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Development Channel

The Development Channel highlights big debates, promising approaches, and new research and thinkers addressing opportunity and exclusion in the global economy.

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Mossack Fonseca law firm sign is pictured in Panama City, April 4, 2016.
Mossack Fonseca law firm sign is pictured in Panama City, April 4, 2016. Carlos Jasso/Reuters

Corruption Brief Series: How Anonymous Shell Companies Finance Insurgents, Criminals, and Dictators

The latest paper in the Corruption Brief series from the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy program at the Council on Foreign Relations was published this month. In the brief, Dr. Jodi Vittori, senior policy advisor at Global Witness, addresses the myriad problems posed by anonymous shell companies – corporate entities with few or no employees and no substantive business, which offer a convenient way to privately move money through the international financial system.

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Americas
The Long Arm of U.S. Law and Latin America’s Corruption Malaise
Latin America’s corruption scandals of the past two years are moving slowly toward resolution. As they move forward, it is interesting to note that in a region that has been particularly protective of its sovereignty, foreign cooperation has played a significant role, whether it is via bilateral exchanges between prosecutors, mutual legal assistance treaties, or even United Nations support, as in the case of Guatemala’s International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG). But these various forms of international cooperation may soon be joined by another international anti-corruption effort that is less well understood in Latin America: prosecution by U.S. attorneys. The Petrobras scandal has so far touched down in Argentina, Peru, Panama, Brazil, and the United States, making it a truly hemispheric corruption case. I was therefore taken aback when a well-informed colleague from the region suggested to me that in his view, the United States would never prosecute Petrobras, because doing so might harm U.S. foreign policy interests. In reflecting on this remark later, I think that he meant that a U.S. government that seems to be trying hard to mend fences in the region would be loathe to be seen as violating national sovereignty or acting in ways that could cast the United States in the familiar role of an avaricious exploiter of Latin American resources. This perspective has deep roots. Brazilian academics have argued that the United States seeks to limit Brazil’s energy self-sufficiency as part of its broader geopolitical strategy of hegemony. A Brazilian senator echoed this perspective in floor debate last week, noting that, having weakened Petrobras, investors were now seeking a reduced role for the oil company that would hand “the future of Brazil to Shell.” Meanwhile, other prominent Brazilian politicians have shown little understanding of the independence of their own national prosecutorial office, and therefore may not be ready to accept that the discretion of U.S. prosecutors is also significant, even when foreign policy is on the line. Domestic legal calculations also play a role: Brazilian prosecutors, for example, have been very careful to paint Petrobras as a victim rather than a target. There are many reasons for this prosecutorial caution: there is doubt about the culpability of many of the firm’s directors, Brazil’s Clean Company Law is new and untested, and there are a variety of more attractive targets for prosecution. Furthermore, there may well be trepidation about the political costs of taking down the the crown jewel of Brazil’s state-owned companies: most Brazilians are up in arms that Petrobras has been so violated by graft and gross mismanagement, but they understandably do not want to see it further damaged. On the U.S. side, however, the big question is not really whether U.S. prosecutors are going to prosecute wrongdoing, but when. Given the sharp drop in Petrobras’ market capitalization—from a high of $380 billion to $23 billion today—the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may have little option, given that its mandate is to curb behaviors that cause damage to shareholders and stock market integrity. Already, Petrobras has taken a write-down of more than $17 billion for overvalued assets, including $2 billion associated with corrupt acts, and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC have announced investigations. News reports suggest that Petrobras could be the target of the largest ever penalties ever levied by U.S. authorities in a corporate corruption investigation, exceeding the record-breaking $800 million paid by Siemens in its 2008 agreement with the DOJ and SEC. If such fines came to pass, they would have a shocking effect on a Brazilian public already reeling from more than their fair share of bad news. A former Brazilian Supreme Court justice predicted that for those who are unaware that it is coming down the pike, a U.S. prosecution will be a “humiliation and a devastation.” U.S. prosecutors will also be keen to understand kickbacks and corruption that may have taken place on U.S. soil, as in possibly fraudulent refinery purchases, or that might have passed through U.S. banks via offshore accounts in Panama or Switzerland, as Brazilian investigators allege. There are a variety of potential avenues for enforcement, ranging from SEC administrative sanctions through a full prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), made possible because Petrobras is publicly listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and made more likely by the DOJ’s recent efforts to ramp up FCPA prosecutions. Prosecutions could be led by state prosecutors, the DOJ, by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, whose office has been aggressive in prosecuting violations of corporate malfeasance, or by some combination of all of these autonomous actors. Potential oversight bodies could also include an alphabet soup of agencies involved in asset forfeiture and money laundering, in the DOJ and U.S. Department of Treasury, as well as state governments. And of course, Petrobras is already facing civil litigation in the United States, as well as the legal costs associated with nearly 300 foreign business partners who are also potential targets of investigation. In sum, the international dimension of Latin America’s corruption saga is only just getting underway. Legal action by the United States may not be greeted with acclaim across the Brazilian political spectrum, but together with Brazil’s enthusiastic prosecution of the case, it brings the hope that the regional compliance environment may change for the better.
Development
This Week in Markets and Democracy: Central America’s Anticorruption Support, UNDP at Fifty, Foreign Bribery Action
Central America’s Anticorruption Support The presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were in Washington to discuss plans for the $750 million that Congress authorized to help their nations take on violence and boost economic development. The outlay comes in the wake of a record uptick in Central American migration to the United States. Nearly 3 million people have fled their homes and neighborhoods, including 100,000 unaccompanied minors who arrived at the southern border between October 2013 and July 2015. The U.S. funding requires Northern Triangle governments to address myriad domestic problems, including strengthening legal systems, protecting human rights, and rooting out corruption. U.S. anticorruption efforts will be met with broad civil society and multilateral support, dovetailing with grassroots campaigns against graft and high-level impunity in Honduras and Guatemala, and furthering the resolve of multilateral-backed bodies such as Honduras’s new Mission Against Corruption and Impunity (MACCIH). The UNDP at Fifty The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the multilateral’s agency dedicated to reducing poverty and inequality, turned fifty on Wednesday. Since its founding, the number of poor dropped from one in three to one in eight people globally. UNDP helped spur these positive changes through its work in 170 countries and by rallying members to make ambitious commitments through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). But development aid is changing. Though worldwide government spending reached a $134.7 billion peak in 2013, it is far short of the UN’s 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) target, with a rich-country average closer to 0.39 percent. And Western governments are increasingly turning their attention and dollars to security assistance. The OECD recently widened the definition of aid to include military spending in fragile countries, and the United States is allocating more foreign assistance to programs such as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). UNDP and other believers in traditional economic and social development worry this shift will not only slow, but undermine decades of gains. Foreign Bribery Actions Up Though only settling two Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases last year, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is ramping up foreign corruption prosecutions. Dedicated staff will rise by 50 percent from nineteen to twenty-nine prosecutors this year, and an assistant attorney general recently announced many pending cases. Meanwhile, foreign authorities are also upping their actions. The UK just convicted its first corporation under the five-year old Bribery Act, finding Sweett Group guilty of paying bribes to secure construction contracts in the UAE. The $3.3 million fine follows a $25.2 million settlement with the British outpost of South Africa’s Standard Bank last December for illegal payments in a Tanzanian infrastructure project. The UK law goes even further than the FCPA in scope, holding companies accountable not just for giving or taking bribes, but also for failing to prevent bribes, as Sweett Group discovered.  
Americas
This Week in Markets and Democracy: Mexico’s Anticorruption Pressure, Ukraine’s Stalled Reforms, and U.S. Acts on Forced Labor
Pressure for Mexican Action on Corruption During a five-day visit to Mexico, Pope Francis repeatedly denounced corruption, decrying the “path of privileges or benefits for a few to the detriment of the good of all.” His message coincides with a strong push by civil society groups to change the status quo. Many are monitoring Congress to ensure it meets a May deadline for secondary legislation to get the National Anticorruption System, signed last year by President Peña Nieto, working. Others are behind the Ley3de3 campaign, which would introduce legislation that defines official corruption and conflicts of interest, and increases the ability to prosecute and convict perpetrators. Coalescing around a social media campaign, active business involvement, academic backing, and even a nod from the pope, the movement needs 100,000 signatures; they hope to collect many times that. Then the question will be whether politicians will tie their own hands. Patience Fades over Ukraine’s Stalled Reforms Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko passed anticorruption legislation as a growing political crisis threatened international aid. Two prominent reformers—the finance minister and number-two prosecutor—resigned in protest against corruption. They claim Poroshenko’s administration is sabotaging investigations and enabling political cronies. Western forbearance faded too. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned it would stop disbursing funds from a $40 billion package without drastic changes. The United States also threatened to cut $190 million in aid. Yet, without significant outside aid and pressure, a needed overhaul of Ukraine’s corrupt judicial system and Poroshenko’s oligarchic government is unlikely. Can the United States Keep Out Forced Labor Products? A recently-passed U.S. trade bill closes an arcane trade loophole that abetted global labor rights abuses. It will overturn a Depression-era tariff amendment that allowed imports of goods produced by slave or child labor if the United States could not otherwise meet demand. This change could affect Brazilian-grown cotton, Thai-caught fish, shoes manufactured in Bangladesh, and 350 other items that the U.S. Department of Labor warns forced or child workers sometimes make. But the challenge for customs agents is determining which cotton, coffee, tea, rice, rubber, or brick imports are “clean” when the multinationals themselves often fail.  
  • China
    This Week in Markets and Democracy: India’s Growth, U.S. Development Seeks Private Investment, and Ugandan Elections
    Can India Avoid Emerging Market Slump? India outpaced China as the world’s fastest growing economy in 2015, with gross domestic product (GDP) rising 7.5 percent. Consumption by the nation’s 1.3 billion citizens drove the gains, along with public infrastructure spending to upgrade the nation’s roads, railways, ports, and power grids. India’s government is on track to spend over a trillion dollars on infrastructure as part of a 2012-2017 five year plan, as one of the emerging markets able to borrow at low international rates (debt to GDP is for now a manageable 50 percent). Yet private sector investment hasn’t followed suit. Bureaucratic difficulties in acquiring land and permits and financing snafus show how difficult it is to do business – India is ranked 130 of 189 in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report. A tough external environment led to a decline in exports and an outflow of portfolio investments. To attract the private investment needed for long term growth, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will have to tackle issues including labor regulations, taxes, and onerous import and export documentation. U.S. Development Seeks Private Investment President Obama asked for $23 billion for development projects in the 2017 budget–roughly one half of a percent of the proposed $4 trillion in spending. A good portion of this amount focuses on stimulating private investment, for instance backing loans and providing guarantees to private companies investing in Sub-Saharan Africa’s power grid through the Power Africa program or funding  Overseas Private Investment Corporation’s (OPIC) development loans. Market trends may undercut this ongoing turn to private capital flows to lead development goals: last year over $700 billion fled emerging markets. Familiar Result in Ugandan Elections Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni looks to extend his thirty year presidential reign in next week’s election. The campaign has been marred by political intimidation, opposition arrests, and press censorship. In the face of threats of violence and even lethal force against potential protests, many young voters–those hit hardest by poverty and unemployment–are responding virtually, galvanizing support through the hasthtag #IChoosePeaceUG. But the United States may remain silent, as Museveni remains a long-standing if flawed ally in this unstable region.
  • India
    Five Questions on Evaluating Progress to End Poverty with Dean Karlan
    This post features a conversation with Dean Karlan, professor of economics at Yale University, president and founder of Innovations for Poverty Action, and founder of ImpactMatters, a newly-launched organization that assesses how well nonprofits use and produce evidence of impact. 1) How have development economics and the study of poverty evolved in recent years? Until about fifteen years ago, there were two different strands of development work, both with limitations. The first asked a big, monolithic policy question—“does aid work?—and compared how aid affected development outcomes across countries. But the cross-country research lacked the necessary data and an understanding of critical micro-level mechanisms, or the obvious first step of why some countries get more aid than others. It led to big debates, but failed to determine causality. The other strand in academia focused on understanding markets and decision-making at the individual and household-level, an approach that was valuable for understanding the world, but was often fairly removed from policy implications. Then, we saw major shifts with the availability of cheaper and better data, and intensified pressure on development economists to deliver policy prescriptions. These shifts allowed us to rigorously evaluate specific projects to find out what was working, what was not, and what to do about it. Perhaps as a byproduct of the cross-country data debate, development economists started focusing on asking when aid works, not whether aid works. The point being: there is no simple answer. This led to a blossoming of work using randomized control trials (RCTs) to test specific policies on the ground with NGOs, the private sector, and governments. We also began to see academic analysis that was more prescriptive than descriptive, and could help to guide policy.   2) In your randomized control trials (RCTs), what were some surprising findings about what’s working and what’s not? Several hot development debates have led to surprises. But, of course, since these were “hot debates,” some were surprised while others were not. Microcredit is a perfect example. Some oversold microcredit as the tool to fight poverty and to increase income for the world’s poorest, benefiting low-income households, which would ultimately lead to better healthcare and education. On the other side, critics claimed that it led to negative outcomes, such as suicides among poor farmers who could not repay loans. Despite anecdotal evidence, there was equally bad analysis on both sides and neither could establish causality, or prove what would have happened if people had not received the loans. There was no counterfactual, as economists call it. Wading into the debate using evidence, we saw strikingly similar results from seven RCTs across seven countries, several of them conducted by researchers with Innovations for Poverty Action. The punchline: microcredit loans were not typically reaching world’s poorest, and they were not increasing income on average. So, they were not meeting their main goal (though they were not causing much harm either). Once we saw the evidence, we said: “we’re a fan of microcredit, but as it’s currently done, it’s best for private investors, not for donors.” Donors should either look elsewhere or use their charitable dollars to push for more innovation, to figure out how to improve the microcredit model.   3) So what is an effective investment for donors? After we found that microcredit is not reaching the world’s poorest, donors asked us: what might? Through RCTs we found one approach that works quite well to move people out of poverty: a graduation program. At its core is the transfer of a “productive asset”—a way to make a living that has a positive impact on household consumption, savings, income, food security, and other life outcomes even years after the initial asset transfer. We have completed six RCTs on graduation programs in six countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru). Other researchers completed a seventh in Bangladesh, and there are several similar studies from Uganda. The program first gave the asset, along with training on how to use it. We also set up a savings account, provided healthcare access, offered life coaching, and supplied food for up to six months (so recipients wouldn’t be forced to kill and eat livestock right away). Because graduation programs are expensive, at around $1,000 per person, our research focused on cost effectiveness. We had no doubt the program would create a bump in income, but would it last? In six of the seven RCTs we found strikingly similar results proving both cost effectiveness and a sustained impact—up to three years after assets were transferred in all of our RCT sites. In one of the sites, India, where we now have seven years of results, the effects are getting bigger over time rather than dissipating. This trend suggests that those in the graduation program were previously stuck in a poverty trap, and that a holistic and integrated approach combining income with social and economic support helped to get them out of it.   4) What have you found on cash transfers, another area of growing interest and investment? The most prominent study Innovations for Poverty Action did on unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) was with GiveDirectly, a nonprofit that does exactly what it says. They donate 91 cents of every dollar to poor households using mobile money for the transfers, which makes for a low-cost, lean operation. People critical of this approach at first were concerned that money would be used for alcohol and tobacco, rather than for food and other necessities. We said, “let’s go get the facts,” and set up a carefully-designed study. Our randomized evaluation found that households receiving cash transfers spent them on food, education, and medical expenses, as well as on family obligations, resulting in higher assets and better psychological well-being. There was no increase on alcohol and tobacco spending. Yet even with evidence of positive outcomes, we are seeing that cash transfers work best for short-run problems—catastrophes or conflicts where the challenge is not long-term development. They work best for helping people in a moment of need.   5) What do you say to RCT critics who argue they are too expensive, or take too long? First, it is critical to note that randomization is not the reason RCTs can be expensive (and I’ll explain why they are not always). Costs are driven by tracking and surveying people over time to see if the program affected lives, which is necessary even for non-randomized studies. While RCTs are more expensive than simple studies that ask beneficiaries—“were you happy with the program?”—I would argue that overall they are far cheaper than non-RCT evaluations, because they allow us to zoom in on what is working and what is not much faster and more accurately, ultimately saving money on bad measurement and ineffective programs. RCTs allow the testing of multiple versions of a program at once, too. For example, in Uganda we tested four variations of a classroom savings program, and found that three that did not work, but one did. The variations shed insight into why the program was working. Regarding timing, it is also critical to point out that an RCT need not be a long-term study, nor does it need to be expensive. We have done cheap, rapid-fire tests on getting people to save more by sending text messages reminding them to save, and a few months later, comparing savings rates for those that received the messages versus those that did not. Many operational questions, such as how to enroll people in a program, can and should be rapid-fire studies to give immediate feedback that improves operations. For example, MIT’s Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab just released a toolkit that helps organizations run RCTs through data they may already be collecting. Full, long-term RCTs aren’t always appropriate. But when they are, getting good data that both establishes causality and illuminates why something works can put programs on the right track to maximize impact, and save money in the long run.