modeling differences weigh more heavily beyond 2025, when the politics of U.S. climate policy could be different than today’s. U.S. corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, mandated by Congress in 2007 and to remain in place at least through 2022, are expected to eliminate roughly 270 MMT of CDE by 2025 as compared with 2005 levels. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that reforestation and other voluntary agricultural programs will save up to 60 MMT of CDE. That leaves a gap of roughly 600 MMT of CDE reductions to be met in other ways.  The Proposal The United States can generate the remaining emissions savings by organizing a nationally verifiable record of voluntary state and local action, by launching a program structured as a national tender. Willing states and localities would volunteer projects to be combined into the official U.S. nationally determined contribution based on their verifiability, scale, and capacity to create jobs. The Paris Agreement requires nationally verified processes, and the tender system would accomplish that. The administration could work with governors, tapping state and local efforts to meet the U.S. Paris pledge in a manner that promotes some of Trump’s other economic and foreign policy goals including ensuring economic competitiveness with China. A federal system for promoting and tracking voluntary contributions would allow the United States to use local initiatives that have proved popular around many parts of the country to bring the country back into the Paris accord. The proposed verification system for voluntary action builds on policies, like the newly proposed ACE, that require the EPA to work with each state on individual compliance plans that include evaluating state actions and targets and verifying emissions reductions. Those federal resources could be reconfigured to oversee a tender for states to contribute the remaining carbon reductions needed to meet the Paris pledge. The cost could be relatively low and similar to the approximately $50 million the EPA requested in fiscal year 2016–2017 to develop tools and work with each of the fifty states on the (now defunct) CPP. As DOE forecasts show, emissions from smaller states that strongly oppose the CPP, like Kentucky and West Virginia, are relatively small (in 2015 West Virginia’s were half of those of New York and one-sixth of Texas’s) and unlikely to increase on a scale that would counter reductions elsewhere. Many large carbon-intensive industries have substantial capital assets that would make it highly expensive to relocate just to avoid regulation, but the EPA would need to evaluate any distortions from emissions shuffling in calculating the national pledge. Roughly 70 percent of Americans say the United States should lead on climate change solutions. Many states have already acted, alone or in regional coalitions to reduce emissions, including by carrying out their original CPP plans. Additional urban policies such as car-free pedestrian regions, expanded public transit, and energy-efficiency programs for buildings, trucking, and businesses could be substantive enough to achieve the remaining reductions needed to meet the U.S. Paris pledge commitment. To name a few examples, California, which has already cut carbon emissions by over 60 MMT since 2005 even as the state’s economy grew 41 percent, is accelerating its push for renewable energy, which is expected to reach 50 percent by 2020, ten years ahead of schedule. New York City is working on a plan to reduce emissions by 10 MMT by 2030; the plan includes a 20 percent drop in energy use for buildings and increased use of battery storage. The popularity of 100 percent renewable energy state mandates is growing.  Washington state is the latest U.S. state to announce a more comprehensive clean energy program. Moreover, a recent scientific paper also postulates that as much as 21% of annual U.S. carbon emissions could be offset via comprehensive natural climate solutions such as reforestation and restoration of grasslands, wetlands and seagrass, as well as other methods, such as use of biochar, improved management of plantations, cover crops, and manure management. Policies like these being considered around the country could approach the 600 MMT needed to stay in Paris, if the political signal of a national program were to create momentum. Revisiting Federal Energy and Environmental Policies That Benefit U.S. Competitiveness The Congress could choose to supplement the tender plan with other policies that would reduce emissions without undermining U.S. competitiveness and jobs. For example, Congress should revisit the Trump administration’s rollbacks of regulations on fugitive oil and gas methane emissions. While some oil-sector representatives argue that methane leakage regulations harm the industry, the opposite is true: implementation of these standards in California, Colorado, and Wyoming have spurred new technologies, jobs, and exportable U.S. products and services. Many large U.S. oil and gas producers have already pledged to address methane leakage from their operations. Using new monitoring and capture technologies to reduce methane leakage is vital to ensure that U.S. energy exports meet the future requirements of global investors and customers in Asia and Europe, who are increasingly focused on the relative carbon content of their fuels, as well as carbon pricing and other carbon-related regulations. Other countries would also purchase these new technologies to reduce methane leakage in their own industries. Revisiting U.S. rules for fugitive emissions could contribute up to 100 MMT of CDE of additional reductions of methane and other volatile organic compound emissions toward the Paris pledge. Congress should press the Trump administration to reconsider its approach to California’s stricter vehicle emissions standards by passing its own new bill to promote the manufacturing of advanced clean vehicles in the United States to meet competition from China. California’s policy to implement additional greenhouse gas emissions standards for automobiles from 2023 to 2025 is in limbo after the EPA proposed reversing an Obama-era executive order to align federal rules with these specific California vehicle carbon emissions restrictions. The proposed reversal would not affect greenhouse gas reductions that will come from congressionally mandated federal corporate average automobile efficiency standards that remain in effect. Still, a Trump administration decision to sue California to block these 2023–2025 greenhouse gas emissions vehicle standards, if implemented, would decrease the likelihood that the United States will set global standards for the next generation of vehicles. The aggressive California policy was a lever to press American carmakers to produce more electric and advanced vehicles. The U.S. Congress should revisit this topic. China has said it may ban sales of traditional internal combustion engine cars by 2040; France and the United Kingdom have already announced similar bans. Higher standards push U.S. carmakers to produce non-gasoline vehicles as fast as possible. U.S. cars need to remain competitive, which means retaining or strengthening current automobile standards, not weakening them. Capping the growth of U.S. domestic motor fuel use by improving automobile standards is a key lever that allows the United States to become a larger net energy exporter, thereby reducing the U.S. trade deficit. Congress should also consider improving fuel economy for U.S. trucks. Such a policy would enhance U.S. supply-chain competitiveness. Conclusion The national tender approach would allow the United States to remain in the Paris Agreement and continue a leadership role in climate negotiations that was allowing the United States to promote its global economic dominance in energy and automotive technologies. The United States needs to have a voice in the process to protect exports from border tariffs or taxes on greenhouse gas emissions embedded in U.S. goods and services. Under the Paris terms, the United States has until 2020 before a final decision can be implemented. Remaining in the agreement through a national tender would be a win-win scenario: it would allow unified verification for those states and municipalities that adopt climate-friendly policies, while those that do not choose to act on climate change would still gain all the trade and economic benefits of staying within the Paris accord, for the good of the United States as a whole. Remaining in the agreement is particularly important in light of a recent scientific report that suggests that the speed and scale of the direct consequences of global warming are more dire than previously thought.
  • Iran
    What Effects Will Tighter U.S. Sanctions on Iran’s Oil Have?
    With significant risks now looming over global energy markets, the United States should be careful in evaluating any future oil sanctions, Amy Myers Jaffe writes in the following Q & A which first appeared on CFR.org.  Oil prices ticked up a few percentage points after the announcement. Do you expect prices to remain higher, or is there enough supply in the market to cover a drop in Iranian exports? U.S. sanctions had already curbed Iran’s oil production substantially earlier this year. The Trump administration’s tough stand on waivers could remove an additional five hundred thousand barrels per day or more from the market in the coming weeks. This would come on top of production cuts planned by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and ongoing production and export problems in Libya and Venezuela. Oil prices will continue to be sensitive to any supply disruptions, despite expectations of rising U.S. oil production and possible production increases from Saudi Arabia. Should prices begin to rise precipitously, the Trump administration could make sales from the United States’ strategic petroleum reserve. How has the United States’ growing role as a major crude oil exporter changed its attitudes when it comes to sanctions?  There is no question that rising U.S. oil production has emboldened U.S. policy regarding oil sanctions. U.S. crude oil exports reached record levels, above 2.5 million barrels per day, in recent weeks and are expected to rise further this year. However, the administration should take care not to impose too many complex sanctions in the oil market at once because surprise events such as hurricanes, accidents at major oil fields, or geopolitical strife can create sudden disruptions in oil supplies and leave markets more vulnerable to price spikes. U.S. crude oil production is still less than 12 percent of the total global crude oil supply. It can only go so far in hedging against the multiple risks now looming in the market. Iran has threatened to stop the flow of oil from other big suppliers via the Strait of Hormuz. Could it do that? How exposed is the U.S. economy to oil disruptions in the Middle East? The Strait of Hormuz is more than twenty miles wide. It would be extremely difficult for Iran to close it completely for an extended period of time. There is the question of whether Iran could use asymmetric warfare tactics, such as swarming speedboats and missile attacks, but the possibility of a decisive international military response led by the United States makes such an endeavor extremely risky for Iran and its military. Iran would likely use more clandestine approaches, such as cyberattacks on neighboring state oil facilities. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have alternative pipeline routes that can bypass the Strait of Hormuz. In the case of Saudi Arabia, upward of 6.5 million barrels per day in exports could bypass the Persian Gulf. The U.S. economy is less exposed now to oil price shocks than in past decades due to the lower oil intensity of the U.S. economy. Still, high gasoline prices can derail consumer spending, especially on durable goods such as cars. At the same time, an oil price shock in the developing world could cut into countries’ appetites for U.S. goods and services. China is the largest purchaser of Iranian crude. How do you expect it to respond to the Trump administration’s decision? China said that Iran’s discounted oil was too cheap to pass up, and it has been increasing its purchases of Iranian crude in 2019, reaching over seven hundred thousand barrels per day this month. In the past, China attempted to circumvent these sanctions by purchasing Iranian crude on a barter basis or by promising to pay Tehran once sanctions are lifted. In the end, the United States and China have many bilateral issues of greater salience, so both sides will be reluctant to fight over Iran policy. What will this additional pressure on Iran achieve? Iran has little incentive at this point to negotiate with the Trump administration so close to the U.S. presidential election cycle. Iran has a policy it calls strategic patience, which is simply waiting to see if a new administration might reinstate the Iran nuclear agreement or take a less aggressive posture. The International Atomic Energy Agency maintains that Iran has continued to comply with nuclear inspections set up by the deal, which is still being honored by European signatories.